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| author |   Mike Pagano <mpagano@gentoo.org> | 2022-03-11 06:30:48 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mike Pagano <mpagano@gentoo.org> | 2022-03-11 06:30:48 -0500 |
| commit | 549c51ef7f24622f906ad3941b9dcea359ada5e1 (patch) | |
| tree | f2de7b803f3f7fb06ea4256214d043dafb4cfde4 | |
| parent | Linux patch 5.10.104 (diff) | |
| download | linux-patches-549c51ef7f24622f906ad3941b9dcea359ada5e1.tar.gz linux-patches-549c51ef7f24622f906ad3941b9dcea359ada5e1.tar.bz2 linux-patches-549c51ef7f24622f906ad3941b9dcea359ada5e1.zip | |
Signed-off-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano@gentoo.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | 0000_README | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1104_linux-5.10.105.patch | 3857 |
2 files changed, 3861 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/0000_README b/0000_README index f4f4b91a..6fbdd908 100644 --- a/0000_README +++ b/0000_README @@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ Patch: 1103_linux-5.10.104.patch From: http://www.kernel.org Desc: Linux 5.10.104 +Patch: 1104_linux-5.10.105.patch +From: http://www.kernel.org +Desc: Linux 5.10.105 + Patch: 1500_XATTR_USER_PREFIX.patch From: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=470644 Desc: Support for namespace user.pax.* on tmpfs. diff --git a/1104_linux-5.10.105.patch b/1104_linux-5.10.105.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa2a1fc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/1104_linux-5.10.105.patch @@ -0,0 +1,3857 @@ +diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +index 985181dba0bac..6bd97cd50d625 100644 +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution. + Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of + conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative + execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory. +-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` +-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`. ++See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>` ++:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`. + + Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass) + --------------------------------------- +@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the + speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the + victim's data. + ++Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the ++Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch ++to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't ++associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically, ++the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of ++Enhanced IBRS. ++ ++Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via ++unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable ++unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines). ++For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use ++retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines). ++ + Attack scenarios + ---------------- + +@@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are: + + - Kernel status: + +- ==================================== ================================= +- 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable +- 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation +- 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation +- 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation +- 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation +- ==================================== ================================= ++ ======================================== ================================= ++ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable ++ 'Mitigation: None' Vulnerable, no mitigation ++ 'Mitigation: Retpolines' Use Retpoline thunks ++ 'Mitigation: LFENCE' Use LFENCE instructions ++ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation ++ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines' Hardware-focused + Retpolines ++ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE' Hardware-focused + LFENCE ++ ======================================== ================================= + + - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is + used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only). +@@ -584,12 +599,13 @@ kernel command line. + + Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: + +- retpoline +- replace indirect branches +- retpoline,generic +- google's original retpoline +- retpoline,amd +- AMD-specific minimal thunk ++ retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence ++ retpoline,generic Retpolines ++ retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch ++ retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence ++ eibrs enhanced IBRS ++ eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines ++ eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2=auto. +@@ -730,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers: + + .. _spec_ref6: + +-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_. ++[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_. + + ARM white papers: + +diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +index d00618967854d..611172f68bb57 100644 +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -4957,8 +4957,12 @@ + Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: + + retpoline - replace indirect branches +- retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline +- retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk ++ retpoline,generic - Retpolines ++ retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch ++ retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence ++ eibrs - enhanced IBRS ++ eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines ++ eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2=auto. +diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst +index 328e0c454fbd4..749ae970c3195 100644 +--- a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst ++++ b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst +@@ -235,7 +235,15 @@ infrastructure: + | DPB | [3-0] | y | + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ + +- 6) ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 - Memory model feature register 2 ++ 6) ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 - Memory model feature register 0 ++ ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ | Name | bits | visible | ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ | ECV | [63-60] | y | ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ ++ 7) ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 - Memory model feature register 2 + + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ + | Name | bits | visible | +@@ -243,7 +251,7 @@ infrastructure: + | AT | [35-32] | y | + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ + +- 7) ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 - SVE feature ID register 0 ++ 8) ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 - SVE feature ID register 0 + + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ + | Name | bits | visible | +@@ -267,6 +275,23 @@ infrastructure: + | SVEVer | [3-0] | y | + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ + ++ 8) ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1 - Memory model feature register 1 ++ ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ | Name | bits | visible | ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ | AFP | [47-44] | y | ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ ++ 9) ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 - Instruction set attribute register 2 ++ ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ | Name | bits | visible | ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ | RPRES | [7-4] | y | ++ +------------------------------+---------+---------+ ++ ++ + Appendix I: Example + ------------------- + +diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst +index bbd9cf54db6c7..e88d245d426da 100644 +--- a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst ++++ b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst +@@ -245,6 +245,18 @@ HWCAP2_MTE + Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.MTE == 0b0010, as described + by Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst. + ++HWCAP2_ECV ++ ++ Functionality implied by ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1.ECV == 0b0001. ++ ++HWCAP2_AFP ++ ++ Functionality implied by ID_AA64MFR1_EL1.AFP == 0b0001. ++ ++HWCAP2_RPRES ++ ++ Functionality implied by ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.RPRES == 0b0001. ++ + 4. Unused AT_HWCAP bits + ----------------------- + +diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile +index 6e6efe5516872..ea665736db040 100644 +--- a/Makefile ++++ b/Makefile +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + VERSION = 5 + PATCHLEVEL = 10 +-SUBLEVEL = 104 ++SUBLEVEL = 105 + EXTRAVERSION = + NAME = Dare mighty things + +diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +index 72627c5fb3b2c..24a1f498b3b5f 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h ++++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +@@ -107,6 +107,16 @@ + .endm + #endif + ++#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 7 ++ .macro dsb, args ++ mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c10, 4 ++ .endm ++ ++ .macro isb, args ++ mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 4 ++ .endm ++#endif ++ + .macro asm_trace_hardirqs_off, save=1 + #if defined(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS) + .if \save +diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..d1fa5607d3aa3 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h +@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ ++ ++#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H ++#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H ++ ++enum { ++ SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED, ++ SPECTRE_MITIGATED, ++ SPECTRE_VULNERABLE, ++}; ++ ++enum { ++ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL, ++ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU, ++ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC, ++ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC, ++ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8, ++}; ++ ++enum { ++ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL), ++ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU), ++ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC), ++ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC), ++ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8 = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8), ++}; ++ ++void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods); ++ ++int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method); ++ ++#endif +diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h +index 4a91428c324db..fad45c884e988 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h ++++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h +@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ + #define ARM_MMU_DISCARD(x) x + #endif + ++/* ++ * ld.lld does not support NOCROSSREFS: ++ * https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1609 ++ */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_LD_IS_LLD ++#define NOCROSSREFS ++#endif ++ ++/* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */ ++#define ARM_LMA(sym, section) \ ++ sym##_start = LOADADDR(section); \ ++ sym##_end = LOADADDR(section) + SIZEOF(section) ++ + #define PROC_INFO \ + . = ALIGN(4); \ + __proc_info_begin = .; \ +@@ -110,19 +123,31 @@ + * only thing that matters is their relative offsets + */ + #define ARM_VECTORS \ +- __vectors_start = .; \ +- .vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) { \ +- *(.vectors) \ ++ __vectors_lma = .; \ ++ OVERLAY 0xffff0000 : NOCROSSREFS AT(__vectors_lma) { \ ++ .vectors { \ ++ *(.vectors) \ ++ } \ ++ .vectors.bhb.loop8 { \ ++ *(.vectors.bhb.loop8) \ ++ } \ ++ .vectors.bhb.bpiall { \ ++ *(.vectors.bhb.bpiall) \ ++ } \ + } \ +- . = __vectors_start + SIZEOF(.vectors); \ +- __vectors_end = .; \ ++ ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors); \ ++ ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_loop8, .vectors.bhb.loop8); \ ++ ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_bpiall, .vectors.bhb.bpiall); \ ++ . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors) + \ ++ SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.loop8) + \ ++ SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.bpiall); \ + \ +- __stubs_start = .; \ +- .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_start) { \ ++ __stubs_lma = .; \ ++ .stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) { \ + *(.stubs) \ + } \ +- . = __stubs_start + SIZEOF(.stubs); \ +- __stubs_end = .; \ ++ ARM_LMA(__stubs, .stubs); \ ++ . = __stubs_lma + SIZEOF(.stubs); \ + \ + PROVIDE(vector_fiq_offset = vector_fiq - ADDR(.vectors)); + +diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile +index 89e5d864e9234..79588b5623532 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile ++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile +@@ -106,4 +106,6 @@ endif + + obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC) += smccc-call.o + ++obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += spectre.o ++ + extra-y := $(head-y) vmlinux.lds +diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S +index 63fbcdc97ded9..3cbd35c82a66c 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S ++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S +@@ -1005,12 +1005,11 @@ vector_\name: + sub lr, lr, #\correction + .endif + +- @ +- @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC) and spsr_<exception> +- @ (parent CPSR) +- @ ++ @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC) + stmia sp, {r0, lr} @ save r0, lr +- mrs lr, spsr ++ ++ @ Save spsr_<exception> (parent CPSR) ++2: mrs lr, spsr + str lr, [sp, #8] @ save spsr + + @ +@@ -1031,6 +1030,44 @@ vector_\name: + movs pc, lr @ branch to handler in SVC mode + ENDPROC(vector_\name) + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ .subsection 1 ++ .align 5 ++vector_bhb_loop8_\name: ++ .if \correction ++ sub lr, lr, #\correction ++ .endif ++ ++ @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC) ++ stmia sp, {r0, lr} ++ ++ @ bhb workaround ++ mov r0, #8 ++1: b . + 4 ++ subs r0, r0, #1 ++ bne 1b ++ dsb ++ isb ++ b 2b ++ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_\name) ++ ++vector_bhb_bpiall_\name: ++ .if \correction ++ sub lr, lr, #\correction ++ .endif ++ ++ @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC) ++ stmia sp, {r0, lr} ++ ++ @ bhb workaround ++ mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL ++ @ isb not needed due to "movs pc, lr" in the vector stub ++ @ which gives a "context synchronisation". ++ b 2b ++ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_\name) ++ .previous ++#endif ++ + .align 2 + @ handler addresses follow this label + 1: +@@ -1039,6 +1076,10 @@ ENDPROC(vector_\name) + .section .stubs, "ax", %progbits + @ This must be the first word + .word vector_swi ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ .word vector_bhb_loop8_swi ++ .word vector_bhb_bpiall_swi ++#endif + + vector_rst: + ARM( swi SYS_ERROR0 ) +@@ -1153,8 +1194,10 @@ vector_addrexcptn: + * FIQ "NMI" handler + *----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Handle a FIQ using the SVC stack allowing FIQ act like NMI on x86 +- * systems. ++ * systems. This must be the last vector stub, so lets place it in its own ++ * subsection. + */ ++ .subsection 2 + vector_stub fiq, FIQ_MODE, 4 + + .long __fiq_usr @ 0 (USR_26 / USR_32) +@@ -1187,6 +1230,30 @@ vector_addrexcptn: + W(b) vector_irq + W(b) vector_fiq + ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ .section .vectors.bhb.loop8, "ax", %progbits ++.L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start: ++ W(b) vector_rst ++ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_und ++ W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start + 0x1004 ++ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_pabt ++ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_dabt ++ W(b) vector_addrexcptn ++ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_irq ++ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_fiq ++ ++ .section .vectors.bhb.bpiall, "ax", %progbits ++.L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start: ++ W(b) vector_rst ++ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_und ++ W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start + 0x1008 ++ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_pabt ++ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_dabt ++ W(b) vector_addrexcptn ++ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_irq ++ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_fiq ++#endif ++ + .data + .align 2 + +diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +index 