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From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
With grsecurity-2.2.2-2.6.32.38-201104171745, the functions pax_report_leak_to_user and
pax_report_overflow_from_user in fs/exec.c were consolidated into pax_report_usercopy.
This patch has been updated to reflect that change.
--
From: Jory Pratt <anarchy@gentoo.org>
Updated patch for kernel 2.6.32
The credits/description from the original version of this patch remain accurate
and are included below.
--
From: Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
Allow PaX options to be selected without first selecting CONFIG_GRKERNSEC.
This patch has been updated to keep current with newer kernel versions.
The original version of this patch contained no credits/description.
diff -Naur a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c 2011-04-17 19:05:03.000000000 -0400
+++ a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c 2011-04-17 19:20:30.000000000 -0400
@@ -651,10 +651,12 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < init_mm.end_code) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
if (current->signal->curr_ip)
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
¤t->signal->curr_ip, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
else
+#endif
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
}
diff -Naur a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
--- a/fs/exec.c 2011-04-17 19:05:03.000000000 -0400
+++ b/fs/exec.c 2011-04-17 19:20:30.000000000 -0400
@@ -2003,9 +2003,11 @@
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
if (tsk->signal->curr_ip)
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", &tsk->signal->curr_ip, path_fault, start, end, offset);
else
+#endif
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
"PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
@@ -2020,10 +2022,12 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_REFCOUNT
void pax_report_refcount_overflow(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
if (current->signal->curr_ip)
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: refcount overflow detected in: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
¤t->signal->curr_ip, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
else
+#endif
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: refcount overflow detected in: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
print_symbol(KERN_ERR "PAX: refcount overflow occured at: %s\n", instruction_pointer(regs));
@@ -2082,10 +2086,12 @@
NORET_TYPE void pax_report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len, bool to, const char *type)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
if (current->signal->curr_ip)
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
¤t->signal->curr_ip, to ? "leak" : "overwrite", to ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
else
+#endif
printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
to ? "leak" : "overwrite", to ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
dump_stack();
diff -Naur a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
--- a/security/Kconfig 2011-04-17 19:05:03.000000000 -0400
+++ b/security/Kconfig 2011-04-17 19:20:30.000000000 -0400
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
config PAX
bool "Enable various PaX features"
- depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS || PARISC || PPC || SPARC || X86)
+ depends on (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS || PARISC || PPC || SPARC || X86)
help
This allows you to enable various PaX features. PaX adds
intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
|