271cb8a1eba1e..bd619da73c84e 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S ++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +@@ -162,6 +162,29 @@ ENDPROC(ret_from_fork) + *----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + ++ .align 5 ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ENTRY(vector_bhb_loop8_swi) ++ sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE ++ stmia sp, {r0 - r12} ++ mov r8, #8 ++1: b 2f ++2: subs r8, r8, #1 ++ bne 1b ++ dsb ++ isb ++ b 3f ++ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_swi) ++ ++ .align 5 ++ENTRY(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi) ++ sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE ++ stmia sp, {r0 - r12} ++ mcr p15, 0, r8, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL ++ isb ++ b 3f ++ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi) ++#endif + .align 5 + ENTRY(vector_swi) + #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_V7M +@@ -169,6 +192,7 @@ ENTRY(vector_swi) + #else + sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE + stmia sp, {r0 - r12} @ Calling r0 - r12 ++3: + ARM( add r8, sp, #S_PC ) + ARM( stmdb r8, {sp, lr}^ ) @ Calling sp, lr + THUMB( mov r8, sp ) +diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..0dcefc36fb7a0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c +@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only ++#include <linux/bpf.h> ++#include <linux/cpu.h> ++#include <linux/device.h> ++ ++#include <asm/spectre.h> ++ ++static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL ++ return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; ++#else ++ return false; ++#endif ++} ++ ++ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, ++ char *buf) ++{ ++ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); ++} ++ ++static unsigned int spectre_v2_state; ++static unsigned int spectre_v2_methods; ++ ++void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int method) ++{ ++ if (state > spectre_v2_state) ++ spectre_v2_state = state; ++ spectre_v2_methods |= method; ++} ++ ++ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, ++ char *buf) ++{ ++ const char *method; ++ ++ if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) ++ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Not affected"); ++ ++ if (spectre_v2_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) ++ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Vulnerable"); ++ ++ if (_unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) ++ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n"); ++ ++ switch (spectre_v2_methods) { ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: ++ method = "Branch predictor hardening"; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU: ++ method = "I-cache invalidation"; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC: ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC: ++ method = "Firmware call"; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8: ++ method = "History overwrite"; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ method = "Multiple mitigations"; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s\n", method); ++} +diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +index 17d5a785df28b..2d9e72ad1b0f9 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c ++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ + #include <linux/atomic.h> + #include <asm/cacheflush.h> + #include <asm/exception.h> ++#include <asm/spectre.h> + #include <asm/unistd.h> + #include <asm/traps.h> + #include <asm/ptrace.h> +@@ -806,10 +807,59 @@ static inline void __init kuser_init(void *vectors) + } + #endif + ++#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M ++static void copy_from_lma(void *vma, void *lma_start, void *lma_end) ++{ ++ memcpy(vma, lma_start, lma_end - lma_start); ++} ++ ++static void flush_vectors(void *vma, size_t offset, size_t size) ++{ ++ unsigned long start = (unsigned long)vma + offset; ++ unsigned long end = start + size; ++ ++ flush_icache_range(start, end); ++} ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY ++int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method) ++{ ++ extern char __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start[], __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end[]; ++ extern char __vectors_bhb_loop8_start[], __vectors_bhb_loop8_end[]; ++ void *vec_start, *vec_end; ++ ++ if (system_state > SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) { ++ pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB workaround too late - system vulnerable\n", ++ smp_processor_id()); ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++ } ++ ++ switch (method) { ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8: ++ vec_start = __vectors_bhb_loop8_start; ++ vec_end = __vectors_bhb_loop8_end; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: ++ vec_start = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start; ++ vec_end = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ pr_err("CPU%u: unknown Spectre BHB state %d\n", ++ smp_processor_id(), method); ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++ } ++ ++ copy_from_lma(vectors_page, vec_start, vec_end); ++ flush_vectors(vectors_page, 0, vec_end - vec_start); ++ ++ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++} ++#endif ++ + void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base) + { +-#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M +- unsigned long vectors = (unsigned long)vectors_base; + extern char __stubs_start[], __stubs_end[]; + extern char __vectors_start[], __vectors_end[]; + unsigned i; +@@ -830,17 +880,20 @@ void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base) + * into the vector page, mapped at 0xffff0000, and ensure these + * are visible to the instruction stream. + */ +- memcpy((void *)vectors, __vectors_start, __vectors_end - __vectors_start); +- memcpy((void *)vectors + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end - __stubs_start); ++ copy_from_lma(vectors_base, __vectors_start, __vectors_end); ++ copy_from_lma(vectors_base + 0x1000, __stubs_start, __stubs_end); + + kuser_init(vectors_base); + +- flush_icache_range(vectors, vectors + PAGE_SIZE * 2); ++ flush_vectors(vectors_base, 0, PAGE_SIZE * 2); ++} + #else /* ifndef CONFIG_CPU_V7M */ ++void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base) ++{ + /* + * on V7-M there is no need to copy the vector table to a dedicated + * memory area. The address is configurable and so a table in the kernel + * image can be used. + */ +-#endif + } ++#endif +diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +index 423a97dd2f57c..c6bf34a33849c 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +@@ -833,6 +833,7 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE + + config CPU_SPECTRE + bool ++ select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES + + config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT +@@ -853,6 +854,16 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + + If unsure, say Y. + ++config HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ bool "Harden Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT ++ depends on CPU_SPECTRE ++ default y ++ help ++ Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can ++ make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When ++ taking an exception, a sequence of branches overwrites the branch ++ history, or branch history is invalidated. ++ + config TLS_REG_EMUL + bool + select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS +diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +index 114c05ab4dd91..06dbfb968182d 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c ++++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +@@ -6,8 +6,35 @@ + #include <asm/cp15.h> + #include <asm/cputype.h> + #include <asm/proc-fns.h> ++#include <asm/spectre.h> + #include <asm/system_misc.h> + ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI ++static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) ++{ ++ struct arm_smccc_res res; ++ ++ arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ++ ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); ++ ++ switch ((int)res.a0) { ++ case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: ++ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ ++ case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED: ++ return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; ++ ++ default: ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++ } ++} ++#else ++static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) ++{ ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++} ++#endif ++ + #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn); + +@@ -36,13 +63,61 @@ static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void) + arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL); + } + +-static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) ++static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) + { + const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL; + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + if (per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu)) +- return; ++ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ ++ switch (method) { ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: ++ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = ++ harden_branch_predictor_bpiall; ++ spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL"; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU: ++ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = ++ harden_branch_predictor_iciallu; ++ spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU"; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC: ++ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = ++ call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; ++ cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm; ++ spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor"; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC: ++ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = ++ call_smc_arch_workaround_1; ++ cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm; ++ spectre_v2_method = "firmware"; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (spectre_v2_method) ++ pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n", ++ smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method); ++ ++ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++} ++#else ++static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method) ++{ ++ pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n", ++ smp_processor_id()); ++ ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++} ++#endif ++ ++static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void) ++{ ++ unsigned int state, method = 0; + + switch (read_cpuid_part()) { + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A8: +@@ -51,69 +126,133 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17: + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73: + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75: +- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = +- harden_branch_predictor_bpiall; +- spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL"; ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL; + break; + + case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15: + case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15: +- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = +- harden_branch_predictor_iciallu; +- spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU"; ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU; + break; + +-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI + case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B53: + /* Requires no workaround */ ++ state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + break; ++ + default: + /* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */ +- if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) ++ if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) { ++ state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + break; ++ } ++ + fallthrough; +- /* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */ +- case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57: +- case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: { +- struct arm_smccc_res res; + +- arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, +- ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); +- if ((int)res.a0 != 0) +- return; ++ /* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */ ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57: ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: ++ state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); ++ if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) ++ break; + + switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) { + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC: +- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = +- call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; +- cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm; +- spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor"; ++ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC; + break; + + case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC: +- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) = +- call_smc_arch_workaround_1; +- cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm; +- spectre_v2_method = "firmware"; ++ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC; + break; + + default: ++ state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + break; + } + } +-#endif ++ ++ if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) ++ state = spectre_v2_install_workaround(method); ++ ++ spectre_v2_update_state(state, method); ++} ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY ++static int spectre_bhb_method; ++ ++static const char *spectre_bhb_method_name(int method) ++{ ++ switch (method) { ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8: ++ return "loop"; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL: ++ return "BPIALL"; ++ ++ default: ++ return "unknown"; + } ++} + +- if (spectre_v2_method) +- pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n", +- smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method); ++static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method) ++{ ++ if (spectre_bhb_method != method) { ++ if (spectre_bhb_method) { ++ pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: method disagreement, system vulnerable\n", ++ smp_processor_id()); ++ ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++ } ++ ++ if (spectre_bhb_update_vectors(method) == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++ ++ spectre_bhb_method = method; ++ } ++ ++ pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n", ++ smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method)); ++ ++ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + } + #else +-static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void) ++static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method) + { ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; + } + #endif + ++static void cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(void) ++{ ++ unsigned int state, method = 0; ++ ++ switch (read_cpuid_part()) { ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15: ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15: ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57: ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8; ++ break; ++ ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73: ++ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75: ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) ++ state = spectre_bhb_install_workaround(method); ++ ++ spectre_v2_update_state(state, method); ++} ++ + static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned, + u32 mask, const char *msg) + { +@@ -142,16 +281,17 @@ static bool check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit) + void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void) + { + if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6))) +- cpu_v7_spectre_init(); ++ cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(); + } + + void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void) + { + if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0))) +- cpu_v7_spectre_init(); ++ cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(); + } + + void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void) + { +- cpu_v7_spectre_init(); ++ cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(); ++ cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(); + } +diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig +index 3da71fe56b922..7c7906e9dafda 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig ++++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig +@@ -1184,6 +1184,15 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 + + If unsure, say Y. + ++config MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ bool "Mitigate Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT ++ default y ++ help ++ Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can ++ make use of branch history to influence future speculation. ++ When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches ++ or a firmware call overwrites the branch history. ++ + config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED + bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases" + default y +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +index ddbe6bf00e336..011e681a23366 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ + hint #20 + .endm + ++/* ++ * Clear Branch History instruction ++ */ ++ .macro clearbhb ++ hint #22 ++ .endm ++ + /* + * Speculation barrier + */ +@@ -795,4 +802,30 @@ USER(\label, ic ivau, \tmp2) // invalidate I line PoU + + #endif /* GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_DEFAULT */ + ++ .macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop tmp ++#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY ++alternative_cb spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter ++ mov \tmp, #32 // Patched to correct the immediate ++alternative_cb_end ++.Lspectre_bhb_loop\@: ++ b . + 4 ++ subs \tmp, \tmp, #1 ++ b.ne .Lspectre_bhb_loop\@ ++ sb ++#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ ++ .endm ++ ++ /* Save/restores x0-x3 to the stack */ ++ .macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_fw ++#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]! ++ stp x2, x3, [sp, #-16]! ++ mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 ++alternative_cb smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit ++ nop // Patched to SMC/HVC #0 ++alternative_cb_end ++ ldp x2, x3, [sp], #16 ++ ldp x0, x1, [sp], #16 ++#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ ++ .endm + #endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H */ +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h +index 7faae6ff3ab4d..24ed6643da266 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_arm64 { + u64 reg_id_aa64dfr1; + u64 reg_id_aa64isar0; + u64 reg_id_aa64isar1; ++ u64 reg_id_aa64isar2; + u64 reg_id_aa64mmfr0; + u64 reg_id_aa64mmfr1; + u64 reg_id_aa64mmfr2; +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +index e7d98997c09c3..f42fd0a2e81c8 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ + #define ARM64_HAS_TLB_RANGE 56 + #define ARM64_MTE 57 + #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1508412 58 ++#define ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB 59 + +-#define ARM64_NCAPS 59 ++#define ARM64_NCAPS 60 + + #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +index da250e4741bd7..423f9b40e4d95 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +@@ -606,6 +606,34 @@ static inline bool cpu_supports_mixed_endian_el0(void) + return id_aa64mmfr0_mixed_endian_el0(read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1)); + } + ++static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope) ++{ ++ u64 pfr0; ++ u8 csv2_val; ++ ++ if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) ++ pfr0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); ++ else ++ pfr0 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); ++ ++ csv2_val = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ++ ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); ++ return csv2_val == 3; ++} ++ ++static inline bool supports_clearbhb(int scope) ++{ ++ u64 isar2; ++ ++ if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) ++ isar2 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); ++ else ++ isar2 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); ++ ++ return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar2, ++ ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT); ++} ++ + static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void) + { + return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0); +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +index ef5b040dee44d..bfbf0c4c7c5e5 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ + #define ARM_CPU_IMP_NVIDIA 0x4E + #define ARM_CPU_IMP_FUJITSU 0x46 + #define ARM_CPU_IMP_HISI 0x48 ++#define ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE 0x61 + + #define ARM_CPU_PART_AEM_V8 0xD0F + #define ARM_CPU_PART_FOUNDATION 0xD00 +@@ -72,6 +73,14 @@ + #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 0xD0B + #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1 0xD0C + #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77 0xD0D ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1 0xD40 ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78 0xD41 ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1 0xD44 ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A510 0xD46 ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710 0xD47 ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2 0xD48 ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2 0xD49 ++#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C 0xD4B + + #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000 + +@@ -99,6 +108,9 @@ + + #define HISI_CPU_PART_TSV110 0xD01 + ++#define APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_ICESTORM 0x022 ++#define APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_FIRESTORM 0x023 ++ + #define MIDR_CORTEX_A53 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A53) + #define MIDR_CORTEX_A57 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57) + #define MIDR_CORTEX_A72 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72) +@@ -109,6 +121,14 @@ + #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76) + #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1) + #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77) ++#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1) ++#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78) ++#define MIDR_CORTEX_X1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1) ++#define MIDR_CORTEX_A510 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A510) ++#define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710) ++#define MIDR_CORTEX_X2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2) ++#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2) ++#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78C MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C) + #define MIDR_THUNDERX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX) + #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX) + #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX) +@@ -127,6 +147,8 @@ + #define MIDR_NVIDIA_CARMEL MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_NVIDIA, NVIDIA_CPU_PART_CARMEL) + #define MIDR_FUJITSU_A64FX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_FUJITSU, FUJITSU_CPU_PART_A64FX) + #define MIDR_HISI_TSV110 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_HISI, HISI_CPU_PART_TSV110) ++#define MIDR_APPLE_M1_ICESTORM MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE, APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_ICESTORM) ++#define MIDR_APPLE_M1_FIRESTORM MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_APPLE, APPLE_CPU_PART_M1_FIRESTORM) + + /* Fujitsu Erratum 010001 affects A64FX 1.0 and 1.1, (v0r0 and v1r0) */ + #define MIDR_FUJITSU_ERRATUM_010001 MIDR_FUJITSU_A64FX +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h +index 4335800201c97..daff882883f92 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h +@@ -62,9 +62,11 @@ enum fixed_addresses { + #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES */ + + #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ++ FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT3, ++ FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT2, ++ FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1, + FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA, +- FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT, +-#define TRAMP_VALIAS (__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT)) ++#define TRAMP_VALIAS (__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1)) + #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ + __end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses, + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h +index 9a5498c2c8eea..6422147ea612f 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h +@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ + #define KERNEL_HWCAP_RNG __khwcap2_feature(RNG) + #define KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI __khwcap2_feature(BTI) + #define KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE __khwcap2_feature(MTE) ++#define KERNEL_HWCAP_ECV __khwcap2_feature(ECV) ++#define KERNEL_HWCAP_AFP __khwcap2_feature(AFP) ++#define KERNEL_HWCAP_RPRES __khwcap2_feature(RPRES) + + /* + * This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h +index 4b39293d0f72d..d45b42295254d 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ enum aarch64_insn_hint_cr_op { + AARCH64_INSN_HINT_PSB = 0x11 << 5, + AARCH64_INSN_HINT_TSB = 0x12 << 5, + AARCH64_INSN_HINT_CSDB = 0x14 << 5, ++ AARCH64_INSN_HINT_CLEARBHB = 0x16 << 5, + + AARCH64_INSN_HINT_BTI = 0x20 << 5, + AARCH64_INSN_HINT_BTIC = 0x22 << 5, +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +index 044bb9e2cd74f..ada24a20a5671 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ + #define KVM_VECTOR_PREAMBLE (2 * AARCH64_INSN_SIZE) + + #define __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ 36 ++#define __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_3_SMC_SZ 36 ++#define __SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ 44 ++#define __SPECTRE_BHB_CLEARBHB_SZ 12 + + #define KVM_HOST_SMCCC_ID(id) \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ +@@ -199,6 +202,11 @@ extern void __vgic_v3_init_lrs(void); + extern u32 __kvm_get_mdcr_el2(void); + + extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc[__SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ]; ++extern char __smccc_workaround_3_smc[__SMCCC_WORKAROUND_3_SMC_SZ]; ++extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k8[__SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ]; ++extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24[__SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ]; ++extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32[__SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ]; ++extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb[__SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ]; + + /* + * Obtain the PC-relative address of a kernel symbol +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +index 331394306ccee..47dafd6ab3a30 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +@@ -237,7 +237,8 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void) + void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector)); + int slot = -1; + +- if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) { ++ if ((cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) || ++ cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB)) && data->template_start) { + vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)); + slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot; + } +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +index c7315862e2435..bc151b7dc042c 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +@@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void); + struct bp_hardening_data { + int hyp_vectors_slot; + bp_hardening_cb_t fn; ++ ++ /* ++ * template_start is only used by the BHB mitigation to identify the ++ * hyp_vectors_slot sequence. ++ */ ++ const char *template_start; + }; + + DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h +index 3994169985efc..6a45c26da46e3 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h +@@ -19,4 +19,9 @@ extern char __irqentry_text_start[], __irqentry_text_end[]; + extern char __mmuoff_data_start[], __mmuoff_data_end[]; + extern char __entry_tramp_text_start[], __entry_tramp_text_end[]; + ++static inline size_t entry_tramp_text_size(void) ++{ ++ return __entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start; ++} ++ + #endif /* __ASM_SECTIONS_H */ +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h +index fcdfbce302bdf..4b3a5f050f71f 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h +@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope); + void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); + void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk); + ++enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void); ++bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope); ++u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope); ++void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); + #endif /* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */ +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +index 801861d054268..1f2209ad2cca1 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ + + #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 0) + #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 1) ++#define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 2) + + #define SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 7, 0) + #define SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1 sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 7, 1) +@@ -687,6 +688,21 @@ + #define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI 0x0 + #define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1 + ++/* id_aa64isar2 */ ++#define ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT 28 ++#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT 4 ++#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SHIFT 0 ++ ++#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_8BIT 0x0 ++#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_12BIT 0x1 ++/* ++ * Value 0x1 has been removed from the architecture, and is ++ * reserved, but has not yet been removed from the ARM ARM ++ * as of ARM DDI 0487G.b. ++ */ ++#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_NI 0x0 ++#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SUPPORTED 0x2 ++ + /* id_aa64pfr0 */ + #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT 60 + #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT 56 +@@ -786,6 +802,8 @@ + #endif + + /* id_aa64mmfr1 */ ++#define ID_AA64MMFR1_ECBHB_SHIFT 60 ++#define ID_AA64MMFR1_AFP_SHIFT 44 + #define ID_AA64MMFR1_ETS_SHIFT 36 + #define ID_AA64MMFR1_TWED_SHIFT 32 + #define ID_AA64MMFR1_XNX_SHIFT 28 +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..f64613a96d530 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2022 ARM Ltd. ++ */ ++#ifndef __ASM_VECTORS_H ++#define __ASM_VECTORS_H ++ ++#include <linux/bug.h> ++#include <linux/percpu.h> ++ ++#include <asm/fixmap.h> ++ ++extern char vectors[]; ++extern char tramp_vectors[]; ++extern char __bp_harden_el1_vectors[]; ++ ++/* ++ * Note: the order of this enum corresponds to two arrays in entry.S: ++ * tramp_vecs and __bp_harden_el1_vectors. By default the canonical ++ * 'full fat' vectors are used directly. ++ */ ++enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { ++#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ /* ++ * Perform the BHB loop mitigation, before branching to the canonical ++ * vectors. ++ */ ++ EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP, ++ ++ /* ++ * Make the SMC call for firmware mitigation, before branching to the ++ * canonical vectors. ++ */ ++ EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW, ++ ++ /* ++ * Use the ClearBHB instruction, before branching to the canonical ++ * vectors. ++ */ ++ EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN, ++#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ ++ ++ /* ++ * Remap the kernel before branching to the canonical vectors. ++ */ ++ EL1_VECTOR_KPTI, ++}; ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY ++#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP -1 ++#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW -1 ++#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN -1 ++#endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ ++ ++/* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */ ++DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector); ++ ++#ifndef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ++#define TRAMP_VALIAS 0 ++#endif ++ ++static inline const char * ++arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot) ++{ ++ if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) ++ return (char *)TRAMP_VALIAS + SZ_2K * slot; ++ ++ WARN_ON_ONCE(slot == EL1_VECTOR_KPTI); ++ ++ return __bp_harden_el1_vectors + SZ_2K * slot; ++} ++ ++#endif /* __ASM_VECTORS_H */ +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +index b8f41aa234ee1..f03731847d9df 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +@@ -75,5 +75,8 @@ + #define HWCAP2_RNG (1 << 16) + #define HWCAP2_BTI (1 << 17) + #define HWCAP2_MTE (1 << 18) ++#define HWCAP2_ECV (1 << 19) ++#define HWCAP2_AFP (1 << 20) ++#define HWCAP2_RPRES (1 << 21) + + #endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */ +diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +index 1c17c3a24411d..531ff62e82e95 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h ++++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +@@ -273,6 +273,11 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_events { + #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED 3 + #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED (1U << 4) + ++#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(3) ++#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL 0 ++#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_AVAIL 1 ++#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_REQUIRED 2 ++ + /* SVE registers */ + #define KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE (0x15 << KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_SHIFT) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +index cafaf0da05b7c..533559c7d2b31 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +@@ -473,6 +473,13 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { + .matches = has_spectre_v4, + .cpu_enable = spectre_v4_enable_mitigation, + }, ++ { ++ .desc = "Spectre-BHB", ++ .capability = ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB, ++ .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, ++ .matches = is_spectre_bhb_affected, ++ .cpu_enable = spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation, ++ }, + #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1418040 + { + .desc = "ARM erratum 1418040", +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +index 5001c43ea6c33..c9108ed406458 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +@@ -65,11 +65,13 @@ + #include <linux/bsearch.h> + #include <linux/cpumask.h> + #include <linux/crash_dump.h> ++#include <linux/percpu.h> + #include <linux/sort.h> + #include <linux/stop_machine.h> + #include <linux/types.h> + #include <linux/mm.h> + #include <linux/cpu.h> ++ + #include <asm/cpu.h> + #include <asm/cpufeature.h> + #include <asm/cpu_ops.h> +@@ -79,6 +81,7 @@ + #include <asm/processor.h> + #include <asm/sysreg.h> + #include <asm/traps.h> ++#include <asm/vectors.h> + #include <asm/virt.h> + + /* Kernel representation of AT_HWCAP and AT_HWCAP2 */ +@@ -104,6 +107,8 @@ DECLARE_BITMAP(boot_capabilities, ARM64_NPATCHABLE); + bool arm64_use_ng_mappings = false; + EXPORT_SYMBOL(arm64_use_ng_mappings); + ++DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector) = vectors; ++ + /* + * Flag to indicate if we have computed the system wide + * capabilities based on the boot time active CPUs. This +@@ -205,6 +210,12 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { + ARM64_FTR_END, + }; + ++static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = { ++ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT, 4, 0), ++ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT, 4, 0), ++ ARM64_FTR_END, ++}; ++ + static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = { + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0), +@@ -259,7 +270,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64zfr0[] = { + }; + + static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr0[] = { +- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_ECV_SHIFT, 4, 0), ++ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_ECV_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_FGT_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_EXS_SHIFT, 4, 0), + /* +@@ -305,6 +316,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr0[] = { + }; + + static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr1[] = { ++ ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_AFP_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_ETS_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_TWED_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_XNX_SHIFT, 4, 0), +@@ -596,6 +608,7 @@ static const struct __ftr_reg_entry { + /* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 6 */ + ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar0), + ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar1), ++ ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar2), + + /* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 7 */ + ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr0), +@@ -830,6 +843,7 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info) + init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64dfr1); + init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar0); + init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar1); ++ init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar2); + init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0); + init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1); + init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2); +@@ -1058,6 +1072,8 @@ void update_cpu_features(int cpu, + info->reg_id_aa64isar0, boot->reg_id_aa64isar0); + taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, cpu, + info->reg_id_aa64isar1, boot->reg_id_aa64isar1); ++ taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, cpu, ++ info->reg_id_aa64isar2, boot->reg_id_aa64isar2); + + /* + * Differing PARange support is fine as long as all peripherals and +@@ -1157,6 +1173,7 @@ static u64 __read_sysreg_by_encoding(u32 sys_id) + read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1); + read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); + read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1); ++ read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); + + read_sysreg_case(SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0); + read_sysreg_case(SYS_CTR_EL0); +@@ -1402,6 +1419,12 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) + + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + ++ if (__this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector) == vectors) { ++ const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(EL1_VECTOR_KPTI); ++ ++ __this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v); ++ } ++ + /* + * We don't need to rewrite the page-tables if either we've done + * it already or we have KASLR enabled and therefore have not +@@ -2252,6 +2275,9 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = { + #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE + HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE), + #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ ++ HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR0_ECV_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_ECV), ++ HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR1_AFP_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_AFP), ++ HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_RPRES), + {}, + }; + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +index 77605aec25fec..4c0e72781f31b 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ static const char *const hwcap_str[] = { + [KERNEL_HWCAP_RNG] = "rng", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI] = "bti", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE] = "mte", ++ [KERNEL_HWCAP_ECV] = "ecv", ++ [KERNEL_HWCAP_AFP] = "afp", ++ [KERNEL_HWCAP_RPRES] = "rpres", + }; + + #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +@@ -364,6 +367,7 @@ static void __cpuinfo_store_cpu(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info) + info->reg_id_aa64dfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR1_EL1); + info->reg_id_aa64isar0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); + info->reg_id_aa64isar1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1); ++ info->reg_id_aa64isar2 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); + info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1); + info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); + info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1); +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +index fe83d6d67ec3d..d5bc1dbdd2fda 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S ++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +@@ -62,18 +62,21 @@ + + .macro kernel_ventry, el, label, regsize = 64 + .align 7 +-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ++.Lventry_start\@: + .if \el == 0 +-alternative_if ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ++ /* ++ * This must be the first instruction of the EL0 vector entries. It is ++ * skipped by the trampoline vectors, to trigger the cleanup. ++ */ ++ b .Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@ + .if \regsize == 64 + mrs x30, tpidrro_el0 + msr tpidrro_el0, xzr + .else + mov x30, xzr + .endif +-alternative_else_nop_endif ++.Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@: + .endif +-#endif + + sub sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE + #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK +@@ -120,11 +123,15 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif + mrs x0, tpidrro_el0 + #endif + b el\()\el\()_\label ++.org .Lventry_start\@ + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? + .endm + +- .macro tramp_alias, dst, sym ++ .macro tramp_alias, dst, sym, tmp + mov_q \dst, TRAMP_VALIAS +- add \dst, \dst, #(\sym - .entry.tramp.text) ++ adr_l \tmp, \sym ++ add \dst, \dst, \tmp ++ adr_l \tmp, .entry.tramp.text ++ sub \dst, \dst, \tmp + .endm + + /* +@@ -141,7 +148,7 @@ alternative_cb_end + tbnz \tmp2, #TIF_SSBD, .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@ + mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 + mov w1, #\state +-alternative_cb spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit ++alternative_cb smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit + nop // Patched to SMC/HVC #0 + alternative_cb_end + .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@: +@@ -351,21 +358,26 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif + ldp x24, x25, [sp, #16 * 12] + ldp x26, x27, [sp, #16 * 13] + ldp x28, x29, [sp, #16 * 14] +- ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] +- add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp + + .if \el == 0 +-alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ++alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ++ ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] ++ add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp ++ eret ++alternative_else_nop_endif + #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 + bne 4f +- msr far_el1, x30 +- tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_native ++ msr far_el1, x29 ++ tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_native, x29 + br x30 + 4: +- tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_compat ++ tramp_alias x30, tramp_exit_compat, x29 + br x30 + #endif + .else ++ ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] ++ add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp ++ + /* Ensure any device/NC reads complete */ + alternative_insn nop, "dmb sy", ARM64_WORKAROUND_1508412 + +@@ -764,12 +776,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_to_user) + + .popsection // .entry.text + +-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 +-/* +- * Exception vectors trampoline. +- */ +- .pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax" +- + // Move from tramp_pg_dir to swapper_pg_dir + .macro tramp_map_kernel, tmp + mrs \tmp, ttbr1_el1 +@@ -803,12 +809,47 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif + */ + .endm + +- .macro tramp_ventry, regsize = 64 ++ .macro tramp_data_page dst ++ adr_l \dst, .entry.tramp.text ++ sub \dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE ++ .endm ++ ++ .macro tramp_data_read_var dst, var ++#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE ++ tramp_data_page \dst ++ add \dst, \dst, #:lo12:__entry_tramp_data_\var ++ ldr \dst, [\dst] ++#else ++ ldr \dst, =\var ++#endif ++ .endm ++ ++#define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE 0 ++#define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP 1 ++#define BHB_MITIGATION_FW 2 ++#define BHB_MITIGATION_INSN 3 ++ ++ .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti, bhb + .align 7 + 1: + .if \regsize == 64 + msr tpidrro_el0, x30 // Restored in kernel_ventry + .endif ++ ++ .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP ++ /* ++ * This sequence must appear before the first indirect branch. i.e. the ++ * ret out of tramp_ventry. It appears here because x30 is free. ++ */ ++ __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop x30 ++ .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP ++ ++ .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN ++ clearbhb ++ isb ++ .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN ++ ++ .if \kpti == 1 + /* + * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy + * entry onto the return stack and using a RET instruction to +@@ -818,46 +859,75 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif + b . + 2: + tramp_map_kernel x30 +-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE +- adr x30, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE + alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003 +- ldr x30, [x30] +-#else +- ldr x30, =vectors +-#endif ++ tramp_data_read_var x30, vectors + alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM +- prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)] ++ prfm plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)] + alternative_else_nop_endif ++ + msr vbar_el1, x30 +- add x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors) + isb ++ .else ++ ldr x30, =vectors ++ .endif // \kpti == 1 ++ ++ .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_FW ++ /* ++ * The firmware sequence must appear before the first indirect branch. ++ * i.e. the ret out of tramp_ventry. But it also needs the stack to be ++ * mapped to save/restore the registers the SMC clobbers. ++ */ ++ __mitigate_spectre_bhb_fw ++ .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_FW ++ ++ add x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4) + ret ++.org 1b + 128 // Did we overflow the ventry slot? + .endm + + .macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64 +- adr x30, tramp_vectors ++ tramp_data_read_var x30, this_cpu_vector ++ this_cpu_offset x29 ++ ldr x30, [x30, x29] ++ + msr vbar_el1, x30 +- tramp_unmap_kernel x30 ++ ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] ++ tramp_unmap_kernel x29 + .if \regsize == 64 +- mrs x30, far_el1 ++ mrs x29, far_el1 + .endif ++ add sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE // restore sp + eret + sb + .endm + +- .align 11 +-SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(tramp_vectors) ++ .macro generate_tramp_vector, kpti, bhb ++.Lvector_start\@: + .space 0x400 + +- tramp_ventry +- tramp_ventry +- tramp_ventry +- tramp_ventry ++ .rept 4 ++ tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, \kpti, \bhb ++ .endr ++ .rept 4 ++ tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, \kpti, \bhb ++ .endr ++ .endm + +- tramp_ventry 32 +- tramp_ventry 32 +- tramp_ventry 32 +- tramp_ventry 32 ++#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ++/* ++ * Exception vectors trampoline. ++ * The order must match __bp_harden_el1_vectors and the ++ * arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors enum. ++ */ ++ .pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax" ++ .align 11 ++SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(tramp_vectors) ++#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP ++ generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW ++ generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN ++#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ ++ generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_NONE + SYM_CODE_END(tramp_vectors) + + SYM_CODE_START(tramp_exit_native) +@@ -874,12 +944,56 @@ SYM_CODE_END(tramp_exit_compat) + .pushsection ".rodata", "a" + .align PAGE_SHIFT + SYM_DATA_START(__entry_tramp_data_start) ++__entry_tramp_data_vectors: + .quad vectors ++#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE ++__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler: ++ .quad __sdei_asm_handler ++#endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */ ++__entry_tramp_data_this_cpu_vector: ++ .quad this_cpu_vector + SYM_DATA_END(__entry_tramp_data_start) + .popsection // .rodata + #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */ + #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ + ++/* ++ * Exception vectors for spectre mitigations on entry from EL1 when ++ * kpti is not in use. ++ */ ++ .macro generate_el1_vector, bhb ++.Lvector_start\@: ++ kernel_ventry 1, sync_invalid // Synchronous EL1t ++ kernel_ventry 1, irq_invalid // IRQ EL1t ++ kernel_ventry 1, fiq_invalid // FIQ EL1t ++ kernel_ventry 1, error_invalid // Error EL1t ++ ++ kernel_ventry 1, sync // Synchronous EL1h ++ kernel_ventry 1, irq // IRQ EL1h ++ kernel_ventry 1, fiq_invalid // FIQ EL1h ++ kernel_ventry 1, error // Error EL1h ++ ++ .rept 4 ++ tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 64, 0, \bhb ++ .endr ++ .rept 4 ++ tramp_ventry .Lvector_start\@, 32, 0, \bhb ++ .endr ++ .endm ++ ++/* The order must match tramp_vecs and the arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors enum. */ ++ .pushsection ".entry.text", "ax" ++ .align 11 ++SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) ++#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY ++ generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP ++ generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW ++ generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN ++#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ ++SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) ++ .popsection ++ ++ + /* + * Register switch for AArch64. The callee-saved registers need to be saved + * and restored. On entry: +@@ -969,13 +1083,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline) + */ + 1: str x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)] + +-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE +- adr x4, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE +- add x4, x4, #:lo12:__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler +- ldr x4, [x4] +-#else +- ldr x4, =__sdei_asm_handler +-#endif ++ tramp_data_read_var x4, __sdei_asm_handler + br x4 + SYM_CODE_END(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline) + NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline) +@@ -998,13 +1106,6 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline) + NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline) + .ltorg + .popsection // .entry.tramp.text +-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE +-.pushsection ".rodata", "a" +-SYM_DATA_START(__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler) +- .quad __sdei_asm_handler +-SYM_DATA_END(__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler) +-.popsection // .rodata +-#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */ + #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */ + + /* +@@ -1112,7 +1213,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 + alternative_else_nop_endif + + #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 +- tramp_alias dst=x5, sym=__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline ++ tramp_alias dst=x5, sym=__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline, tmp=x3 + br x5 + #endif + SYM_CODE_END(__sdei_asm_handler) +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +index f6e4e3737405d..3dd489b62b29f 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +@@ -18,14 +18,18 @@ + */ + + #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> ++#include <linux/bpf.h> + #include <linux/cpu.h> + #include <linux/device.h> + #include <linux/nospec.h> + #include <linux/prctl.h> + #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> + ++#include <asm/insn.h> + #include <asm/spectre.h> + #include <asm/traps.h> ++#include <asm/vectors.h> ++#include <asm/virt.h> + + /* + * We try to ensure that the mitigation state can never change as the result of +@@ -94,14 +98,51 @@ static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(void) + return ret; + } + ++static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state) ++{ ++ switch (bhb_state) { ++ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: ++ return ""; ++ default: ++ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: ++ return ", but not BHB"; ++ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: ++ return ", BHB"; ++ } ++} ++ ++static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) ++{ ++#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL ++ return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; ++#else ++ return false; ++#endif ++} ++ + ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) + { ++ enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(); ++ const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state); ++ const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening"; ++ + switch (spectre_v2_state) { + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: +- return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); ++ if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) ++ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); ++ ++ /* ++ * Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report ++ * "Not affected" for Spectre-v2. ++ */ ++ v2_str = "CSV2"; ++ fallthrough; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: +- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n"); ++ if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED && _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) ++ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n"); ++ ++ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str); + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + fallthrough; + default: +@@ -195,9 +236,9 @@ static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, + __flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); + } + ++static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); + static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn) + { +- static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); + int cpu, slot = -1; + const char *hyp_vecs_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc; + const char *hyp_vecs_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc + +@@ -228,6 +269,7 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn) + + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); ++ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start); + raw_spin_unlock(&bp_lock); + } + #else +@@ -571,9 +613,9 @@ void __init spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt, + * Patch a NOP in the Spectre-v4 mitigation code with an SMC/HVC instruction + * to call into firmware to adjust the mitigation state. + */ +-void __init spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, +- __le32 *origptr, +- __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) ++void __init smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, ++ __le32 *origptr, ++ __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) + { + u32 insn; + +@@ -787,3 +829,308 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) + return -ENODEV; + } + } ++ ++/* ++ * Spectre BHB. ++ * ++ * A CPU is either: ++ * - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed ++ * in our "loop mitigated list". ++ * - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call. ++ * - Has the ClearBHB instruction to perform the mitigation. ++ * - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no ++ * software mitigation in the vectors is needed. ++ * - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected. ++ */ ++static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state; ++ ++enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) ++{ ++ return spectre_bhb_state; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * This must be called with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU for each type of CPU, before any ++ * SCOPE_SYSTEM call will give the right answer. ++ */ ++u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope) ++{ ++ u8 k = 0; ++ static u8 max_bhb_k; ++ ++ if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) { ++ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = { ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1), ++ {}, ++ }; ++ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k24_list[] = { ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1), ++ {}, ++ }; ++ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k8_list[] = { ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), ++ {}, ++ }; ++ ++ if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k32_list)) ++ k = 32; ++ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k24_list)) ++ k = 24; ++ else if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_bhb_k8_list)) ++ k = 8; ++ ++ max_bhb_k = max(max_bhb_k, k); ++ } else { ++ k = max_bhb_k; ++ } ++ ++ return k; ++} ++ ++static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ struct arm_smccc_res res; ++ ++ arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ++ ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, &res); ++ ++ ret = res.a0; ++ switch (ret) { ++ case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: ++ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED: ++ return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; ++ default: ++ fallthrough; ++ case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED: ++ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++ } ++} ++ ++static bool is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(int scope) ++{ ++ static bool system_affected; ++ enum mitigation_state fw_state; ++ bool has_smccc = arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() != SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE; ++ static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list[] = { ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), ++ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), ++ {}, ++ }; ++ bool cpu_in_list = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), ++ spectre_bhb_firmware_mitigated_list); ++ ++ if (scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) ++ return system_affected; ++ ++ fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); ++ if (cpu_in_list || (has_smccc && fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)) { ++ system_affected = true; ++ return true; ++ } ++ ++ return false; ++} ++ ++static bool supports_ecbhb(int scope) ++{ ++ u64 mmfr1; ++ ++ if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) ++ mmfr1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); ++ else ++ mmfr1 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); ++ ++ return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(mmfr1, ++ ID_AA64MMFR1_ECBHB_SHIFT); ++} ++ ++bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, ++ int scope) ++{ ++ WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); ++ ++ if (supports_csv2p3(scope)) ++ return false; ++ ++ if (supports_clearbhb(scope)) ++ return true; ++ ++ if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope)) ++ return true; ++ ++ if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(scope)) ++ return true; ++ ++ return false; ++} ++ ++static void this_cpu_set_vectors(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot) ++{ ++ const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(slot); ++ ++ if (slot < 0) ++ return; ++ ++ __this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v); ++ ++ /* ++ * When KPTI is in use, the vectors are switched when exiting to ++ * user-space. ++ */ ++ if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) ++ return; ++ ++ write_sysreg(v, vbar_el1); ++ isb(); ++} ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_KVM ++static int kvm_bhb_get_vecs_size(const char *start) ++{ ++ if (start == __smccc_workaround_3_smc) ++ return __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_3_SMC_SZ; ++ else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k8 || ++ start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k24 || ++ start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k32) ++ return __SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ; ++ else if (start == __spectre_bhb_clearbhb) ++ return __SPECTRE_BHB_CLEARBHB_SZ; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) ++{ ++ int cpu, slot = -1, size; ++ const char *hyp_vecs_end; ++ ++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) || !is_hyp_mode_available()) ++ return; ++ ++ size = kvm_bhb_get_vecs_size(hyp_vecs_start); ++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hyp_vecs_start || !size)) ++ return; ++ hyp_vecs_end = hyp_vecs_start + size; ++ ++ raw_spin_lock(&bp_lock); ++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { ++ if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.template_start, cpu) == hyp_vecs_start) { ++ slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (slot == -1) { ++ slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot); ++ BUG_ON(slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS); ++ __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); ++ } ++ ++ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); ++ __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start); ++ raw_spin_unlock(&bp_lock); ++} ++#else ++#define __smccc_workaround_3_smc NULL ++#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k8 NULL ++#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k24 NULL ++#define __spectre_bhb_loop_k32 NULL ++#define __spectre_bhb_clearbhb NULL ++ ++static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { } ++#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ ++ ++void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) ++{ ++ enum mitigation_state fw_state, state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; ++ ++ if (!is_spectre_bhb_affected(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) ++ return; ++ ++ if (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) { ++ /* No point mitigating Spectre-BHB alone. */ ++ } else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) { ++ pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by compile time option\n"); ++ } else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) { ++ pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); ++ } else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ } else if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { ++ kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb); ++ this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN); ++ ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { ++ switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) { ++ case 8: ++ kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8); ++ break; ++ case 24: ++ kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24); ++ break; ++ case 32: ++ kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32); ++ break; ++ default: ++ WARN_ON_ONCE(1); ++ } ++ this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP); ++ ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ } else if (is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { ++ fw_state = spectre_bhb_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(); ++ if (fw_state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED) { ++ kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__smccc_workaround_3_smc); ++ this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW); ++ ++ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ update_mitigation_state(&spectre_bhb_state, state); ++} ++ ++/* Patched to correct the immediate */ ++void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter(struct alt_instr *alt, ++ __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) ++{ ++ u8 rd; ++ u32 insn; ++ u16 loop_count = spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM); ++ ++ BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); /* MOV -> MOV */ ++ ++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY)) ++ return; ++ ++ insn = le32_to_cpu(*origptr); ++ rd = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RD, insn); ++ insn = aarch64_insn_gen_movewide(rd, loop_count, 0, ++ AARCH64_INSN_VARIANT_64BIT, ++ AARCH64_INSN_MOVEWIDE_ZERO); ++ *updptr++ = cpu_to_le32(insn); ++} ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL ++#define EBPF_WARN "Unprivileged eBPF is enabled, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" ++void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) ++{ ++ if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE || ++ spectre_bhb_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED) ++ return; ++ ++ if (!new_state) ++ pr_err("WARNING: %s", EBPF_WARN); ++} ++#endif +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +index 30c1029789427..71f4b5f24d15f 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S ++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ ASSERT(__hibernate_exit_text_end - (__hibernate_exit_text_start & ~(SZ_4K - 1)) + <= SZ_4K, "Hibernate exit text too big or misaligned") + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 +-ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) == PAGE_SIZE, ++ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) <= 3*PAGE_SIZE, + "Entry trampoline text too big") + #endif + /* +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +index 5bc978be80434..4d63fcd7574b2 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +@@ -1337,7 +1337,8 @@ static int kvm_map_vectors(void) + * !SV2 + HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping + * SV2 + HEL2 -> use hardened vectors and use exec mapping + */ +- if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2)) { ++ if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) || ++ cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB)) { + __kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs); + __kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base); + } +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +index bcbead3746c66..bc06243cf4225 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ el1_sync: // Guest trapped into EL2 + /* ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling */ + eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 ^ \ + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2) ++ cbz w1, wa_epilogue ++ ++ eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 ^ \ ++ ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3) + cbnz w1, el1_trap + + wa_epilogue: +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/smccc_wa.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/smccc_wa.S +index b0441dbdf68bd..24b281912463d 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/smccc_wa.S ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/smccc_wa.S +@@ -30,3 +30,78 @@ SYM_DATA_START(__smccc_workaround_1_smc) + 1: .org __smccc_workaround_1_smc + __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ + .org 1b + SYM_DATA_END(__smccc_workaround_1_smc) ++ ++ .global __smccc_workaround_3_smc ++SYM_DATA_START(__smccc_workaround_3_smc) ++ esb ++ sub sp, sp, #(8 * 4) ++ stp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)] ++ mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 ++ smc #0 ++ ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 2)] ++ add sp, sp, #(8 * 4) ++1: .org __smccc_workaround_3_smc + __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_3_SMC_SZ ++ .org 1b ++SYM_DATA_END(__smccc_workaround_3_smc) ++ ++ .global __spectre_bhb_loop_k8 ++SYM_DATA_START(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8) ++ esb ++ sub sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ++ stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ mov x0, #8 ++2: b . + 4 ++ subs x0, x0, #1 ++ b.ne 2b ++ dsb nsh ++ isb ++ ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ++1: .org __spectre_bhb_loop_k8 + __SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ ++ .org 1b ++SYM_DATA_END(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8) ++ ++ .global __spectre_bhb_loop_k24 ++SYM_DATA_START(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24) ++ esb ++ sub sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ++ stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ mov x0, #8 ++2: b . + 4 ++ subs x0, x0, #1 ++ b.ne 2b ++ dsb nsh ++ isb ++ ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ++1: .org __spectre_bhb_loop_k24 + __SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ ++ .org 1b ++SYM_DATA_END(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24) ++ ++ .global __spectre_bhb_loop_k32 ++SYM_DATA_START(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32) ++ esb ++ sub sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ++ stp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ mov x0, #8 ++2: b . + 4 ++ subs x0, x0, #1 ++ b.ne 2b ++ dsb nsh ++ isb ++ ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] ++ add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ++1: .org __spectre_bhb_loop_k32 + __SPECTRE_BHB_LOOP_SZ ++ .org 1b ++SYM_DATA_END(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32) ++ ++ .global __spectre_bhb_clearbhb ++SYM_DATA_START(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb) ++ esb ++ clearbhb ++ isb ++1: .org __spectre_bhb_clearbhb + __SPECTRE_BHB_CLEARBHB_SZ ++ .org 1b ++SYM_DATA_END(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb) +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +index 62546e20b2511..532e687f69366 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ + #include <linux/kvm_host.h> + #include <linux/types.h> + #include <linux/jump_label.h> ++#include <linux/percpu.h> + #include <uapi/linux/psci.h> + + #include <kvm/arm_psci.h> +@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ + #include <asm/debug-monitors.h> + #include <asm/processor.h> + #include <asm/thread_info.h> ++#include <asm/vectors.h> + + const char __hyp_panic_string[] = "HYP panic:\nPS:%08llx PC:%016llx ESR:%08llx\nFAR:%016llx HPFAR:%016llx PAR:%016llx\nVCPU:%p\n"; + +@@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__activate_traps); + + static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + { +- extern char vectors[]; /* kernel exception vectors */ ++ const char *host_vectors = vectors; + + ___deactivate_traps(vcpu); + +@@ -84,7 +86,10 @@ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", "isb", ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT)); + + write_sysreg(CPACR_EL1_DEFAULT, cpacr_el1); +- write_sysreg(vectors, vbar_el1); ++ ++ if (!arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) ++ host_vectors = __this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector); ++ write_sysreg(host_vectors, vbar_el1); + } + NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__deactivate_traps); + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c +index 25ea4ecb6449f..bc111a1aff032 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c +@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + break; + } + break; ++ case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: ++ switch (arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state()) { ++ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: ++ break; ++ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: ++ val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; ++ break; ++ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: ++ val = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED; ++ break; ++ } ++ break; + case ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_TIME_FEATURES: + val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; + break; +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c +index db4056ecccfda..20ba5136ac3dd 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c +@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ int kvm_psci_call(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + + int kvm_arm_get_fw_num_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) + { +- return 3; /* PSCI version and two workaround registers */ ++ return 4; /* PSCI version and three workaround registers */ + } + + int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices) +@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices) + if (put_user(KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, uindices++)) + return -EFAULT; + ++ if (put_user(KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, uindices++)) ++ return -EFAULT; ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -450,6 +453,17 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid) + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; + } ++ break; ++ case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: ++ switch (arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state()) { ++ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: ++ return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL; ++ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: ++ return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_AVAIL; ++ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: ++ return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_REQUIRED; ++ } ++ return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL; + } + + return -EINVAL; +@@ -466,6 +480,7 @@ int kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) + break; + case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: + case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: ++ case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: + val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK; + break; + default: +@@ -511,6 +526,7 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) + } + + case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: ++ case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: + if (val & ~KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +index 568f11e23830c..835fa036b2d54 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = { + /* CRm=6 */ + ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1), + ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1), +- ID_UNALLOCATED(6,2), ++ ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1), + ID_UNALLOCATED(6,3), + ID_UNALLOCATED(6,4), + ID_UNALLOCATED(6,5), +diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +index 2601a514d8c4a..991e599f70577 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c ++++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ early_param("rodata", parse_rodata); + #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 + static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void) + { ++ int i; ++ + pgprot_t prot = rodata_enabled ? PAGE_KERNEL_ROX : PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC; + phys_addr_t pa_start = __pa_symbol(__entry_tramp_text_start); + +@@ -600,11 +602,15 @@ static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void) + + /* Map only the text into the trampoline page table */ + memset(tramp_pg_dir, 0, PGD_SIZE); +- __create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, PAGE_SIZE, +- prot, __pgd_pgtable_alloc, 0); ++ __create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, ++ entry_tramp_text_size(), prot, ++ __pgd_pgtable_alloc, NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS); + + /* Map both the text and data into the kernel page table */ +- __set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT, pa_start, prot); ++ for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(entry_tramp_text_size(), PAGE_SIZE); i++) ++ __set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1 - i, ++ pa_start + i * PAGE_SIZE, prot); ++ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) { + extern char __entry_tramp_data_start[]; + +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +index dad350d42ecfb..3b407f46f1a0d 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ + #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ + #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ + #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ ++#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ + #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ +diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +index cb9ad6b739737..4d0f5386e637b 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ + #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \ + __stringify(jmp __x86_retpoline_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ +- __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ++ __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE + #else + jmp *%\reg + #endif +@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ + #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), \ + __stringify(call __x86_retpoline_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ +- __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ++ __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE + #else + call *%\reg + #endif +@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ + "lfence;\n" \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ +- X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) ++ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) + + # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr) + +@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ + "lfence;\n" \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ +- X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) ++ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) + + # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) + #endif +@@ -176,9 +176,11 @@ + /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */ + enum spectre_v2_mitigation { + SPECTRE_V2_NONE, +- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, +- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, +- SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, ++ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE, ++ SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE, ++ SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, ++ SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, ++ SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, + }; + + /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +index d41b70fe4918e..78b9514a38440 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ + #include <linux/prctl.h> + #include <linux/sched/smt.h> + #include <linux/pgtable.h> ++#include <linux/bpf.h> + + #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> + #include <asm/cmdline.h> +@@ -613,6 +614,32 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) + static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } + #endif + ++#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n" ++#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" ++#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL ++void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) ++{ ++ if (new_state) ++ return; ++ ++ /* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */ ++ ++ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) { ++ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: ++ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); ++ break; ++ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: ++ if (sched_smt_active()) ++ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG); ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++} ++#endif ++ + static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) + { + int len = strlen(opt); +@@ -627,7 +654,10 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, +- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, ++ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, ++ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, ++ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, ++ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, + }; + + enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { +@@ -700,6 +730,13 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) + return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; + } + ++static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) ++{ ++ return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || ++ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || ++ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE); ++} ++ + static void __init + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) + { +@@ -767,7 +804,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) + */ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + !smt_possible || +- spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) ++ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + return; + + /* +@@ -787,9 +824,11 @@ set_mode: + + static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { + [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", +- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", +- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", +- [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", ++ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines", ++ [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE", ++ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", ++ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", ++ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", + }; + + static const struct { +@@ -800,8 +839,12 @@ static const struct { + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, +- { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, ++ { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false }, ++ { "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false }, + { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, ++ { "eibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false }, ++ { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false }, ++ { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, + }; + +@@ -838,17 +881,30 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) + } + + if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || +- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD || +- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) && ++ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE || ++ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC || ++ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE || ++ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) && + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { +- pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); ++ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", ++ mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + +- if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD && +- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON && +- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) { +- pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n"); ++ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS || ++ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE || ++ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) && ++ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { ++ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n", ++ mitigation_options[i].option); ++ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; ++ } ++ ++ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE || ++ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) && ++ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { ++ pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n", ++ mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + +@@ -857,6 +913,16 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) + return cmd; + } + ++static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) ++{ ++ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) { ++ pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"); ++ return SPECTRE_V2_NONE; ++ } ++ ++ return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; ++} ++ + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) + { + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); +@@ -877,49 +943,64 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { +- mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED; +- /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ +- x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; +- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); +- goto specv2_set_mode; ++ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS; ++ break; + } +- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) +- goto retpoline_auto; ++ ++ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); + break; +- case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD: +- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) +- goto retpoline_amd; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE: ++ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG); ++ mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE; + break; ++ + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC: +- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) +- goto retpoline_generic; ++ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; + break; ++ + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE: +- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) +- goto retpoline_auto; ++ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS: ++ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE: ++ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: ++ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE; + break; + } +- pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!"); +- return; + +-retpoline_auto: +- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || +- boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) { +- retpoline_amd: +- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) { +- pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n"); +- goto retpoline_generic; +- } +- mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD; +- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD); +- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); +- } else { +- retpoline_generic: +- mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; ++ if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) ++ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); ++ ++ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { ++ /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ ++ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; ++ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); ++ } ++ ++ switch (mode) { ++ case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: ++ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: ++ break; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: ++ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); ++ fallthrough; ++ ++ case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: ++ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); ++ break; + } + +-specv2_set_mode: + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; + pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); + +@@ -945,7 +1026,7 @@ specv2_set_mode: + * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not + * enable IBRS around firmware calls. + */ +- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) { ++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); + pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); + } +@@ -1015,6 +1096,10 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void) + { + mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); + ++ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() && ++ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE) ++ pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG); ++ + switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: + break; +@@ -1621,7 +1706,7 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf) + + static char *stibp_state(void) + { +- if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) ++ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + return ""; + + switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { +@@ -1651,6 +1736,27 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) + return ""; + } + ++static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) ++{ ++ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE) ++ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n"); ++ ++ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) ++ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n"); ++ ++ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() && ++ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE) ++ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n"); ++ ++ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], ++ ibpb_state(), ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", ++ stibp_state(), ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", ++ spectre_v2_module_string()); ++} ++ + static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) + { + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); +@@ -1676,12 +1782,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]); + + case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: +- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], +- ibpb_state(), +- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", +- stibp_state(), +- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", +- spectre_v2_module_string()); ++ return spectre_v2_show_state(buf); + + case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/ec.c b/drivers/acpi/ec.c +index 8347eaee679c8..3f2e5ea9ab6b7 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/ec.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/ec.c +@@ -2064,16 +2064,6 @@ bool acpi_ec_dispatch_gpe(void) + if (acpi_any_gpe_status_set(first_ec->gpe)) + return true; + +- /* +- * Cancel the SCI wakeup and process all pending events in case there +- * are any wakeup ones in there. +- * +- * Note that if any non-EC GPEs are active at this point, the SCI will +- * retrigger after the rearming in acpi_s2idle_wake(), so no events +- * should be missed by canceling the wakeup here. +- */ +- pm_system_cancel_wakeup(); +- + /* + * Dispatch the EC GPE in-band, but do not report wakeup in any case + * to allow the caller to process events properly after that. +diff --git a/drivers/acpi/sleep.c b/drivers/acpi/sleep.c +index e2614ea820bb8..503935b1deeb1 100644 +--- a/drivers/acpi/sleep.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/sleep.c +@@ -1012,15 +1012,21 @@ static bool acpi_s2idle_wake(void) + return true; + } + +- /* +- * Check non-EC GPE wakeups and if there are none, cancel the +- * SCI-related wakeup and dispatch the EC GPE. +- */ ++ /* Check non-EC GPE wakeups and dispatch the EC GPE. */ + if (acpi_ec_dispatch_gpe()) { + pm_pr_dbg("ACPI non-EC GPE wakeup\n"); + return true; + } + ++ /* ++ * Cancel the SCI wakeup and process all pending events in case ++ * there are any wakeup ones in there. ++ * ++ * Note that if any non-EC GPEs are active at this point, the ++ * SCI will retrigger after the rearming below, so no events ++ * should be missed by canceling the wakeup here. ++ */ ++ pm_system_cancel_wakeup(); + acpi_os_wait_events_complete(); + + /* +diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +index 22842d2938c28..47d4bb23d6f31 100644 +--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c ++++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +@@ -1352,7 +1352,8 @@ free_shadow: + rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF; + } + } +- free_pages((unsigned long)rinfo->ring.sring, get_order(info->nr_ring_pages * XEN_PAGE_SIZE)); ++ free_pages_exact(rinfo->ring.sring, ++ info->nr_ring_pages * XEN_PAGE_SIZE); + rinfo->ring.sring = NULL; + + if (rinfo->irq) +@@ -1436,9 +1437,15 @@ static int blkif_get_final_status(enum blk_req_status s1, + return BLKIF_RSP_OKAY; + } + +-static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, +- struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo, +- struct blkif_response *bret) ++/* ++ * Return values: ++ * 1 response processed. ++ * 0 missing further responses. ++ * -1 error while processing. ++ */ ++static int blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, ++ struct blkfront_ring_info *rinfo, ++ struct blkif_response *bret) + { + int i = 0; + struct scatterlist *sg; +@@ -1461,7 +1468,7 @@ static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, + + /* Wait the second response if not yet here. */ + if (s2->status < REQ_DONE) +- return false; ++ return 0; + + bret->status = blkif_get_final_status(s->status, + s2->status); +@@ -1512,42 +1519,43 @@ static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, + } + /* Add the persistent grant into the list of free grants */ + for (i = 0; i < num_grant; i++) { +- if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref)) { ++ if (!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref)) { + /* + * If the grant is still mapped by the backend (the + * backend has chosen to make this grant persistent) + * we add it at the head of the list, so it will be + * reused first. + */ +- if (!info->feature_persistent) +- pr_alert_ratelimited("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", +- s->grants_used[i]->gref); ++ if (!info->feature_persistent) { ++ pr_alert("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", ++ s->grants_used[i]->gref); ++ return -1; ++ } + list_add(&s->grants_used[i]->node, &rinfo->grants); + rinfo->persistent_gnts_c++; + } else { + /* +- * If the grant is not mapped by the backend we end the +- * foreign access and add it to the tail of the list, +- * so it will not be picked again unless we run out of +- * persistent grants. ++ * If the grant is not mapped by the backend we add it ++ * to the tail of the list, so it will not be picked ++ * again unless we run out of persistent grants. + */ +- gnttab_end_foreign_access(s->grants_used[i]->gref, 0, 0UL); + s->grants_used[i]->gref = GRANT_INVALID_REF; + list_add_tail(&s->grants_used[i]->node, &rinfo->grants); + } + } + if (s->req.operation == BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT) { + for (i = 0; i < INDIRECT_GREFS(num_grant); i++) { +- if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref)) { +- if (!info->feature_persistent) +- pr_alert_ratelimited("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", +- s->indirect_grants[i]->gref); ++ if (!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref)) { ++ if (!info->feature_persistent) { ++ pr_alert("backed has not unmapped grant: %u\n", ++ s->indirect_grants[i]->gref); ++ return -1; ++ } + list_add(&s->indirect_grants[i]->node, &rinfo->grants); + rinfo->persistent_gnts_c++; + } else { + struct page *indirect_page; + +- gnttab_end_foreign_access(s->indirect_grants[i]->gref, 0, 0UL); + /* + * Add the used indirect page back to the list of + * available pages for indirect grefs. +@@ -1562,7 +1570,7 @@ static bool blkif_completion(unsigned long *id, + } + } + +- return true; ++ return 1; + } + + static irqreturn_t blkif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) +@@ -1628,12 +1636,17 @@ static irqreturn_t blkif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) + } + + if (bret.operation != BLKIF_OP_DISCARD) { ++ int ret; ++ + /* + * We may need to wait for an extra response if the + * I/O request is split in 2 + */ +- if (!blkif_completion(&id, rinfo, &bret)) ++ ret = blkif_completion(&id, rinfo, &bret); ++ if (!ret) + continue; ++ if (unlikely(ret < 0)) ++ goto err; + } + + if (add_id_to_freelist(rinfo, id)) { +@@ -1740,8 +1753,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_device *dev, + for (i = 0; i < info->nr_ring_pages; i++) + rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF; + +- sring = (struct blkif_sring *)__get_free_pages(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH, +- get_order(ring_size)); ++ sring = alloc_pages_exact(ring_size, GFP_NOIO); + if (!sring) { + xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, -ENOMEM, "allocating shared ring"); + return -ENOMEM; +@@ -1751,7 +1763,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_device *dev, + + err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rinfo->ring.sring, info->nr_ring_pages, gref); + if (err < 0) { +- free_pages((unsigned long)sring, get_order(ring_size)); ++ free_pages_exact(sring, ring_size); + rinfo->ring.sring = NULL; + goto fail; + } +@@ -2729,11 +2741,10 @@ static void purge_persistent_grants(struct blkfront_info *info) + list_for_each_entry_safe(gnt_list_entry, tmp, &rinfo->grants, + node) { + if (gnt_list_entry->gref == GRANT_INVALID_REF || +- gnttab_query_foreign_access(gnt_list_entry->gref)) ++ !gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(gnt_list_entry->gref)) + continue; + + list_del(&gnt_list_entry->node); +- gnttab_end_foreign_access(gnt_list_entry->gref, 0, 0UL); + rinfo->persistent_gnts_c--; + gnt_list_entry->gref = GRANT_INVALID_REF; + list_add_tail(&gnt_list_entry->node, &rinfo->grants); +diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +index 7ed8872d08c60..1a69b5246133b 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c ++++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +@@ -424,14 +424,12 @@ static bool xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue) + queue->tx_link[id] = TX_LINK_NONE; + skb = queue->tx_skbs[id]; + queue->tx_skbs[id] = NULL; +- if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access( +- queue->grant_tx_ref[id]) != 0)) { ++ if (unlikely(!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref( ++ queue->grant_tx_ref[id], GNTMAP_readonly))) { + dev_alert(dev, + "Grant still in use by backend domain\n"); + goto err; + } +- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref( +- queue->grant_tx_ref[id], GNTMAP_readonly); + gnttab_release_grant_reference( + &queue->gref_tx_head, queue->grant_tx_ref[id]); + queue->grant_tx_ref[id] = GRANT_INVALID_REF; +@@ -992,7 +990,6 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue, + struct device *dev = &queue->info->netdev->dev; + struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog; + struct xdp_buff xdp; +- unsigned long ret; + int slots = 1; + int err = 0; + u32 verdict; +@@ -1034,8 +1031,13 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue, + goto next; + } + +- ret = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0); +- BUG_ON(!ret); ++ if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0)) { ++ dev_alert(dev, ++ "Grant still in use by backend domain\n"); ++ queue->info->broken = true; ++ dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n"); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } + + gnttab_release_grant_reference(&queue->gref_rx_head, ref); + +@@ -1256,6 +1258,10 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) + &need_xdp_flush); + + if (unlikely(err)) { ++ if (queue->info->broken) { ++ spin_unlock(&queue->rx_lock); ++ return 0; ++ } + err: + while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&tmpq))) + __skb_queue_tail(&errq, skb); +@@ -1920,7 +1926,7 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev, + struct netfront_queue *queue, unsigned int feature_split_evtchn) + { + struct xen_netif_tx_sring *txs; +- struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs; ++ struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs = NULL; + grant_ref_t gref; + int err; + +@@ -1940,21 +1946,21 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev, + + err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, txs, 1, &gref); + if (err < 0) +- goto grant_tx_ring_fail; ++ goto fail; + queue->tx_ring_ref = gref; + + rxs = (struct xen_netif_rx_sring *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH); + if (!rxs) { + err = -ENOMEM; + xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "allocating rx ring page"); +- goto alloc_rx_ring_fail; ++ goto fail; + } + SHARED_RING_INIT(rxs); + FRONT_RING_INIT(&queue->rx, rxs, XEN_PAGE_SIZE); + + err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rxs, 1, &gref); + if (err < 0) +- goto grant_rx_ring_fail; ++ goto fail; + queue->rx_ring_ref = gref; + + if (feature_split_evtchn) +@@ -1967,22 +1973,28 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_device *dev, + err = setup_netfront_single(queue); + + if (err) +- goto alloc_evtchn_fail; ++ goto fail; + + return 0; + + /* If we fail to setup netfront, it is safe to just revoke access to + * granted pages because backend is not accessing it at this point. + */ +-alloc_evtchn_fail: +- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0); +-grant_rx_ring_fail: +- free_page((unsigned long)rxs); +-alloc_rx_ring_fail: +- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0); +-grant_tx_ring_fail: +- free_page((unsigned long)txs); +-fail: ++ fail: ++ if (queue->rx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) { ++ gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0, ++ (unsigned long)rxs); ++ queue->rx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF; ++ } else { ++ free_page((unsigned long)rxs); ++ } ++ if (queue->tx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) { ++ gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0, ++ (unsigned long)txs); ++ queue->tx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF; ++ } else { ++ free_page((unsigned long)txs); ++ } + return err; + } + +diff --git a/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c b/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c +index 259fc248d06cf..a25c9386fdf78 100644 +--- a/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c ++++ b/drivers/scsi/xen-scsifront.c +@@ -233,12 +233,11 @@ static void scsifront_gnttab_done(struct vscsifrnt_info *info, + return; + + for (i = 0; i < shadow->nr_grants; i++) { +- if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i]))) { ++ if (unlikely(!gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i]))) { + shost_printk(KERN_ALERT, info->host, KBUILD_MODNAME + "grant still in use by backend\n"); + BUG(); + } +- gnttab_end_foreign_access(shadow->gref[i], 0, 0UL); + } + + kfree(shadow->sg); +diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c +index 3fa40c723e8e9..edb0acd0b8323 100644 +--- a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c ++++ b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c +@@ -169,20 +169,14 @@ undo: + __del_gref(gref); + } + +- /* It's possible for the target domain to map the just-allocated grant +- * references by blindly guessing their IDs; if this is done, then +- * __del_gref will leave them in the queue_gref list. They need to be +- * added to the global list so that we can free them when they are no +- * longer referenced. +- */ +- if (unlikely(!list_empty(&queue_gref))) +- list_splice_tail(&queue_gref, &gref_list); + mutex_unlock(&gref_mutex); + return rc; + } + + static void __del_gref(struct gntalloc_gref *gref) + { ++ unsigned long addr; ++ + if (gref->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE) { + uint8_t *tmp = kmap(gref->page); + tmp[gref->notify.pgoff] = 0; +@@ -196,21 +190,16 @@ static void __del_gref(struct gntalloc_gref *gref) + gref->notify.flags = 0; + + if (gref->gref_id) { +- if (gnttab_query_foreign_access(gref->gref_id)) +- return; +- +- if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(gref->gref_id, 0)) +- return; +- +- gnttab_free_grant_reference(gref->gref_id); ++ if (gref->page) { ++ addr = (unsigned long)page_to_virt(gref->page); ++ gnttab_end_foreign_access(gref->gref_id, 0, addr); ++ } else ++ gnttab_free_grant_reference(gref->gref_id); + } + + gref_size--; + list_del(&gref->next_gref); + +- if (gref->page) +- __free_page(gref->page); +- + kfree(gref); + } + +diff --git a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c +index 3729bea0c9895..5c83d41766c85 100644 +--- a/drivers/xen/grant-table.c ++++ b/drivers/xen/grant-table.c +@@ -134,12 +134,9 @@ struct gnttab_ops { + */ + unsigned long (*end_foreign_transfer_ref)(grant_ref_t ref); + /* +- * Query the status of a grant entry. Ref parameter is reference of +- * queried grant entry, return value is the status of queried entry. +- * Detailed status(writing/reading) can be gotten from the return value +- * by bit operations. ++ * Read the frame number related to a given grant reference. + */ +- int (*query_foreign_access)(grant_ref_t ref); ++ unsigned long (*read_frame)(grant_ref_t ref); + }; + + struct unmap_refs_callback_data { +@@ -284,22 +281,6 @@ int gnttab_grant_foreign_access(domid_t domid, unsigned long frame, + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_grant_foreign_access); + +-static int gnttab_query_foreign_access_v1(grant_ref_t ref) +-{ +- return gnttab_shared.v1[ref].flags & (GTF_reading|GTF_writing); +-} +- +-static int gnttab_query_foreign_access_v2(grant_ref_t ref) +-{ +- return grstatus[ref] & (GTF_reading|GTF_writing); +-} +- +-int gnttab_query_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref) +-{ +- return gnttab_interface->query_foreign_access(ref); +-} +-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_query_foreign_access); +- + static int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly) + { + u16 flags, nflags; +@@ -353,6 +334,16 @@ int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly) + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref); + ++static unsigned long gnttab_read_frame_v1(grant_ref_t ref) ++{ ++ return gnttab_shared.v1[ref].frame; ++} ++ ++static unsigned long gnttab_read_frame_v2(grant_ref_t ref) ++{ ++ return gnttab_shared.v2[ref].full_page.frame; ++} ++ + struct deferred_entry { + struct list_head list; + grant_ref_t ref; +@@ -382,12 +373,9 @@ static void gnttab_handle_deferred(struct timer_list *unused) + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gnttab_list_lock, flags); + if (_gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(entry->ref, entry->ro)) { + put_free_entry(entry->ref); +- if (entry->page) { +- pr_debug("freeing g.e. %#x (pfn %#lx)\n", +- entry->ref, page_to_pfn(entry->page)); +- put_page(entry->page); +- } else +- pr_info("freeing g.e. %#x\n", entry->ref); ++ pr_debug("freeing g.e. %#x (pfn %#lx)\n", ++ entry->ref, page_to_pfn(entry->page)); ++ put_page(entry->page); + kfree(entry); + entry = NULL; + } else { +@@ -412,9 +400,18 @@ static void gnttab_handle_deferred(struct timer_list *unused) + static void gnttab_add_deferred(grant_ref_t ref, bool readonly, + struct page *page) + { +- struct deferred_entry *entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC); ++ struct deferred_entry *entry; ++ gfp_t gfp = (in_atomic() || irqs_disabled()) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL; + const char *what = KERN_WARNING "leaking"; + ++ entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), gfp); ++ if (!page) { ++ unsigned long gfn = gnttab_interface->read_frame(ref); ++ ++ page = pfn_to_page(gfn_to_pfn(gfn)); ++ get_page(page); ++ } ++ + if (entry) { + unsigned long flags; + +@@ -435,11 +432,21 @@ static void gnttab_add_deferred(grant_ref_t ref, bool readonly, + what, ref, page ? page_to_pfn(page) : -1); + } + ++int gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref) ++{ ++ int ret = _gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0); ++ ++ if (ret) ++ put_free_entry(ref); ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gnttab_try_end_foreign_access); ++ + void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly, + unsigned long page) + { +- if (gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, readonly)) { +- put_free_entry(ref); ++ if (gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(ref)) { + if (page != 0) + put_page(virt_to_page(page)); + } else +@@ -1417,7 +1424,7 @@ static const struct gnttab_ops gnttab_v1_ops = { + .update_entry = gnttab_update_entry_v1, + .end_foreign_access_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v1, + .end_foreign_transfer_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref_v1, +- .query_foreign_access = gnttab_query_foreign_access_v1, ++ .read_frame = gnttab_read_frame_v1, + }; + + static const struct gnttab_ops gnttab_v2_ops = { +@@ -1429,7 +1436,7 @@ static const struct gnttab_ops gnttab_v2_ops = { + .update_entry = gnttab_update_entry_v2, + .end_foreign_access_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref_v2, + .end_foreign_transfer_ref = gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref_v2, +- .query_foreign_access = gnttab_query_foreign_access_v2, ++ .read_frame = gnttab_read_frame_v2, + }; + + static bool gnttab_need_v2(void) +diff --git a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c +index 7984645b59563..bbe337dc296e3 100644 +--- a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c ++++ b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c +@@ -337,8 +337,8 @@ static void free_active_ring(struct sock_mapping *map) + if (!map->active.ring) + return; + +- free_pages((unsigned long)map->active.data.in, +- map->active.ring->ring_order); ++ free_pages_exact(map->active.data.in, ++ PAGE_SIZE << map->active.ring->ring_order); + free_page((unsigned long)map->active.ring); + } + +@@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ static int alloc_active_ring(struct sock_mapping *map) + goto out; + + map->active.ring->ring_order = PVCALLS_RING_ORDER; +- bytes = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, +- PVCALLS_RING_ORDER); ++ bytes = alloc_pages_exact(PAGE_SIZE << PVCALLS_RING_ORDER, ++ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!bytes) + goto out; + +diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c +index 0cd728961fce9..16cfef0993295 100644 +--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c ++++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c +@@ -379,7 +379,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr, + unsigned int nr_pages, grant_ref_t *grefs) + { + int err; +- int i, j; ++ unsigned int i; ++ grant_ref_t gref_head; ++ ++ err = gnttab_alloc_grant_references(nr_pages, &gref_head); ++ if (err) { ++ xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "granting access to ring page"); ++ return err; ++ } + + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { + unsigned long gfn; +@@ -389,23 +396,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr, + else + gfn = virt_to_gfn(vaddr); + +- err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, gfn, 0); +- if (err < 0) { +- xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, +- "granting access to ring page"); +- goto fail; +- } +- grefs[i] = err; ++ grefs[i] = gnttab_claim_grant_reference(&gref_head); ++ gnttab_grant_foreign_access_ref(grefs[i], dev->otherend_id, ++ gfn, 0); + + vaddr = vaddr + XEN_PAGE_SIZE; + } + + return 0; +- +-fail: +- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) +- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grefs[j], 0); +- return err; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_grant_ring); + +diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +index f860645f65128..ff38737475ecb 100644 +--- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h ++++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + 0, 0x7fff) + ++#define ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 \ ++ ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ ++ ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ ++ 0, 0x3fff) ++ + #define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED 1 + + /* Paravirtualised time calls (defined by ARM DEN0057A) */ +diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h +index e6ddf5a3beaf8..ea3ff499e94a3 100644 +--- a/include/linux/bpf.h ++++ b/include/linux/bpf.h +@@ -1485,6 +1485,12 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_by_id(u32 id); + struct bpf_link *bpf_link_by_id(u32 id); + + const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id); ++ ++static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) ++{ ++ return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; ++} ++ + #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd) + { +@@ -1679,6 +1685,12 @@ bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) + { + return NULL; + } ++ ++static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) ++{ ++ return false; ++} ++ + #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + + static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get_type(u32 ufd, +diff --git a/include/xen/grant_table.h b/include/xen/grant_table.h +index 0b1182a3cf412..57b4ae6a4a186 100644 +--- a/include/xen/grant_table.h ++++ b/include/xen/grant_table.h +@@ -97,17 +97,32 @@ int gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly); + * access has been ended, free the given page too. Access will be ended + * immediately iff the grant entry is not in use, otherwise it will happen + * some time later. page may be 0, in which case no freeing will occur. ++ * Note that the granted page might still be accessed (read or write) by the ++ * other side after gnttab_end_foreign_access() returns, so even if page was ++ * specified as 0 it is not allowed to just reuse the page for other ++ * purposes immediately. gnttab_end_foreign_access() will take an additional ++ * reference to the granted page in this case, which is dropped only after ++ * the grant is no longer in use. ++ * This requires that multi page allocations for areas subject to ++ * gnttab_end_foreign_access() are done via alloc_pages_exact() (and freeing ++ * via free_pages_exact()) in order to avoid high order pages. + */ + void gnttab_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref, int readonly, + unsigned long page); + ++/* ++ * End access through the given grant reference, iff the grant entry is ++ * no longer in use. In case of success ending foreign access, the ++ * grant reference is deallocated. ++ * Return 1 if the grant entry was freed, 0 if it is still in use. ++ */ ++int gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref); ++ + int gnttab_grant_foreign_transfer(domid_t domid, unsigned long pfn); + + unsigned long gnttab_end_foreign_transfer_ref(grant_ref_t ref); + unsigned long gnttab_end_foreign_transfer(grant_ref_t ref); + +-int gnttab_query_foreign_access(grant_ref_t ref); +- + /* + * operations on reserved batches of grant references + */ +diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c +index 72ceb19574d0c..8832440a4938e 100644 +--- a/kernel/sysctl.c ++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c +@@ -234,6 +234,10 @@ static int bpf_stats_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + return ret; + } + ++void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) ++{ ++} ++ + static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) + { +@@ -251,6 +255,9 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + return -EPERM; + *(int *)table->data = unpriv_enable; + } ++ ++ unpriv_ebpf_notify(unpriv_enable); ++ + return ret; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL && CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +diff --git a/net/9p/trans_xen.c b/net/9p/trans_xen.c +index 3ec1a51a6944e..432ac5a16f2e0 100644 +--- a/net/9p/trans_xen.c ++++ b/net/9p/trans_xen.c +@@ -304,9 +304,9 @@ static void xen_9pfs_front_free(struct xen_9pfs_front_priv *priv) + ref = priv->rings[i].intf->ref[j]; + gnttab_end_foreign_access(ref, 0, 0); + } +- free_pages((unsigned long)priv->rings[i].data.in, +- priv->rings[i].intf->ring_order - +- (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); ++ free_pages_exact(priv->rings[i].data.in, ++ 1UL << (priv->rings[i].intf->ring_order + ++ XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); + } + gnttab_end_foreign_access(priv->rings[i].ref, 0, 0); + free_page((unsigned long)priv->rings[i].intf); +@@ -345,8 +345,8 @@ static int xen_9pfs_front_alloc_dataring(struct xenbus_device *dev, + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ring->ref = ret; +- bytes = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, +- order - (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); ++ bytes = alloc_pages_exact(1UL << (order + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT), ++ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!bytes) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; +@@ -377,9 +377,7 @@ out: + if (bytes) { + for (i--; i >= 0; i--) + gnttab_end_foreign_access(ring->intf->ref[i], 0, 0); +- free_pages((unsigned long)bytes, +- ring->intf->ring_order - +- (PAGE_SHIFT - XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); ++ free_pages_exact(bytes, 1UL << (order + XEN_PAGE_SHIFT)); + } + gnttab_end_foreign_access(ring->ref, 0, 0); + free_page((unsigned long)ring->intf); +diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +index dad350d42ecfb..b58730cc12e83 100644 +--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ + #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ + #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ + #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ ++#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCEs for Spectre variant 2 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ + #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ |