Xen 4.15.5-pre-patchset-04.15.5-pre-patchset-04.15

Signed-off-by: Tomáš Mózes <hydrapolic@gmail.com>

140 files changed, 1298 insertions, 16591 deletions

diff --git a/0001-automation-Remove-clang-8-from-Debian-unstable-conta.patch b/0001-automation-Remove-clang-8-from-Debian-unstable-conta.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..765ff82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0001-automation-Remove-clang-8-from-Debian-unstable-conta.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From fa875574b73618daf3bc70e6ff4d342493fa11d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 16:55:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 01/13] automation: Remove clang-8 from Debian unstable
+ container
+
+First, apt complain that it isn't the right way to add keys anymore,
+but hopefully that's just a warning.
+
+Second, we can't install clang-8:
+The following packages have unmet dependencies:
+ clang-8 : Depends: libstdc++-8-dev but it is not installable
+           Depends: libgcc-8-dev but it is not installable
+           Depends: libobjc-8-dev but it is not installable
+           Recommends: llvm-8-dev but it is not going to be installed
+           Recommends: libomp-8-dev but it is not going to be installed
+ libllvm8 : Depends: libffi7 (>= 3.3~20180313) but it is not installable
+E: Unable to correct problems, you have held broken packages.
+
+clang on Debian unstable is now version 14.0.6.
+
+Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a6b1e2b80fe2053b1c9c9843fb086a668513ea36)
+---
+ automation/build/debian/unstable-llvm-8.list |  3 ---
+ automation/build/debian/unstable.dockerfile  | 12 ------------
+ automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml              | 10 ----------
+ 3 files changed, 25 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 automation/build/debian/unstable-llvm-8.list
+
+diff --git a/automation/build/debian/unstable-llvm-8.list b/automation/build/debian/unstable-llvm-8.list
+deleted file mode 100644
+index dc119fa0b4..0000000000
+--- a/automation/build/debian/unstable-llvm-8.list
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
+-# Unstable LLVM 8 repos
+-deb http://apt.llvm.org/unstable/ llvm-toolchain-8 main
+-deb-src http://apt.llvm.org/unstable/ llvm-toolchain-8 main
+diff --git a/automation/build/debian/unstable.dockerfile b/automation/build/debian/unstable.dockerfile
+index 9a10ee08d6..1200245c9b 100644
+--- a/automation/build/debian/unstable.dockerfile
++++ b/automation/build/debian/unstable.dockerfile
+@@ -51,15 +51,3 @@ RUN apt-get update && \
+         apt-get autoremove -y && \
+         apt-get clean && \
+         rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists* /tmp/* /var/tmp/*
+-
+-RUN wget -O - https://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key|apt-key add -
+-COPY unstable-llvm-8.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/
+-
+-RUN apt-get update && \
+-    apt-get --quiet --yes install \
+-        clang-8 \
+-        lld-8 \
+-        && \
+-        apt-get autoremove -y && \
+-        apt-get clean && \
+-        rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists* /tmp/* /var/tmp/*
+diff --git a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+index 23ab81d892..6cca2122aa 100644
+--- a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
++++ b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+@@ -276,16 +276,6 @@ debian-unstable-clang-debug:
+   variables:
+     CONTAINER: debian:unstable
+ 
+-debian-unstable-clang-8:
+-  extends: .clang-8-x86-64-build
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:unstable
+-
+-debian-unstable-clang-8-debug:
+-  extends: .clang-8-x86-64-build-debug
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:unstable
+-
+ debian-unstable-gcc:
+   extends: .gcc-x86-64-build
+   variables:
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0001-build-fix-exported-variable-name-CFLAGS_stack_bounda.patch b/0001-build-fix-exported-variable-name-CFLAGS_stack_bounda.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4b643e1..0000000
--- a/0001-build-fix-exported-variable-name-CFLAGS_stack_bounda.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-From f6e26ce7d9317abc41130ead6dc2443a7e2dde00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:20:46 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 001/126] build: fix exported variable name
- CFLAGS_stack_boundary
-
-Exporting a variable with a dash doesn't work reliably, they may be
-striped from the environment when calling a sub-make or sub-shell.
-
-CFLAGS-stack-boundary start to be removed from env in patch "build:
-set ALL_OBJS in main Makefile; move prelink.o to main Makefile" when
-running `make "ALL_OBJS=.."` due to the addition of the quote. At
-least in my empirical tests.
-
-Fixes: 2740d96efd ("xen/build: have the root Makefile generates the CFLAGS")
-Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: aa390d513a67a6ec0a069eea7478e5ecd54a7ea6
-master date: 2022-01-28 11:44:33 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk     | 4 ++--
- xen/arch/x86/arch.mk      | 4 ++--
- xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk b/xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk
-index 56fe22c979ea..7aef93f5f3a0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk
-@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ object_label_flags = '-D__OBJECT_LABEL__=$(subst $(BASEDIR)/,,$(CURDIR))/$@'
- else
- object_label_flags = '-D__OBJECT_LABEL__=$(subst /,$$,$(subst -,_,$(subst $(BASEDIR)/,,$(CURDIR))/$@))'
- endif
--c_flags += $(object_label_flags) $(CFLAGS-stack-boundary)
--a_flags += $(object_label_flags) $(CFLAGS-stack-boundary)
-+c_flags += $(object_label_flags) $(CFLAGS_stack_boundary)
-+a_flags += $(object_label_flags) $(CFLAGS_stack_boundary)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk b/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-index 033048ab6b2d..456e5d5c1ad7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ endif
- 
- # If supported by the compiler, reduce stack alignment to 8 bytes. But allow
- # this to be overridden elsewhere.
--$(call cc-option-add,CFLAGS-stack-boundary,CC,-mpreferred-stack-boundary=3)
--export CFLAGS-stack-boundary
-+$(call cc-option-add,CFLAGS_stack_boundary,CC,-mpreferred-stack-boundary=3)
-+export CFLAGS_stack_boundary
- 
- ifeq ($(CONFIG_UBSAN),y)
- # Don't enable alignment sanitisation.  x86 has efficient unaligned accesses,
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-index e857c0f2cc2c..a5b2041f9b96 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/Makefile
-@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ boot.init.o: buildid.o
- EFIOBJ := boot.init.o pe.init.o ebmalloc.o compat.o runtime.o
- 
- $(call cc-option-add,cflags-stack-boundary,CC,-mpreferred-stack-boundary=4)
--$(EFIOBJ): CFLAGS-stack-boundary := $(cflags-stack-boundary)
-+$(EFIOBJ): CFLAGS_stack_boundary := $(cflags-stack-boundary)
- 
- obj-y := stub.o
- obj-$(XEN_BUILD_EFI) := $(filter-out %.init.o,$(EFIOBJ))
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0002-IOMMU-x86-work-around-bogus-gcc12-warning-in-hvm_gsi.patch b/0002-IOMMU-x86-work-around-bogus-gcc12-warning-in-hvm_gsi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index edc6857..0000000
--- a/0002-IOMMU-x86-work-around-bogus-gcc12-warning-in-hvm_gsi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From b89b932cfe86556c5de4ad56702aed83142e22a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:21:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 002/126] IOMMU/x86: work around bogus gcc12 warning in
- hvm_gsi_eoi()
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-As per [1] the expansion of the pirq_dpci() macro causes a -Waddress
-controlled warning (enabled implicitly in our builds, if not by default)
-tying the middle part of the involved conditional expression to the
-surrounding boolean context. Work around this by introducing a local
-inline function in the affected source file.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-
-[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102967
-master commit: 80ad8db8a4d9bb24952f0aea788ce6f47566fa76
-master date: 2022-06-15 10:19:32 +0200
----
- xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/hvm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/hvm.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/hvm.c
-index 9544f3234e65..50865eec2c04 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/hvm.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,18 @@
- #include <asm/hvm/support.h>
- #include <asm/io_apic.h>
- 
-+/*
-+ * Gcc12 takes issue with pirq_dpci() being used in boolean context (see gcc
-+ * bug 102967). While we can't replace the macro definition in the header by an
-+ * inline function, we can do so here.
-+ */
-+static inline struct hvm_pirq_dpci *_pirq_dpci(struct pirq *pirq)
-+{
-+    return pirq_dpci(pirq);
-+}
-+#undef pirq_dpci
-+#define pirq_dpci(pirq) _pirq_dpci(pirq)
-+
- static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, dpci_list);
- 
- /*
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0002-x86-shadow-account-for-log-dirty-mode-when-pre-alloc.patch b/0002-x86-shadow-account-for-log-dirty-mode-when-pre-alloc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b5d582
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0002-x86-shadow-account-for-log-dirty-mode-when-pre-alloc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+From 3a0b7fb38a3e40fcf82c10980775f0fecab667b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 12:00:02 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 02/13] x86/shadow: account for log-dirty mode when
+ pre-allocating
+
+Pre-allocation is intended to ensure that in the course of constructing
+or updating shadows there won't be any risk of just made shadows or
+shadows being acted upon can disappear under our feet. The amount of
+pages pre-allocated then, however, needs to account for all possible
+subsequent allocations. While the use in sh_page_fault() accounts for
+all shadows which may need making, so far it didn't account for
+allocations coming from log-dirty tracking (which piggybacks onto the
+P2M allocation functions).
+
+Since shadow_prealloc() takes a count of shadows (or other data
+structures) rather than a count of pages, putting the adjustment at the
+call site of this function won't work very well: We simply can't express
+the correct count that way in all cases. Instead take care of this in
+the function itself, by "snooping" for L1 type requests. (While not
+applicable right now, future new request sites of L1 tables would then
+also be covered right away.)
+
+It is relevant to note here that pre-allocations like the one done from
+shadow_alloc_p2m_page() are benign when they fall in the "scope" of an
+earlier pre-alloc which already included that count: The inner call will
+simply find enough pages available then; it'll bail right away.
+
+This is CVE-2022-42332 / XSA-427.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 91767a71061035ae42be93de495cd976f863a41a)
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c         |  1 +
+ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c  | 12 +++++++++++-
+ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h |  1 +
+ xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h     |  4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+index 579d01c161..ab1cdf1e72 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ void paging_mark_pfn_dirty(struct domain *d, pfn_t pfn)
+     if ( unlikely(!VALID_M2P(pfn_x(pfn))) )
+         return;
+ 
++    BUILD_BUG_ON(paging_logdirty_levels() != 4);
+     i1 = L1_LOGDIRTY_IDX(pfn);
+     i2 = L2_LOGDIRTY_IDX(pfn);
+     i3 = L3_LOGDIRTY_IDX(pfn);
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+index e36d49d1fc..e73931573b 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+@@ -1014,7 +1014,17 @@ bool shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type, unsigned int count)
+     if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
+        return false;
+ 
+-    ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
++    count *= shadow_size(type);
++    /*
++     * Log-dirty handling may result in allocations when populating its
++     * tracking structures.  Tie this to the caller requesting space for L1
++     * shadows.
++     */
++    if ( paging_mode_log_dirty(d) &&
++         ((SHF_L1_ANY | SHF_FL1_ANY) & (1u << type)) )
++        count += paging_logdirty_levels();
++
++    ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, count);
+     if ( !ret && (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
+         /*
+          * Failing to allocate memory required for shadow usage can only result in
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
+index 3fe0388e7c..1be84fc951 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
+@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ static inline void sh_terminate_list(struct page_list_head *tmp_list)
+ #define SHF_64  (SHF_L1_64|SHF_FL1_64|SHF_L2_64|SHF_L2H_64|SHF_L3_64|SHF_L4_64)
+ 
+ #define SHF_L1_ANY  (SHF_L1_32|SHF_L1_PAE|SHF_L1_64)
++#define SHF_FL1_ANY (SHF_FL1_32|SHF_FL1_PAE|SHF_FL1_64)
+ 
+ #if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC)
+ /* Marks a guest L1 page table which is shadowed but not write-protected.
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
+index eb23652978..5ec508a351 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
+@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ int paging_mfn_is_dirty(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn);
+ #define L4_LOGDIRTY_IDX(pfn) ((pfn_x(pfn) >> (PAGE_SHIFT + 3 + PAGETABLE_ORDER * 2)) & \
+                               (LOGDIRTY_NODE_ENTRIES-1))
+ 
++#define paging_logdirty_levels() \
++    (DIV_ROUND_UP(PADDR_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT - (PAGE_SHIFT + 3), \
++                  PAGE_SHIFT - ilog2(sizeof(mfn_t))) + 1)
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
+ /* VRAM dirty tracking support */
+ struct sh_dirty_vram {
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0003-ehci-dbgp-fix-selecting-n-th-ehci-controller.patch b/0003-ehci-dbgp-fix-selecting-n-th-ehci-controller.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fd460e0..0000000
--- a/0003-ehci-dbgp-fix-selecting-n-th-ehci-controller.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From b53df5b4341fa97614ad064a7c8e781c88b6ed71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Marek=20Marczykowski-G=C3=B3recki?=
- <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:22:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 003/126] ehci-dbgp: fix selecting n-th ehci controller
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The ehci<n> number was parsed but ignored.
-
-Fixes: 322ecbe4ac85 ("console: add EHCI debug port based serial console")
-Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: d6d0cb659fda64430d4649f8680c5cead32da8fd
-master date: 2022-06-16 14:23:37 +0100
----
- xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c b/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
-index c893d246defa..66b4811af24a 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
-@@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ void __init ehci_dbgp_init(void)
-         unsigned int num = 0;
- 
-         if ( opt_dbgp[4] )
--            simple_strtoul(opt_dbgp + 4, &e, 10);
-+            num = simple_strtoul(opt_dbgp + 4, &e, 10);
- 
-         dbgp->cap = find_dbgp(dbgp, num);
-         if ( !dbgp->cap )
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0003-x86-HVM-bound-number-of-pinned-cache-attribute-regio.patch b/0003-x86-HVM-bound-number-of-pinned-cache-attribute-regio.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9974108
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0003-x86-HVM-bound-number-of-pinned-cache-attribute-regio.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 887ba097cfcd4454d4707e1bee6504322335ea79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 12:01:01 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 03/13] x86/HVM: bound number of pinned cache attribute regions
+
+This is exposed via DMOP, i.e. to potentially not fully privileged
+device models. With that we may not permit registration of an (almost)
+unbounded amount of such regions.
+
+This is CVE-2022-42333 / part of XSA-428.
+
+Fixes: 642123c5123f ("x86/hvm: provide XEN_DMOP_pin_memory_cacheattr")
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a5e768640f786b681063f4e08af45d0c4e91debf)
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
+index fb051d59c3..09a51f415d 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
+@@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
+                                  uint64_t gfn_end, uint32_t type)
+ {
+     struct hvm_mem_pinned_cacheattr_range *range;
++    unsigned int nr = 0;
+     int rc = 1;
+ 
+     if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+@@ -667,11 +668,15 @@ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
+             rc = -EBUSY;
+             break;
+         }
++        ++nr;
+     }
+     rcu_read_unlock(&pinned_cacheattr_rcu_lock);
+     if ( rc <= 0 )
+         return rc;
+ 
++    if ( nr >= 64 /* The limit is arbitrary. */ )
++        return -ENOSPC;
++
+     range = xzalloc(struct hvm_mem_pinned_cacheattr_range);
+     if ( range == NULL )
+         return -ENOMEM;
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0004-tools-xenstored-Harden-corrupt.patch b/0004-tools-xenstored-Harden-corrupt.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c9e6852..0000000
--- a/0004-tools-xenstored-Harden-corrupt.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 7fe638c28fa693d8bb8f9419de1220d4359a1b2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:23:01 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 004/126] tools/xenstored: Harden corrupt()
-
-At the moment, corrupt() is neither checking for allocation failure
-nor freeing the allocated memory.
-
-Harden the code by printing ENOMEM if the allocation failed and
-free 'str' after the last use.
-
-This is not considered to be a security issue because corrupt() should
-only be called when Xenstored thinks the database is corrupted. Note
-that the trigger (i.e. a guest reliably provoking the call) would be
-a security issue.
-
-Fixes: 06d17943f0cd ("Added a basic integrity checker, and some basic ability to recover from store")
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-master commit: db3382dd4f468c763512d6bf91c96773395058fb
-master date: 2022-06-23 13:44:10 +0100
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 8033c1e0eb28..9172dd767140 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1988,7 +1988,10 @@ void corrupt(struct connection *conn, const char *fmt, ...)
- 	va_end(arglist);
- 
- 	log("corruption detected by connection %i: err %s: %s",
--	    conn ? (int)conn->id : -1, strerror(saved_errno), str);
-+	    conn ? (int)conn->id : -1, strerror(saved_errno),
-+	    str ?: "ENOMEM");
-+
-+	talloc_free(str);
- 
- 	check_store();
- }
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0004-x86-HVM-serialize-pinned-cache-attribute-list-manipu.patch b/0004-x86-HVM-serialize-pinned-cache-attribute-list-manipu.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b655f04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0004-x86-HVM-serialize-pinned-cache-attribute-list-manipu.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From fc7dfd94432f4c55a97e86ff63387bfac5da58e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 12:01:01 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 04/13] x86/HVM: serialize pinned cache attribute list
+ manipulation
+
+While the RCU variants of list insertion and removal allow lockless list
+traversal (with RCU just read-locked), insertions and removals still
+need serializing amongst themselves. To keep things simple, use the
+domain lock for this purpose.
+
+This is CVE-2022-42334 / part of XSA-428.
+
+Fixes: 642123c5123f ("x86/hvm: provide XEN_DMOP_pin_memory_cacheattr")
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 829ec245cf66560e3b50d140ccb3168e7fb7c945)
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
+index 09a51f415d..1d31def3c3 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c
+@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static void free_pinned_cacheattr_entry(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
+                                  uint64_t gfn_end, uint32_t type)
+ {
+-    struct hvm_mem_pinned_cacheattr_range *range;
++    struct hvm_mem_pinned_cacheattr_range *range, *newr;
+     unsigned int nr = 0;
+     int rc = 1;
+ 
+@@ -609,14 +609,15 @@ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
+     {
+     case XEN_DOMCTL_DELETE_MEM_CACHEATTR:
+         /* Remove the requested range. */
+-        rcu_read_lock(&pinned_cacheattr_rcu_lock);
+-        list_for_each_entry_rcu ( range,
+-                                  &d->arch.hvm.pinned_cacheattr_ranges,
+-                                  list )
++        domain_lock(d);
++        list_for_each_entry ( range,
++                              &d->arch.hvm.pinned_cacheattr_ranges,
++                              list )
+             if ( range->start == gfn_start && range->end == gfn_end )
+             {
+-                rcu_read_unlock(&pinned_cacheattr_rcu_lock);
+                 list_del_rcu(&range->list);
++                domain_unlock(d);
++
+                 type = range->type;
+                 call_rcu(&range->rcu, free_pinned_cacheattr_entry);
+                 p2m_memory_type_changed(d);
+@@ -637,7 +638,7 @@ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
+                 }
+                 return 0;
+             }
+-        rcu_read_unlock(&pinned_cacheattr_rcu_lock);
++        domain_unlock(d);
+         return -ENOENT;
+ 
+     case PAT_TYPE_UC_MINUS:
+@@ -652,7 +653,10 @@ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
+         return -EINVAL;
+     }
+ 
+-    rcu_read_lock(&pinned_cacheattr_rcu_lock);
++    newr = xzalloc(struct hvm_mem_pinned_cacheattr_range);
++
++    domain_lock(d);
++
+     list_for_each_entry_rcu ( range,
+                               &d->arch.hvm.pinned_cacheattr_ranges,
+                               list )
+@@ -670,27 +674,34 @@ int hvm_set_mem_pinned_cacheattr(struct domain *d, uint64_t gfn_start,
+         }
+         ++nr;
+     }
+-    rcu_read_unlock(&pinned_cacheattr_rcu_lock);
++
+     if ( rc <= 0 )
+-        return rc;
++        /* nothing */;
++    else if ( nr >= 64 /* The limit is arbitrary. */ )
++        rc = -ENOSPC;
++    else if ( !newr )
++        rc = -ENOMEM;
++    else
++    {
++        newr->start = gfn_start;
++        newr->end = gfn_end;
++        newr->type = type;
+ 
+-    if ( nr >= 64 /* The limit is arbitrary. */ )
+-        return -ENOSPC;
++        list_add_rcu(&newr->list, &d->arch.hvm.pinned_cacheattr_ranges);
+ 
+-    range = xzalloc(struct hvm_mem_pinned_cacheattr_range);
+-    if ( range == NULL )
+-        return -ENOMEM;
++        newr = NULL;
++        rc = 0;
++    }
++
++    domain_unlock(d);
+ 
+-    range->start = gfn_start;
+-    range->end = gfn_end;
+-    range->type = type;
++    xfree(newr);
+ 
+-    list_add_rcu(&range->list, &d->arch.hvm.pinned_cacheattr_ranges);
+     p2m_memory_type_changed(d);
+     if ( type != PAT_TYPE_WRBACK )
+         flush_all(FLUSH_CACHE);
+ 
+-    return 0;
++    return rc;
+ }
+ 
+ static int hvm_save_mtrr_msr(struct vcpu *v, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0005-x86-spec-ctrl-Defer-CR4_PV32_RESTORE-on-the-cstar_en.patch b/0005-x86-spec-ctrl-Defer-CR4_PV32_RESTORE-on-the-cstar_en.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a65bda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0005-x86-spec-ctrl-Defer-CR4_PV32_RESTORE-on-the-cstar_en.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 11193e13e5359ba1896be46be3e9b468154c1295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 21:11:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 05/13] x86/spec-ctrl: Defer CR4_PV32_RESTORE on the
+ cstar_enter path
+
+As stated (correctly) by the comment next to SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV, between
+the two hunks visible in the patch, RET's are not safe prior to this point.
+
+CR4_PV32_RESTORE hides a CALL/RET pair in certain configurations (PV32
+compiled in, SMEP or SMAP active), and the RET can be attacked with one of
+several known speculative issues.
+
+Furthermore, CR4_PV32_RESTORE also hides a reference to the cr4_pv32_mask
+global variable, which is not safe when XPTI is active before restoring Xen's
+full pagetables.
+
+This crash has gone unnoticed because it is only AMD CPUs which permit the
+SYSCALL instruction in compatibility mode, and these are not vulnerable to
+Meltdown so don't activate XPTI by default.
+
+This is XSA-429 / CVE-2022-42331
+
+Fixes: 5e7962901131 ("x86/entry: Organise the use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point")
+Fixes: 5784de3e2067 ("x86: Meltdown band-aid against malicious 64-bit PV guests")
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+(cherry picked from commit df5b055b12116d9e63ced59ae5389e69a2a3de48)
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+index 5c999271e6..09a86768ac 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+@@ -206,7 +206,6 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter)
+         ALTERNATIVE "", "setssbsy", X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK
+ #endif
+         push  %rax          /* Guest %rsp */
+-        CR4_PV32_RESTORE
+         movq  8(%rsp), %rax /* Restore guest %rax. */
+         movq  $FLAT_USER_SS32, 8(%rsp) /* Assume a 64bit domain.  Compat handled lower. */
+         pushq %r11
+@@ -230,6 +229,8 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter)
+ .Lcstar_cr3_okay:
+         sti
+ 
++        CR4_PV32_RESTORE
++
+         movq  STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(current_vcpu)(%rbx), %rbx
+         movq  VCPU_domain(%rbx),%rcx
+         cmpb  $0,DOMAIN_is_32bit_pv(%rcx)
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0005-x86-spec-ctrl-Only-adjust-MSR_SPEC_CTRL-for-idle-wit.patch b/0005-x86-spec-ctrl-Only-adjust-MSR_SPEC_CTRL-for-idle-wit.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dcfc447..0000000
--- a/0005-x86-spec-ctrl-Only-adjust-MSR_SPEC_CTRL-for-idle-wit.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From 799a8d49237a62ea0d33c3756a6a7f665b8389b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:23:32 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 005/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Only adjust MSR_SPEC_CTRL for idle
- with legacy IBRS
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Back at the time of the original Spectre-v2 fixes, it was recommended to clear
-MSR_SPEC_CTRL when going idle.  This is because of the side effects on the
-sibling thread caused by the microcode IBRS and STIBP implementations which
-were retrofitted to existing CPUs.
-
-However, there are no relevant cross-thread impacts for the hardware
-IBRS/STIBP implementations, so this logic should not be used on Intel CPUs
-supporting eIBRS, or any AMD CPUs; doing so only adds unnecessary latency to
-the idle path.
-
-Furthermore, there's no point playing with MSR_SPEC_CTRL in the idle paths if
-SMT is disabled for other reasons.
-
-Fixes: 8d03080d2a33 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Cease using thunk=lfence on AMD")
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-master commit: ffc7694e0c99eea158c32aa164b7d1e1bb1dc46b
-master date: 2022-06-30 18:07:13 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c          | 10 ++++++++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h |  2 +-
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h   |  5 +++--
- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 83b856fa9158..eb7fb70e86f9 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -1103,8 +1103,14 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-     /* (Re)init BSP state now that default_spec_ctrl_flags has been calculated. */
-     init_shadow_spec_ctrl_state();
- 
--    /* If Xen is using any MSR_SPEC_CTRL settings, adjust the idle path. */
--    if ( default_xen_spec_ctrl )
-+    /*
-+     * For microcoded IBRS only (i.e. Intel, pre eIBRS), it is recommended to
-+     * clear MSR_SPEC_CTRL before going idle, to avoid impacting sibling
-+     * threads.  Activate this if SMT is enabled, and Xen is using a non-zero
-+     * MSR_SPEC_CTRL setting.
-+     */
-+    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) &&
-+         hw_smt_enabled && default_xen_spec_ctrl )
-         setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_IDLE);
- 
-     xpti_init_default(caps);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-index 9eaab7a2a1fa..f7488d3ccbfa 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_HVM,        X86_SYNTH(17)) /* MSR_SPEC_CTRL used by Xen fo
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_PV,         X86_SYNTH(18)) /* RSB overwrite needed for PV */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM,        X86_SYNTH(19)) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SELFSNOOP,     X86_SYNTH(20)) /* SELFSNOOP gets used by Xen itself */
--XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE,       X86_SYNTH(21)) /* (SC_MSR_PV || SC_MSR_HVM) && default_xen_spec_ctrl */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE,       X86_SYNTH(21)) /* Clear MSR_SPEC_CTRL on idle */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR,           X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */
- /* Bits 23,24 unused. */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE,      X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index 68f6c46c470c..12283573cdd5 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static always_inline void spec_ctrl_enter_idle(struct cpu_info *info)
-     uint32_t val = 0;
- 
-     /*
--     * Branch Target Injection:
-+     * It is recommended in some cases to clear MSR_SPEC_CTRL when going idle,
-+     * to avoid impacting sibling threads.
-      *
-      * Latch the new shadow value, then enable shadowing, then update the MSR.
-      * There are no SMP issues here; only local processor ordering concerns.
-@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static always_inline void spec_ctrl_exit_idle(struct cpu_info *info)
-     uint32_t val = info->xen_spec_ctrl;
- 
-     /*
--     * Branch Target Injection:
-+     * Restore MSR_SPEC_CTRL on exit from idle.
-      *
-      * Disable shadowing before updating the MSR.  There are no SMP issues
-      * here; only local processor ordering concerns.
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0006-tools-Drop-gettext-as-a-build-dependency.patch b/0006-tools-Drop-gettext-as-a-build-dependency.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9aaae10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0006-tools-Drop-gettext-as-a-build-dependency.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+From 708b0d75e77a8305a756b55eefa0f226212f4d36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 11:25:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 06/13] tools: Drop gettext as a build dependency
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+It has not been a dependency since at least 4.13.  Remove its mandatory check
+from ./configure.
+
+Annotate the dependency in the CI dockerfiles, and drop them from CirrusCI and
+TravisCI.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+(cherry picked from commit e21a6a4f966a7e91cb0bb014dbe15d15cc0502ad)
+---
+ .cirrus.yml        |  2 +-
+ .travis.yml        |  1 -
+ README             |  1 -
+ tools/configure    | 49 ----------------------------------------------
+ tools/configure.ac |  2 --
+ 5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 54 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/.cirrus.yml b/.cirrus.yml
+index 0efff6fa98..fdb1c9c94d 100644
+--- a/.cirrus.yml
++++ b/.cirrus.yml
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ freebsd_template: &FREEBSD_TEMPLATE
+     APPEND_LIB: /usr/local/lib
+     APPEND_INCLUDES: /usr/local/include
+ 
+-  install_script: pkg install -y seabios gettext-tools gmake
++  install_script: pkg install -y seabios gmake
+                                  pkgconf python libiconv bison perl5
+                                  yajl lzo2 pixman argp-standalone
+                                  libxml2 glib git
+diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
+index 2362475f7a..f3cd15b79f 100644
+--- a/.travis.yml
++++ b/.travis.yml
+@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ addons:
+             - pkg-config
+             - flex
+             - bison
+-            - gettext
+             - acpica-tools
+             - bin86
+             - bcc
+diff --git a/README b/README
+index de579080d7..efaa1451cb 100644
+--- a/README
++++ b/README
+@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ provided by your OS distributor:
+     * bridge-utils package (/sbin/brctl)
+     * iproute package (/sbin/ip)
+     * GNU bison and GNU flex
+-    * GNU gettext
+     * ACPI ASL compiler (iasl)
+ 
+ In addition to the above there are a number of optional build
+diff --git a/tools/configure b/tools/configure
+index bb5acf9d43..5df30df9b3 100755
+--- a/tools/configure
++++ b/tools/configure
+@@ -689,7 +689,6 @@ INSTALL_PROGRAM
+ SET_MAKE
+ AWK
+ IASL
+-XGETTEXT
+ FLEX
+ BISON
+ PERL
+@@ -847,7 +846,6 @@ PYTHON
+ PERL
+ BISON
+ FLEX
+-XGETTEXT
+ AS86
+ LD86
+ BCC
+@@ -1597,7 +1595,6 @@ Some influential environment variables:
+   PERL        Path to Perl parser
+   BISON       Path to Bison parser generator
+   FLEX        Path to Flex lexical analyser generator
+-  XGETTEXT    Path to xgetttext tool
+   AS86        Path to as86 tool
+   LD86        Path to ld86 tool
+   BCC         Path to bcc tool
+@@ -4738,7 +4735,6 @@ LDFLAGS="$PREPEND_LDFLAGS $LDFLAGS $APPEND_LDFLAGS"
+ 
+ 
+ 
+-
+ # Checks for programs.
+ ac_ext=c
+ ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+@@ -7846,51 +7842,6 @@ fi
+ 
+ if ! $rump; then
+ 
+-# Extract the first word of "xgettext", so it can be a program name with args.
+-set dummy xgettext; ac_word=$2
+-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+-if ${ac_cv_path_XGETTEXT+:} false; then :
+-  $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+-else
+-  case $XGETTEXT in
+-  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+-  ac_cv_path_XGETTEXT="$XGETTEXT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+-  ;;
+-  *)
+-  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+-for as_dir in $PATH
+-do
+-  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+-  test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+-    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+-  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+-    ac_cv_path_XGETTEXT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+-    $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+-    break 2
+-  fi
+-done
+-  done
+-IFS=$as_save_IFS
+-
+-  test -z "$ac_cv_path_XGETTEXT" && ac_cv_path_XGETTEXT="no"
+-  ;;
+-esac
+-fi
+-XGETTEXT=$ac_cv_path_XGETTEXT
+-if test -n "$XGETTEXT"; then
+-  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $XGETTEXT" >&5
+-$as_echo "$XGETTEXT" >&6; }
+-else
+-  { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+-fi
+-
+-
+-if test x"${XGETTEXT}" = x"no"
+-then
+-    as_fn_error $? "Unable to find xgettext, please install xgettext" "$LINENO" 5
+-fi
+ case "$host_cpu" in
+ i[3456]86|x86_64|aarch64)
+     # Extract the first word of "iasl", so it can be a program name with args.
+diff --git a/tools/configure.ac b/tools/configure.ac
+index 636e7077be..6414fcbb44 100644
+--- a/tools/configure.ac
++++ b/tools/configure.ac
+@@ -298,7 +298,6 @@ AC_ARG_VAR([PYTHON], [Path to the Python parser])
+ AC_ARG_VAR([PERL], [Path to Perl parser])
+ AC_ARG_VAR([BISON], [Path to Bison parser generator])
+ AC_ARG_VAR([FLEX], [Path to Flex lexical analyser generator])
+-AC_ARG_VAR([XGETTEXT], [Path to xgetttext tool])
+ AC_ARG_VAR([AS86], [Path to as86 tool])
+ AC_ARG_VAR([LD86], [Path to ld86 tool])
+ AC_ARG_VAR([BCC], [Path to bcc tool])
+@@ -381,7 +380,6 @@ AS_IF([test "$cross_compiling" != yes], [
+ 
+ if ! $rump; then
+ 
+-AX_PATH_PROG_OR_FAIL([XGETTEXT], [xgettext])
+ dnl as86, ld86, bcc and iasl are only required when the host system is x86*.
+ dnl "host" here means the platform on which the hypervisor and tools is
+ dnl going to run, not the platform on which we are building (known as
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0006-x86-spec-ctrl-Knobs-for-STIBP-and-PSFD-and-follow-ha.patch b/0006-x86-spec-ctrl-Knobs-for-STIBP-and-PSFD-and-follow-ha.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 177d677..0000000
--- a/0006-x86-spec-ctrl-Knobs-for-STIBP-and-PSFD-and-follow-ha.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
-From cd5081e8c31651e623d86532306b4c56bbcb6e6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:24:11 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 006/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Knobs for STIBP and PSFD, and follow
- hardware STIBP hint
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-STIBP and PSFD are slightly weird bits, because they're both implied by other
-bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL.  Add fine grain controls for them, and take the
-implications into account when setting IBRS/SSBD.
-
-Rearrange the IBPB text/variables/logic to keep all the MSR_SPEC_CTRL bits
-together, for consistency.
-
-However, AMD have a hardware hint CPUID bit recommending that STIBP be set
-unilaterally.  This is advertised on Zen3, so follow the recommendation.
-Furthermore, in such cases, set STIBP behind the guest's back for now.  This
-has negligible overhead for the guest, but saves a WRMSR on vmentry.  This is
-the only default change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-master commit: fef244b179c06fcdfa581f7d57fa6e578c49ff50
-master date: 2022-06-30 18:07:13 +0100
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 21 +++++++---
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c       |  9 +++++
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c          | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-index e17a835ed254..1db3da9ef78e 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-@@ -2170,8 +2170,9 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`).
- 
- ### spec-ctrl (x86)
- > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>,
-->              bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu,
-->              l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]`
-+>              bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
-+>              eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,
-+>              unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]`
- 
- Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations.  By default, Xen
- will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support,
-@@ -2221,9 +2222,10 @@ On hardware supporting IBRS (Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation), the
- If Xen is not using IBRS itself, functionality is still set up so IBRS can be
- virtualised for guests.
- 
--On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=`
--option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch
--prediction barriers on vcpu context switches.
-+On hardware supporting STIBP (Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors), the
-+`stibp=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.
-+By default, Xen will use STIBP when IBRS is in use (IBRS implies STIBP), and
-+when hardware hints recommend using it as a blanket setting.
- 
- On hardware supporting SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable), the `ssbd=`
- option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.  On AMD
-@@ -2231,6 +2233,15 @@ hardware, this is a global option applied at boot, and not virtualised for
- guest use.  On Intel hardware, the feature is virtualised for guests,
- independently of Xen's choice of setting.
- 
-+On hardware supporting PSFD (Predictive Store Forwarding Disable), the `psfd=`
-+option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.  By
-+default, Xen will not use PSFD.  PSFD is implied by SSBD, and SSBD is off by
-+default.
-+
-+On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=`
-+option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch
-+prediction barriers on vcpu context switches.
-+
- On all hardware, the `eager-fpu=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen
- from using fully eager FPU context switches.  This is currently implemented as
- a global control.  By default, Xen will choose to use fully eager context
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
-index 55da9302e5d7..a0bf9f4e056a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
- #include <asm/hvm/support.h>
- #include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h>
- #include <asm/hvm/svm/svmdebug.h>
-+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
- 
- struct vmcb_struct *alloc_vmcb(void)
- {
-@@ -175,6 +176,14 @@ static int construct_vmcb(struct vcpu *v)
-             vmcb->_pause_filter_thresh = SVM_PAUSETHRESH_INIT;
-     }
- 
-+    /*
-+     * When default_xen_spec_ctrl simply SPEC_CTRL_STIBP, default this behind
-+     * the back of the VM too.  Our SMT topology isn't accurate, the overhead
-+     * is neglegable, and doing this saves a WRMSR on the vmentry path.
-+     */
-+    if ( default_xen_spec_ctrl == SPEC_CTRL_STIBP )
-+        v->arch.msrs->spec_ctrl.raw = SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index eb7fb70e86f9..8212227ee02a 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -48,9 +48,13 @@ static enum ind_thunk {
-     THUNK_LFENCE,
-     THUNK_JMP,
- } opt_thunk __initdata = THUNK_DEFAULT;
-+
- static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1;
-+int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1;
-+bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd;
-+int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1;
-+
- bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true;
--bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd = false;
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1;
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1;
- bool __read_mostly opt_branch_harden = true;
-@@ -172,12 +176,20 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-             else
-                 rc = -EINVAL;
-         }
-+
-+        /* Bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL. */
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibrs", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-             opt_ibrs = val;
--        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
--            opt_ibpb = val;
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("stibp", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+            opt_stibp = val;
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ssbd", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-             opt_ssbd = val;
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("psfd", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+            opt_psfd = val;
-+
-+        /* Misc settings. */
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+            opt_ibpb = val;
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("eager-fpu", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-             opt_eager_fpu = val;
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-@@ -376,7 +388,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-                "\n");
- 
-     /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
--    printk("  Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            thunk == THUNK_NONE      ? "N/A" :
-            thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" :
-            thunk == THUNK_LFENCE    ? "LFENCE" :
-@@ -390,6 +402,9 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-            (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) &&
-             !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))     ? "" :
-            (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)  ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-",
-+           (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) &&
-+            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PSFD))   ? "" :
-+           (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_PSFD)  ? " PSFD+" : " PSFD-",
-            !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)              ? "" :
-            (opt_tsx & 1)                             ? " TSX+" : " TSX-",
-            !cpu_has_srbds_ctrl                       ? "" :
-@@ -950,10 +965,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-         if ( !has_spec_ctrl )
-             printk(XENLOG_WARNING "?!? CET active, but no MSR_SPEC_CTRL?\n");
-         else if ( opt_ibrs == -1 )
--        {
-             opt_ibrs = ibrs = true;
--            default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
--        }
- 
-         if ( opt_thunk == THUNK_DEFAULT || opt_thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE )
-             thunk = THUNK_JMP;
-@@ -1057,14 +1069,49 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM);
-     }
- 
--    /* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */
-+    /* Figure out default_xen_spec_ctrl. */
-     if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs )
--        default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-+    {
-+        /* IBRS implies STIBP.  */
-+        if ( opt_stibp == -1 )
-+            opt_stibp = 1;
-+
-+        default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Use STIBP by default if the hardware hint is set.  Otherwise, leave it
-+     * off as it a severe performance pentalty on pre-eIBRS Intel hardware
-+     * where it was retrofitted in microcode.
-+     */
-+    if ( opt_stibp == -1 )
-+        opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS);
-+
-+    if ( opt_stibp && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
-+                       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) )
-+        default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
- 
--    /* If we have SSBD available, see whether we should use it. */
-     if ( opt_ssbd && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) ||
-                       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) )
-+    {
-+        /* SSBD implies PSFD */
-+        if ( opt_psfd == -1 )
-+            opt_psfd = 1;
-+
-         default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Don't use PSFD by default.  AMD designed the predictor to
-+     * auto-clear on privilege change.  PSFD is implied by SSBD, which is
-+     * off by default.
-+     */
-+    if ( opt_psfd == -1 )
-+        opt_psfd = 0;
-+
-+    if ( opt_psfd && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) ||
-+                      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PSFD)) )
-+        default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_PSFD;
- 
-     /*
-      * PV guests can poison the RSB to any virtual address from which
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0007-CI-Drop-TravisCI.patch b/0007-CI-Drop-TravisCI.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb31ecf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0007-CI-Drop-TravisCI.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+From e006948dd27b320602a718e2728678160c61593f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:16:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 07/13] CI: Drop TravisCI
+
+Travis-ci.org is shutting down shortly.  The arm cross-compile testing has
+been broken for a long time now, and all testing has now been superseded by
+our Gitlab infrastructure.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e0dc9b095e7c73dcf6dbfe5c87c33c4708da4d1f)
+
+CI: Drop more TravisCI remnants
+
+This was missed from previous attempts to remove Travis.
+
+Fixes: e0dc9b095e7c ("CI: Drop TravisCI")
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Release-acked-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
+(cherry picked from commit bad4832710c7261fad1abe2d0e8e2e1d259b3e8d)
+---
+ .travis.yml          | 86 --------------------------------------------
+ MAINTAINERS          |  1 -
+ scripts/travis-build | 32 -----------------
+ 3 files changed, 119 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 .travis.yml
+ delete mode 100755 scripts/travis-build
+
+diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
+deleted file mode 100644
+index f3cd15b79f..0000000000
+--- a/.travis.yml
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
+-language: c
+-dist: trusty
+-sudo: required
+-# don't test master, smoke and coverity branches
+-branches:
+-    except:
+-        - master
+-        - smoke
+-        - /^coverity-tested\/.*/
+-        - /^stable-.*/
+-matrix:
+-    include:
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 debug=n
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 XEN_CONFIG_EXPERT=y RANDCONFIG=y debug=n
+-        - compiler: gcc-5
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 debug=n
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 debug=y
+-        - compiler: gcc-5
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 debug=y
+-        - compiler: clang
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 clang=y debug=n
+-        - compiler: clang
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=x86_64 clang=y debug=y
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=arm32 CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf- debug=n
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=arm32 CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf- XEN_CONFIG_EXPERT=y RANDCONFIG=y debug=n
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=arm32 CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf- debug=y
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=arm64 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- debug=n
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=arm64 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- XEN_CONFIG_EXPERT=y RANDCONFIG=y debug=n
+-        - compiler: gcc
+-          env: XEN_TARGET_ARCH=arm64 CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- debug=y
+-addons:
+-    apt:
+-        sources:
+-            - ubuntu-toolchain-r-test
+-        packages:
+-            - zlib1g-dev
+-            - libncurses5-dev
+-            - libssl-dev
+-            - python-dev
+-            - xorg-dev
+-            - uuid-dev
+-            - libyajl-dev
+-            - libaio-dev
+-            - libglib2.0-dev
+-            - libpixman-1-dev
+-            - pkg-config
+-            - flex
+-            - bison
+-            - acpica-tools
+-            - bin86
+-            - bcc
+-            - libnl-3-dev
+-            - ocaml-nox
+-            - libfindlib-ocaml-dev
+-            - transfig
+-            - pandoc
+-            - gcc-arm-linux-gnueabihf
+-            - gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
+-            - gcc-5
+-            - g++-5
+-            - seabios
+-            - checkpolicy
+-            - ghostscript
+-# we must set CXX manually instead of using 'language: cpp' due to
+-# travis-ci/travis-ci#3871
+-before_script:
+-    - export CXX=${CC/cc/++}
+-    - export CXX=${CXX/clang/clang++}
+-script:
+-    - ./scripts/travis-build
+-after_script:
+-    - cat xen/.config
+-    - cat tools/config.log
+-    - cat docs/config.log
+-notifications:
+-    irc:
+-        channels:
+-            - secure: "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"
+diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
+index 91064c09f9..37aa60dd64 100644
+--- a/MAINTAINERS
++++ b/MAINTAINERS
+@@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ S:	Supported
+ F:	.gitlab-ci.yml
+ F:	.travis.yml
+ F:	automation/
+-F:	scripts/travis-build
+ 
+ CPU POOLS
+ M:	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+diff --git a/scripts/travis-build b/scripts/travis-build
+deleted file mode 100755
+index 84d74266a0..0000000000
+--- a/scripts/travis-build
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
+-#!/bin/bash -ex
+-
+-$CC --version
+-
+-# random config or default config
+-if [[ "${RANDCONFIG}" == "y" ]]; then
+-    make -C xen KCONFIG_ALLCONFIG=tools/kconfig/allrandom.config randconfig
+-else
+-    make -C xen defconfig
+-fi
+-
+-# build up our configure options
+-cfgargs=()
+-cfgargs+=("--disable-stubdom") # more work needed into building this
+-cfgargs+=("--disable-rombios")
+-cfgargs+=("--enable-docs")
+-cfgargs+=("--with-system-seabios=/usr/share/seabios/bios.bin")
+-
+-# Qemu requires Python 3.5 or later
+-if ! type python3 || python3 -c "import sys; res = sys.version_info < (3, 5); exit(not(res))"; then
+-    cfgargs+=("--with-system-qemu=/bin/false")
+-fi
+-
+-if [[ "${XEN_TARGET_ARCH}" == "x86_64" ]]; then
+-    cfgargs+=("--enable-tools")
+-else
+-    cfgargs+=("--disable-tools") # we don't have the cross depends installed
+-fi
+-
+-./configure "${cfgargs[@]}"
+-
+-make dist
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0007-libxc-fix-compilation-error-with-gcc13.patch b/0007-libxc-fix-compilation-error-with-gcc13.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 388111e..0000000
--- a/0007-libxc-fix-compilation-error-with-gcc13.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 77deab4233b5d9ec5cf214fdc1652424fd4fc9d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:24:39 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 007/126] libxc: fix compilation error with gcc13
-
-xc_psr.c:161:5: error: conflicting types for 'xc_psr_cmt_get_data'
-due to enum/integer mismatch;
-
-Signed-off-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-master commit: 8eeae8c2b4efefda8e946461e86cf2ae9c18e5a9
-master date: 2022-07-06 13:06:40 +0200
----
- tools/include/xenctrl.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
-index 318920166c5e..2013200b9eff 100644
---- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h
-+++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
-@@ -2577,7 +2577,7 @@ int xc_psr_cmt_get_l3_event_mask(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t *event_mask);
- int xc_psr_cmt_get_l3_cache_size(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t cpu,
-                                  uint32_t *l3_cache_size);
- int xc_psr_cmt_get_data(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t rmid, uint32_t cpu,
--                        uint32_t psr_cmt_type, uint64_t *monitor_data,
-+                        xc_psr_cmt_type type, uint64_t *monitor_data,
-                         uint64_t *tsc);
- int xc_psr_cmt_enabled(xc_interface *xch);
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0008-build-add-full-to-version.sh-to-guess-XEN_FULLVERSIO.patch b/0008-build-add-full-to-version.sh-to-guess-XEN_FULLVERSIO.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..779d805
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0008-build-add-full-to-version.sh-to-guess-XEN_FULLVERSIO.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From b461db64b37f9a04ba5a726b0e474e870226f2ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2021 15:33:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 08/13] build: add --full to version.sh to guess
+ $(XEN_FULLVERSION)
+
+Running $(MAKE) like that in a $(shell ) while parsing the Makefile
+doesn't work reliably. In some case, make will complain with
+"jobserver unavailable: using -j1.  Add '+' to parent make rule.".
+Also, it isn't possible to distinguish between the output produced by
+the target "xenversion" and `make`'s own output.
+
+Instead of running make, this patch "improve" `version.sh` to try to
+guess the output of `make xenversion`.
+
+In order to have version.sh works in more scenario, it will use
+XEN_EXTRAVERSION and XEN_VENDORVERSION from the environment when
+present. As for the cases were those two variables are overridden by a
+make command line arguments, we export them when invoking version.sh
+via a new $(XEN_FULLVERSION) macro.
+
+That should hopefully get us to having ./version.sh returning the same
+value that `make xenversion` would.
+
+This fix GitLab CI's build job "debian-unstable-gcc-arm64".
+
+Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
+(cherry picked from commit ab4a83023eda9f04ad864877c1956b087ec6fc4f)
+---
+ tools/Rules.mk                     |  5 +++++
+ tools/flask/policy/Makefile.common |  2 +-
+ version.sh                         | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/Rules.mk b/tools/Rules.mk
+index 444e5bacdd..051a5d3555 100644
+--- a/tools/Rules.mk
++++ b/tools/Rules.mk
+@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ all:
+ -include $(XEN_ROOT)/config/Tools.mk
+ include $(XEN_ROOT)/Config.mk
+ 
++XEN_FULLVERSION=$(shell env \
++    XEN_EXTRAVERSION=$(XEN_EXTRAVERSION) \
++    XEN_VENDORVERSION=$(XEN_VENDORVERSION) \
++    $(SHELL) $(XEN_ROOT)/version.sh --full $(XEN_ROOT)/xen/Makefile)
++
+ export _INSTALL := $(INSTALL)
+ INSTALL = $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/cross-install
+ 
+diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/Makefile.common b/tools/flask/policy/Makefile.common
+index bea5ba4b6a..e5ed58200e 100644
+--- a/tools/flask/policy/Makefile.common
++++ b/tools/flask/policy/Makefile.common
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ OUTPUT_POLICY ?= $(BEST_POLICY_VER)
+ #
+ ########################################
+ 
+-POLICY_FILENAME = $(FLASK_BUILD_DIR)/xenpolicy-$(shell $(MAKE) -C $(XEN_ROOT)/xen xenversion --no-print-directory)
++POLICY_FILENAME = $(FLASK_BUILD_DIR)/xenpolicy-$(XEN_FULLVERSION)
+ POLICY_LOADPATH = /boot
+ 
+ # List of policy versions supported by the hypervisor
+diff --git a/version.sh b/version.sh
+index e894ee7e04..c6a5692c19 100755
+--- a/version.sh
++++ b/version.sh
+@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
+ #!/bin/sh
+ 
++opt_full=false
++while [ $# -gt 1 ]; do
++    case "$1" in
++        --full) opt_full=true ;;
++        *) break ;;
++    esac
++    shift
++done
++
+ MAJOR=`grep "export XEN_VERSION" $1 | sed 's/.*=//g' | tr -s " "`
+ MINOR=`grep "export XEN_SUBVERSION" $1 | sed 's/.*=//g' | tr -s " "`
+-printf "%d.%d" $MAJOR $MINOR
++
++if $opt_full; then
++    extraversion=$(grep "export XEN_EXTRAVERSION" $1 | sed 's/^.* ?=\s\+//; s/\$([^)]*)//g; s/ //g')
++    : ${XEN_EXTRAVERSION:=${extraversion}${XEN_VENDORVERSION}}
++else
++    unset XEN_EXTRAVERSION
++fi
++printf "%d.%d%s" $MAJOR $MINOR $XEN_EXTRAVERSION
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0008-x86-spec-ctrl-Honour-spec-ctrl-0-for-unpriv-mmio-sub.patch b/0008-x86-spec-ctrl-Honour-spec-ctrl-0-for-unpriv-mmio-sub.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 18ec7de..0000000
--- a/0008-x86-spec-ctrl-Honour-spec-ctrl-0-for-unpriv-mmio-sub.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 5be1f46f435f8b05608b1eae029cb17d8bd3a560 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:25:05 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 008/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Honour spec-ctrl=0 for unpriv-mmio
- sub-option
-
-This was an oversight from when unpriv-mmio was introduced.
-
-Fixes: 8c24b70fedcb ("x86/spec-ctrl: Add spec-ctrl=unpriv-mmio")
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 4cdb519d797c19ebb8fadc5938cdb47479d5a21b
-master date: 2022-07-11 15:21:35 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 8212227ee02a..06790897e496 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-             opt_l1d_flush = 0;
-             opt_branch_harden = false;
-             opt_srb_lock = 0;
-+            opt_unpriv_mmio = false;
-         }
-         else if ( val > 0 )
-             rc = -EINVAL;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0009-bump-default-SeaBIOS-version-to-1.16.0.patch b/0009-bump-default-SeaBIOS-version-to-1.16.0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e96cb31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0009-bump-default-SeaBIOS-version-to-1.16.0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From b11fc96b1e6e474da614b87b6ac97183273c6ebd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 14:46:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/13] bump default SeaBIOS version to 1.16.0
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 944e389daa133dd310d87c4eebacba9f6da76018)
+---
+ Config.mk | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Config.mk b/Config.mk
+index 9696e1a151..381bdf17b1 100644
+--- a/Config.mk
++++ b/Config.mk
+@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ OVMF_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= a3741780fe3535e19e02efa869a7cac481891129
+ QEMU_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= qemu-xen-4.15.4
+ MINIOS_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= xen-RELEASE-4.15.4
+ 
+-SEABIOS_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= rel-1.14.0
++SEABIOS_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= rel-1.16.0
+ 
+ ETHERBOOT_NICS ?= rtl8139 8086100e
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0009-xen-cmdline-Extend-parse_boolean-to-signal-a-name-ma.patch b/0009-xen-cmdline-Extend-parse_boolean-to-signal-a-name-ma.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bfae8e2..0000000
--- a/0009-xen-cmdline-Extend-parse_boolean-to-signal-a-name-ma.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From ae417706870333bb52ebcf33c527809cdd2d7265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:25:40 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 009/126] xen/cmdline: Extend parse_boolean() to signal a name
- match
-
-This will help parsing a sub-option which has boolean and non-boolean options
-available.
-
-First, rework 'int val' into 'bool has_neg_prefix'.  This inverts it's value,
-but the resulting logic is far easier to follow.
-
-Second, reject anything of the form 'no-$FOO=' which excludes ambiguous
-constructs such as 'no-$foo=yes' which have never been valid.
-
-This just leaves the case where everything is otherwise fine, but parse_bool()
-can't interpret the provided string.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 382326cac528dd1eb0d04efd5c05363c453e29f4
-master date: 2022-07-11 15:21:35 +0100
----
- xen/common/kernel.c   | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
- xen/include/xen/lib.h |  3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/kernel.c b/xen/common/kernel.c
-index 7a345ae45e1e..daf965266573 100644
---- a/xen/common/kernel.c
-+++ b/xen/common/kernel.c
-@@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ int parse_bool(const char *s, const char *e)
- int parse_boolean(const char *name, const char *s, const char *e)
- {
-     size_t slen, nlen;
--    int val = !!strncmp(s, "no-", 3);
-+    bool has_neg_prefix = !strncmp(s, "no-", 3);
- 
--    if ( !val )
-+    if ( has_neg_prefix )
-         s += 3;
- 
-     slen = e ? ({ ASSERT(e >= s); e - s; }) : strlen(s);
-@@ -286,11 +286,23 @@ int parse_boolean(const char *name, const char *s, const char *e)
- 
-     /* Exact, unadorned name?  Result depends on the 'no-' prefix. */
-     if ( slen == nlen )
--        return val;
-+        return !has_neg_prefix;
-+
-+    /* Inexact match with a 'no-' prefix?  Not valid. */
-+    if ( has_neg_prefix )
-+        return -1;
- 
-     /* =$SOMETHING?  Defer to the regular boolean parsing. */
-     if ( s[nlen] == '=' )
--        return parse_bool(&s[nlen + 1], e);
-+    {
-+        int b = parse_bool(&s[nlen + 1], e);
-+
-+        if ( b >= 0 )
-+            return b;
-+
-+        /* Not a boolean, but the name matched.  Signal specially. */
-+        return -2;
-+    }
- 
-     /* Unrecognised.  Give up. */
-     return -1;
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/lib.h b/xen/include/xen/lib.h
-index 1198c7c0b207..be7498135170 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/lib.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/lib.h
-@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ int parse_bool(const char *s, const char *e);
- /**
-  * Given a specific name, parses a string of the form:
-  *   [no-]$NAME[=...]
-- * returning 0 or 1 for a recognised boolean, or -1 for an error.
-+ * returning 0 or 1 for a recognised boolean.  Returns -1 for general errors,
-+ * and -2 for "not a boolean, but $NAME= matches".
-  */
- int parse_boolean(const char *name, const char *s, const char *e);
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0010-CI-Drop-automation-configs.patch b/0010-CI-Drop-automation-configs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac5a0eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0010-CI-Drop-automation-configs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 8455998e32d07e103a44826ac7f721639a4ebc26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2022 15:39:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 10/13] CI: Drop automation/configs/
+
+Having 3 extra hypervisor builds on the end of a full build is deeply
+confusing to debug if one of them fails, because the .config file presented in
+the artefacts is not the one which caused a build failure.  Also, the log
+tends to be truncated in the UI.
+
+PV-only is tested as part of PV-Shim in a full build anyway, so doesn't need
+repeating.  HVM-only and neither appear frequently in randconfig, so drop all
+the logic here to simplify things.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 7b20009a812f26e74bdbde2ab96165376b3dad34)
+---
+ automation/configs/x86/hvm_only_config  |  3 ---
+ automation/configs/x86/no_hvm_pv_config |  3 ---
+ automation/configs/x86/pv_only_config   |  3 ---
+ automation/scripts/build                | 21 ---------------------
+ 4 files changed, 30 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 automation/configs/x86/hvm_only_config
+ delete mode 100644 automation/configs/x86/no_hvm_pv_config
+ delete mode 100644 automation/configs/x86/pv_only_config
+
+diff --git a/automation/configs/x86/hvm_only_config b/automation/configs/x86/hvm_only_config
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 9efbddd535..0000000000
+--- a/automation/configs/x86/hvm_only_config
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
+-CONFIG_HVM=y
+-# CONFIG_PV is not set
+-# CONFIG_DEBUG is not set
+diff --git a/automation/configs/x86/no_hvm_pv_config b/automation/configs/x86/no_hvm_pv_config
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 0bf6a8e468..0000000000
+--- a/automation/configs/x86/no_hvm_pv_config
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
+-# CONFIG_HVM is not set
+-# CONFIG_PV is not set
+-# CONFIG_DEBUG is not set
+diff --git a/automation/configs/x86/pv_only_config b/automation/configs/x86/pv_only_config
+deleted file mode 100644
+index e9d8b4a7c7..0000000000
+--- a/automation/configs/x86/pv_only_config
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
+-CONFIG_PV=y
+-# CONFIG_HVM is not set
+-# CONFIG_DEBUG is not set
+diff --git a/automation/scripts/build b/automation/scripts/build
+index 1b752edfe6..fd87b02036 100755
+--- a/automation/scripts/build
++++ b/automation/scripts/build
+@@ -62,24 +62,3 @@ if [[ "${XEN_TARGET_ARCH}" != "x86_32" ]]; then
+         cp -r dist binaries/
+     fi
+ fi
+-
+-if [[ "${hypervisor_only}" == "y" ]]; then
+-    # If we are build testing a specific Kconfig exit now, there's no point in
+-    # testing all the possible configs.
+-    exit 0
+-fi
+-
+-# Build all the configs we care about
+-case ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} in
+-    x86_64) arch=x86 ;;
+-    *) exit 0 ;;
+-esac
+-
+-cfg_dir="automation/configs/${arch}"
+-for cfg in `ls ${cfg_dir}`; do
+-    echo "Building $cfg"
+-    make -j$(nproc) -C xen clean
+-    rm -f xen/.config
+-    make -C xen KBUILD_DEFCONFIG=../../../../${cfg_dir}/${cfg} XEN_CONFIG_EXPERT=y defconfig
+-    make -j$(nproc) -C xen XEN_CONFIG_EXPERT=y
+-done
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0010-x86-spec-ctrl-Add-fine-grained-cmdline-suboptions-fo.patch b/0010-x86-spec-ctrl-Add-fine-grained-cmdline-suboptions-fo.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 621d372..0000000
--- a/0010-x86-spec-ctrl-Add-fine-grained-cmdline-suboptions-fo.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-From 08bfd4d01185e94fda1be9dd79a981d890a9085e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:26:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 010/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Add fine-grained cmdline suboptions
- for primitives
-
-Support controling the PV/HVM suboption of msr-sc/rsb/md-clear, which
-previously wasn't possible.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 27357c394ba6e1571a89105b840ce1c6f026485c
-master date: 2022-07-11 15:21:35 +0100
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 12 ++++--
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c          | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-index 1db3da9ef78e..b06db5f654e5 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-@@ -2169,7 +2169,8 @@ not be able to control the state of the mitigation.
- By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`).
- 
- ### spec-ctrl (x86)
--> `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>,
-+> `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm}=<bool>,
-+>              {msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>,
- >              bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
- >              eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,
- >              unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]`
-@@ -2194,12 +2195,17 @@ in place for guests to use.
- 
- Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid.
- 
--The booleans `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` offer fine
-+The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` options offer fine
- grained control over the primitives by Xen.  These impact Xen's ability to
--protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use.
-+protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use.
- 
- * `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests
-   respectively.
-+* Each other option can be used either as a plain boolean
-+  (e.g. `spec-ctrl=rsb` to control both the PV and HVM sub-options), or with
-+  `pv=` or `hvm=` subsuboptions (e.g. `spec-ctrl=rsb=no-hvm` to disable HVM
-+  RSB only).
-+
- * `msr-sc=` offers control over Xen's support for manipulating `MSR_SPEC_CTRL`
-   on entry and exit.  These blocks are necessary to virtualise support for
-   guests and if disabled, guests will be unable to use IBRS/STIBP/SSBD/etc.
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 06790897e496..225fe08259b3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -147,20 +147,68 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-             opt_rsb_hvm = val;
-             opt_md_clear_hvm = val;
-         }
--        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("msr-sc", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("msr-sc", s, ss)) != -1 )
-         {
--            opt_msr_sc_pv = val;
--            opt_msr_sc_hvm = val;
-+            switch ( val )
-+            {
-+            case 0:
-+            case 1:
-+                opt_msr_sc_pv = opt_msr_sc_hvm = val;
-+                break;
-+
-+            case -2:
-+                s += strlen("msr-sc=");
-+                if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_msr_sc_pv = val;
-+                else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_msr_sc_hvm = val;
-+                else
-+            default:
-+                    rc = -EINVAL;
-+                break;
-+            }
-         }
--        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("rsb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("rsb", s, ss)) != -1 )
-         {
--            opt_rsb_pv = val;
--            opt_rsb_hvm = val;
-+            switch ( val )
-+            {
-+            case 0:
-+            case 1:
-+                opt_rsb_pv = opt_rsb_hvm = val;
-+                break;
-+
-+            case -2:
-+                s += strlen("rsb=");
-+                if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_rsb_pv = val;
-+                else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_rsb_hvm = val;
-+                else
-+            default:
-+                    rc = -EINVAL;
-+                break;
-+            }
-         }
--        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("md-clear", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("md-clear", s, ss)) != -1 )
-         {
--            opt_md_clear_pv = val;
--            opt_md_clear_hvm = val;
-+            switch ( val )
-+            {
-+            case 0:
-+            case 1:
-+                opt_md_clear_pv = opt_md_clear_hvm = val;
-+                break;
-+
-+            case -2:
-+                s += strlen("md-clear=");
-+                if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_md_clear_pv = val;
-+                else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_md_clear_hvm = val;
-+                else
-+            default:
-+                    rc = -EINVAL;
-+                break;
-+            }
-         }
- 
-         /* Xen's speculative sidechannel mitigation settings. */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0011-automation-Remove-CentOS-7.2-containers-and-builds.patch b/0011-automation-Remove-CentOS-7.2-containers-and-builds.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a37b6cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0011-automation-Remove-CentOS-7.2-containers-and-builds.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From c1367de50a304dcb327890d5c69fd7d2f66f1beb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 16:55:36 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 11/13] automation: Remove CentOS 7.2 containers and builds
+
+We already have a container which track the latest CentOS 7, no need
+for this one as well.
+
+Also, 7.2 have outdated root certificate which prevent connection to
+website which use Let's Encrypt.
+
+Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ba512629f76dfddb39ea9133ee51cdd9e392a927)
+---
+ automation/build/centos/7.2.dockerfile  | 51 -------------------------
+ automation/build/centos/CentOS-7.2.repo | 35 -----------------
+ automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml         | 10 -----
+ 3 files changed, 96 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 automation/build/centos/7.2.dockerfile
+ delete mode 100644 automation/build/centos/CentOS-7.2.repo
+
+diff --git a/automation/build/centos/7.2.dockerfile b/automation/build/centos/7.2.dockerfile
+deleted file mode 100644
+index af672a0be1..0000000000
+--- a/automation/build/centos/7.2.dockerfile
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
+-FROM centos:7.2.1511
+-LABEL maintainer.name="The Xen Project" \
+-      maintainer.email="xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org"
+-
+-# ensure we only get bits from the vault for
+-# the version we want
+-COPY CentOS-7.2.repo /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-Base.repo
+-
+-# install EPEL for dev86, xz-devel and possibly other packages
+-RUN yum -y install https://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/epel/epel-release-latest-7.noarch.rpm && \
+-        yum clean all
+-
+-RUN mkdir /build
+-WORKDIR /build
+-
+-# work around https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/10180
+-# and install Xen depends
+-RUN rpm --rebuilddb && \
+-    yum -y install \
+-        yum-plugin-ovl \
+-        gcc \
+-        gcc-c++ \
+-        ncurses-devel \
+-        zlib-devel \
+-        openssl-devel \
+-        python-devel \
+-        libuuid-devel \
+-        pkgconfig \
+-        gettext \
+-        flex \
+-        bison \
+-        libaio-devel \
+-        glib2-devel \
+-        yajl-devel \
+-        pixman-devel \
+-        glibc-devel \
+-        # glibc-devel.i686 for Xen < 4.15
+-        glibc-devel.i686 \
+-        make \
+-        binutils \
+-        git \
+-        wget \
+-        acpica-tools \
+-        python-markdown \
+-        patch \
+-        checkpolicy \
+-        dev86 \
+-        xz-devel \
+-        bzip2 \
+-        nasm \
+-    && yum clean all
+diff --git a/automation/build/centos/CentOS-7.2.repo b/automation/build/centos/CentOS-7.2.repo
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 4da27faeb5..0000000000
+--- a/automation/build/centos/CentOS-7.2.repo
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
+-# CentOS-Base.repo
+-#
+-# This is a replacement file that pins things to just use CentOS 7.2
+-# from the CentOS Vault.
+-#
+-
+-[base]
+-name=CentOS-7.2.1511 - Base
+-baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/7.2.1511/os/$basearch/
+-gpgcheck=1
+-gpgkey=file:///etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-CentOS-7
+-
+-#released updates 
+-[updates]
+-name=CentOS-7.2.1511 - Updates
+-baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/7.2.1511/updates/$basearch/
+-gpgcheck=1
+-gpgkey=file:///etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-CentOS-7
+-
+-#additional packages that may be useful
+-[extras]
+-name=CentOS-7.2.1511 - Extras
+-baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/7.2.1511/extras/$basearch/
+-gpgcheck=1
+-gpgkey=file:///etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-CentOS-7
+-
+-#additional packages that extend functionality of existing packages
+-[centosplus]
+-name=CentOS-7.2.1511 - Plus
+-baseurl=http://vault.centos.org/7.2.1511/centosplus/$basearch/
+-gpgcheck=1
+-gpgcheck=1
+-enabled=0
+-gpgkey=file:///etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-CentOS-7
+-
+diff --git a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+index 6cca2122aa..35a6643c3d 100644
+--- a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
++++ b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+@@ -156,16 +156,6 @@ archlinux-gcc-debug:
+   variables:
+     CONTAINER: archlinux:current
+ 
+-centos-7-2-gcc:
+-  extends: .gcc-x86-64-build
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: centos:7.2
+-
+-centos-7-2-gcc-debug:
+-  extends: .gcc-x86-64-build-debug
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: centos:7.2
+-
+ centos-7-gcc:
+   extends: .gcc-x86-64-build
+   variables:
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0011-tools-helpers-fix-build-of-xen-init-dom0-with-Werror.patch b/0011-tools-helpers-fix-build-of-xen-init-dom0-with-Werror.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 34acad9..0000000
--- a/0011-tools-helpers-fix-build-of-xen-init-dom0-with-Werror.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From f241cc48dabeef6cb0b381db62f2562b0a3970eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:26:47 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 011/126] tools/helpers: fix build of xen-init-dom0 with
- -Werror
-
-Missing prototype of asprintf() without _GNU_SOURCE.
-
-Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-master commit: d693b22733044d68e9974766b5c9e6259c9b1708
-master date: 2022-07-12 08:38:35 +0200
----
- tools/helpers/xen-init-dom0.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/helpers/xen-init-dom0.c b/tools/helpers/xen-init-dom0.c
-index c99224a4b607..b4861c9e8041 100644
---- a/tools/helpers/xen-init-dom0.c
-+++ b/tools/helpers/xen-init-dom0.c
-@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
-+
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdint.h>
- #include <string.h>
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0012-automation-Remove-non-debug-x86_32-build-jobs.patch b/0012-automation-Remove-non-debug-x86_32-build-jobs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b5aa10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0012-automation-Remove-non-debug-x86_32-build-jobs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 7fa798d8615df5e3451fda020d6e1ebc850819c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 17:29:15 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 12/13] automation: Remove non-debug x86_32 build jobs
+
+In the interest of having less jobs, we remove the x86_32 build jobs
+that do release build. Debug build is very likely to be enough to find
+32bit build issues.
+
+Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7b66792ea7f77fb9e587e1e9c530a7c869eecba1)
+---
+ automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml | 20 --------------------
+ 1 file changed, 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+index 35a6643c3d..44f8bc6725 100644
+--- a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
++++ b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+@@ -236,21 +236,11 @@ debian-stretch-gcc-debug:
+   variables:
+     CONTAINER: debian:stretch
+ 
+-debian-stretch-32-clang:
+-  extends: .clang-x86-32-build
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:stretch-i386
+-
+ debian-stretch-32-clang-debug:
+   extends: .clang-x86-32-build-debug
+   variables:
+     CONTAINER: debian:stretch-i386
+ 
+-debian-stretch-32-gcc:
+-  extends: .gcc-x86-32-build
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:stretch-i386
+-
+ debian-stretch-32-gcc-debug:
+   extends: .gcc-x86-32-build-debug
+   variables:
+@@ -288,21 +278,11 @@ debian-unstable-gcc-debug-randconfig:
+     CONTAINER: debian:unstable
+     RANDCONFIG: y
+ 
+-debian-unstable-32-clang:
+-  extends: .clang-x86-32-build
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:unstable-i386
+-
+ debian-unstable-32-clang-debug:
+   extends: .clang-x86-32-build-debug
+   variables:
+     CONTAINER: debian:unstable-i386
+ 
+-debian-unstable-32-gcc:
+-  extends: .gcc-x86-32-build
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:unstable-i386
+-
+ debian-unstable-32-gcc-debug:
+   extends: .gcc-x86-32-build-debug
+   variables:
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0012-libxl-check-return-value-of-libxl__xs_directory-in-n.patch b/0012-libxl-check-return-value-of-libxl__xs_directory-in-n.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ca34af..0000000
--- a/0012-libxl-check-return-value-of-libxl__xs_directory-in-n.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From d470a54087e0fbd813dae4d773ad0b830eeec4a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:26:58 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 012/126] libxl: check return value of libxl__xs_directory in
- name2bdf
-
-libxl__xs_directory() can potentially return NULL without setting `n`.
-As `n` isn't initialised, we need to check libxl__xs_directory()
-return value before checking `n`. Otherwise, `n` might be non-zero
-with `bdfs` NULL which would lead to a segv.
-
-Fixes: 57bff091f4 ("libxl: add 'name' field to 'libxl_device_pci' in the IDL...")
-Reported-by: "G.R." <firemeteor@users.sourceforge.net>
-Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Tested-by: "G.R." <firemeteor@users.sourceforge.net>
-master commit: d778089ac70e5b8e3bdea0c85fc8c0b9ed0eaf2f
-master date: 2022-07-12 08:38:51 +0200
----
- tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
-index 92bf86b2bebd..a5f5cdf62b80 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
-@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int name2bdf(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_pci *pci)
-     int rc = ERROR_NOTFOUND;
- 
-     bdfs = libxl__xs_directory(gc, XBT_NULL, PCI_INFO_PATH, &n);
--    if (!n)
-+    if (!bdfs || !n)
-         goto out;
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0013-CI-Remove-llvm-8-from-the-Debian-Stretch-container.patch b/0013-CI-Remove-llvm-8-from-the-Debian-Stretch-container.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4c6226
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0013-CI-Remove-llvm-8-from-the-Debian-Stretch-container.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+From 7963cdbf91d8a8d2f8338171adab3807b20f658a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 17:59:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 13/13] CI: Remove llvm-8 from the Debian Stretch container
+
+For similar reasons to c/s a6b1e2b80fe20.  While this container is still
+build-able for now, all the other problems with explicitly-versioned compilers
+remain.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 7a298375721636290a57f31bb0f7c2a5a38956a4)
+---
+ automation/build/debian/stretch-llvm-8.list |  3 ---
+ automation/build/debian/stretch.dockerfile  | 12 ---------
+ automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml             | 27 ---------------------
+ 3 files changed, 42 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 automation/build/debian/stretch-llvm-8.list
+
+diff --git a/automation/build/debian/stretch-llvm-8.list b/automation/build/debian/stretch-llvm-8.list
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 09fe843fb2..0000000000
+--- a/automation/build/debian/stretch-llvm-8.list
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
+-# Strech LLVM 8 repos
+-deb http://apt.llvm.org/stretch/ llvm-toolchain-stretch-8 main
+-deb-src http://apt.llvm.org/stretch/ llvm-toolchain-stretch-8 main
+diff --git a/automation/build/debian/stretch.dockerfile b/automation/build/debian/stretch.dockerfile
+index e3bace1f87..09e8a522ea 100644
+--- a/automation/build/debian/stretch.dockerfile
++++ b/automation/build/debian/stretch.dockerfile
+@@ -50,15 +50,3 @@ RUN apt-get update && \
+         apt-get autoremove -y && \
+         apt-get clean && \
+         rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists* /tmp/* /var/tmp/*
+-
+-RUN wget -O - https://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key | apt-key add -
+-COPY stretch-llvm-8.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/
+-
+-RUN apt-get update && \
+-    apt-get --quiet --yes install \
+-        clang-8 \
+-        lld-8 \
+-        && \
+-        apt-get autoremove -y && \
+-        apt-get clean && \
+-        rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists* /tmp/* /var/tmp/*
+diff --git a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+index 44f8bc6725..321e167b57 100644
+--- a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
++++ b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+@@ -26,13 +26,6 @@
+     CXX: clang++
+     clang: y
+ 
+-.clang-8-tmpl:
+-  variables: &clang-8
+-    CC: clang-8
+-    CXX: clang++-8
+-    LD: ld.lld-8
+-    clang: y
+-
+ .x86-64-build-tmpl:
+   <<: *build
+   variables:
+@@ -97,16 +90,6 @@
+   variables:
+     <<: *clang
+ 
+-.clang-8-x86-64-build:
+-  extends: .x86-64-build
+-  variables:
+-    <<: *clang-8
+-
+-.clang-8-x86-64-build-debug:
+-  extends: .x86-64-build-debug
+-  variables:
+-    <<: *clang-8
+-
+ .clang-x86-32-build:
+   extends: .x86-32-build
+   variables:
+@@ -216,16 +199,6 @@ debian-stretch-clang-debug:
+   variables:
+     CONTAINER: debian:stretch
+ 
+-debian-stretch-clang-8:
+-  extends: .clang-8-x86-64-build
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:stretch
+-
+-debian-stretch-clang-8-debug:
+-  extends: .clang-8-x86-64-build-debug
+-  variables:
+-    CONTAINER: debian:stretch
+-
+ debian-stretch-gcc:
+   extends: .gcc-x86-64-build
+   variables:
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
diff --git a/0013-update-Xen-version-to-4.15.4-pre.patch b/0013-update-Xen-version-to-4.15.4-pre.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e8c05b..0000000
--- a/0013-update-Xen-version-to-4.15.4-pre.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 505771bb1dffdf6f763fad18ee49a913b98abfea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:28:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 013/126] update Xen version to 4.15.4-pre
-
----
- xen/Makefile | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/Makefile b/xen/Makefile
-index e9a88325c467..cd66bb3b1c84 100644
---- a/xen/Makefile
-+++ b/xen/Makefile
-@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
- # All other places this is stored (eg. compile.h) should be autogenerated.
- export XEN_VERSION       = 4
- export XEN_SUBVERSION    = 15
--export XEN_EXTRAVERSION ?= .3$(XEN_VENDORVERSION)
-+export XEN_EXTRAVERSION ?= .4-pre$(XEN_VENDORVERSION)
- export XEN_FULLVERSION   = $(XEN_VERSION).$(XEN_SUBVERSION)$(XEN_EXTRAVERSION)
- -include xen-version
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0014-x86-spec-ctrl-Rework-spec_ctrl_flags-context-switchi.patch b/0014-x86-spec-ctrl-Rework-spec_ctrl_flags-context-switchi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1c237f2..0000000
--- a/0014-x86-spec-ctrl-Rework-spec_ctrl_flags-context-switchi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-From 156ab775769d39b2dfb048ccd34dee7e86ba83a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 15:59:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 014/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Rework spec_ctrl_flags context
- switching
-
-We are shortly going to need to context switch new bits in both the vcpu and
-S3 paths.  Introduce SCF_IST_MASK and SCF_DOM_MASK, and rework d->arch.verw
-into d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags to accommodate.
-
-No functional change.
-
-This is part of XSA-407.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 5796912f7279d9348a3166655588d30eae9f72cc)
----
- xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c           |  8 ++++----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c               |  8 ++++----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c            |  9 ++++++---
- xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h        |  3 +--
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h     | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h |  3 ---
- 6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
-index 5eaa77f66a28..dd397f713067 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
-@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ static int enter_state(u32 state)
-         error = 0;
- 
-     ci = get_cpu_info();
--    /* Avoid NMI/#MC using MSR_SPEC_CTRL until we've reloaded microcode. */
--    ci->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_ist_wrmsr;
-+    /* Avoid NMI/#MC using unsafe MSRs until we've reloaded microcode. */
-+    ci->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_IST_MASK;
- 
-     ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE();
- 
-@@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ static int enter_state(u32 state)
-     if ( !recheck_cpu_features(0) )
-         panic("Missing previously available feature(s)\n");
- 
--    /* Re-enabled default NMI/#MC use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL. */
--    ci->spec_ctrl_flags |= (default_spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_ist_wrmsr);
-+    /* Re-enabled default NMI/#MC use of MSRs now microcode is loaded. */
-+    ci->spec_ctrl_flags |= (default_spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_IST_MASK);
- 
-     if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) )
-     {
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 4a61e951facf..79f2c6ab19b8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -2069,10 +2069,10 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
-             }
-         }
- 
--        /* Update the top-of-stack block with the VERW disposition. */
--        info->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_verw;
--        if ( nextd->arch.verw )
--            info->spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_verw;
-+        /* Update the top-of-stack block with the new spec_ctrl settings. */
-+        info->spec_ctrl_flags =
-+            (info->spec_ctrl_flags       & ~SCF_DOM_MASK) |
-+            (nextd->arch.spec_ctrl_flags &  SCF_DOM_MASK);
-     }
- 
-     sched_context_switched(prev, next);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 225fe08259b3..0fabfbe2a9f4 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -981,9 +981,12 @@ void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d)
- {
-     bool pv = is_pv_domain(d);
- 
--    d->arch.verw =
--        (pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm) ||
--        (opt_fb_clear_mmio && is_iommu_enabled(d));
-+    bool verw = ((pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm) ||
-+                 (opt_fb_clear_mmio && is_iommu_enabled(d)));
-+
-+    d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags =
-+        (verw   ? SCF_verw         : 0) |
-+        0;
- }
- 
- void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-index d0df7f83aa0c..7d6483f21bb1 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
-@@ -319,8 +319,7 @@ struct arch_domain
-     uint32_t pci_cf8;
-     uint8_t cmos_idx;
- 
--    /* Use VERW on return-to-guest for its flushing side effect. */
--    bool verw;
-+    uint8_t spec_ctrl_flags; /* See SCF_DOM_MASK */
- 
-     union {
-         struct pv_domain pv;
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index 12283573cdd5..60d6d2dc9407 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -20,12 +20,40 @@
- #ifndef __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__
- #define __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__
- 
--/* Encoding of cpuinfo.spec_ctrl_flags */
-+/*
-+ * Encoding of:
-+ *   cpuinfo.spec_ctrl_flags
-+ *   default_spec_ctrl_flags
-+ *   domain.spec_ctrl_flags
-+ *
-+ * Live settings are in the top-of-stack block, because they need to be
-+ * accessable when XPTI is active.  Some settings are fixed from boot, some
-+ * context switched per domain, and some inhibited in the S3 path.
-+ */
- #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0)
- #define SCF_ist_wrmsr  (1 << 1)
- #define SCF_ist_rsb    (1 << 2)
- #define SCF_verw       (1 << 3)
- 
-+/*
-+ * The IST paths (NMI/#MC) can interrupt any arbitrary context.  Some
-+ * functionality requires updated microcode to work.
-+ *
-+ * On boot, this is easy; we load microcode before figuring out which
-+ * speculative protections to apply.  However, on the S3 resume path, we must
-+ * be able to disable the configured mitigations until microcode is reloaded.
-+ *
-+ * These are the controls to inhibit on the S3 resume path until microcode has
-+ * been reloaded.
-+ */
-+#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_wrmsr)
-+
-+/*
-+ * Some speculative protections are per-domain.  These settings are merged
-+ * into the top-of-stack block in the context switch path.
-+ */
-+#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw)
-+
- #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
- 
- #include <asm/alternative.h>
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-index 5a590bac44aa..66b00d511fc6 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@
- 
- /*
-  * Use in IST interrupt/exception context.  May interrupt Xen or PV context.
-- * Fine grain control of SCF_ist_wrmsr is needed for safety in the S3 resume
-- * path to avoid using MSR_SPEC_CTRL before the microcode introducing it has
-- * been reloaded.
-  */
- .macro SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
- /*
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0015-x86-spec-ctrl-Rename-SCF_ist_wrmsr-to-SCF_ist_sc_msr.patch b/0015-x86-spec-ctrl-Rename-SCF_ist_wrmsr-to-SCF_ist_sc_msr.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a9cc63f..0000000
--- a/0015-x86-spec-ctrl-Rename-SCF_ist_wrmsr-to-SCF_ist_sc_msr.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-From 2cfbca32b9dc3a8d6520549ff468a7f550daf1b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:36:56 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 015/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Rename SCF_ist_wrmsr to SCF_ist_sc_msr
-
-We are about to introduce SCF_ist_ibpb, at which point SCF_ist_wrmsr becomes
-ambiguous.
-
-No functional change.
-
-This is part of XSA-407.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 76d6a36f645dfdbad8830559d4d52caf36efc75e)
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c            | 6 +++---
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h     | 4 ++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 8 ++++----
- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 0fabfbe2a9f4..a6def47061e8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-     {
-         if ( opt_msr_sc_pv )
-         {
--            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_wrmsr;
-+            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_sc_msr;
-             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV);
-         }
- 
-@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-              * Xen's value is not restored atomically.  An early NMI hitting
-              * the VMExit path needs to restore Xen's value for safety.
-              */
--            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_wrmsr;
-+            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_sc_msr;
-             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM);
-         }
-     }
-@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-          * on real hardware matches the availability of MSR_SPEC_CTRL in the
-          * first place.
-          *
--         * No need for SCF_ist_wrmsr because Xen's value is restored
-+         * No need for SCF_ist_sc_msr because Xen's value is restored
-          * atomically WRT NMIs in the VMExit path.
-          *
-          * TODO: Adjust cpu_has_svm_spec_ctrl to be usable earlier on boot.
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index 60d6d2dc9407..6f8b0e09348e 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
-  * context switched per domain, and some inhibited in the S3 path.
-  */
- #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0)
--#define SCF_ist_wrmsr  (1 << 1)
-+#define SCF_ist_sc_msr (1 << 1)
- #define SCF_ist_rsb    (1 << 2)
- #define SCF_verw       (1 << 3)
- 
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
-  * These are the controls to inhibit on the S3 resume path until microcode has
-  * been reloaded.
-  */
--#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_wrmsr)
-+#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_sc_msr)
- 
- /*
-  * Some speculative protections are per-domain.  These settings are merged
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-index 66b00d511fc6..0ff1b118f882 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@
- 
- .L\@_skip_rsb:
- 
--    test $SCF_ist_wrmsr, %al
--    jz .L\@_skip_wrmsr
-+    test $SCF_ist_sc_msr, %al
-+    jz .L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl
- 
-     xor %edx, %edx
-     testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise):
-      * to speculate around the WRMSR.  As a result, we need a dispatch
-      * serialising instruction in the else clause.
-      */
--.L\@_skip_wrmsr:
-+.L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl:
-     lfence
-     UNLIKELY_END(\@_serialise)
- .endm
-@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise):
-  * Requires %rbx=stack_end
-  * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx
-  */
--    testb $SCF_ist_wrmsr, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%rbx)
-+    testb $SCF_ist_sc_msr, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%rbx)
-     jz .L\@_skip
- 
-     DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0016-x86-spec-ctrl-Rename-opt_ibpb-to-opt_ibpb_ctxt_switc.patch b/0016-x86-spec-ctrl-Rename-opt_ibpb-to-opt_ibpb_ctxt_switc.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cfe270c..0000000
--- a/0016-x86-spec-ctrl-Rename-opt_ibpb-to-opt_ibpb_ctxt_switc.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-From c707015bf118df2c43e3a48b3774916322fca50a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2022 21:32:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 016/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Rename opt_ibpb to
- opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch
-
-We are about to introduce the use of IBPB at different points in Xen, making
-opt_ibpb ambiguous.  Rename it to opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch.
-
-No functional change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit a8e5ef079d6f5c88c472e3e620db5a8d1402a50d)
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c           |  2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c        | 10 +++++-----
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h |  2 +-
- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 79f2c6ab19b8..2838f976d729 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -2041,7 +2041,7 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
- 
-         ctxt_switch_levelling(next);
- 
--        if ( opt_ibpb && !is_idle_domain(nextd) )
-+        if ( opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch && !is_idle_domain(nextd) )
-         {
-             static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, last);
-             unsigned int *last_id = &this_cpu(last);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index a6def47061e8..ced0f8c2aea6 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1;
- bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd;
- int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1;
- 
--bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true;
-+bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = true;
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1;
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1;
- bool __read_mostly opt_branch_harden = true;
-@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
- 
-             opt_thunk = THUNK_JMP;
-             opt_ibrs = 0;
--            opt_ibpb = false;
-+            opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = false;
-             opt_ssbd = false;
-             opt_l1d_flush = 0;
-             opt_branch_harden = false;
-@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
- 
-         /* Misc settings. */
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 )
--            opt_ibpb = val;
-+            opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = val;
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("eager-fpu", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-             opt_eager_fpu = val;
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-            (opt_tsx & 1)                             ? " TSX+" : " TSX-",
-            !cpu_has_srbds_ctrl                       ? "" :
-            opt_srb_lock                              ? " SRB_LOCK+" : " SRB_LOCK-",
--           opt_ibpb                                  ? " IBPB"  : "",
-+           opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch                      ? " IBPB-ctxt" : "",
-            opt_l1d_flush                             ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "",
-            opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm ||
-            opt_fb_clear_mmio                         ? " VERW"  : "",
-@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
- 
-     /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */
-     if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) )
--        opt_ibpb = false;
-+        opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = false;
- 
-     /* Check whether Eager FPU should be enabled by default. */
-     if ( opt_eager_fpu == -1 )
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index 6f8b0e09348e..fd8162ca9ab9 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
- void init_speculation_mitigations(void);
- void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d);
- 
--extern bool opt_ibpb;
-+extern bool opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch;
- extern bool opt_ssbd;
- extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu;
- extern int8_t opt_l1d_flush;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0017-x86-spec-ctrl-Rework-SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST.patch b/0017-x86-spec-ctrl-Rework-SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a6bfa5..0000000
--- a/0017-x86-spec-ctrl-Rework-SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From d7f5fb1e2abd0d56cada9bfcf96ab530d214d9aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 15:59:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 017/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Rework SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
-
-We are shortly going to add a conditional IBPB in this path.
-
-Therefore, we cannot hold spec_ctrl_flags in %eax, and rely on only clobbering
-it after we're done with its contents.  %rbx is available for use, and the
-more normal register to hold preserved information in.
-
-With %rax freed up, use it instead of %rdx for the RSB tmp register, and for
-the adjustment to spec_ctrl_flags.
-
-This leaves no use of %rdx, except as 0 for the upper half of WRMSR.  In
-practice, %rdx is 0 from SAVE_ALL on all paths and isn't likely to change in
-the foreseeable future, so update the macro entry requirements to state this
-dependency.  This marginal optimisation can be revisited if circumstances
-change.
-
-No practical change.
-
-This is part of XSA-407.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit e9b8d31981f184c6539f91ec54bd9cae29cdae36)
----
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S         |  4 ++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 21 ++++++++++-----------
- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index 2f3f48ff27c3..9bfc5964a911 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ ENTRY(double_fault)
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(14)
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: abcd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rbx
-@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ handle_ist_exception:
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(14)
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: abcd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-index 0ff1b118f882..15e24cde00d1 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-@@ -251,34 +251,33 @@
-  */
- .macro SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
- /*
-- * Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end
-- * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx
-+ * Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end, %rdx=0
-+ * Clobbers %rax, %rbx, %rcx, %rdx
-  *
-  * This is logical merge of DO_OVERWRITE_RSB and DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY
-  * maybexen=1, but with conditionals rather than alternatives.
-  */
--    movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14), %eax
-+    movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14), %ebx
- 
--    test $SCF_ist_rsb, %al
-+    test $SCF_ist_rsb, %bl
-     jz .L\@_skip_rsb
- 
--    DO_OVERWRITE_RSB tmp=rdx /* Clobbers %rcx/%rdx */
-+    DO_OVERWRITE_RSB         /* Clobbers %rax/%rcx */
- 
- .L\@_skip_rsb:
- 
--    test $SCF_ist_sc_msr, %al
-+    test $SCF_ist_sc_msr, %bl
-     jz .L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl
- 
--    xor %edx, %edx
-+    xor %eax, %eax
-     testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
--    setnz %dl
--    not %edx
--    and %dl, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14)
-+    setnz %al
-+    not %eax
-+    and %al, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14)
- 
-     /* Load Xen's intended value. */
-     mov $MSR_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
-     movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_spec_ctrl)(%r14), %eax
--    xor %edx, %edx
-     wrmsr
- 
-     /* Opencoded UNLIKELY_START() with no condition. */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0018-x86-spec-ctrl-Support-IBPB-on-entry.patch b/0018-x86-spec-ctrl-Support-IBPB-on-entry.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 43b2d76..0000000
--- a/0018-x86-spec-ctrl-Support-IBPB-on-entry.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-From f0d78e0c11d3984c74f34a7325f862dee93a5835 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 13:44:33 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 018/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Support IBPB-on-entry
-
-We are going to need this to mitigate Branch Type Confusion on AMD/Hygon CPUs,
-but as we've talked about using it in other cases too, arrange to support it
-generally.  However, this is also very expensive in some cases, so we're going
-to want per-domain controls.
-
-Introduce SCF_ist_ibpb and SCF_entry_ibpb controls, adding them to the IST and
-DOM masks as appropriate.  Also introduce X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_{PV,HVM} to
-to patch the code blocks.
-
-For SVM, the STGI is serialising enough to protect against Spectre-v1 attacks,
-so no "else lfence" is necessary.  VT-x will use use the MSR host load list,
-so doesn't need any code in the VMExit path.
-
-For the IST path, we can't safely check CPL==0 to skip a flush, as we might
-have hit an entry path before it's IBPB.  As IST hitting Xen is rare, flush
-irrespective of CPL.  A later path, SCF_ist_sc_msr, provides Spectre-v1
-safety.
-
-For the PV paths, we know we're interrupting CPL>0, while for the INTR paths,
-we can safely check CPL==0.  Only flush when interrupting guest context.
-
-An "else lfence" is needed for safety, but we want to be able to skip it on
-unaffected CPUs, so the block wants to be an alternative, which means the
-lfence has to be inline rather than UNLIKELY() (the replacement block doesn't
-have displacements fixed up for anything other than the first instruction).
-
-As with SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST, %rdx is 0 on entry so rely on this to
-shrink the logic marginally.  Update the comments to specify this new
-dependency.
-
-This is part of XSA-407.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 53a570b285694947776d5190f591a0d5b9b18de7)
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S        | 18 ++++++++++-
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c         |  4 +++
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S  |  4 +--
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S         | 10 +++---
- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h   |  2 ++
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h     |  6 ++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 7 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
-index 4ae55a2ef605..0ff4008060fa 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S
-@@ -97,7 +97,19 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap)
- 
-         GET_CURRENT(bx)
- 
--        /* SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_SVM    Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo         Clob: acd */
-+        /* SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_SVM    Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0 Clob: acd */
-+
-+        .macro svm_vmexit_cond_ibpb
-+            testb  $SCF_entry_ibpb, CPUINFO_xen_spec_ctrl(%rsp)
-+            jz     .L_skip_ibpb
-+
-+            mov    $MSR_PRED_CMD, %ecx
-+            mov    $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
-+            wrmsr
-+.L_skip_ibpb:
-+	.endm
-+        ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmexit_cond_ibpb, X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM
-+
-         ALTERNATIVE "", DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM
- 
-         .macro svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl
-@@ -114,6 +126,10 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap)
-         ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-+        /*
-+         * STGI is executed unconditionally, and is sufficiently serialising
-+         * to safely resolve any Spectre-v1 concerns in the above logic.
-+         */
-         stgi
- GLOBAL(svm_stgi_label)
-         mov  %rsp,%rdi
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index f9f9bc18cdbc..dd817cee4e69 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1345,6 +1345,10 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
-         rc = vmx_add_msr(v, MSR_FLUSH_CMD, FLUSH_CMD_L1D,
-                          VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY);
- 
-+    if ( !rc && (d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_entry_ibpb) )
-+        rc = vmx_add_msr(v, MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,
-+                         VMX_MSR_HOST);
-+
-  out:
-     vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-index 0cfe95314249..5c999271e617 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_int82)
-         movl  $HYPERCALL_VECTOR, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL compat=1 /* DPL1 gate, restricted to 32bit PV guests only. */
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         CR4_PV32_RESTORE
-@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter)
-         movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(bx)
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-index 9bfc5964a911..3c8593325606 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
-@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ ENTRY(lstar_enter)
-         movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(bx)
-@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved)
-         movl  $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(bx)
-@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ ENTRY(int80_direct_trap)
-         movl  $0x80, 4(%rsp)
-         SAVE_ALL
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(bx)
-@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ ENTRY(common_interrupt)
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(14)
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ GLOBAL(handle_exception)
- 
-         GET_STACK_END(14)
- 
--        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */
-+        SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */
-         /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
- 
-         mov   STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-index f7488d3ccbfa..b233e5835fb5 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR,           X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE,      X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK,         X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT,           X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_PV,     X86_SYNTH(28)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for PV */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM,    X86_SYNTH(29)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for HVM */
- 
- /* Bug words follow the synthetic words. */
- #define X86_NR_BUG 1
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index fd8162ca9ab9..10cd0cd2518f 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
- #define SCF_ist_sc_msr (1 << 1)
- #define SCF_ist_rsb    (1 << 2)
- #define SCF_verw       (1 << 3)
-+#define SCF_ist_ibpb   (1 << 4)
-+#define SCF_entry_ibpb (1 << 5)
- 
- /*
-  * The IST paths (NMI/#MC) can interrupt any arbitrary context.  Some
-@@ -46,13 +48,13 @@
-  * These are the controls to inhibit on the S3 resume path until microcode has
-  * been reloaded.
-  */
--#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_sc_msr)
-+#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_sc_msr | SCF_ist_ibpb)
- 
- /*
-  * Some speculative protections are per-domain.  These settings are merged
-  * into the top-of-stack block in the context switch path.
-  */
--#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw)
-+#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw | SCF_entry_ibpb)
- 
- #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
- 
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-index 15e24cde00d1..9eb4ad9ab71d 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
-@@ -88,6 +88,35 @@
-  *  - SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_{SVM,VMX}
-  */
- 
-+.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen:req
-+/*
-+ * Requires %rsp=regs (also cpuinfo if !maybexen)
-+ * Requires %r14=stack_end (if maybexen), %rdx=0
-+ * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx
-+ *
-+ * Conditionally issue IBPB if SCF_entry_ibpb is active.  In the maybexen
-+ * case, we can safely look at UREGS_cs to skip taking the hit when
-+ * interrupting Xen.
-+ */
-+    .if \maybexen
-+        testb  $SCF_entry_ibpb, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14)
-+        jz     .L\@_skip
-+        testb  $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
-+    .else
-+        testb  $SCF_entry_ibpb, CPUINFO_xen_spec_ctrl(%rsp)
-+    .endif
-+    jz     .L\@_skip
-+
-+    mov     $MSR_PRED_CMD, %ecx
-+    mov     $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
-+    wrmsr
-+    jmp     .L\@_done
-+
-+.L\@_skip:
-+    lfence
-+.L\@_done:
-+.endm
-+
- .macro DO_OVERWRITE_RSB tmp=rax
- /*
-  * Requires nothing
-@@ -225,12 +254,16 @@
- 
- /* Use after an entry from PV context (syscall/sysenter/int80/int82/etc). */
- #define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV                                         \
-+    ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen=0),     \
-+        X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV;                                      \
-     ALTERNATIVE "", DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV;            \
-     ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=0),         \
-         X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV
- 
- /* Use in interrupt/exception context.  May interrupt Xen or PV context. */
- #define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR                                       \
-+    ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen=1),     \
-+        X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV;                                      \
-     ALTERNATIVE "", DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV;            \
-     ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1),         \
-         X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV
-@@ -254,11 +287,23 @@
-  * Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end, %rdx=0
-  * Clobbers %rax, %rbx, %rcx, %rdx
-  *
-- * This is logical merge of DO_OVERWRITE_RSB and DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY
-- * maybexen=1, but with conditionals rather than alternatives.
-+ * This is logical merge of:
-+ *    DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen=0
-+ *    DO_OVERWRITE_RSB
-+ *    DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1
-+ * but with conditionals rather than alternatives.
-  */
-     movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14), %ebx
- 
-+    test    $SCF_ist_ibpb, %bl
-+    jz      .L\@_skip_ibpb
-+
-+    mov     $MSR_PRED_CMD, %ecx
-+    mov     $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
-+    wrmsr
-+
-+.L\@_skip_ibpb:
-+
-     test $SCF_ist_rsb, %bl
-     jz .L\@_skip_rsb
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0019-x86-cpuid-Enumeration-for-BTC_NO.patch b/0019-x86-cpuid-Enumeration-for-BTC_NO.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 626bfd8..0000000
--- a/0019-x86-cpuid-Enumeration-for-BTC_NO.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From 2b29ac476fa0c91655906fac3512202e514ecbed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 15:48:24 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 019/126] x86/cpuid: Enumeration for BTC_NO
-
-BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not succeptable to Branch Type Confusion.
-
-Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
-
-This is part of XSA-407.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 76cb04ad64f3ab9ae785988c40655a71dde9c319)
----
- tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c              |  1 +
- tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c                      |  2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c                      | 10 ++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c                    |  5 +++--
- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h |  1 +
- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c
-index 9a4eb8015a43..2632efc6adb0 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c
-@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list *cpuid, const char* str)
-         {"virt-ssbd",    0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 25,  1},
-         {"ssb-no",       0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 26,  1},
-         {"psfd",         0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 28,  1},
-+        {"btc-no",       0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 29,  1},
- 
-         {"nc",           0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX,  0,  8},
-         {"apicidsize",   0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 12,  4},
-diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-index 12111fe12d16..e83bc4793d6e 100644
---- a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-+++ b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static const char *const str_e8b[32] =
-     /* [22] */                 [23] = "ppin",
-     [24] = "amd-ssbd",         [25] = "virt-ssbd",
-     [26] = "ssb-no",
--    [28] = "psfd",
-+    [28] = "psfd",             [29] = "btc-no",
- };
- 
- static const char *const str_7d0[32] =
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-index 986672a072b7..675b877f193c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -822,6 +822,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- 			warning_add(text);
- 		}
- 		break;
-+
-+	case 0x19:
-+		/*
-+		 * Zen3 (Fam19h model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
-+		 * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
-+		 * BTC_NO bit.  Fill it back in if we're not virtualised.
-+		 */
-+		if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
-+			__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO, c->x86_capability);
-+		break;
- 	}
- 
- 	display_cacheinfo(c);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index ced0f8c2aea6..9f66c715516c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-      * Hardware read-only information, stating immunity to certain issues, or
-      * suggestions of which mitigation to use.
-      */
--    printk("  Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO)                        ? " RDCL_NO"        : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL)                       ? " IBRS_ALL"       : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA)                           ? " RSBA"           : "",
-@@ -403,7 +403,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ALWAYS))    ? " IBRS_ALWAYS"    : "",
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS))   ? " STIBP_ALWAYS"   : "",
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_FAST))      ? " IBRS_FAST"      : "",
--           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_SAME_MODE)) ? " IBRS_SAME_MODE" : "");
-+           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_SAME_MODE)) ? " IBRS_SAME_MODE" : "",
-+           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))         ? " BTC_NO"         : "");
- 
-     /* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */
-     printk("  Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-index 9686c82ed75c..1bbc7da4b53c 100644
---- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_SSBD,      8*32+24) /*S  MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD,     8*32+25) /*   MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO,        8*32+26) /*A  Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(PSFD,          8*32+28) /*S  MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(BTC_NO,        8*32+29) /*A  Hardware not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
- 
- /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0.edx, word 9 */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A  AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0020-x86-spec-ctrl-Enable-Zen2-chickenbit.patch b/0020-x86-spec-ctrl-Enable-Zen2-chickenbit.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 933660d..0000000
--- a/0020-x86-spec-ctrl-Enable-Zen2-chickenbit.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From 409976bed91f61fb7b053d536d2fc87cf3ad7018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 18:30:25 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 020/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Enable Zen2 chickenbit
-
-... as instructed in the Branch Type Confusion whitepaper.
-
-This is part of XSA-407.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9deaf2d932f08c16c6b96a1c426e4b1142c0cdbe)
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c          | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h          |  1 +
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c        |  6 ++++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-index 675b877f193c..60dbe61a61ca 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -731,6 +731,31 @@ void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- 		printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n");
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation.
-+ *
-+ * Refer to the AMD Branch Type Confusion whitepaper:
-+ * https://XXX
-+ *
-+ * Setting this unnamed bit supposedly causes prediction information on
-+ * non-branch instructions to be ignored.  It is to be set unilaterally in
-+ * newer microcode.
-+ *
-+ * This chickenbit is something unrelated on Zen1, and Zen1 vs Zen2 isn't a
-+ * simple model number comparison, so use STIBP as a heuristic to separate the
-+ * two uarches in Fam17h(AMD)/18h(Hygon).
-+ */
-+void amd_init_spectral_chicken(void)
-+{
-+	uint64_t val, chickenbit = 1 << 1;
-+
-+	if (cpu_has_hypervisor || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP))
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2, val) == 0 && !(val & chickenbit))
-+		wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2, val | chickenbit);
-+}
-+
- static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- {
- 	u32 l, h;
-@@ -783,6 +808,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- 
- 	amd_init_ssbd(c);
- 
-+	if (c->x86 == 0x17)
-+		amd_init_spectral_chicken();
-+
- 	/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
- 	if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch)
- 		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
-index 1a5b3918b37e..e76ab5ce1ae2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
-@@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
- void amd_log_freq(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
- void amd_init_lfence(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
- void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
-+void amd_init_spectral_chicken(void);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
-index 3845e0cf0e89..0cb0e7d55e61 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- 
- 	amd_init_ssbd(c);
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * TODO: Check heuristic safety with Hygon first
-+	if (c->x86 == 0x18)
-+		amd_init_spectral_chicken();
-+	 */
-+
- 	/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
- 	if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch)
- 		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index 1e743461e91d..b4a360723b14 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@
- #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029
- #define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE	(_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
- #define MSR_AMD64_EX_CFG		0xc001102c
-+#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2		0xc00110e3
- 
- #define MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK	0xc0011027
- #define MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK	0xc0011019
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0021-x86-spec-ctrl-Mitigate-Branch-Type-Confusion-when-po.patch b/0021-x86-spec-ctrl-Mitigate-Branch-Type-Confusion-when-po.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 01be575..0000000
--- a/0021-x86-spec-ctrl-Mitigate-Branch-Type-Confusion-when-po.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,305 +0,0 @@
-From 35bf91d30f1a480dcf5bfd99b79384b2b283da7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 19:29:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 021/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate Branch Type Confusion when
- possible
-
-Branch Type Confusion affects AMD/Hygon CPUs on Zen2 and earlier.  To
-mitigate, we require SMT safety (STIBP on Zen2, no-SMT on Zen1), and to issue
-an IBPB on each entry to Xen, to flush the BTB.
-
-Due to performance concerns, dom0 (which is trusted in most configurations) is
-excluded from protections by default.
-
-Therefore:
- * Use STIBP by default on Zen2 too, which now means we want it on by default
-   on all hardware supporting STIBP.
- * Break the current IBPB logic out into a new function, extending it with
-   IBPB-at-entry logic.
- * Change the existing IBPB-at-ctxt-switch boolean to be tristate, and disable
-   it by default when IBPB-at-entry is providing sufficient safety.
-
-If all PV guests on the system are trusted, then it is recommended to boot
-with `spec-ctrl=ibpb-entry=no-pv`, as this will provide an additional marginal
-perf improvement.
-
-This is part of XSA-407 / CVE-2022-23825.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit d8cb7e0f069e0f106d24941355b59b45a731eabe)
----
- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc |  14 ++--
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c          | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h   |   2 +-
- 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-index b06db5f654e5..b73c4a605011 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
-@@ -2170,7 +2170,7 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`).
- 
- ### spec-ctrl (x86)
- > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm}=<bool>,
-->              {msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>,
-+>              {msr-sc,rsb,md-clear,ibpb-entry}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>,
- >              bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
- >              eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,
- >              unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]`
-@@ -2195,9 +2195,10 @@ in place for guests to use.
- 
- Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid.
- 
--The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` options offer fine
--grained control over the primitives by Xen.  These impact Xen's ability to
--protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use.
-+The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=`, `md-clear=` and `ibpb-entry=` options
-+offer fine grained control over the primitives by Xen.  These impact Xen's
-+ability to protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for
-+guests to use.
- 
- * `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests
-   respectively.
-@@ -2216,6 +2217,11 @@ protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use.
-   compatibility with development versions of this fix, `mds=` is also accepted
-   on Xen 4.12 and earlier as an alias.  Consult vendor documentation in
-   preference to here.*
-+* `ibpb-entry=` offers control over whether IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction
-+  Barrier) is used on entry to Xen.  This is used by default on hardware
-+  vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion, but for performance reasons, dom0 is
-+  unprotected by default.  If it necessary to protect dom0 too, boot with
-+  `spec-ctrl=ibpb-entry`.
- 
- If Xen was compiled with INDIRECT_THUNK support, `bti-thunk=` can be used to
- select which of the thunks gets patched into the `__x86_indirect_thunk_%reg`
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 9f66c715516c..563519ce0e31 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ static bool __initdata opt_rsb_hvm = true;
- static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_pv = -1;
- static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_hvm = -1;
- 
-+static int8_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb_entry_pv = -1;
-+static int8_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = -1;
-+static bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb_entry_dom0;
-+
- /* Cmdline controls for Xen's speculative settings. */
- static enum ind_thunk {
-     THUNK_DEFAULT, /* Decide which thunk to use at boot time. */
-@@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1;
- bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd;
- int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1;
- 
--bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = true;
-+int8_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = -1;
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1;
- int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1;
- bool __read_mostly opt_branch_harden = true;
-@@ -114,6 +118,9 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-             opt_rsb_hvm = false;
-             opt_md_clear_pv = 0;
-             opt_md_clear_hvm = 0;
-+            opt_ibpb_entry_pv = 0;
-+            opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = 0;
-+            opt_ibpb_entry_dom0 = false;
- 
-             opt_thunk = THUNK_JMP;
-             opt_ibrs = 0;
-@@ -140,12 +147,14 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-             opt_msr_sc_pv = val;
-             opt_rsb_pv = val;
-             opt_md_clear_pv = val;
-+            opt_ibpb_entry_pv = val;
-         }
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-         {
-             opt_msr_sc_hvm = val;
-             opt_rsb_hvm = val;
-             opt_md_clear_hvm = val;
-+            opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = val;
-         }
-         else if ( (val = parse_boolean("msr-sc", s, ss)) != -1 )
-         {
-@@ -210,6 +219,28 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
-                 break;
-             }
-         }
-+        else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb-entry", s, ss)) != -1 )
-+        {
-+            switch ( val )
-+            {
-+            case 0:
-+            case 1:
-+                opt_ibpb_entry_pv = opt_ibpb_entry_hvm =
-+                    opt_ibpb_entry_dom0 = val;
-+                break;
-+
-+            case -2:
-+                s += strlen("ibpb-entry=");
-+                if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_ibpb_entry_pv = val;
-+                else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 )
-+                    opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = val;
-+                else
-+            default:
-+                    rc = -EINVAL;
-+                break;
-+            }
-+        }
- 
-         /* Xen's speculative sidechannel mitigation settings. */
-         else if ( !strncmp(s, "bti-thunk=", 10) )
-@@ -477,27 +508,31 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-      * mitigation support for guests.
-      */
- #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
--    printk("  Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)   ||
-+            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM) ||
-             opt_eager_fpu)                           ? ""               : " None",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM)      ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM)      ? " RSB"           : "",
-            opt_eager_fpu                             ? " EAGER_FPU"     : "",
--           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)        ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "");
-+           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)        ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "",
-+           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM)  ? " IBPB-entry"    : "");
- 
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_PV
--    printk("  Support for PV VMs:%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Support for PV VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV) ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)  ||
-+            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) ||
-             opt_eager_fpu)                           ? ""               : " None",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV)       ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV)       ? " RSB"           : "",
-            opt_eager_fpu                             ? " EAGER_FPU"     : "",
--           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)        ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "");
-+           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)        ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "",
-+           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV)   ? " IBPB-entry"    : "");
- 
-     printk("  XPTI (64-bit PV only): Dom0 %s, DomU %s (with%s PCID)\n",
-            opt_xpti_hwdom ? "enabled" : "disabled",
-@@ -730,6 +765,55 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
-     }
- }
- 
-+static void __init ibpb_calculations(void)
-+{
-+    /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */
-+    if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) )
-+    {
-+        opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = opt_ibpb_entry_pv = opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = 0;
-+        opt_ibpb_entry_dom0 = false;
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * IBPB-on-entry mitigations for Branch Type Confusion.
-+     *
-+     * IBPB && !BTC_NO selects all AMD/Hygon hardware, not known to be safe,
-+     * that we can provide some form of mitigation on.
-+     */
-+    if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv == -1 )
-+        opt_ibpb_entry_pv = (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) &&
-+                             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
-+                             !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO));
-+    if ( opt_ibpb_entry_hvm == -1 )
-+        opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) &&
-+                              boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
-+                              !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO));
-+
-+    if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv )
-+    {
-+        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV);
-+
-+        /*
-+         * We only need to flush in IST context if we're protecting against PV
-+         * guests.  HVM IBPB-on-entry protections are both atomic with
-+         * NMI/#MC, so can't interrupt Xen ahead of having already flushed the
-+         * BTB.
-+         */
-+        default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_ibpb;
-+    }
-+    if ( opt_ibpb_entry_hvm )
-+        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM);
-+
-+    /*
-+     * If we're using IBPB-on-entry to protect against PV and HVM guests
-+     * (ignoring dom0 if trusted), then there's no need to also issue IBPB on
-+     * context switch too.
-+     */
-+    if ( opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch == -1 )
-+        opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = !(opt_ibpb_entry_hvm && opt_ibpb_entry_pv);
-+}
-+
- /* Calculate whether this CPU is vulnerable to L1TF. */
- static __init void l1tf_calculations(uint64_t caps)
- {
-@@ -985,8 +1069,12 @@ void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d)
-     bool verw = ((pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm) ||
-                  (opt_fb_clear_mmio && is_iommu_enabled(d)));
- 
-+    bool ibpb = ((pv ? opt_ibpb_entry_pv : opt_ibpb_entry_hvm) &&
-+                 (d->domain_id != 0 || opt_ibpb_entry_dom0));
-+
-     d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags =
-         (verw   ? SCF_verw         : 0) |
-+        (ibpb   ? SCF_entry_ibpb   : 0) |
-         0;
- }
- 
-@@ -1133,12 +1221,15 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-     }
- 
-     /*
--     * Use STIBP by default if the hardware hint is set.  Otherwise, leave it
--     * off as it a severe performance pentalty on pre-eIBRS Intel hardware
--     * where it was retrofitted in microcode.
-+     * Use STIBP by default on all AMD systems.  Zen3 and later enumerate
-+     * STIBP_ALWAYS, but STIBP is needed on Zen2 as part of the mitigations
-+     * for Branch Type Confusion.
-+     *
-+     * Leave STIBP off by default on Intel.  Pre-eIBRS systems suffer a
-+     * substantial perf hit when it was implemented in microcode.
-      */
-     if ( opt_stibp == -1 )
--        opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS);
-+        opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP);
- 
-     if ( opt_stibp && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
-                        boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) )
-@@ -1192,9 +1283,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-     if ( opt_rsb_hvm )
-         setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM);
- 
--    /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */
--    if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) )
--        opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = false;
-+    ibpb_calculations();
- 
-     /* Check whether Eager FPU should be enabled by default. */
-     if ( opt_eager_fpu == -1 )
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index 10cd0cd2518f..33e845991b0a 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
- void init_speculation_mitigations(void);
- void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d);
- 
--extern bool opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch;
-+extern int8_t opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch;
- extern bool opt_ssbd;
- extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu;
- extern int8_t opt_l1d_flush;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0022-x86-mm-correct-TLB-flush-condition-in-_get_page_type.patch b/0022-x86-mm-correct-TLB-flush-condition-in-_get_page_type.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b038c4..0000000
--- a/0022-x86-mm-correct-TLB-flush-condition-in-_get_page_type.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From 3859f3ee7e37323ae5e0014c07ba8d3a4d7890b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 15:03:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 022/126] x86/mm: correct TLB flush condition in
- _get_page_type()
-
-When this logic was moved, it was moved across the point where nx is
-updated to hold the new type for the page. IOW originally it was
-equivalent to using x (and perhaps x would better have been used), but
-now it isn't anymore. Switch to using x, which then brings things in
-line again with the slightly earlier comment there (now) talking about
-transitions _from_ writable.
-
-I have to confess though that I cannot make a direct connection between
-the reported observed behavior of guests leaving several pages around
-with pending general references and the change here. Repeated testing,
-nevertheless, confirms the reported issue is no longer there.
-
-This is CVE-2022-33745 / XSA-408.
-
-Reported-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
-Fixes: 8cc5036bc385 ("x86/pv: Fix ABAC cmpxchg() race in _get_page_type()")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: a9949efb288fd6e21bbaf9d5826207c7c41cda27
-master date: 2022-07-26 14:54:34 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-index 7d0747017db5..c88dc749d431 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -2992,7 +2992,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type,
-             if ( unlikely(!cpumask_empty(mask)) &&
-                  /* Shadow mode: track only writable pages. */
-                  (!shadow_mode_enabled(d) ||
--                  ((nx & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page)) )
-+                  ((x & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page)) )
-             {
-                 perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush);
-                 /*
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0023-xl-relax-freemem-s-retry-calculation.patch b/0023-xl-relax-freemem-s-retry-calculation.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1879884..0000000
--- a/0023-xl-relax-freemem-s-retry-calculation.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-From 2173d9c8be28d5f33c0e299a363ac994867d111b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:28:46 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 023/126] xl: relax freemem()'s retry calculation
-
-While in principle possible also under other conditions as long as other
-parallel operations potentially consuming memory aren't "locked out", in
-particular with IOMMU large page mappings used in Dom0 (for PV when in
-strict mode; for PVH when not sharing page tables with HAP) ballooning
-out of individual pages can actually lead to less free memory available
-afterwards. This is because to split a large page, one or more page
-table pages are necessary (one per level that is split).
-
-When rebooting a guest I've observed freemem() to fail: A single page
-was required to be ballooned out (presumably because of heap
-fragmentation in the hypervisor). This ballooning out of a single page
-of course went fast, but freemem() then found that it would require to
-balloon out another page. This repeating just another time leads to the
-function to signal failure to the caller - without having come anywhere
-near the designated 30s that the whole process is allowed to not make
-any progress at all.
-
-Convert from a simple retry count to actually calculating elapsed time,
-subtracting from an initial credit of 30s. Don't go as far as limiting
-the "wait_secs" value passed to libxl_wait_for_memory_target(), though.
-While this leads to the overall process now possibly taking longer (if
-the previous iteration ended very close to the intended 30s), this
-compensates to some degree for the value passed really meaning "allowed
-to run for this long without making progress".
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-master commit: e58370df76eacf1f7ca0340e9b96430c77b41a79
-master date: 2022-07-12 15:25:00 +0200
----
- tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c | 10 +++++++---
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c b/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-index 435155a03396..5dee7730ca76 100644
---- a/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-+++ b/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-@@ -321,7 +321,8 @@ static int domain_wait_event(uint32_t domid, libxl_event **event_r)
-  */
- static bool freemem(uint32_t domid, libxl_domain_config *d_config)
- {
--    int rc, retries = 3;
-+    int rc;
-+    double credit = 30;
-     uint64_t need_memkb, free_memkb;
- 
-     if (!autoballoon)
-@@ -332,6 +333,8 @@ static bool freemem(uint32_t domid, libxl_domain_config *d_config)
-         return false;
- 
-     do {
-+        time_t start;
-+
-         rc = libxl_get_free_memory(ctx, &free_memkb);
-         if (rc < 0)
-             return false;
-@@ -345,12 +348,13 @@ static bool freemem(uint32_t domid, libxl_domain_config *d_config)
- 
-         /* wait until dom0 reaches its target, as long as we are making
-          * progress */
-+        start = time(NULL);
-         rc = libxl_wait_for_memory_target(ctx, 0, 10);
-         if (rc < 0)
-             return false;
- 
--        retries--;
--    } while (retries > 0);
-+        credit -= difftime(time(NULL), start);
-+    } while (credit > 0);
- 
-     return false;
- }
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0024-tools-init-xenstore-domain-fix-memory-map-for-PVH-st.patch b/0024-tools-init-xenstore-domain-fix-memory-map-for-PVH-st.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ccde751..0000000
--- a/0024-tools-init-xenstore-domain-fix-memory-map-for-PVH-st.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From a2684d9cbbfb02b268be7e551674f709db0617a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:29:08 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 024/126] tools/init-xenstore-domain: fix memory map for PVH
- stubdom
-
-In case of maxmem != memsize the E820 map of the PVH stubdom is wrong,
-as it is missing the RAM above memsize.
-
-Additionally the memory map should only specify the Xen special pages
-as reserved.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-master commit: 134d53f577076d4f26091e25762f27cc3c73bf58
-master date: 2022-07-12 15:25:20 +0200
----
- tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c | 14 +++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c b/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c
-index 6836002f0bad..32689abd7479 100644
---- a/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c
-+++ b/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c
-@@ -72,8 +72,9 @@ static int build(xc_interface *xch)
-     char cmdline[512];
-     int rv, xs_fd;
-     struct xc_dom_image *dom = NULL;
--    int limit_kb = (maxmem ? : (memory + 1)) * 1024;
-+    int limit_kb = (maxmem ? : memory) * 1024 + X86_HVM_NR_SPECIAL_PAGES * 4;
-     uint64_t mem_size = MB(memory);
-+    uint64_t max_size = MB(maxmem ? : memory);
-     struct e820entry e820[3];
-     struct xen_domctl_createdomain config = {
-         .ssidref = SECINITSID_DOMU,
-@@ -157,13 +158,16 @@ static int build(xc_interface *xch)
-         dom->mmio_start = LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS;
-         dom->max_vcpus = 1;
-         e820[0].addr = 0;
--        e820[0].size = dom->lowmem_end;
-+        e820[0].size = (max_size > LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS) ?
-+                       LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS : max_size;
-         e820[0].type = E820_RAM;
--        e820[1].addr = LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS;
--        e820[1].size = dom->mmio_size;
-+        e820[1].addr = (X86_HVM_END_SPECIAL_REGION -
-+                        X86_HVM_NR_SPECIAL_PAGES) << XC_PAGE_SHIFT;
-+        e820[1].size = X86_HVM_NR_SPECIAL_PAGES << XC_PAGE_SHIFT;
-         e820[1].type = E820_RESERVED;
-         e820[2].addr = GB(4);
--        e820[2].size = dom->highmem_end - GB(4);
-+        e820[2].size = (max_size > LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS) ?
-+                       max_size - LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS : 0;
-         e820[2].type = E820_RAM;
-     }
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0025-xl-move-freemem-s-credit-expired-loop-exit.patch b/0025-xl-move-freemem-s-credit-expired-loop-exit.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a3b2e2b..0000000
--- a/0025-xl-move-freemem-s-credit-expired-loop-exit.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From c37099426ea678c1d5b6c99ae5ad6834f4edd2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:29:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 025/126] xl: move freemem()'s "credit expired" loop exit
-
-Move the "credit expired" loop exit to the middle of the loop,
-immediately after "return true". This way having reached the goal on the
-last iteration would be reported as success to the caller, rather than
-as "timed out".
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-master commit: d8f8cb8bdd02fad3b6986ae93511f750fa7f7e6a
-master date: 2022-07-18 17:48:18 +0200
----
- tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c | 9 +++++----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c b/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-index 5dee7730ca76..d1c6f8aae67a 100644
---- a/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-+++ b/tools/xl/xl_vmcontrol.c
-@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static bool freemem(uint32_t domid, libxl_domain_config *d_config)
-     if (rc < 0)
-         return false;
- 
--    do {
-+    for (;;) {
-         time_t start;
- 
-         rc = libxl_get_free_memory(ctx, &free_memkb);
-@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static bool freemem(uint32_t domid, libxl_domain_config *d_config)
-         if (free_memkb >= need_memkb)
-             return true;
- 
-+        if (credit <= 0)
-+            return false;
-+
-         rc = libxl_set_memory_target(ctx, 0, free_memkb - need_memkb, 1, 0);
-         if (rc < 0)
-             return false;
-@@ -354,9 +357,7 @@ static bool freemem(uint32_t domid, libxl_domain_config *d_config)
-             return false;
- 
-         credit -= difftime(time(NULL), start);
--    } while (credit > 0);
--
--    return false;
-+    }
- }
- 
- static void reload_domain_config(uint32_t domid,
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0026-x86-spec-ctrl-correct-per-guest-type-reporting-of-MD.patch b/0026-x86-spec-ctrl-correct-per-guest-type-reporting-of-MD.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fbbf450..0000000
--- a/0026-x86-spec-ctrl-correct-per-guest-type-reporting-of-MD.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From 5f1d0179e15d726622a49044a825894d5010df15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:29:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 026/126] x86/spec-ctrl: correct per-guest-type reporting of
- MD_CLEAR
-
-There are command line controls for this and the default also isn't "always
-enable when hardware supports it", which logging should take into account.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: fdbf8bdfebc2ed323c521848f642cc4f6b8cb662
-master date: 2022-07-19 08:36:53 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 10 ++++------
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 563519ce0e31..f7b0251c42bc 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -511,13 +511,12 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-     printk("  Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ||
--            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)   ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM) ||
--            opt_eager_fpu)                           ? ""               : " None",
-+            opt_eager_fpu || opt_md_clear_hvm)       ? ""               : " None",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM)      ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM)      ? " RSB"           : "",
-            opt_eager_fpu                             ? " EAGER_FPU"     : "",
--           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)        ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "",
-+           opt_md_clear_hvm                          ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM)  ? " IBPB-entry"    : "");
- 
- #endif
-@@ -525,13 +524,12 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-     printk("  Support for PV VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV) ||
--            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)  ||
-             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) ||
--            opt_eager_fpu)                           ? ""               : " None",
-+            opt_eager_fpu || opt_md_clear_pv)        ? ""               : " None",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV)       ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV)       ? " RSB"           : "",
-            opt_eager_fpu                             ? " EAGER_FPU"     : "",
--           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)        ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "",
-+           opt_md_clear_pv                           ? " MD_CLEAR"      : "",
-            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV)   ? " IBPB-entry"    : "");
- 
-     printk("  XPTI (64-bit PV only): Dom0 %s, DomU %s (with%s PCID)\n",
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0027-x86-deal-with-gcc12-release-build-issues.patch b/0027-x86-deal-with-gcc12-release-build-issues.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b30c65b..0000000
--- a/0027-x86-deal-with-gcc12-release-build-issues.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-From a095c6cde8a717325cc31bb393c547cad5e16e35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:30:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 027/126] x86: deal with gcc12 release build issues
-
-While a number of issues we previously had with pre-release gcc12 were
-fixed in the final release, we continue to have one issue (with multiple
-instances) when doing release builds (i.e. at higher optimization
-levels): The compiler takes issue with subtracting (always 1 in our
-case) from artifical labels (expressed as array) marking the end of
-certain regions. This isn't an unreasonable position to take. Simply
-hide the "array-ness" by casting to an integer type. To keep things
-looking consistently, apply the same cast also on the respective
-expressions dealing with the starting addresses. (Note how
-efi_arch_memory_setup()'s l2_table_offset() invocations avoid a similar
-issue by already having the necessary casts.) In is_xen_fixed_mfn()
-further switch from __pa() to virt_to_maddr() to better match the left
-sides of the <= operators.
-
-Reported-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 9723507daf2120131410c91980d4e4d9b0d0aa90
-master date: 2022-07-19 08:37:29 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h | 6 +++---
- xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h    | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h b/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h
-index 2541ba1f320a..84fd77931456 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h
-@@ -624,10 +624,10 @@ static void __init efi_arch_memory_setup(void)
-      * appropriate l2 slots to map.
-      */
- #define l2_4G_offset(a)                                                 \
--    (((UINTN)(a) >> L2_PAGETABLE_SHIFT) & (4 * L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1))
-+    (((a) >> L2_PAGETABLE_SHIFT) & (4 * L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1))
- 
--    for ( i  = l2_4G_offset(_start);
--          i <= l2_4G_offset(_end - 1); ++i )
-+    for ( i  = l2_4G_offset((UINTN)_start);
-+          i <= l2_4G_offset((UINTN)_end - 1); ++i )
-     {
-         l2_pgentry_t pte = l2e_from_paddr(i << L2_PAGETABLE_SHIFT,
-                                           __PAGE_HYPERVISOR | _PAGE_PSE);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-index 5c19b71eca70..71dd28f126c3 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
-@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ struct page_info
- #define is_xen_heap_mfn(mfn) \
-     (mfn_valid(mfn) && is_xen_heap_page(mfn_to_page(mfn)))
- #define is_xen_fixed_mfn(mfn)                     \
--    (((mfn_to_maddr(mfn)) >= __pa(_stext)) &&     \
--     ((mfn_to_maddr(mfn)) <= __pa(__2M_rwdata_end - 1)))
-+    (((mfn_to_maddr(mfn)) >= virt_to_maddr((unsigned long)_stext)) && \
-+     ((mfn_to_maddr(mfn)) <= virt_to_maddr((unsigned long)__2M_rwdata_end - 1)))
- 
- #define PRtype_info "016lx"/* should only be used for printk's */
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0028-x86emul-add-memory-operand-low-bits-checks-for-ENQCM.patch b/0028-x86emul-add-memory-operand-low-bits-checks-for-ENQCM.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1a63be4..0000000
--- a/0028-x86emul-add-memory-operand-low-bits-checks-for-ENQCM.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From 4799a202a9017360708c18aa8cd699bd8d6be08b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:31:01 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 028/126] x86emul: add memory operand low bits checks for
- ENQCMD{,S}
-
-Already ISE rev 044 added text to this effect; rev 045 further dropped
-leftover earlier text indicating the contrary:
-- ENQCMD requires the low 32 bits of the memory operand to be clear,
-- ENDCMDS requires bits 20...30 of the memory operand to be clear.
-
-Fixes: d27385968741 ("x86emul: support ENQCMD insns")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: d620c66bdbe5510c3bae89be8cc7ca9a2a6cbaba
-master date: 2022-07-20 15:46:48 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-index 5e297f797187..247c14dc4e68 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
-@@ -10464,6 +10464,7 @@ x86_emulate(
-             goto done;
-         if ( vex.pfx == vex_f2 ) /* enqcmd */
-         {
-+            generate_exception_if(mmvalp->data32[0], EXC_GP, 0);
-             fail_if(!ops->read_msr);
-             if ( (rc = ops->read_msr(MSR_PASID, &msr_val,
-                                      ctxt)) != X86EMUL_OKAY )
-@@ -10471,7 +10472,8 @@ x86_emulate(
-             generate_exception_if(!(msr_val & PASID_VALID), EXC_GP, 0);
-             mmvalp->data32[0] = MASK_EXTR(msr_val, PASID_PASID_MASK);
-         }
--        mmvalp->data32[0] &= ~0x7ff00000;
-+        else
-+            generate_exception_if(mmvalp->data32[0] & 0x7ff00000, EXC_GP, 0);
-         state->blk = blk_enqcmd;
-         if ( (rc = ops->blk(x86_seg_es, src.val, mmvalp, 64, &_regs.eflags,
-                             state, ctxt)) != X86EMUL_OKAY )
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0029-x86-also-suppress-use-of-MMX-insns.patch b/0029-x86-also-suppress-use-of-MMX-insns.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d954cdd..0000000
--- a/0029-x86-also-suppress-use-of-MMX-insns.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 30d3de4c61c297e12662df1fdb89af335947e59d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:31:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 029/126] x86: also suppress use of MMX insns
-
-Passing -mno-sse alone is not enough: The compiler may still find
-(questionable) reasons to use MMX insns. In particular with gcc12 use
-of MOVD+PUNPCKLDQ+MOVQ was observed in an apparent attempt to auto-
-vectorize the storing of two adjacent zeroes, 32 bits each.
-
-Reported-by: ChrisD <chris@dalessio.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 6fe2e39a0243bddba60f83b77b972a5922d25eb8
-master date: 2022-07-20 15:48:49 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/arch.mk | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk b/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-index 456e5d5c1ad7..c4337a1a118c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/arch.mk
-@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ $(call as-option-add,CFLAGS,CC,\
- 
- CFLAGS += -mno-red-zone -fpic
- 
--# Xen doesn't use SSE interally.  If the compiler supports it, also skip the
--# SSE setup for variadic function calls.
--CFLAGS += -mno-sse $(call cc-option,$(CC),-mskip-rax-setup)
-+# Xen doesn't use MMX or SSE interally.  If the compiler supports it, also skip
-+# the SSE setup for variadic function calls.
-+CFLAGS += -mno-mmx -mno-sse $(call cc-option,$(CC),-mskip-rax-setup)
- 
- # Compile with thunk-extern, indirect-branch-register if avaiable.
- CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) += -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0030-common-memory-Fix-ifdefs-for-ptdom_max_order.patch b/0030-common-memory-Fix-ifdefs-for-ptdom_max_order.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b4f6881..0000000
--- a/0030-common-memory-Fix-ifdefs-for-ptdom_max_order.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From b64f1c9e3e3a2a416c7bb5aab77ba5d2cba98638 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:31:49 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 030/126] common/memory: Fix ifdefs for ptdom_max_order
-
-In common/memory.c the ifdef code surrounding ptdom_max_order is
-using HAS_PASSTHROUGH instead of CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH, fix the
-problem using the correct macro.
-
-Fixes: e0d44c1f9461 ("build: convert HAS_PASSTHROUGH use to Kconfig")
-Signed-off-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 5707470bf3103ebae43697a7ac2faced6cd35f92
-master date: 2022-07-26 08:33:46 +0200
----
- xen/common/memory.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
-index 297b98a562b2..95b2b934e4a2 100644
---- a/xen/common/memory.c
-+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct memop_args {
- static unsigned int __read_mostly domu_max_order = CONFIG_DOMU_MAX_ORDER;
- static unsigned int __read_mostly ctldom_max_order = CONFIG_CTLDOM_MAX_ORDER;
- static unsigned int __read_mostly hwdom_max_order = CONFIG_HWDOM_MAX_ORDER;
--#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
- static unsigned int __read_mostly ptdom_max_order = CONFIG_PTDOM_MAX_ORDER;
- #endif
- 
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int __init parse_max_order(const char *s)
-         ctldom_max_order = simple_strtoul(s, &s, 0);
-     if ( *s == ',' && *++s != ',' )
-         hwdom_max_order = simple_strtoul(s, &s, 0);
--#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-     if ( *s == ',' && *++s != ',' )
-         ptdom_max_order = simple_strtoul(s, &s, 0);
- #endif
-@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static unsigned int max_order(const struct domain *d)
- {
-     unsigned int order = domu_max_order;
- 
--#ifdef HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
-     if ( cache_flush_permitted(d) && order < ptdom_max_order )
-         order = ptdom_max_order;
- #endif
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0031-tools-libxl-env-variable-to-signal-whether-disk-nic-.patch b/0031-tools-libxl-env-variable-to-signal-whether-disk-nic-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 65fe05b..0000000
--- a/0031-tools-libxl-env-variable-to-signal-whether-disk-nic-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-From 1b9845dcf959421db3a071a6bc0aa9d8edbffb50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 12:41:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 031/126] tools/libxl: env variable to signal whether disk/nic
- backend is trusted
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Introduce support in libxl for fetching the default backend trusted
-option for disk and nic devices.
-
-Users can set LIBXL_{DISK,NIC}_BACKEND_UNTRUSTED environment variable
-to notify libxl of whether the backends for disk and nic devices
-should be trusted.  Such information is passed into the frontend so it
-can take the appropriate measures.
-
-This is part of XSA-403.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
----
- docs/man/xl.1.pod.in          | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- tools/libs/light/libxl_disk.c |  5 +++++
- tools/libs/light/libxl_nic.c  |  7 +++++++
- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/docs/man/xl.1.pod.in b/docs/man/xl.1.pod.in
-index e2176bd696cb..45e1430aeb74 100644
---- a/docs/man/xl.1.pod.in
-+++ b/docs/man/xl.1.pod.in
-@@ -1946,6 +1946,24 @@ shows the decimal value. For non-linear mode, it shows hexadecimal value.
- 
- =back
- 
-+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
-+
-+=over 4
-+
-+=item B<LIBXL_DISK_BACKEND_UNTRUSTED>
-+
-+Set this environment variable to "1" to suggest to the guest that the disk
-+backend shouldn't be trusted. If the variable is absent or set to "0", the
-+backend will be trusted.
-+
-+=item B<LIBXL_NIC_BACKEND_UNTRUSTED>
-+
-+Set this environment variable to "1" to suggest to the guest that the network
-+backend shouldn't be trusted. If the variable is absent or set to "0", the
-+backend will be trusted.
-+
-+=back
-+
- =head1 IGNORED FOR COMPATIBILITY WITH XM
- 
- xl is mostly command-line compatible with the old xm utility used with
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_disk.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_disk.c
-index 93936d0dd0f8..67d1cc18578f 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_disk.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_disk.c
-@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *egc, uint32_t domid,
-     libxl_domain_config d_config;
-     libxl_device_disk disk_saved;
-     libxl__flock *lock = NULL;
-+    const char *envvar;
- 
-     libxl_domain_config_init(&d_config);
-     libxl_device_disk_init(&disk_saved);
-@@ -395,6 +396,10 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *egc, uint32_t domid,
-         flexarray_append(front, GCSPRINTF("%d", device->devid));
-         flexarray_append(front, "device-type");
-         flexarray_append(front, disk->is_cdrom ? "cdrom" : "disk");
-+        flexarray_append(front, "trusted");
-+        envvar = getenv("LIBXL_DISK_BACKEND_UNTRUSTED");
-+        /* Set "trusted=1" if envvar missing or is "0". */
-+        flexarray_append(front, !envvar || !strcmp("0", envvar) ? "1" : "0");
- 
-         /*
-          * Old PV kernel disk frontends before 2.6.26 rely on tool stack to
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_nic.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_nic.c
-index 0b9e70c9d13d..f87890d1d65f 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_nic.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_nic.c
-@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static int libxl__set_xenstore_nic(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
-                                    flexarray_t *back, flexarray_t *front,
-                                    flexarray_t *ro_front)
- {
-+    const char *envvar;
-+
-     flexarray_grow(back, 2);
- 
-     if (nic->script)
-@@ -255,6 +257,11 @@ static int libxl__set_xenstore_nic(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
-     flexarray_append(back, "hotplug-status");
-     flexarray_append(back, "");
- 
-+    flexarray_append(front, "trusted");
-+    envvar = getenv("LIBXL_NIC_BACKEND_UNTRUSTED");
-+    /* Set "trusted=1" if envvar missing or is "0". */
-+    flexarray_append(front, !envvar || !strcmp("0", envvar) ? "1" : "0");
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0032-x86-msr-fix-X2APIC_LAST.patch b/0032-x86-msr-fix-X2APIC_LAST.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4046822..0000000
--- a/0032-x86-msr-fix-X2APIC_LAST.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From df3395f6b2d759aba39fb67a7bc0fe49147c8b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 12:41:49 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 032/126] x86/msr: fix X2APIC_LAST
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The latest Intel manual now says the X2APIC reserved range is only
-0x800 to 0x8ff (NOT 0xbff).
-This changed between SDM 68 (Nov 2018) and SDM 69 (Jan 2019).
-The AMD manual documents 0x800-0x8ff too.
-
-There are non-X2APIC MSRs in the 0x900-0xbff range now:
-e.g. 0x981 is IA32_TME_CAPABILITY, an architectural MSR.
-
-The new MSR in this range appears to have been introduced in Icelake,
-so this commit should be backported to Xen versions supporting Icelake.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 13316827faadbb4f72ae6c625af9938d8f976f86
-master date: 2022-07-27 12:57:10 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c      | 4 ++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-index 868151a2e533..775b36433e24 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
-@@ -3401,7 +3401,7 @@ void vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(struct vcpu *v)
-             if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
-             {
-                 for ( msr = MSR_X2APIC_FIRST;
--                      msr <= MSR_X2APIC_FIRST + 0xff; msr++ )
-+                      msr <= MSR_X2APIC_LAST; msr++ )
-                     vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, msr, VMX_MSR_R);
- 
-                 vmx_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_X2APIC_PPR, VMX_MSR_R);
-@@ -3422,7 +3422,7 @@ void vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( !(v->arch.hvm.vmx.secondary_exec_control &
-            SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE) )
-         for ( msr = MSR_X2APIC_FIRST;
--              msr <= MSR_X2APIC_FIRST + 0xff; msr++ )
-+              msr <= MSR_X2APIC_LAST; msr++ )
-             vmx_set_msr_intercept(v, msr, VMX_MSR_RW);
- 
-     vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(v);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index b4a360723b14..f1b2cf5460c1 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@
- #define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST		0x0000003b
- 
- #define MSR_X2APIC_FIRST                0x00000800
--#define MSR_X2APIC_LAST                 0x00000bff
-+#define MSR_X2APIC_LAST                 0x000008ff
- 
- #define MSR_X2APIC_TPR                  0x00000808
- #define MSR_X2APIC_PPR                  0x0000080a
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0033-x86-spec-ctrl-Use-IST-RSB-protection-for-SVM-systems.patch b/0033-x86-spec-ctrl-Use-IST-RSB-protection-for-SVM-systems.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f1400b8..0000000
--- a/0033-x86-spec-ctrl-Use-IST-RSB-protection-for-SVM-systems.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 8ae0b4d1331c14fb9e30a42987c0152c9b00f530 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:40:05 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 033/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Use IST RSB protection for !SVM
- systems
-
-There is a corner case where a VT-x guest which manages to reliably trigger
-non-fatal #MC's could evade the rogue RSB speculation protections that were
-supposed to be in place.
-
-This is a lack of defence in depth; Xen does not architecturally execute more
-RET than CALL instructions, so an attacker would have to locate a different
-gadget (e.g. SpectreRSB) first to execute a transient path of excess RET
-instructions.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: e570e8d520ab542d8d35666b95cb3a0125b7b110
-master date: 2022-08-05 12:16:24 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index f7b0251c42bc..ac73806eacd8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -1279,8 +1279,24 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
-      * mappings.
-      */
-     if ( opt_rsb_hvm )
-+    {
-         setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM);
- 
-+        /*
-+         * For SVM, Xen's RSB safety actions are performed before STGI, so
-+         * behave atomically with respect to IST sources.
-+         *
-+         * For VT-x, NMIs are atomic with VMExit (the NMI gets queued but not
-+         * delivered) whereas other IST sources are not atomic.  Specifically,
-+         * #MC can hit ahead the RSB safety action in the vmexit path.
-+         *
-+         * Therefore, it is necessary for the IST logic to protect Xen against
-+         * possible rogue RSB speculation.
-+         */
-+        if ( !cpu_has_svm )
-+            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_rsb;
-+    }
-+
-     ibpb_calculations();
- 
-     /* Check whether Eager FPU should be enabled by default. */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0034-x86-Expose-more-MSR_ARCH_CAPS-to-hwdom.patch b/0034-x86-Expose-more-MSR_ARCH_CAPS-to-hwdom.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5433ddb..0000000
--- a/0034-x86-Expose-more-MSR_ARCH_CAPS-to-hwdom.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-From 5efcae1eb30ff24e100954e00889a568c1745ea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:40:47 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 034/126] x86: Expose more MSR_ARCH_CAPS to hwdom
-
-commit e46474278a0e ("x86/intel: Expose MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0") started
-exposing MSR_ARCH_CAPS to dom0.  More bits in MSR_ARCH_CAPS have since
-been defined, but they haven't been exposed.  Update the list to allow
-them through.
-
-As one example, this allows a Linux Dom0 to know that it has the
-appropriate microcode via FB_CLEAR.  Notably, and with the updated
-microcode, this changes dom0's
-/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data changes from:
-
-  "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode; SMT Host state unknown"
-
-to:
-
-  "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT Host state unknown"
-
-This exposes the MMIO Stale Data and Intel Branch History Injection
-(BHI) controls as well as the page size change MCE issue bit.
-
-Fixes: commit 2ebe8fe9b7e0 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for MMIO Stale Data controls")
-Fixes: commit cea9ae062295 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for new Intel BHI controls")
-Fixes: commit 59e89cdabc71 ("x86/vtx: Disable executable EPT superpages to work around CVE-2018-12207")
-Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: e83cd54611fec5b7a539fa1281a14319143490e6
-master date: 2022-08-09 16:35:25 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/msr.c              | 5 ++++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-index 0739d00e74f1..aa9face9aad3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-@@ -145,7 +145,10 @@ int init_domain_msr_policy(struct domain *d)
- 
-         mp->arch_caps.raw = val &
-             (ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA |
--             ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO);
-+             ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO |
-+             ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO |
-+             ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA |
-+             ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO);
-     }
- 
-     d->arch.msr = mp;
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index f1b2cf5460c1..49ca1f1845e6 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@
- #define  ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO                  (_AC(1, ULL) << 15)
- #define  ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR                 (_AC(1, ULL) << 17)
- #define  ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR_CTRL            (_AC(1, ULL) << 18)
-+#define  ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA                    (_AC(1, ULL) << 19)
-+#define  ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO                   (_AC(1, ULL) << 20)
- 
- #define MSR_FLUSH_CMD                       0x0000010b
- #define  FLUSH_CMD_L1D                      (_AC(1, ULL) <<  0)
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0035-xen-sched-setup-dom0-vCPUs-affinity-only-once.patch b/0035-xen-sched-setup-dom0-vCPUs-affinity-only-once.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 150de40..0000000
--- a/0035-xen-sched-setup-dom0-vCPUs-affinity-only-once.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-From 1e31848cdd8d2ff3cb76f364f04f9771f9b3a8b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:41:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 035/126] xen/sched: setup dom0 vCPUs affinity only once
-
-Right now, affinity for dom0 vCPUs is setup in two steps. This is a
-problem as, at least in Credit2, unit_insert() sees and uses the
-"intermediate" affinity, and place the vCPUs on CPUs where they cannot
-be run. And this in turn results in boot hangs, if the "dom0_nodes"
-parameter is used.
-
-Fix this by setting up the affinity properly once and for all, in
-sched_init_vcpu() called by create_vcpu().
-
-Note that, unless a soft-affinity is explicitly specified for dom0 (by
-using the relaxed mode of "dom0_nodes") we set it to the default, which
-is all CPUs, instead of computing it basing on hard affinity (if any).
-This is because hard and soft affinity should be considered as
-independent user controlled properties. In fact, if we dor derive dom0's
-soft-affinity from its boot-time hard-affinity, such computed value will
-continue to be used even if later the user changes the hard-affinity.
-And this could result in the vCPUs behaving differently than what the
-user wanted and expects.
-
-Fixes: dafd936dddbd ("Make credit2 the default scheduler")
-Reported-by: Olaf Hering <ohering@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: c79e4d209be3ed2a6b8e97c35944786ed2a66b94
-master date: 2022-08-11 11:46:22 +0200
----
- xen/common/sched/core.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/core.c b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-index 8f4b1ca10d1c..f07bd2681fcb 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-@@ -571,12 +571,46 @@ int sched_init_vcpu(struct vcpu *v)
-         return 1;
-     }
- 
--    /*
--     * Initialize affinity settings. The idler, and potentially
--     * domain-0 VCPUs, are pinned onto their respective physical CPUs.
--     */
--    if ( is_idle_domain(d) || (is_hardware_domain(d) && opt_dom0_vcpus_pin) )
-+    if ( is_idle_domain(d) )
-+    {
-+        /* Idle vCPUs are always pinned onto their respective pCPUs */
-         sched_set_affinity(unit, cpumask_of(processor), &cpumask_all);
-+    }
-+    else if ( pv_shim && v->vcpu_id == 0 )
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * PV-shim: vcpus are pinned 1:1. Initially only 1 cpu is online,
-+         * others will be dealt with when onlining them. This avoids pinning
-+         * a vcpu to a not yet online cpu here.
-+         */
-+        sched_set_affinity(unit, cpumask_of(0), cpumask_of(0));
-+    }
-+    else if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && opt_dom0_vcpus_pin )
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * If dom0_vcpus_pin is specified, dom0 vCPUs are pinned 1:1 to
-+         * their respective pCPUs too.
-+         */
-+        sched_set_affinity(unit, cpumask_of(processor), &cpumask_all);
-+    }
-+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
-+    else if ( d->domain_id == 0 )
-+    {
-+        /*
-+         * In absence of dom0_vcpus_pin instead, the hard and soft affinity of
-+         * dom0 is controlled by the (x86 only) dom0_nodes parameter. At this
-+         * point it has been parsed and decoded into the dom0_cpus mask.
-+         *
-+         * Note that we always honor what user explicitly requested, for both
-+         * hard and soft affinity, without doing any dynamic computation of
-+         * either of them.
-+         */
-+        if ( !dom0_affinity_relaxed )
-+            sched_set_affinity(unit, &dom0_cpus, &cpumask_all);
-+        else
-+            sched_set_affinity(unit, &cpumask_all, &dom0_cpus);
-+    }
-+#endif
-     else
-         sched_set_affinity(unit, &cpumask_all, &cpumask_all);
- 
-@@ -3386,29 +3420,10 @@ void wait(void)
- void __init sched_setup_dom0_vcpus(struct domain *d)
- {
-     unsigned int i;
--    struct sched_unit *unit;
- 
-     for ( i = 1; i < d->max_vcpus; i++ )
-         vcpu_create(d, i);
- 
--    /*
--     * PV-shim: vcpus are pinned 1:1.
--     * Initially only 1 cpu is online, others will be dealt with when
--     * onlining them. This avoids pinning a vcpu to a not yet online cpu here.
--     */
--    if ( pv_shim )
--        sched_set_affinity(d->vcpu[0]->sched_unit,
--                           cpumask_of(0), cpumask_of(0));
--    else
--    {
--        for_each_sched_unit ( d, unit )
--        {
--            if ( !opt_dom0_vcpus_pin && !dom0_affinity_relaxed )
--                sched_set_affinity(unit, &dom0_cpus, NULL);
--            sched_set_affinity(unit, NULL, &dom0_cpus);
--        }
--    }
--
-     domain_update_node_affinity(d);
- }
- #endif
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0036-tools-libxl-Replace-deprecated-sdl-option-on-QEMU-co.patch b/0036-tools-libxl-Replace-deprecated-sdl-option-on-QEMU-co.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bd1b1cb..0000000
--- a/0036-tools-libxl-Replace-deprecated-sdl-option-on-QEMU-co.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From c373ad3d084614a93c55e25dc20e70ffc7574971 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:42:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 036/126] tools/libxl: Replace deprecated -sdl option on QEMU
- command line
-
-"-sdl" is deprecated upstream since 6695e4c0fd9e ("softmmu/vl:
-Deprecate the -sdl and -curses option"), QEMU v6.2, and the option is
-removed by 707d93d4abc6 ("ui: Remove deprecated options "-sdl" and
-"-curses""), in upcoming QEMU v7.1.
-
-Instead, use "-display sdl", available since 1472a95bab1e ("Introduce
--display argument"), before QEMU v1.0.
-
-Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
-master commit: 41fcb3af8ad6d4c9f65a9d72798e6d18afec55ac
-master date: 2022-08-11 11:47:11 +0200
----
- tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c
-index 24f6e73b0a77..ae5f35e0c3fd 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c
-@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ static int libxl__build_device_model_args_new(libxl__gc *gc,
-     flexarray_append_pair(dm_args, "-display", "none");
- 
-     if (sdl && !is_stubdom) {
--        flexarray_append(dm_args, "-sdl");
-+        flexarray_append_pair(dm_args, "-display", "sdl");
-         if (sdl->display)
-             flexarray_append_pair(dm_envs, "DISPLAY", sdl->display);
-         if (sdl->xauthority)
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0037-x86-spec-ctrl-Enumeration-for-PBRSB_NO.patch b/0037-x86-spec-ctrl-Enumeration-for-PBRSB_NO.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bfd812b..0000000
--- a/0037-x86-spec-ctrl-Enumeration-for-PBRSB_NO.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-From fba0c22e79922085c46527eb1391123aadfb24d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:42:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 037/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for PBRSB_NO
-
-The PBRSB_NO bit indicates that the CPU is not vulnerable to the Post-Barrier
-RSB speculative vulnerability.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: b874e47eb13feb75be3ee7b5dc4ae9c97d80d774
-master date: 2022-08-11 16:19:50 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/msr.c              | 2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c        | 3 ++-
- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 1 +
- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-index aa9face9aad3..9bced8d36caa 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
-@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int init_domain_msr_policy(struct domain *d)
-              ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO |
-              ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO |
-              ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA |
--             ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO);
-+             ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO);
-     }
- 
-     d->arch.msr = mp;
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index ac73806eacd8..3ff602bd0281 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-      * Hardware read-only information, stating immunity to certain issues, or
-      * suggestions of which mitigation to use.
-      */
--    printk("  Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO)                        ? " RDCL_NO"        : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL)                       ? " IBRS_ALL"       : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA)                           ? " RSBA"           : "",
-@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO)                   ? " SBDR_SSDP_NO"   : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO)                       ? " FBSDP_NO"       : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO)                        ? " PSDP_NO"        : "",
-+           (caps & ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO)                       ? " PBRSB_NO"       : "",
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ALWAYS))    ? " IBRS_ALWAYS"    : "",
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS))   ? " STIBP_ALWAYS"   : "",
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_FAST))      ? " IBRS_FAST"      : "",
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-index 49ca1f1845e6..5a830f76a8d4 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #define  ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR_CTRL            (_AC(1, ULL) << 18)
- #define  ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA                    (_AC(1, ULL) << 19)
- #define  ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO                   (_AC(1, ULL) << 20)
-+#define  ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO                 (_AC(1, ULL) << 24)
- 
- #define MSR_FLUSH_CMD                       0x0000010b
- #define  FLUSH_CMD_L1D                      (_AC(1, ULL) <<  0)
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0038-x86-amd-only-call-setup_force_cpu_cap-for-boot-CPU.patch b/0038-x86-amd-only-call-setup_force_cpu_cap-for-boot-CPU.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e3d159b..0000000
--- a/0038-x86-amd-only-call-setup_force_cpu_cap-for-boot-CPU.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 104a54a307b08945365faf6d285cd5a02f94a80f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:43:08 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 038/126] x86/amd: only call setup_force_cpu_cap for boot CPU
-
-This should only be called for the boot CPU to avoid calling _init code
-after it has been unloaded.
-
-Fixes: 062868a5a8b4 ("x86/amd: Work around CLFLUSH ordering on older parts")
-Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 31b41ce858c8bd5159212d40969f8e0b7124bbf0
-master date: 2022-08-11 17:44:26 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-index 60dbe61a61ca..a8d2fb8a1590 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- 	 * everything, including reads and writes to address, and
- 	 * LFENCE/SFENCE instructions.
- 	 */
--	if (!cpu_has_clflushopt)
-+	if (c == &boot_cpu_data && !cpu_has_clflushopt)
- 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE);
- 
- 	switch(c->x86)
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0039-build-x86-suppress-GNU-ld-2.39-warning-about-RWX-loa.patch b/0039-build-x86-suppress-GNU-ld-2.39-warning-about-RWX-loa.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f6e62b7..0000000
--- a/0039-build-x86-suppress-GNU-ld-2.39-warning-about-RWX-loa.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From a075900cf768fe45f270b6f1d09c4e99281da142 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:43:56 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 039/126] build/x86: suppress GNU ld 2.39 warning about RWX
- load segments
-
-Commit 68f5aac012b9 ("build: suppress future GNU ld warning about RWX
-load segments") didn't quite cover all the cases: Apparently I missed
-ones in the building of 32-bit helper objects because of only looking at
-incremental builds (where those wouldn't normally be re-built). Clone
-the workaround there to the specific Makefile in question.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 3eb1865ae305772b558757904d81951e31de43de
-master date: 2022-08-11 17:45:12 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/boot/build32.mk | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/boot/build32.mk b/xen/arch/x86/boot/build32.mk
-index e90680cd9f52..d2fae5cf9eee 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/boot/build32.mk
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/build32.mk
-@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ CFLAGS += -Werror -fno-builtin -g0 -msoft-float
- CFLAGS += -I$(BASEDIR)/include
- CFLAGS := $(filter-out -flto,$(CFLAGS)) 
- 
-+LDFLAGS_DIRECT-$(shell $(LD) -v --warn-rwx-segments >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo y) := --no-warn-rwx-segments
-+LDFLAGS_DIRECT += $(LDFLAGS_DIRECT-y)
-+
- # NB. awk invocation is a portable alternative to 'head -n -1'
- %.S: %.bin
- 	(od -v -t x $< | tr -s ' ' | awk 'NR > 1 {print s} {s=$$0}' | \
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0040-PCI-simplify-and-thus-correct-pci_get_pdev-_by_domai.patch b/0040-PCI-simplify-and-thus-correct-pci_get_pdev-_by_domai.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1de5d0d..0000000
--- a/0040-PCI-simplify-and-thus-correct-pci_get_pdev-_by_domai.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-From 9acedc3c58c31930737edbe212f2ccf437a0b757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 15:44:23 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 040/126] PCI: simplify (and thus correct)
- pci_get_pdev{,_by_domain}()
-
-The last "wildcard" use of either function went away with f591755823a7
-("IOMMU/PCI: don't let domain cleanup continue when device de-assignment
-failed"). Don't allow them to be called this way anymore. Besides
-simplifying the code this also fixes two bugs:
-
-1) When seg != -1, the outer loops should have been terminated after the
-   first iteration, or else a device with the same BDF but on another
-   segment could be found / returned.
-
-Reported-by: Rahul Singh <rahul.singh@arm.com>
-
-2) When seg == -1 calling get_pseg() is bogus. The function (taking a
-   u16) would look for segment 0xffff, which might exist. If it exists,
-   we might then find / return a wrong device.
-
-In pci_get_pdev_by_domain() also switch from using the per-segment list
-to using the per-domain one, with the exception of the hardware domain
-(see the code comment there).
-
-While there also constify "pseg" and drop "pdev"'s already previously
-unnecessary initializer.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Rahul Singh <rahul.singh@arm.com>
-Tested-by: Rahul Singh <rahul.singh@arm.com>
-master commit: 8cf6e0738906fc269af40135ed82a07815dd3b9c
-master date: 2022-08-12 08:34:33 +0200
----
- xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 61 +++++++++++++++--------------------
- xen/include/xen/pci.h         |  6 ++--
- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-index bbacbe41dac4..9b81b941c8bb 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
-@@ -528,30 +528,19 @@ int __init pci_ro_device(int seg, int bus, int devfn)
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn)
-+struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(uint16_t seg, uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn)
- {
--    struct pci_seg *pseg = get_pseg(seg);
--    struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
-+    const struct pci_seg *pseg = get_pseg(seg);
-+    struct pci_dev *pdev;
- 
-     ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
--    ASSERT(seg != -1 || bus == -1);
--    ASSERT(bus != -1 || devfn == -1);
- 
-     if ( !pseg )
--    {
--        if ( seg == -1 )
--            radix_tree_gang_lookup(&pci_segments, (void **)&pseg, 0, 1);
--        if ( !pseg )
--            return NULL;
--    }
-+        return NULL;
- 
--    do {
--        list_for_each_entry ( pdev, &pseg->alldevs_list, alldevs_list )
--            if ( (pdev->bus == bus || bus == -1) &&
--                 (pdev->devfn == devfn || devfn == -1) )
--                return pdev;
--    } while ( radix_tree_gang_lookup(&pci_segments, (void **)&pseg,
--                                     pseg->nr + 1, 1) );
-+    list_for_each_entry ( pdev, &pseg->alldevs_list, alldevs_list )
-+        if ( pdev->bus == bus && pdev->devfn == devfn )
-+            return pdev;
- 
-     return NULL;
- }
-@@ -577,31 +566,33 @@ struct pci_dev *pci_get_real_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn)
-     return pdev;
- }
- 
--struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(const struct domain *d, int seg,
--                                       int bus, int devfn)
-+struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(const struct domain *d, uint16_t seg,
-+                                       uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn)
- {
--    struct pci_seg *pseg = get_pseg(seg);
--    struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
-+    struct pci_dev *pdev;
- 
--    ASSERT(seg != -1 || bus == -1);
--    ASSERT(bus != -1 || devfn == -1);
--
--    if ( !pseg )
-+    /*
-+     * The hardware domain owns the majority of the devices in the system.
-+     * When there are multiple segments, traversing the per-segment list is
-+     * likely going to be faster, whereas for a single segment the difference
-+     * shouldn't be that large.
-+     */
-+    if ( is_hardware_domain(d) )
-     {
--        if ( seg == -1 )
--            radix_tree_gang_lookup(&pci_segments, (void **)&pseg, 0, 1);
-+        const struct pci_seg *pseg = get_pseg(seg);
-+
-         if ( !pseg )
-             return NULL;
--    }
- 
--    do {
-         list_for_each_entry ( pdev, &pseg->alldevs_list, alldevs_list )
--            if ( (pdev->bus == bus || bus == -1) &&
--                 (pdev->devfn == devfn || devfn == -1) &&
--                 (pdev->domain == d) )
-+            if ( pdev->bus == bus && pdev->devfn == devfn &&
-+                 pdev->domain == d )
-+                return pdev;
-+    }
-+    else
-+        list_for_each_entry ( pdev, &d->pdev_list, domain_list )
-+            if ( pdev->bus == bus && pdev->devfn == devfn )
-                 return pdev;
--    } while ( radix_tree_gang_lookup(&pci_segments, (void **)&pseg,
--                                     pseg->nr + 1, 1) );
- 
-     return NULL;
- }
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/pci.h b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-index 8e3d4d94543a..cd238ae852b0 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
-@@ -166,10 +166,10 @@ int pci_add_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn,
- int pci_remove_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
- int pci_ro_device(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
- int pci_hide_device(unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus, unsigned int devfn);
--struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
-+struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(uint16_t seg, uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn);
- struct pci_dev *pci_get_real_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn);
--struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(const struct domain *, int seg,
--                                       int bus, int devfn);
-+struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain(const struct domain *, uint16_t seg,
-+                                       uint8_t bus, uint8_t devfn);
- void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
- 
- uint8_t pci_conf_read8(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0041-xen-arm-p2m-Prevent-adding-mapping-when-domain-is-dy.patch b/0041-xen-arm-p2m-Prevent-adding-mapping-when-domain-is-dy.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e695f96..0000000
--- a/0041-xen-arm-p2m-Prevent-adding-mapping-when-domain-is-dy.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From 09fc590c15773c2471946a78740c6b02e8c34a45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:05:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 041/126] xen/arm: p2m: Prevent adding mapping when domain is
- dying
-
-During the domain destroy process, the domain will still be accessible
-until it is fully destroyed. So does the P2M because we don't bail
-out early if is_dying is non-zero. If a domain has permission to
-modify the other domain's P2M (i.e. dom0, or a stubdomain), then
-foreign mapping can be added past relinquish_p2m_mapping().
-
-Therefore, we need to prevent mapping to be added when the domain
-is dying. This commit prevents such adding of mapping by adding the
-d->is_dying check to p2m_set_entry(). Also this commit enhances the
-check in relinquish_p2m_mapping() to make sure that no mappings can
-be added in the P2M after the P2M lock is released.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Tested-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-master commit: 3ebe773293e3b945460a3d6f54f3b91915397bab
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:20:18 +0200
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index 2ddd06801a82..8398251c518b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -1093,6 +1093,15 @@ int p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
- {
-     int rc = 0;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * Any reference taken by the P2M mappings (e.g. foreign mapping) will
-+     * be dropped in relinquish_p2m_mapping(). As the P2M will still
-+     * be accessible after, we need to prevent mapping to be added when the
-+     * domain is dying.
-+     */
-+    if ( unlikely(p2m->domain->is_dying) )
-+        return -ENOMEM;
-+
-     while ( nr )
-     {
-         unsigned long mask;
-@@ -1613,6 +1622,8 @@ int relinquish_p2m_mapping(struct domain *d)
-     unsigned int order;
-     gfn_t start, end;
- 
-+    BUG_ON(!d->is_dying);
-+    /* No mappings can be added in the P2M after the P2M lock is released. */
-     p2m_write_lock(p2m);
- 
-     start = p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0042-xen-arm-p2m-Handle-preemption-when-freeing-intermedi.patch b/0042-xen-arm-p2m-Handle-preemption-when-freeing-intermedi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 96b8528..0000000
--- a/0042-xen-arm-p2m-Handle-preemption-when-freeing-intermedi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-From 0d805f9fba4bc155d15047685024f7d842e925e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:06:36 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 042/126] xen/arm: p2m: Handle preemption when freeing
- intermediate page tables
-
-At the moment the P2M page tables will be freed when the domain structure
-is freed without any preemption. As the P2M is quite large, iterating
-through this may take more time than it is reasonable without intermediate
-preemption (to run softirqs and perhaps scheduler).
-
-Split p2m_teardown() in two parts: one preemptible and called when
-relinquishing the resources, the other one non-preemptible and called
-when freeing the domain structure.
-
-As we are now freeing the P2M pages early, we also need to prevent
-further allocation if someone call p2m_set_entry() past p2m_teardown()
-(I wasn't able to prove this will never happen). This is done by
-the checking domain->is_dying from previous patch in p2m_set_entry().
-
-Similarly, we want to make sure that no-one can accessed the free
-pages. Therefore the root is cleared before freeing pages.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Tested-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-master commit: 3202084566bba0ef0c45caf8c24302f83d92f9c8
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:20:56 +0200
----
- xen/arch/arm/domain.c     | 10 +++++++--
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c        | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h | 13 +++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-index 5eaf4c718ec3..223ec9694df1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-@@ -779,10 +779,10 @@ fail:
- void arch_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
- {
-     /* IOMMU page table is shared with P2M, always call
--     * iommu_domain_destroy() before p2m_teardown().
-+     * iommu_domain_destroy() before p2m_final_teardown().
-      */
-     iommu_domain_destroy(d);
--    p2m_teardown(d);
-+    p2m_final_teardown(d);
-     domain_vgic_free(d);
-     domain_vuart_free(d);
-     free_xenheap_page(d->shared_info);
-@@ -984,6 +984,7 @@ enum {
-     PROG_xen,
-     PROG_page,
-     PROG_mapping,
-+    PROG_p2m,
-     PROG_done,
- };
- 
-@@ -1038,6 +1039,11 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
-         if ( ret )
-             return ret;
- 
-+    PROGRESS(p2m):
-+        ret = p2m_teardown(d);
-+        if ( ret )
-+            return ret;
-+
-     PROGRESS(done):
-         break;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index 8398251c518b..4ad3e0606e9c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -1530,17 +1530,58 @@ static void p2m_free_vmid(struct domain *d)
-     spin_unlock(&vmid_alloc_lock);
- }
- 
--void p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
-+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
- {
-     struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
-+    unsigned long count = 0;
-     struct page_info *pg;
-+    unsigned int i;
-+    int rc = 0;
-+
-+    p2m_write_lock(p2m);
-+
-+    /*
-+     * We are about to free the intermediate page-tables, so clear the
-+     * root to prevent any walk to use them.
-+     */
-+    for ( i = 0; i < P2M_ROOT_PAGES; i++ )
-+        clear_and_clean_page(p2m->root + i);
-+
-+    /*
-+     * The domain will not be scheduled anymore, so in theory we should
-+     * not need to flush the TLBs. Do it for safety purpose.
-+     *
-+     * Note that all the devices have already been de-assigned. So we don't
-+     * need to flush the IOMMU TLB here.
-+     */
-+    p2m_force_tlb_flush_sync(p2m);
-+
-+    while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
-+    {
-+        free_domheap_page(pg);
-+        count++;
-+        /* Arbitrarily preempt every 512 iterations */
-+        if ( !(count % 512) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-+        {
-+            rc = -ERESTART;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    p2m_write_unlock(p2m);
-+
-+    return rc;
-+}
-+
-+void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
- 
-     /* p2m not actually initialized */
-     if ( !p2m->domain )
-         return;
- 
--    while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
--        free_domheap_page(pg);
-+    ASSERT(page_list_empty(&p2m->pages));
- 
-     if ( p2m->root )
-         free_domheap_pages(p2m->root, P2M_ROOT_ORDER);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-index 6a2108398fd7..3a2d51b35d71 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-@@ -192,8 +192,17 @@ void setup_virt_paging(void);
- /* Init the datastructures for later use by the p2m code */
- int p2m_init(struct domain *d);
- 
--/* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */
--void p2m_teardown(struct domain *d);
-+/*
-+ * The P2M resources are freed in two parts:
-+ *  - p2m_teardown() will be called when relinquish the resources. It
-+ *    will free large resources (e.g. intermediate page-tables) that
-+ *    requires preemption.
-+ *  - p2m_final_teardown() will be called when domain struct is been
-+ *    freed. This *cannot* be preempted and therefore one small
-+ *    resources should be freed here.
-+ */
-+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d);
-+void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d);
- 
- /*
-  * Remove mapping refcount on each mapping page in the p2m
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0043-x86-p2m-add-option-to-skip-root-pagetable-removal-in.patch b/0043-x86-p2m-add-option-to-skip-root-pagetable-removal-in.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f8d61bb..0000000
--- a/0043-x86-p2m-add-option-to-skip-root-pagetable-removal-in.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-From 0f3eab90f327210d91e8e31a769376f286e8819a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:07:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 043/126] x86/p2m: add option to skip root pagetable removal in
- p2m_teardown()
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Add a new parameter to p2m_teardown() in order to select whether the
-root page table should also be freed.  Note that all users are
-adjusted to pass the parameter to remove the root page tables, so
-behavior is not modified.
-
-No functional change intended.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Suggested-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-master commit: 1df52a270225527ae27bfa2fc40347bf93b78357
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:21:23 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c       |  6 +++---
- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c |  4 ++--
- xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h       |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-index 47a7487fa7a3..a8f5a19da917 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -541,18 +541,18 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-         }
- 
-         for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
--            p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i]);
-+            p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true);
-     }
- 
-     /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */
-     for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) {
--        p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i]);
-+        p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true);
-     }
- 
-     if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 )
-         hap_teardown(d, NULL);
- 
--    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d));
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
-     /* Free any memory that the p2m teardown released */
-     paging_lock(d);
-     hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-index 85681dee2623..8ba73082c1bf 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-@@ -741,11 +741,11 @@ int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
-  * hvm fixme: when adding support for pvh non-hardware domains, this path must
-  * cleanup any foreign p2m types (release refcnts on them).
-  */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root)
- /* Return all the p2m pages to Xen.
-  * We know we don't have any extra mappings to these pages */
- {
--    struct page_info *pg;
-+    struct page_info *pg, *root_pg = NULL;
-     struct domain *d;
- 
-     if (p2m == NULL)
-@@ -755,10 +755,22 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
- 
-     p2m_lock(p2m);
-     ASSERT(atomic_read(&d->shr_pages) == 0);
--    p2m->phys_table = pagetable_null();
-+
-+    if ( remove_root )
-+        p2m->phys_table = pagetable_null();
-+    else if ( !pagetable_is_null(p2m->phys_table) )
-+    {
-+        root_pg = pagetable_get_page(p2m->phys_table);
-+        clear_domain_page(pagetable_get_mfn(p2m->phys_table));
-+    }
- 
-     while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
--        d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+        if ( pg != root_pg )
-+            d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+
-+    if ( root_pg )
-+        page_list_add(root_pg, &p2m->pages);
-+
-     p2m_unlock(p2m);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index 4a8882430b3f..abe6d4334382 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2768,7 +2768,7 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32 mode)
-     paging_unlock(d);
-  out_unlocked:
-     if ( rv != 0 && !pagetable_is_null(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)) )
--        p2m_teardown(p2m);
-+        p2m_teardown(p2m, true);
-     if ( rv != 0 && pg != NULL )
-     {
-         pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-@@ -2933,7 +2933,7 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-         shadow_teardown(d, NULL);
- 
-     /* It is now safe to pull down the p2m map. */
--    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d));
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
-     /* Free any shadow memory that the p2m teardown released */
-     paging_lock(d);
-     shadow_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-index 46e8b94a49df..46eb51d44cf5 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d);
- int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
- 
- /* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root);
- void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d);
- 
- /* Add a page to a domain's p2m table */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0044-x86-HAP-adjust-monitor-table-related-error-handling.patch b/0044-x86-HAP-adjust-monitor-table-related-error-handling.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 97a55a5..0000000
--- a/0044-x86-HAP-adjust-monitor-table-related-error-handling.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From d24a10a91d46a56e1d406239643ec651a31033d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:07:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 044/126] x86/HAP: adjust monitor table related error handling
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-hap_make_monitor_table() will return INVALID_MFN if it encounters an
-error condition, but hap_update_paging_modes() wasn’t handling this
-value, resulting in an inappropriate value being stored in
-monitor_table. This would subsequently misguide at least
-hap_vcpu_teardown(). Avoid this by bailing early.
-
-Further, when a domain has/was already crashed or (perhaps less
-important as there's no such path known to lead here) is already dying,
-avoid calling domain_crash() on it again - that's at best confusing.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-master commit: 5b44a61180f4f2e4f490a28400c884dd357ff45d
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:21:56 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-index a8f5a19da917..d75dc2b9ed3d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include <asm/domain.h>
- #include <xen/numa.h>
- #include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h>
-+#include <public/sched.h>
- 
- #include "private.h"
- 
-@@ -405,8 +406,13 @@ static mfn_t hap_make_monitor_table(struct vcpu *v)
-     return m4mfn;
- 
-  oom:
--    printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "out of memory building monitor pagetable\n");
--    domain_crash(d);
-+    if ( !d->is_dying &&
-+         (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
-+    {
-+        printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%pd: out of memory building monitor pagetable\n",
-+               d);
-+        domain_crash(d);
-+    }
-     return INVALID_MFN;
- }
- 
-@@ -766,6 +772,9 @@ static void hap_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( pagetable_is_null(v->arch.hvm.monitor_table) )
-     {
-         mfn_t mmfn = hap_make_monitor_table(v);
-+
-+        if ( mfn_eq(mmfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-+            goto unlock;
-         v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(mmfn);
-         make_cr3(v, mmfn);
-         hvm_update_host_cr3(v);
-@@ -774,6 +783,7 @@ static void hap_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
-     /* CR3 is effectively updated by a mode change. Flush ASIDs, etc. */
-     hap_update_cr3(v, 0, false);
- 
-+ unlock:
-     paging_unlock(d);
-     put_gfn(d, cr3_gfn);
- }
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0045-x86-shadow-tolerate-failure-of-sh_set_toplevel_shado.patch b/0045-x86-shadow-tolerate-failure-of-sh_set_toplevel_shado.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 08ff309..0000000
--- a/0045-x86-shadow-tolerate-failure-of-sh_set_toplevel_shado.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 95f6d555ec84383f7daaf3374f65bec5ff4351f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:07:57 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 045/126] x86/shadow: tolerate failure of
- sh_set_toplevel_shadow()
-
-Subsequently sh_set_toplevel_shadow() will be adjusted to install a
-blank entry in case prealloc fails. There are, in fact, pre-existing
-error paths which would put in place a blank entry. The 4- and 2-level
-code in sh_update_cr3(), however, assume the top level entry to be
-valid.
-
-Hence bail from the function in the unlikely event that it's not. Note
-that 3-level logic works differently: In particular a guest is free to
-supply a PDPTR pointing at 4 non-present (or otherwise deemed invalid)
-entries. The guest will crash, but we already cope with that.
-
-Really mfn_valid() is likely wrong to use in sh_set_toplevel_shadow(),
-and it should instead be !mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN). Avoid such a change
-in security context, but add a respective assertion.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: eac000978c1feb5a9ee3236ab0c0da9a477e5336
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:22:24 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c |  1 +
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c  | 10 ++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index abe6d4334382..0ab2ac6b7a3c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2583,6 +2583,7 @@ void sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu *v,
-     /* Now figure out the new contents: is this a valid guest MFN? */
-     if ( !mfn_valid(gmfn) )
-     {
-+        ASSERT(mfn_eq(gmfn, INVALID_MFN));
-         new_entry = pagetable_null();
-         goto install_new_entry;
-     }
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-index 9b43cb116c47..7e0494cf7faa 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -3697,6 +3697,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_locking, bool noflush)
-     if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 4, 0) != 0 )
-         guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
-     sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l4_shadow, sh_make_shadow);
-+    if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down);
-+        return;
-+    }
-     if ( !shadow_mode_external(d) && !is_pv_32bit_domain(d) )
-     {
-         mfn_t smfn = pagetable_get_mfn(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0]);
-@@ -3757,6 +3762,11 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_locking, bool noflush)
-     if ( sh_remove_write_access(d, gmfn, 2, 0) != 0 )
-         guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
-     sh_set_toplevel_shadow(v, 0, gmfn, SH_type_l2_shadow, sh_make_shadow);
-+    if ( unlikely(pagetable_is_null(v->arch.paging.shadow.shadow_table[0])) )
-+    {
-+        ASSERT(d->is_dying || d->is_shutting_down);
-+        return;
-+    }
- #else
- #error This should never happen
- #endif
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0046-x86-shadow-tolerate-failure-in-shadow_prealloc.patch b/0046-x86-shadow-tolerate-failure-in-shadow_prealloc.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4773eef..0000000
--- a/0046-x86-shadow-tolerate-failure-in-shadow_prealloc.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
-From 1e26afa846fb9a00b9155280eeae3b8cb8375dd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:08:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 046/126] x86/shadow: tolerate failure in shadow_prealloc()
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Prevent _shadow_prealloc() from calling BUG() when unable to fulfill
-the pre-allocation and instead return true/false.  Modify
-shadow_prealloc() to crash the domain on allocation failure (if the
-domain is not already dying), as shadow cannot operate normally after
-that.  Modify callers to also gracefully handle {_,}shadow_prealloc()
-failing to fulfill the request.
-
-Note this in turn requires adjusting the callers of
-sh_make_monitor_table() also to handle it returning INVALID_MFN.
-sh_update_paging_modes() is also modified to add additional error
-paths in case of allocation failure, some of those will return with
-null monitor page tables (and the domain likely crashed).  This is no
-different that current error paths, but the newly introduced ones are
-more likely to trigger.
-
-The now added failure points in sh_update_paging_modes() also require
-that on some error return paths the previous structures are cleared,
-and thus monitor table is null.
-
-While there adjust the 'type' parameter type of shadow_prealloc() to
-unsigned int rather than u32.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-master commit: b7f93c6afb12b6061e2d19de2f39ea09b569ac68
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:22:53 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c  | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c     |  4 +-
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c   | 11 +++--
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h |  3 +-
- 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index 0ab2ac6b7a3c..fc4f7f78ce43 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include <asm/flushtlb.h>
- #include <asm/shadow.h>
- #include <xen/numa.h>
-+#include <public/sched.h>
- #include "private.h"
- 
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(uint32_t,trace_shadow_path_flags);
-@@ -927,14 +928,15 @@ static inline void trace_shadow_prealloc_unpin(struct domain *d, mfn_t smfn)
- 
- /* Make sure there are at least count order-sized pages
-  * available in the shadow page pool. */
--static void _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-+static bool __must_check _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
- {
-     struct vcpu *v;
-     struct page_info *sp, *t;
-     mfn_t smfn;
-     int i;
- 
--    if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) return;
-+    if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
-+        return true;
- 
-     /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */
-     ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]);
-@@ -950,7 +952,8 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-         sh_unpin(d, smfn);
- 
-         /* See if that freed up enough space */
--        if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages ) return;
-+        if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
-+            return true;
-     }
- 
-     /* Stage two: all shadow pages are in use in hierarchies that are
-@@ -973,7 +976,7 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-                 if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
-                 {
-                     guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
--                    return;
-+                    return true;
-                 }
-             }
-         }
-@@ -986,7 +989,12 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-            d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages,
-            d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages,
-            d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
--    BUG();
-+
-+    ASSERT(d->is_dying);
-+
-+    guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
-+
-+    return false;
- }
- 
- /* Make sure there are at least count pages of the order according to
-@@ -994,9 +1002,19 @@ static void _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-  * This must be called before any calls to shadow_alloc().  Since this
-  * will free existing shadows to make room, it must be called early enough
-  * to avoid freeing shadows that the caller is currently working on. */
--void shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, u32 type, unsigned int count)
-+bool shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type, unsigned int count)
- {
--    return _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+    bool ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+
-+    if ( !ret && !d->is_dying &&
-+         (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
-+        /*
-+         * Failing to allocate memory required for shadow usage can only result in
-+         * a domain crash, do it here rather that relying on every caller to do it.
-+         */
-+        domain_crash(d);
-+
-+    return ret;
- }
- 
- /* Deliberately free all the memory we can: this will tear down all of
-@@ -1215,7 +1233,7 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t smfn)
- static struct page_info *
- shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
- {
--    struct page_info *pg;
-+    struct page_info *pg = NULL;
- 
-     /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the
-      * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
-@@ -1233,16 +1251,18 @@ shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
-                     d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages,
-                     shadow_min_acceptable_pages(d));
-         }
--        paging_unlock(d);
--        return NULL;
-+        goto out;
-     }
- 
--    shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 1);
-+    if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 1) )
-+        goto out;
-+
-     pg = mfn_to_page(shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_p2m_table, 0));
-     d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages++;
-     d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages--;
-     ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask));
- 
-+ out:
-     paging_unlock(d);
- 
-     return pg;
-@@ -1333,7 +1353,9 @@ int shadow_set_allocation(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages, bool *preempted)
-         else if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages > pages )
-         {
-             /* Need to return memory to domheap */
--            _shadow_prealloc(d, 1);
-+            if ( !_shadow_prealloc(d, 1) )
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+
-             sp = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
-             ASSERT(sp);
-             /*
-@@ -2401,12 +2423,13 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
-     if ( mfn_eq(v->arch.paging.shadow.oos_snapshot[0], INVALID_MFN) )
-     {
-         int i;
-+
-+        if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, SHADOW_OOS_PAGES) )
-+            return;
-+
-         for(i = 0; i < SHADOW_OOS_PAGES; i++)
--        {
--            shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, 1);
-             v->arch.paging.shadow.oos_snapshot[i] =
-                 shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_oos_snapshot, 0);
--        }
-     }
- #endif /* OOS */
- 
-@@ -2470,6 +2493,9 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
-             mfn_t mmfn = sh_make_monitor_table(
-                              v, v->arch.paging.mode->shadow.shadow_levels);
- 
-+            if ( mfn_eq(mmfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-+                return;
-+
-             v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(mmfn);
-             make_cr3(v, mmfn);
-             hvm_update_host_cr3(v);
-@@ -2508,6 +2534,12 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
-                 v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_null();
-                 new_mfn = sh_make_monitor_table(
-                               v, v->arch.paging.mode->shadow.shadow_levels);
-+                if ( mfn_eq(new_mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-+                {
-+                    sh_destroy_monitor_table(v, old_mfn,
-+                                             old_mode->shadow.shadow_levels);
-+                    return;
-+                }
-                 v->arch.hvm.monitor_table = pagetable_from_mfn(new_mfn);
-                 SHADOW_PRINTK("new monitor table %"PRI_mfn "\n",
-                                mfn_x(new_mfn));
-@@ -2593,7 +2625,12 @@ void sh_set_toplevel_shadow(struct vcpu *v,
-     if ( !mfn_valid(smfn) )
-     {
-         /* Make sure there's enough free shadow memory. */
--        shadow_prealloc(d, root_type, 1);
-+        if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, root_type, 1) )
-+        {
-+            new_entry = pagetable_null();
-+            goto install_new_entry;
-+        }
-+
-         /* Shadow the page. */
-         smfn = make_shadow(v, gmfn, root_type);
-     }
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c
-index 87fc57704f25..d68796c495b7 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/hvm.c
-@@ -700,7 +700,9 @@ mfn_t sh_make_monitor_table(const struct vcpu *v, unsigned int shadow_levels)
-     ASSERT(!pagetable_get_pfn(v->arch.hvm.monitor_table));
- 
-     /* Guarantee we can get the memory we need */
--    shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS);
-+    if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS) )
-+        return INVALID_MFN;
-+
-     m4mfn = shadow_alloc(d, SH_type_monitor_table, 0);
-     mfn_to_page(m4mfn)->shadow_flags = 4;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-index 7e0494cf7faa..6a9f82d39ce6 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
-@@ -2825,9 +2825,14 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
-      * Preallocate shadow pages *before* removing writable accesses
-      * otherwhise an OOS L1 might be demoted and promoted again with
-      * writable mappings. */
--    shadow_prealloc(d,
--                    SH_type_l1_shadow,
--                    GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS < 4 ? 1 : GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS - 1);
-+    if ( !shadow_prealloc(d, SH_type_l1_shadow,
-+                          GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS < 4
-+                          ? 1 : GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS - 1) )
-+    {
-+        paging_unlock(d);
-+        put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gfn));
-+        return 0;
-+    }
- 
-     rc = gw_remove_write_accesses(v, va, &gw);
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-index 911db46e7399..3fe0388e7c4f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
-@@ -351,7 +351,8 @@ void shadow_promote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, u32 type);
- void shadow_demote(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn, u32 type);
- 
- /* Shadow page allocation functions */
--void  shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, u32 shadow_type, unsigned int count);
-+bool __must_check shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int shadow_type,
-+                                  unsigned int count);
- mfn_t shadow_alloc(struct domain *d,
-                     u32 shadow_type,
-                     unsigned long backpointer);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0047-x86-p2m-refuse-new-allocations-for-dying-domains.patch b/0047-x86-p2m-refuse-new-allocations-for-dying-domains.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 880b68d..0000000
--- a/0047-x86-p2m-refuse-new-allocations-for-dying-domains.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-From 4f9b535194f70582863f2a78f113547d8822b2b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:08:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 047/126] x86/p2m: refuse new allocations for dying domains
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-This will in particular prevent any attempts to add entries to the p2m,
-once - in a subsequent change - non-root entries have been removed.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-master commit: ff600a8cf8e36f8ecbffecf96a035952e022ab87
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:23:22 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c       |  5 ++++-
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-index d75dc2b9ed3d..787991233e53 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc(struct domain *d)
- 
-     ASSERT(paging_locked_by_me(d));
- 
-+    if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+        return NULL;
-+
-     pg = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.hap.freelist);
-     if ( unlikely(!pg) )
-         return NULL;
-@@ -281,7 +284,7 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
-         d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages++;
-         ASSERT(!page_get_owner(pg) && !(pg->count_info & PGC_count_mask));
-     }
--    else if ( !d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed )
-+    else if ( !d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed && !d->is_dying )
-     {
-         d->arch.paging.p2m_alloc_failed = 1;
-         dprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "d%i failed to allocate from HAP pool\n",
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index fc4f7f78ce43..9ad7e5a88650 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -938,6 +938,10 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-     if ( d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages >= pages )
-         return true;
- 
-+    if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+        /* No reclaim when the domain is dying, teardown will take care of it. */
-+        return false;
-+
-     /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */
-     ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]);
- 
-@@ -990,7 +994,7 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-            d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages,
-            d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
- 
--    ASSERT(d->is_dying);
-+    ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
- 
-     guest_flush_tlb_mask(d, d->dirty_cpumask);
- 
-@@ -1004,10 +1008,13 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-  * to avoid freeing shadows that the caller is currently working on. */
- bool shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int type, unsigned int count)
- {
--    bool ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+    bool ret;
- 
--    if ( !ret && !d->is_dying &&
--         (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
-+    if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+       return false;
-+
-+    ret = _shadow_prealloc(d, shadow_size(type) * count);
-+    if ( !ret && (!d->is_shutting_down || d->shutdown_code != SHUTDOWN_crash) )
-         /*
-          * Failing to allocate memory required for shadow usage can only result in
-          * a domain crash, do it here rather that relying on every caller to do it.
-@@ -1235,6 +1242,9 @@ shadow_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
- {
-     struct page_info *pg = NULL;
- 
-+    if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+       return NULL;
-+
-     /* This is called both from the p2m code (which never holds the
-      * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
-     paging_lock_recursive(d);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0048-x86-p2m-truly-free-paging-pool-memory-for-dying-doma.patch b/0048-x86-p2m-truly-free-paging-pool-memory-for-dying-doma.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 280b6d8..0000000
--- a/0048-x86-p2m-truly-free-paging-pool-memory-for-dying-doma.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-From 7f055b011a657f8f16b0df242301efb312058eea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:08:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 048/126] x86/p2m: truly free paging pool memory for dying
- domains
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Modify {hap,shadow}_free to free the page immediately if the domain is
-dying, so that pages don't accumulate in the pool when
-{shadow,hap}_final_teardown() get called. This is to limit the amount of
-work which needs to be done there (in a non-preemptable manner).
-
-Note the call to shadow_free() in shadow_free_p2m_page() is moved after
-increasing total_pages, so that the decrease done in shadow_free() in
-case the domain is dying doesn't underflow the counter, even if just for
-a short interval.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-master commit: f50a2c0e1d057c00d6061f40ae24d068226052ad
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:23:51 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c       | 12 ++++++++++++
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-index 787991233e53..aef2297450e1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -265,6 +265,18 @@ static void hap_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn)
- 
-     ASSERT(paging_locked_by_me(d));
- 
-+    /*
-+     * For dying domains, actually free the memory here. This way less work is
-+     * left to hap_final_teardown(), which cannot easily have preemption checks
-+     * added.
-+     */
-+    if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+    {
-+        free_domheap_page(pg);
-+        d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages--;
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     d->arch.paging.hap.free_pages++;
-     page_list_add_tail(pg, &d->arch.paging.hap.freelist);
- }
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index 9ad7e5a88650..366956c146aa 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@ mfn_t shadow_alloc(struct domain *d,
- void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t smfn)
- {
-     struct page_info *next = NULL, *sp = mfn_to_page(smfn);
-+    bool dying = ACCESS_ONCE(d->is_dying);
-     struct page_list_head *pin_list;
-     unsigned int pages;
-     u32 shadow_type;
-@@ -1226,11 +1227,32 @@ void shadow_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t smfn)
-          * just before the allocator hands the page out again. */
-         page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(sp);
-         perfc_decr(shadow_alloc_count);
--        page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
-+
-+        /*
-+         * For dying domains, actually free the memory here. This way less
-+         * work is left to shadow_final_teardown(), which cannot easily have
-+         * preemption checks added.
-+         */
-+        if ( unlikely(dying) )
-+        {
-+            /*
-+             * The backpointer field (sh.back) used by shadow code aliases the
-+             * domain owner field, unconditionally clear it here to avoid
-+             * free_domheap_page() attempting to parse it.
-+             */
-+            page_set_owner(sp, NULL);
-+            free_domheap_page(sp);
-+        }
-+        else
-+            page_list_add_tail(sp, &d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist);
-+
-         sp = next;
-     }
- 
--    d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages += pages;
-+    if ( unlikely(dying) )
-+        d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages -= pages;
-+    else
-+        d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages += pages;
- }
- 
- /* Divert a page from the pool to be used by the p2m mapping.
-@@ -1300,9 +1322,9 @@ shadow_free_p2m_page(struct domain *d, struct page_info *pg)
-      * paging lock) and the log-dirty code (which always does). */
-     paging_lock_recursive(d);
- 
--    shadow_free(d, page_to_mfn(pg));
-     d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages--;
-     d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages++;
-+    shadow_free(d, page_to_mfn(pg));
- 
-     paging_unlock(d);
- }
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0049-x86-p2m-free-the-paging-memory-pool-preemptively.patch b/0049-x86-p2m-free-the-paging-memory-pool-preemptively.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aef6a24..0000000
--- a/0049-x86-p2m-free-the-paging-memory-pool-preemptively.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-From 686c920fa9389fe2b6b619643024ed98b4b7d51f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:08:58 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 049/126] x86/p2m: free the paging memory pool preemptively
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The paging memory pool is currently freed in two different places:
-from {shadow,hap}_teardown() via domain_relinquish_resources() and
-from {shadow,hap}_final_teardown() via complete_domain_destroy().
-While the former does handle preemption, the later doesn't.
-
-Attempt to move as much p2m related freeing as possible to happen
-before the call to {shadow,hap}_teardown(), so that most memory can be
-freed in a preemptive way.  In order to avoid causing issues to
-existing callers leave the root p2m page tables set and free them in
-{hap,shadow}_final_teardown().  Also modify {hap,shadow}_free to free
-the page immediately if the domain is dying, so that pages don't
-accumulate in the pool when {shadow,hap}_final_teardown() get called.
-
-Move altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve() to be done in hap_teardown(), as that's
-the place where altp2m_active gets disabled now.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Reported-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-master commit: e7aa55c0aab36d994bf627c92bd5386ae167e16e
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:24:21 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c           |  7 ------
- xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c       | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 12 ++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index 2838f976d729..ce6ddcf31397 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
- #include <xen/livepatch.h>
- #include <public/sysctl.h>
- #include <public/hvm/hvm_vcpu.h>
--#include <asm/altp2m.h>
- #include <asm/regs.h>
- #include <asm/mc146818rtc.h>
- #include <asm/system.h>
-@@ -2358,12 +2357,6 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
-             vpmu_destroy(v);
-         }
- 
--        if ( altp2m_active(d) )
--        {
--            for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
--                altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve(v);
--        }
--
-         if ( is_pv_domain(d) )
-         {
-             for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-index aef2297450e1..a44fcfd95e1e 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include <xen/domain_page.h>
- #include <xen/guest_access.h>
- #include <xen/keyhandler.h>
-+#include <asm/altp2m.h>
- #include <asm/event.h>
- #include <asm/page.h>
- #include <asm/current.h>
-@@ -546,24 +547,8 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-     unsigned int i;
- 
-     if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() )
--    {
--        d->arch.altp2m_active = 0;
--
--        if ( d->arch.altp2m_eptp )
--        {
--            free_xenheap_page(d->arch.altp2m_eptp);
--            d->arch.altp2m_eptp = NULL;
--        }
--
--        if ( d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp )
--        {
--            free_xenheap_page(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp);
--            d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp = NULL;
--        }
--
-         for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
-             p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true);
--    }
- 
-     /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */
-     for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) {
-@@ -578,6 +563,8 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-     paging_lock(d);
-     hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
-     ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.p2m_pages == 0);
-+    ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.free_pages == 0);
-+    ASSERT(d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages == 0);
-     paging_unlock(d);
- }
- 
-@@ -603,6 +590,7 @@ void hap_vcpu_teardown(struct vcpu *v)
- void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool *preempted)
- {
-     struct vcpu *v;
-+    unsigned int i;
- 
-     ASSERT(d->is_dying);
-     ASSERT(d != current->domain);
-@@ -611,6 +599,28 @@ void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool *preempted)
-     for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-         hap_vcpu_teardown(v);
- 
-+    /* Leave the root pt in case we get further attempts to modify the p2m. */
-+    if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() )
-+    {
-+        if ( altp2m_active(d) )
-+            for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-+                altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve(v);
-+
-+        d->arch.altp2m_active = 0;
-+
-+        FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_eptp);
-+        FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp);
-+
-+        for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
-+            p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false);
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Destroy nestedp2m's after altp2m. */
-+    for ( i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++ )
-+        p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false);
-+
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+
-     paging_lock(d); /* Keep various asserts happy */
- 
-     if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 )
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index 366956c146aa..680766fd5170 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2891,8 +2891,17 @@ void shadow_teardown(struct domain *d, bool *preempted)
-     for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-         shadow_vcpu_teardown(v);
- 
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+
-     paging_lock(d);
- 
-+    /*
-+     * Reclaim all shadow memory so that shadow_set_allocation() doesn't find
-+     * in-use pages, as _shadow_prealloc() will no longer try to reclaim pages
-+     * because the domain is dying.
-+     */
-+    shadow_blow_tables(d);
-+
- #if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & (SHOPT_VIRTUAL_TLB|SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC))
-     /* Free the virtual-TLB array attached to each vcpu */
-     for_each_vcpu(d, v)
-@@ -3013,6 +3022,9 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-                    d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages,
-                    d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages,
-                    d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
-+    ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.total_pages);
-+    ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.free_pages);
-+    ASSERT(!d->arch.paging.shadow.p2m_pages);
-     paging_unlock(d);
- }
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0050-xen-x86-p2m-Add-preemption-in-p2m_teardown.patch b/0050-xen-x86-p2m-Add-preemption-in-p2m_teardown.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8ab565d..0000000
--- a/0050-xen-x86-p2m-Add-preemption-in-p2m_teardown.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-From b03074bb47d10c9373688b3661c7c31da01c21a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:09:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 050/126] xen/x86: p2m: Add preemption in p2m_teardown()
-
-The list p2m->pages contain all the pages used by the P2M. On large
-instance this can be quite large and the time spent to call
-d->arch.paging.free_page() will take more than 1ms for a 80GB guest
-on a Xen running in nested environment on a c5.metal.
-
-By extrapolation, it would take > 100ms for a 8TB guest (what we
-current security support). So add some preemption in p2m_teardown()
-and propagate to the callers. Note there are 3 places where
-the preemption is not enabled:
-    - hap_final_teardown()/shadow_final_teardown(): We are
-      preventing update the P2M once the domain is dying (so
-      no more pages could be allocated) and most of the P2M pages
-      will be freed in preemptive manneer when relinquishing the
-      resources. So this is fine to disable preemption.
-    - shadow_enable(): This is fine because it will undo the allocation
-      that may have been made by p2m_alloc_table() (so only the root
-      page table).
-
-The preemption is arbitrarily checked every 1024 iterations.
-
-We now need to include <xen/event.h> in p2m-basic in order to
-import the definition for local_events_need_delivery() used by
-general_preempt_check(). Ideally, the inclusion should happen in
-xen/sched.h but it opened a can of worms.
-
-Note that with the current approach, Xen doesn't keep track on whether
-the alt/nested P2Ms have been cleared. So there are some redundant work.
-However, this is not expected to incurr too much overhead (the P2M lock
-shouldn't be contended during teardown). So this is optimization is
-left outside of the security event.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33746 / XSA-410.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 8a2111250b424edc49c65c4d41b276766d30635c
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:24:48 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c       | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c           | 18 +++++++++++++++---
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 12 +++++++++---
- xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h       |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-index a44fcfd95e1e..1f9a157a0c34 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
-@@ -548,17 +548,17 @@ void hap_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
- 
-     if ( hvm_altp2m_supported() )
-         for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
--            p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true);
-+            p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], true, NULL);
- 
-     /* Destroy nestedp2m's first */
-     for (i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++) {
--        p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true);
-+        p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], true, NULL);
-     }
- 
-     if ( d->arch.paging.hap.total_pages != 0 )
-         hap_teardown(d, NULL);
- 
--    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true, NULL);
-     /* Free any memory that the p2m teardown released */
-     paging_lock(d);
-     hap_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
-@@ -612,14 +612,24 @@ void hap_teardown(struct domain *d, bool *preempted)
-         FREE_XENHEAP_PAGE(d->arch.altp2m_visible_eptp);
- 
-         for ( i = 0; i < MAX_ALTP2M; i++ )
--            p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false);
-+        {
-+            p2m_teardown(d->arch.altp2m_p2m[i], false, preempted);
-+            if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+                return;
-+        }
-     }
- 
-     /* Destroy nestedp2m's after altp2m. */
-     for ( i = 0; i < MAX_NESTEDP2M; i++ )
--        p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false);
-+    {
-+        p2m_teardown(d->arch.nested_p2m[i], false, preempted);
-+        if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+            return;
-+    }
- 
--    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false, preempted);
-+    if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+        return;
- 
-     paging_lock(d); /* Keep various asserts happy */
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-index 8ba73082c1bf..107f6778a6e1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-@@ -741,12 +741,13 @@ int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
-  * hvm fixme: when adding support for pvh non-hardware domains, this path must
-  * cleanup any foreign p2m types (release refcnts on them).
-  */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root)
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root, bool *preempted)
- /* Return all the p2m pages to Xen.
-  * We know we don't have any extra mappings to these pages */
- {
-     struct page_info *pg, *root_pg = NULL;
-     struct domain *d;
-+    unsigned int i = 0;
- 
-     if (p2m == NULL)
-         return;
-@@ -765,8 +766,19 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root)
-     }
- 
-     while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
--        if ( pg != root_pg )
--            d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+    {
-+        if ( pg == root_pg )
-+            continue;
-+
-+        d->arch.paging.free_page(d, pg);
-+
-+        /* Arbitrarily check preemption every 1024 iterations */
-+        if ( preempted && !(++i % 1024) && general_preempt_check() )
-+        {
-+            *preempted = true;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+    }
- 
-     if ( root_pg )
-         page_list_add(root_pg, &p2m->pages);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index 680766fd5170..8f7fddcee1e5 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -2837,8 +2837,12 @@ int shadow_enable(struct domain *d, u32 mode)
-  out_locked:
-     paging_unlock(d);
-  out_unlocked:
-+    /*
-+     * This is fine to ignore the preemption here because only the root
-+     * will be allocated by p2m_alloc_table().
-+     */
-     if ( rv != 0 && !pagetable_is_null(p2m_get_pagetable(p2m)) )
--        p2m_teardown(p2m, true);
-+        p2m_teardown(p2m, true, NULL);
-     if ( rv != 0 && pg != NULL )
-     {
-         pg->count_info &= ~PGC_count_mask;
-@@ -2891,7 +2895,9 @@ void shadow_teardown(struct domain *d, bool *preempted)
-     for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-         shadow_vcpu_teardown(v);
- 
--    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false);
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), false, preempted);
-+    if ( preempted && *preempted )
-+        return;
- 
-     paging_lock(d);
- 
-@@ -3012,7 +3018,7 @@ void shadow_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-         shadow_teardown(d, NULL);
- 
-     /* It is now safe to pull down the p2m map. */
--    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true);
-+    p2m_teardown(p2m_get_hostp2m(d), true, NULL);
-     /* Free any shadow memory that the p2m teardown released */
-     paging_lock(d);
-     shadow_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL);
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-index 46eb51d44cf5..edbe4cee2717 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d);
- int p2m_alloc_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m);
- 
- /* Return all the p2m resources to Xen. */
--void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root);
-+void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m, bool remove_root, bool *preempted);
- void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d);
- 
- /* Add a page to a domain's p2m table */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0051-libxl-docs-Use-arch-specific-default-paging-memory.patch b/0051-libxl-docs-Use-arch-specific-default-paging-memory.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4ec35bf..0000000
--- a/0051-libxl-docs-Use-arch-specific-default-paging-memory.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-From 0c0680d6e7953ca4c91699e60060c732f9ead5c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:09:32 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 051/126] libxl, docs: Use arch-specific default paging memory
-
-The default paging memory (descibed in `shadow_memory` entry in xl
-config) in libxl is used to determine the memory pool size for xl
-guests. Currently this size is only used for x86, and contains a part
-of RAM to shadow the resident processes. Since on Arm there is no
-shadow mode guests, so the part of RAM to shadow the resident processes
-is not necessary. Therefore, this commit splits the function
-`libxl_get_required_shadow_memory()` to arch specific helpers and
-renamed the helper to `libxl__arch_get_required_paging_memory()`.
-
-On x86, this helper calls the original value from
-`libxl_get_required_shadow_memory()` so no functional change intended.
-
-On Arm, this helper returns 1MB per vcpu plus 4KB per MiB of RAM
-for the P2M map and additional 512KB.
-
-Also update the xl.cfg documentation to add Arm documentation
-according to code changes and correct the comment style following Xen
-coding style.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33747 / XSA-409.
-
-Suggested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-master commit: 156a239ea288972425f967ac807b3cb5b5e14874
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:28:37 +0200
----
- docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in       |  5 +++++
- tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h  |  4 ++++
- tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c   | 12 ++++++++++++
- tools/libs/light/libxl_utils.c |  9 ++-------
- tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c   | 13 +++++++++++++
- 5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in b/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in
-index 56370a37dbb1..af7fae7c52f9 100644
---- a/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in
-+++ b/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in
-@@ -1746,6 +1746,11 @@ are not using hardware assisted paging (i.e. you are using shadow
- mode) and your guest workload consists of a very large number of
- similar processes then increasing this value may improve performance.
- 
-+On Arm, this field is used to determine the size of the guest P2M pages
-+pool, and the default value is 1MB per vCPU plus 4KB per MB of RAM for
-+the P2M map. Users should adjust this value if bigger P2M pool size is
-+needed.
-+
- =back
- 
- =head3 Processor and Platform Features
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h
-index 8527fc5c6c23..6741b7f6f457 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arch.h
-@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ void libxl__arch_update_domain_config(libxl__gc *gc,
-                                       libxl_domain_config *dst,
-                                       const libxl_domain_config *src);
- 
-+_hidden
-+unsigned long libxl__arch_get_required_paging_memory(unsigned long maxmem_kb,
-+                                                     unsigned int smp_cpus);
-+
- #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
- 
- #define LAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS  0xfee00000
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-index e2901f13b724..d59b464192c2 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ out:
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-+unsigned long libxl__arch_get_required_paging_memory(unsigned long maxmem_kb,
-+                                                     unsigned int smp_cpus)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * 256 pages (1MB) per vcpu,
-+     * plus 1 page per MiB of RAM for the P2M map,
-+     * This is higher than the minimum that Xen would allocate if no value
-+     * were given (but the Xen minimum is for safety, not performance).
-+     */
-+    return 4 * (256 * smp_cpus + maxmem_kb / 1024);
-+}
-+
- static struct arch_info {
-     const char *guest_type;
-     const char *timer_compat;
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_utils.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_utils.c
-index 4699c4a0a36f..e276c0ee9cc3 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_utils.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_utils.c
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
- #include <ctype.h>
- 
- #include "libxl_internal.h"
-+#include "libxl_arch.h"
- #include "_paths.h"
- 
- #ifndef LIBXL_HAVE_NONCONST_LIBXL_BASENAME_RETURN_VALUE
-@@ -39,13 +40,7 @@ char *libxl_basename(const char *name)
- 
- unsigned long libxl_get_required_shadow_memory(unsigned long maxmem_kb, unsigned int smp_cpus)
- {
--    /* 256 pages (1MB) per vcpu,
--       plus 1 page per MiB of RAM for the P2M map,
--       plus 1 page per MiB of RAM to shadow the resident processes.
--       This is higher than the minimum that Xen would allocate if no value
--       were given (but the Xen minimum is for safety, not performance).
--     */
--    return 4 * (256 * smp_cpus + 2 * (maxmem_kb / 1024));
-+    return libxl__arch_get_required_paging_memory(maxmem_kb, smp_cpus);
- }
- 
- char *libxl_domid_to_name(libxl_ctx *ctx, uint32_t domid)
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c
-index 18c3c77ccde3..4d66478fe9dd 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_x86.c
-@@ -882,6 +882,19 @@ void libxl__arch_update_domain_config(libxl__gc *gc,
-                     libxl_defbool_val(src->b_info.arch_x86.msr_relaxed));
- }
- 
-+unsigned long libxl__arch_get_required_paging_memory(unsigned long maxmem_kb,
-+                                                     unsigned int smp_cpus)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * 256 pages (1MB) per vcpu,
-+     * plus 1 page per MiB of RAM for the P2M map,
-+     * plus 1 page per MiB of RAM to shadow the resident processes.
-+     * This is higher than the minimum that Xen would allocate if no value
-+     * were given (but the Xen minimum is for safety, not performance).
-+     */
-+    return 4 * (256 * smp_cpus + 2 * (maxmem_kb / 1024));
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Local variables:
-  * mode: C
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0052-xen-arm-Construct-the-P2M-pages-pool-for-guests.patch b/0052-xen-arm-Construct-the-P2M-pages-pool-for-guests.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a17ad53..0000000
--- a/0052-xen-arm-Construct-the-P2M-pages-pool-for-guests.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
-From 45336d8f88725aec65ee177b1b09abf6eef1dc8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:09:58 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 052/126] xen/arm: Construct the P2M pages pool for guests
-
-This commit constructs the p2m pages pool for guests from the
-data structure and helper perspective.
-
-This is implemented by:
-
-- Adding a `struct paging_domain` which contains a freelist, a
-counter variable and a spinlock to `struct arch_domain` to
-indicate the free p2m pages and the number of p2m total pages in
-the p2m pages pool.
-
-- Adding a helper `p2m_get_allocation` to get the p2m pool size.
-
-- Adding a helper `p2m_set_allocation` to set the p2m pages pool
-size. This helper should be called before allocating memory for
-a guest.
-
-- Adding a helper `p2m_teardown_allocation` to free the p2m pages
-pool. This helper should be called during the xl domain destory.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33747 / XSA-409.
-
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-master commit: 55914f7fc91a468649b8a3ec3f53ae1c4aca6670
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:28:39 +0200
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c           | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h | 10 ++++
- xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h    |  4 ++
- 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index 4ad3e0606e9c..6883d8627702 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,92 @@ static uint64_t generate_vttbr(uint16_t vmid, mfn_t root_mfn)
-     return (mfn_to_maddr(root_mfn) | ((uint64_t)vmid << 48));
- }
- 
-+/* Return the size of the pool, rounded up to the nearest MB */
-+unsigned int p2m_get_allocation(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+    unsigned long nr_pages = ACCESS_ONCE(d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages);
-+
-+    return ROUNDUP(nr_pages, 1 << (20 - PAGE_SHIFT)) >> (20 - PAGE_SHIFT);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Set the pool of pages to the required number of pages.
-+ * Returns 0 for success, non-zero for failure.
-+ * Call with d->arch.paging.lock held.
-+ */
-+int p2m_set_allocation(struct domain *d, unsigned long pages, bool *preempted)
-+{
-+    struct page_info *pg;
-+
-+    ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&d->arch.paging.lock));
-+
-+    for ( ; ; )
-+    {
-+        if ( d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages < pages )
-+        {
-+            /* Need to allocate more memory from domheap */
-+            pg = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, 0);
-+            if ( pg == NULL )
-+            {
-+                printk(XENLOG_ERR "Failed to allocate P2M pages.\n");
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+            }
-+            ACCESS_ONCE(d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages) =
-+                d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages + 1;
-+            page_list_add_tail(pg, &d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
-+        }
-+        else if ( d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages > pages )
-+        {
-+            /* Need to return memory to domheap */
-+            pg = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
-+            if( pg )
-+            {
-+                ACCESS_ONCE(d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages) =
-+                    d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages - 1;
-+                free_domheap_page(pg);
-+            }
-+            else
-+            {
-+                printk(XENLOG_ERR
-+                       "Failed to free P2M pages, P2M freelist is empty.\n");
-+                return -ENOMEM;
-+            }
-+        }
-+        else
-+            break;
-+
-+        /* Check to see if we need to yield and try again */
-+        if ( preempted && general_preempt_check() )
-+        {
-+            *preempted = true;
-+            return -ERESTART;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int p2m_teardown_allocation(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+    int ret = 0;
-+    bool preempted = false;
-+
-+    spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+    if ( d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages != 0 )
-+    {
-+        ret = p2m_set_allocation(d, 0, &preempted);
-+        if ( preempted )
-+        {
-+            spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+            return -ERESTART;
-+        }
-+        ASSERT(d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages == 0);
-+    }
-+    spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* Unlock the flush and do a P2M TLB flush if necessary */
- void p2m_write_unlock(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
- {
-@@ -1602,7 +1688,9 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d)
-     unsigned int cpu;
- 
-     rwlock_init(&p2m->lock);
-+    spin_lock_init(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&p2m->pages);
-+    INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
- 
-     p2m->vmid = INVALID_VMID;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
-index bb0a6adbe00b..1d8935778f3b 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/domain.h
-@@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ struct vtimer {
-     uint64_t cval;
- };
- 
-+struct paging_domain {
-+    spinlock_t lock;
-+    /* Free P2M pages from the pre-allocated P2M pool */
-+    struct page_list_head p2m_freelist;
-+    /* Number of pages from the pre-allocated P2M pool */
-+    unsigned long p2m_total_pages;
-+};
-+
- struct arch_domain
- {
- #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_64
-@@ -51,6 +59,8 @@ struct arch_domain
- 
-     struct hvm_domain hvm;
- 
-+    struct paging_domain paging;
-+
-     struct vmmio vmmio;
- 
-     /* Continuable domain_relinquish_resources(). */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-index 3a2d51b35d71..18675b234570 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-@@ -218,6 +218,10 @@ void p2m_restore_state(struct vcpu *n);
- /* Print debugging/statistial info about a domain's p2m */
- void p2m_dump_info(struct domain *d);
- 
-+unsigned int p2m_get_allocation(struct domain *d);
-+int p2m_set_allocation(struct domain *d, unsigned long pages, bool *preempted);
-+int p2m_teardown_allocation(struct domain *d);
-+
- static inline void p2m_write_lock(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
- {
-     write_lock(&p2m->lock);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0053-xen-arm-libxl-Implement-XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op-for-Arm.patch b/0053-xen-arm-libxl-Implement-XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op-for-Arm.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c4e543d..0000000
--- a/0053-xen-arm-libxl-Implement-XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op-for-Arm.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-From c5215044578e88b401a1296ed6302df05c113c5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:10:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 053/126] xen/arm, libxl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op for
- Arm
-
-This commit implements the `XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op` support in Xen
-for Arm. The p2m pages pool size for xl guests is supposed to be
-determined by `XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op`. Hence, this commit:
-
-- Introduces a function `p2m_domctl` and implements the subops
-`XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION` and
-`XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_GET_ALLOCATION` of `XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op`.
-
-- Adds the `XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION` support in libxl.
-
-Therefore enabling the setting of shadow memory pool size
-when creating a guest from xl and getting shadow memory pool size
-from Xen.
-
-Note that the `XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op` added in this commit is only
-a dummy op, and the functionality of setting/getting p2m memory pool
-size for xl guests will be added in following commits.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33747 / XSA-409.
-
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-master commit: cf2a68d2ffbc3ce95e01449d46180bddb10d24a0
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:28:42 +0200
----
- tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- xen/arch/arm/domctl.c        | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-index d59b464192c2..d21f614ed788 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-@@ -131,6 +131,18 @@ int libxl__arch_domain_create(libxl__gc *gc,
-                               libxl__domain_build_state *state,
-                               uint32_t domid)
- {
-+    libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
-+    unsigned int shadow_mb = DIV_ROUNDUP(d_config->b_info.shadow_memkb, 1024);
-+
-+    int r = xc_shadow_control(ctx->xch, domid,
-+                              XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION,
-+                              &shadow_mb, 0);
-+    if (r) {
-+        LOGED(ERROR, domid,
-+              "Failed to set %u MiB shadow allocation", shadow_mb);
-+        return ERROR_FAIL;
-+    }
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-index a8c48b0beaab..a049bc7f3e52 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-@@ -45,11 +45,43 @@ static int handle_vuart_init(struct domain *d,
-     return rc;
- }
- 
-+static long p2m_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_shadow_op *sc,
-+                       XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
-+{
-+    if ( unlikely(d == current->domain) )
-+    {
-+        printk(XENLOG_ERR "Tried to do a p2m domctl op on itself.\n");
-+        return -EINVAL;
-+    }
-+
-+    if ( unlikely(d->is_dying) )
-+    {
-+        printk(XENLOG_ERR "Tried to do a p2m domctl op on dying domain %u\n",
-+               d->domain_id);
-+        return -EINVAL;
-+    }
-+
-+    switch ( sc->op )
-+    {
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION:
-+        return 0;
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_GET_ALLOCATION:
-+        return 0;
-+    default:
-+    {
-+        printk(XENLOG_ERR "Bad p2m domctl op %u\n", sc->op);
-+        return -EINVAL;
-+    }
-+    }
-+}
-+
- long arch_do_domctl(struct xen_domctl *domctl, struct domain *d,
-                     XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
- {
-     switch ( domctl->cmd )
-     {
-+    case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
-+        return p2m_domctl(d, &domctl->u.shadow_op, u_domctl);
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_cacheflush:
-     {
-         gfn_t s = _gfn(domctl->u.cacheflush.start_pfn);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0054-xen-arm-Allocate-and-free-P2M-pages-from-the-P2M-poo.patch b/0054-xen-arm-Allocate-and-free-P2M-pages-from-the-P2M-poo.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 78ce712..0000000
--- a/0054-xen-arm-Allocate-and-free-P2M-pages-from-the-P2M-poo.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,290 +0,0 @@
-From 7ad38a39f08aadc1578bdb46ccabaad79ed0faee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:10:34 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 054/126] xen/arm: Allocate and free P2M pages from the P2M
- pool
-
-This commit sets/tearsdown of p2m pages pool for non-privileged Arm
-guests by calling `p2m_set_allocation` and `p2m_teardown_allocation`.
-
-- For dom0, P2M pages should come from heap directly instead of p2m
-pool, so that the kernel may take advantage of the extended regions.
-
-- For xl guests, the setting of the p2m pool is called in
-`XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op` and the p2m pool is destroyed in
-`domain_relinquish_resources`. Note that domctl->u.shadow_op.mb is
-updated with the new size when setting the p2m pool.
-
-- For dom0less domUs, the setting of the p2m pool is called before
-allocating memory during domain creation. Users can specify the p2m
-pool size by `xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb` dts property.
-
-To actually allocate/free pages from the p2m pool, this commit adds
-two helper functions namely `p2m_alloc_page` and `p2m_free_page` to
-`struct p2m_domain`. By replacing the `alloc_domheap_page` and
-`free_domheap_page` with these two helper functions, p2m pages can
-be added/removed from the list of p2m pool rather than from the heap.
-
-Since page from `p2m_alloc_page` is cleaned, take the opportunity
-to remove the redundant `clean_page` in `p2m_create_table`.
-
-This is part of CVE-2022-33747 / XSA-409.
-
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-master commit: cbea5a1149ca7fd4b7cdbfa3ec2e4f109b601ff7
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:28:44 +0200
----
- docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt |  8 ++++
- xen/arch/arm/domain.c                 |  6 +++
- xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c           | 29 ++++++++++++++
- xen/arch/arm/domctl.c                 | 23 ++++++++++-
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c                    | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 5 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
-index 5243bc7fd344..470c9491a781 100644
---- a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
-+++ b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
-@@ -164,6 +164,14 @@ with the following properties:
-     Both #address-cells and #size-cells need to be specified because
-     both sub-nodes (described shortly) have reg properties.
- 
-+- xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb
-+
-+    Optional. A 32-bit integer specifying the amount of megabytes of RAM
-+    used for the domain P2M pool. This is in-sync with the shadow_memory
-+    option in xl.cfg. Leaving this field empty in device tree will lead to
-+    the default size of domain P2M pool, i.e. 1MB per guest vCPU plus 4KB
-+    per MB of guest RAM plus 512KB for guest extended regions.
-+
- Under the "xen,domain" compatible node, one or more sub-nodes are present
- for the DomU kernel and ramdisk.
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-index 223ec9694df1..a5ffd952ecd0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-@@ -985,6 +985,7 @@ enum {
-     PROG_page,
-     PROG_mapping,
-     PROG_p2m,
-+    PROG_p2m_pool,
-     PROG_done,
- };
- 
-@@ -1044,6 +1045,11 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
-         if ( ret )
-             return ret;
- 
-+    PROGRESS(p2m_pool):
-+        ret = p2m_teardown_allocation(d);
-+        if( ret )
-+            return ret;
-+
-     PROGRESS(done):
-         break;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
-index 26c13429488d..df0ec84f034c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
-@@ -2333,6 +2333,21 @@ static void __init find_gnttab_region(struct domain *d,
-            kinfo->gnttab_start, kinfo->gnttab_start + kinfo->gnttab_size);
- }
- 
-+static unsigned long __init domain_p2m_pages(unsigned long maxmem_kb,
-+                                             unsigned int smp_cpus)
-+{
-+    /*
-+     * Keep in sync with libxl__get_required_paging_memory().
-+     * 256 pages (1MB) per vcpu, plus 1 page per MiB of RAM for the P2M map,
-+     * plus 128 pages to cover extended regions.
-+     */
-+    unsigned long memkb = 4 * (256 * smp_cpus + (maxmem_kb / 1024) + 128);
-+
-+    BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE != SZ_4K);
-+
-+    return DIV_ROUND_UP(memkb, 1024) << (20 - PAGE_SHIFT);
-+}
-+
- static int __init construct_domain(struct domain *d, struct kernel_info *kinfo)
- {
-     unsigned int i;
-@@ -2424,6 +2439,8 @@ static int __init construct_domU(struct domain *d,
-     struct kernel_info kinfo = {};
-     int rc;
-     u64 mem;
-+    u32 p2m_mem_mb;
-+    unsigned long p2m_pages;
- 
-     rc = dt_property_read_u64(node, "memory", &mem);
-     if ( !rc )
-@@ -2433,6 +2450,18 @@ static int __init construct_domU(struct domain *d,
-     }
-     kinfo.unassigned_mem = (paddr_t)mem * SZ_1K;
- 
-+    rc = dt_property_read_u32(node, "xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb", &p2m_mem_mb);
-+    /* If xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb is not specified, use the default value. */
-+    p2m_pages = rc ?
-+                p2m_mem_mb << (20 - PAGE_SHIFT) :
-+                domain_p2m_pages(mem, d->max_vcpus);
-+
-+    spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+    rc = p2m_set_allocation(d, p2m_pages, NULL);
-+    spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+    if ( rc != 0 )
-+        return rc;
-+
-     printk("*** LOADING DOMU cpus=%u memory=%"PRIx64"KB ***\n", d->max_vcpus, mem);
- 
-     kinfo.vpl011 = dt_property_read_bool(node, "vpl011");
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-index a049bc7f3e52..4ab5ed4ab24d 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domctl.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static int handle_vuart_init(struct domain *d,
- static long p2m_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_shadow_op *sc,
-                        XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
- {
-+    long rc;
-+    bool preempted = false;
-+
-     if ( unlikely(d == current->domain) )
-     {
-         printk(XENLOG_ERR "Tried to do a p2m domctl op on itself.\n");
-@@ -64,9 +67,27 @@ static long p2m_domctl(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_shadow_op *sc,
-     switch ( sc->op )
-     {
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION:
--        return 0;
-+    {
-+        /* Allow and handle preemption */
-+        spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+        rc = p2m_set_allocation(d, sc->mb << (20 - PAGE_SHIFT), &preempted);
-+        spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+
-+        if ( preempted )
-+            /* Not finished. Set up to re-run the call. */
-+            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_domctl, "h",
-+                                               u_domctl);
-+        else
-+            /* Finished. Return the new allocation. */
-+            sc->mb = p2m_get_allocation(d);
-+
-+        return rc;
-+    }
-     case XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_GET_ALLOCATION:
-+    {
-+        sc->mb = p2m_get_allocation(d);
-         return 0;
-+    }
-     default:
-     {
-         printk(XENLOG_ERR "Bad p2m domctl op %u\n", sc->op);
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index 6883d8627702..c1055ff2a745 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,54 @@ static uint64_t generate_vttbr(uint16_t vmid, mfn_t root_mfn)
-     return (mfn_to_maddr(root_mfn) | ((uint64_t)vmid << 48));
- }
- 
-+static struct page_info *p2m_alloc_page(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+    struct page_info *pg;
-+
-+    spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+    /*
-+     * For hardware domain, there should be no limit in the number of pages that
-+     * can be allocated, so that the kernel may take advantage of the extended
-+     * regions. Hence, allocate p2m pages for hardware domains from heap.
-+     */
-+    if ( is_hardware_domain(d) )
-+    {
-+        pg = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, 0);
-+        if ( pg == NULL )
-+        {
-+            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "Failed to allocate P2M pages for hwdom.\n");
-+            spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+            return NULL;
-+        }
-+    }
-+    else
-+    {
-+        pg = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
-+        if ( unlikely(!pg) )
-+        {
-+            spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+            return NULL;
-+        }
-+        d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages--;
-+    }
-+    spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+
-+    return pg;
-+}
-+
-+static void p2m_free_page(struct domain *d, struct page_info *pg)
-+{
-+    spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+    if ( is_hardware_domain(d) )
-+        free_domheap_page(pg);
-+    else
-+    {
-+        d->arch.paging.p2m_total_pages++;
-+        page_list_add_tail(pg, &d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
-+    }
-+    spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+}
-+
- /* Return the size of the pool, rounded up to the nearest MB */
- unsigned int p2m_get_allocation(struct domain *d)
- {
-@@ -751,7 +799,7 @@ static int p2m_create_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m, lpae_t *entry)
- 
-     ASSERT(!p2m_is_valid(*entry));
- 
--    page = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, 0);
-+    page = p2m_alloc_page(p2m->domain);
-     if ( page == NULL )
-         return -ENOMEM;
- 
-@@ -878,7 +926,7 @@ static void p2m_free_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-     pg = mfn_to_page(mfn);
- 
-     page_list_del(pg, &p2m->pages);
--    free_domheap_page(pg);
-+    p2m_free_page(p2m->domain, pg);
- }
- 
- static bool p2m_split_superpage(struct p2m_domain *p2m, lpae_t *entry,
-@@ -902,7 +950,7 @@ static bool p2m_split_superpage(struct p2m_domain *p2m, lpae_t *entry,
-     ASSERT(level < target);
-     ASSERT(p2m_is_superpage(*entry, level));
- 
--    page = alloc_domheap_page(NULL, 0);
-+    page = p2m_alloc_page(p2m->domain);
-     if ( !page )
-         return false;
- 
-@@ -1644,7 +1692,7 @@ int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
- 
-     while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) )
-     {
--        free_domheap_page(pg);
-+        p2m_free_page(p2m->domain, pg);
-         count++;
-         /* Arbitrarily preempt every 512 iterations */
-         if ( !(count % 512) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-@@ -1668,6 +1716,7 @@ void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-         return;
- 
-     ASSERT(page_list_empty(&p2m->pages));
-+    ASSERT(page_list_empty(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist));
- 
-     if ( p2m->root )
-         free_domheap_pages(p2m->root, P2M_ROOT_ORDER);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0055-gnttab-correct-locking-on-transitive-grant-copy-erro.patch b/0055-gnttab-correct-locking-on-transitive-grant-copy-erro.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b8a7ea..0000000
--- a/0055-gnttab-correct-locking-on-transitive-grant-copy-erro.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From bb43a10fefe494ab747b020fef3e823b63fc566d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:11:01 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 055/126] gnttab: correct locking on transitive grant copy
- error path
-
-While the comment next to the lock dropping in preparation of
-recursively calling acquire_grant_for_copy() mistakenly talks about the
-rd == td case (excluded a few lines further up), the same concerns apply
-to the calling of release_grant_for_copy() on a subsequent error path.
-
-This is CVE-2022-33748 / XSA-411.
-
-Fixes: ad48fb963dbf ("gnttab: fix transitive grant handling")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 6e3aab858eef614a21a782a3b73acc88e74690ea
-master date: 2022-10-11 14:29:30 +0200
----
- xen/common/grant_table.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index 77bba9806937..0523beb9b734 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -2608,9 +2608,8 @@ acquire_grant_for_copy(
-                      trans_domid);
- 
-         /*
--         * acquire_grant_for_copy() could take the lock on the
--         * remote table (if rd == td), so we have to drop the lock
--         * here and reacquire.
-+         * acquire_grant_for_copy() will take the lock on the remote table,
-+         * so we have to drop the lock here and reacquire.
-          */
-         active_entry_release(act);
-         grant_read_unlock(rgt);
-@@ -2647,11 +2646,25 @@ acquire_grant_for_copy(
-                           act->trans_gref != trans_gref ||
-                           !act->is_sub_page)) )
-         {
-+            /*
-+             * Like above for acquire_grant_for_copy() we need to drop and then
-+             * re-acquire the locks here to prevent lock order inversion issues.
-+             * Unlike for acquire_grant_for_copy() we don't need to re-check
-+             * anything, as release_grant_for_copy() doesn't depend on the grant
-+             * table entry: It only updates internal state and the status flags.
-+             */
-+            active_entry_release(act);
-+            grant_read_unlock(rgt);
-+
-             release_grant_for_copy(td, trans_gref, readonly);
-             rcu_unlock_domain(td);
-+
-+            grant_read_lock(rgt);
-+            act = active_entry_acquire(rgt, gref);
-             reduce_status_for_pin(rd, act, status, readonly);
-             active_entry_release(act);
-             grant_read_unlock(rgt);
-+
-             put_page(*page);
-             *page = NULL;
-             return ERESTART;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0056-tools-libxl-Replace-deprecated-soundhw-on-QEMU-comma.patch b/0056-tools-libxl-Replace-deprecated-soundhw-on-QEMU-comma.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 80a1923..0000000
--- a/0056-tools-libxl-Replace-deprecated-soundhw-on-QEMU-comma.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-From d65ebacb78901b695bc5e8a075ad1ad865a78928 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:13:15 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 056/126] tools/libxl: Replace deprecated -soundhw on QEMU
- command line
-
--soundhw is deprecated since 825ff02911c9 ("audio: add soundhw
-deprecation notice"), QEMU v5.1, and is been remove for upcoming v7.1
-by 039a68373c45 ("introduce -audio as a replacement for -soundhw").
-
-Instead we can just add the sound card with "-device", for most option
-that "-soundhw" could handle. "-device" is an option that existed
-before QEMU 1.0, and could already be used to add audio hardware.
-
-The list of possible option for libxl's "soundhw" is taken the list
-from QEMU 7.0.
-
-The list of options for "soundhw" are listed in order of preference in
-the manual. The first three (hda, ac97, es1370) are PCI devices and
-easy to test on Linux, and the last four are ISA devices which doesn't
-seems to work out of the box on linux.
-
-The sound card 'pcspk' isn't listed even if it used to be accepted by
-'-soundhw' because QEMU crash when trying to add it to a Xen domain.
-Also, it wouldn't work with "-device" might need to be "-machine
-pcspk-audiodev=default" instead.
-
-Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
-master commit: 62ca138c2c052187783aca3957d3f47c4dcfd683
-master date: 2022-08-18 09:25:50 +0200
----
- docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in                  |  6 +++---
- tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c               | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
- tools/libs/light/libxl_types_internal.idl | 10 ++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in b/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in
-index af7fae7c52f9..ef9505f91341 100644
---- a/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in
-+++ b/docs/man/xl.cfg.5.pod.in
-@@ -2523,9 +2523,9 @@ The form serial=DEVICE is also accepted for backwards compatibility.
- 
- =item B<soundhw="DEVICE">
- 
--Select the virtual sound card to expose to the guest. The valid
--devices are defined by the device model configuration, please see the
--B<qemu(1)> manpage for details. The default is not to export any sound
-+Select the virtual sound card to expose to the guest. The valid devices are
-+B<hda>, B<ac97>, B<es1370>, B<adlib>, B<cs4231a>, B<gus>, B<sb16> if there are
-+available with the device model QEMU. The default is not to export any sound
- device.
- 
- =item B<vkb_device=BOOLEAN>
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c
-index ae5f35e0c3fd..b86e8ccc858f 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_dm.c
-@@ -1204,6 +1204,7 @@ static int libxl__build_device_model_args_new(libxl__gc *gc,
-     uint64_t ram_size;
-     const char *path, *chardev;
-     bool is_stubdom = libxl_defbool_val(b_info->device_model_stubdomain);
-+    int rc;
- 
-     dm_args = flexarray_make(gc, 16, 1);
-     dm_envs = flexarray_make(gc, 16, 1);
-@@ -1531,7 +1532,23 @@ static int libxl__build_device_model_args_new(libxl__gc *gc,
-             }
-         }
-         if (b_info->u.hvm.soundhw) {
--            flexarray_vappend(dm_args, "-soundhw", b_info->u.hvm.soundhw, NULL);
-+            libxl__qemu_soundhw soundhw;
-+
-+            rc = libxl__qemu_soundhw_from_string(b_info->u.hvm.soundhw, &soundhw);
-+            if (rc) {
-+                LOGD(ERROR, guest_domid, "Unknown soundhw option '%s'", b_info->u.hvm.soundhw);
-+                return ERROR_INVAL;
-+            }
-+
-+            switch (soundhw) {
-+            case LIBXL__QEMU_SOUNDHW_HDA:
-+                flexarray_vappend(dm_args, "-device", "intel-hda",
-+                                  "-device", "hda-duplex", NULL);
-+                break;
-+            default:
-+                flexarray_append_pair(dm_args, "-device",
-+                                      (char*)libxl__qemu_soundhw_to_string(soundhw));
-+            }
-         }
-         if (!libxl__acpi_defbool_val(b_info)) {
-             flexarray_append(dm_args, "-no-acpi");
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_types_internal.idl b/tools/libs/light/libxl_types_internal.idl
-index 3593e21dbb64..caa08d3229cd 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_types_internal.idl
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_types_internal.idl
-@@ -55,3 +55,13 @@ libxl__device_action = Enumeration("device_action", [
-     (1, "ADD"),
-     (2, "REMOVE"),
-     ])
-+
-+libxl__qemu_soundhw = Enumeration("qemu_soundhw", [
-+    (1, "ac97"),
-+    (2, "adlib"),
-+    (3, "cs4231a"),
-+    (4, "es1370"),
-+    (5, "gus"),
-+    (6, "hda"),
-+    (7, "sb16"),
-+    ])
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0057-x86-CPUID-surface-suitable-value-in-EBX-of-XSTATE-su.patch b/0057-x86-CPUID-surface-suitable-value-in-EBX-of-XSTATE-su.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2949fb0..0000000
--- a/0057-x86-CPUID-surface-suitable-value-in-EBX-of-XSTATE-su.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 7923ea47e578bca30a6e45951a9da09e827ff028 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:14:05 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 057/126] x86/CPUID: surface suitable value in EBX of XSTATE
- subleaf 1
-
-While the SDM isn't very clear about this, our present behavior make
-Linux 5.19 unhappy. As of commit 8ad7e8f69695 ("x86/fpu/xsave: Support
-XSAVEC in the kernel") they're using this CPUID output also to size
-the compacted area used by XSAVEC. Getting back zero there isn't really
-liked, yet for PV that's the default on capable hardware: XSAVES isn't
-exposed to PV domains.
-
-Considering that the size reported is that of the compacted save area,
-I view Linux'es assumption as appropriate (short of the SDM properly
-considering the case). Therefore we need to populate the field also when
-only XSAVEC is supported for a guest.
-
-Fixes: 460b9a4b3630 ("x86/xsaves: enable xsaves/xrstors for hvm guest")
-Fixes: 8d050ed1097c ("x86: don't expose XSAVES capability to PV guests")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: c3bd0b83ea5b7c0da6542687436042eeea1e7909
-master date: 2022-08-24 14:23:59 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-index ee2c4ea03a89..11c95178f110 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
-@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ void guest_cpuid(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
-         switch ( subleaf )
-         {
-         case 1:
--            if ( p->xstate.xsaves )
-+            if ( p->xstate.xsavec || p->xstate.xsaves )
-             {
-                 /*
-                  * TODO: Figure out what to do for XSS state.  VT-x manages
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0058-xen-sched-introduce-cpupool_update_node_affinity.patch b/0058-xen-sched-introduce-cpupool_update_node_affinity.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c2cf0b8..0000000
--- a/0058-xen-sched-introduce-cpupool_update_node_affinity.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-From 735b10844489babf52d3193193285a7311cf2c39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:14:22 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 058/126] xen/sched: introduce cpupool_update_node_affinity()
-
-For updating the node affinities of all domains in a cpupool add a new
-function cpupool_update_node_affinity().
-
-In order to avoid multiple allocations of cpumasks carve out memory
-allocation and freeing from domain_update_node_affinity() into new
-helpers, which can be used by cpupool_update_node_affinity().
-
-Modify domain_update_node_affinity() to take an additional parameter
-for passing the allocated memory in and to allocate and free the memory
-via the new helpers in case NULL was passed.
-
-This will help later to pre-allocate the cpumasks in order to avoid
-allocations in stop-machine context.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: a83fa1e2b96ace65b45dde6954d67012633a082b
-master date: 2022-09-05 11:42:30 +0100
----
- xen/common/sched/core.c    | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- xen/common/sched/cpupool.c | 39 +++++++++++++++------------
- xen/common/sched/private.h |  7 +++++
- xen/include/xen/sched.h    |  9 ++++++-
- 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/core.c b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-index f07bd2681fcb..065a83eca912 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-@@ -1824,9 +1824,28 @@ int vcpu_affinity_domctl(struct domain *d, uint32_t cmd,
-     return ret;
- }
- 
--void domain_update_node_affinity(struct domain *d)
-+bool alloc_affinity_masks(struct affinity_masks *affinity)
- {
--    cpumask_var_t dom_cpumask, dom_cpumask_soft;
-+    if ( !alloc_cpumask_var(&affinity->hard) )
-+        return false;
-+    if ( !alloc_cpumask_var(&affinity->soft) )
-+    {
-+        free_cpumask_var(affinity->hard);
-+        return false;
-+    }
-+
-+    return true;
-+}
-+
-+void free_affinity_masks(struct affinity_masks *affinity)
-+{
-+    free_cpumask_var(affinity->soft);
-+    free_cpumask_var(affinity->hard);
-+}
-+
-+void domain_update_node_aff(struct domain *d, struct affinity_masks *affinity)
-+{
-+    struct affinity_masks masks;
-     cpumask_t *dom_affinity;
-     const cpumask_t *online;
-     struct sched_unit *unit;
-@@ -1836,14 +1855,16 @@ void domain_update_node_affinity(struct domain *d)
-     if ( !d->vcpu || !d->vcpu[0] )
-         return;
- 
--    if ( !zalloc_cpumask_var(&dom_cpumask) )
--        return;
--    if ( !zalloc_cpumask_var(&dom_cpumask_soft) )
-+    if ( !affinity )
-     {
--        free_cpumask_var(dom_cpumask);
--        return;
-+        affinity = &masks;
-+        if ( !alloc_affinity_masks(affinity) )
-+            return;
-     }
- 
-+    cpumask_clear(affinity->hard);
-+    cpumask_clear(affinity->soft);
-+
-     online = cpupool_domain_master_cpumask(d);
- 
-     spin_lock(&d->node_affinity_lock);
-@@ -1864,22 +1885,21 @@ void domain_update_node_affinity(struct domain *d)
-          */
-         for_each_sched_unit ( d, unit )
-         {
--            cpumask_or(dom_cpumask, dom_cpumask, unit->cpu_hard_affinity);
--            cpumask_or(dom_cpumask_soft, dom_cpumask_soft,
--                       unit->cpu_soft_affinity);
-+            cpumask_or(affinity->hard, affinity->hard, unit->cpu_hard_affinity);
-+            cpumask_or(affinity->soft, affinity->soft, unit->cpu_soft_affinity);
-         }
-         /* Filter out non-online cpus */
--        cpumask_and(dom_cpumask, dom_cpumask, online);
--        ASSERT(!cpumask_empty(dom_cpumask));
-+        cpumask_and(affinity->hard, affinity->hard, online);
-+        ASSERT(!cpumask_empty(affinity->hard));
-         /* And compute the intersection between hard, online and soft */
--        cpumask_and(dom_cpumask_soft, dom_cpumask_soft, dom_cpumask);
-+        cpumask_and(affinity->soft, affinity->soft, affinity->hard);
- 
-         /*
-          * If not empty, the intersection of hard, soft and online is the
-          * narrowest set we want. If empty, we fall back to hard&online.
-          */
--        dom_affinity = cpumask_empty(dom_cpumask_soft) ?
--                           dom_cpumask : dom_cpumask_soft;
-+        dom_affinity = cpumask_empty(affinity->soft) ? affinity->hard
-+                                                     : affinity->soft;
- 
-         nodes_clear(d->node_affinity);
-         for_each_cpu ( cpu, dom_affinity )
-@@ -1888,8 +1908,8 @@ void domain_update_node_affinity(struct domain *d)
- 
-     spin_unlock(&d->node_affinity_lock);
- 
--    free_cpumask_var(dom_cpumask_soft);
--    free_cpumask_var(dom_cpumask);
-+    if ( affinity == &masks )
-+        free_affinity_masks(affinity);
- }
- 
- typedef long ret_t;
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c b/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c
-index 8c6e6eb9ccd5..45b6ff99561a 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c
-@@ -401,6 +401,25 @@ int cpupool_move_domain(struct domain *d, struct cpupool *c)
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-+/* Update affinities of all domains in a cpupool. */
-+static void cpupool_update_node_affinity(const struct cpupool *c)
-+{
-+    struct affinity_masks masks;
-+    struct domain *d;
-+
-+    if ( !alloc_affinity_masks(&masks) )
-+        return;
-+
-+    rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
-+
-+    for_each_domain_in_cpupool(d, c)
-+        domain_update_node_aff(d, &masks);
-+
-+    rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
-+
-+    free_affinity_masks(&masks);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * assign a specific cpu to a cpupool
-  * cpupool_lock must be held
-@@ -408,7 +427,6 @@ int cpupool_move_domain(struct domain *d, struct cpupool *c)
- static int cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(struct cpupool *c, unsigned int cpu)
- {
-     int ret;
--    struct domain *d;
-     const cpumask_t *cpus;
- 
-     cpus = sched_get_opt_cpumask(c->gran, cpu);
-@@ -433,12 +451,7 @@ static int cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(struct cpupool *c, unsigned int cpu)
- 
-     rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
- 
--    rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
--    for_each_domain_in_cpupool(d, c)
--    {
--        domain_update_node_affinity(d);
--    }
--    rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
-+    cpupool_update_node_affinity(c);
- 
-     return 0;
- }
-@@ -447,18 +460,14 @@ static int cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(struct cpupool *c)
- {
-     int cpu = cpupool_moving_cpu;
-     const cpumask_t *cpus;
--    struct domain *d;
-     int ret;
- 
-     if ( c != cpupool_cpu_moving )
-         return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
- 
--    /*
--     * We need this for scanning the domain list, both in
--     * cpu_disable_scheduler(), and at the bottom of this function.
--     */
-     rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
-     ret = cpu_disable_scheduler(cpu);
-+    rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
- 
-     rcu_read_lock(&sched_res_rculock);
-     cpus = get_sched_res(cpu)->cpus;
-@@ -485,11 +494,7 @@ static int cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(struct cpupool *c)
-     }
-     rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
- 
--    for_each_domain_in_cpupool(d, c)
--    {
--        domain_update_node_affinity(d);
--    }
--    rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
-+    cpupool_update_node_affinity(c);
- 
-     return ret;
- }
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/private.h b/xen/common/sched/private.h
-index 92d0d4961063..6e036f8c8077 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/private.h
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/private.h
-@@ -593,6 +593,13 @@ affinity_balance_cpumask(const struct sched_unit *unit, int step,
-         cpumask_copy(mask, unit->cpu_hard_affinity);
- }
- 
-+struct affinity_masks {
-+    cpumask_var_t hard;
-+    cpumask_var_t soft;
-+};
-+
-+bool alloc_affinity_masks(struct affinity_masks *affinity);
-+void free_affinity_masks(struct affinity_masks *affinity);
- void sched_rm_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
- const cpumask_t *sched_get_opt_cpumask(enum sched_gran opt, unsigned int cpu);
- void schedule_dump(struct cpupool *c);
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-index 701963f84cb8..4e25627d9685 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-@@ -649,8 +649,15 @@ static inline void get_knownalive_domain(struct domain *d)
-     ASSERT(!(atomic_read(&d->refcnt) & DOMAIN_DESTROYED));
- }
- 
-+struct affinity_masks;
-+
- int domain_set_node_affinity(struct domain *d, const nodemask_t *affinity);
--void domain_update_node_affinity(struct domain *d);
-+void domain_update_node_aff(struct domain *d, struct affinity_masks *affinity);
-+
-+static inline void domain_update_node_affinity(struct domain *d)
-+{
-+    domain_update_node_aff(d, NULL);
-+}
- 
- /*
-  * To be implemented by each architecture, sanity checking the configuration
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0059-xen-sched-carve-out-memory-allocation-and-freeing-fr.patch b/0059-xen-sched-carve-out-memory-allocation-and-freeing-fr.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7e81f53..0000000
--- a/0059-xen-sched-carve-out-memory-allocation-and-freeing-fr.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,263 +0,0 @@
-From d638c2085f71f694344b34e70eb1b371c86b00f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:15:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 059/126] xen/sched: carve out memory allocation and freeing
- from schedule_cpu_rm()
-
-In order to prepare not allocating or freeing memory from
-schedule_cpu_rm(), move this functionality to dedicated functions.
-
-For now call those functions from schedule_cpu_rm().
-
-No change of behavior expected.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: d42be6f83480b3ada286dc18444331a816be88a3
-master date: 2022-09-05 11:42:30 +0100
----
- xen/common/sched/core.c    | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- xen/common/sched/private.h |  11 +++
- 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/core.c b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-index 065a83eca912..2decb1161a63 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-@@ -3221,6 +3221,75 @@ out:
-     return ret;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Allocate all memory needed for free_cpu_rm_data(), as allocations cannot
-+ * be made in stop_machine() context.
-+ *
-+ * Between alloc_cpu_rm_data() and the real cpu removal action the relevant
-+ * contents of struct sched_resource can't change, as the cpu in question is
-+ * locked against any other movement to or from cpupools, and the data copied
-+ * by alloc_cpu_rm_data() is modified only in case the cpu in question is
-+ * being moved from or to a cpupool.
-+ */
-+struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu)
-+{
-+    struct cpu_rm_data *data;
-+    const struct sched_resource *sr;
-+    unsigned int idx;
-+
-+    rcu_read_lock(&sched_res_rculock);
-+
-+    sr = get_sched_res(cpu);
-+    data = xmalloc_flex_struct(struct cpu_rm_data, sr, sr->granularity - 1);
-+    if ( !data )
-+        goto out;
-+
-+    data->old_ops = sr->scheduler;
-+    data->vpriv_old = idle_vcpu[cpu]->sched_unit->priv;
-+    data->ppriv_old = sr->sched_priv;
-+
-+    for ( idx = 0; idx < sr->granularity - 1; idx++ )
-+    {
-+        data->sr[idx] = sched_alloc_res();
-+        if ( data->sr[idx] )
-+        {
-+            data->sr[idx]->sched_unit_idle = sched_alloc_unit_mem();
-+            if ( !data->sr[idx]->sched_unit_idle )
-+            {
-+                sched_res_free(&data->sr[idx]->rcu);
-+                data->sr[idx] = NULL;
-+            }
-+        }
-+        if ( !data->sr[idx] )
-+        {
-+            while ( idx > 0 )
-+                sched_res_free(&data->sr[--idx]->rcu);
-+            XFREE(data);
-+            goto out;
-+        }
-+
-+        data->sr[idx]->curr = data->sr[idx]->sched_unit_idle;
-+        data->sr[idx]->scheduler = &sched_idle_ops;
-+        data->sr[idx]->granularity = 1;
-+
-+        /* We want the lock not to change when replacing the resource. */
-+        data->sr[idx]->schedule_lock = sr->schedule_lock;
-+    }
-+
-+ out:
-+    rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
-+
-+    return data;
-+}
-+
-+void free_cpu_rm_data(struct cpu_rm_data *mem, unsigned int cpu)
-+{
-+    sched_free_udata(mem->old_ops, mem->vpriv_old);
-+    sched_free_pdata(mem->old_ops, mem->ppriv_old, cpu);
-+
-+    xfree(mem);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Remove a pCPU from its cpupool. Its scheduler becomes &sched_idle_ops
-  * (the idle scheduler).
-@@ -3229,53 +3298,23 @@ out:
-  */
- int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu)
- {
--    void *ppriv_old, *vpriv_old;
--    struct sched_resource *sr, **sr_new = NULL;
-+    struct sched_resource *sr;
-+    struct cpu_rm_data *data;
-     struct sched_unit *unit;
--    struct scheduler *old_ops;
-     spinlock_t *old_lock;
-     unsigned long flags;
--    int idx, ret = -ENOMEM;
-+    int idx = 0;
-     unsigned int cpu_iter;
- 
-+    data = alloc_cpu_rm_data(cpu);
-+    if ( !data )
-+        return -ENOMEM;
-+
-     rcu_read_lock(&sched_res_rculock);
- 
-     sr = get_sched_res(cpu);
--    old_ops = sr->scheduler;
- 
--    if ( sr->granularity > 1 )
--    {
--        sr_new = xmalloc_array(struct sched_resource *, sr->granularity - 1);
--        if ( !sr_new )
--            goto out;
--        for ( idx = 0; idx < sr->granularity - 1; idx++ )
--        {
--            sr_new[idx] = sched_alloc_res();
--            if ( sr_new[idx] )
--            {
--                sr_new[idx]->sched_unit_idle = sched_alloc_unit_mem();
--                if ( !sr_new[idx]->sched_unit_idle )
--                {
--                    sched_res_free(&sr_new[idx]->rcu);
--                    sr_new[idx] = NULL;
--                }
--            }
--            if ( !sr_new[idx] )
--            {
--                for ( idx--; idx >= 0; idx-- )
--                    sched_res_free(&sr_new[idx]->rcu);
--                goto out;
--            }
--            sr_new[idx]->curr = sr_new[idx]->sched_unit_idle;
--            sr_new[idx]->scheduler = &sched_idle_ops;
--            sr_new[idx]->granularity = 1;
--
--            /* We want the lock not to change when replacing the resource. */
--            sr_new[idx]->schedule_lock = sr->schedule_lock;
--        }
--    }
--
--    ret = 0;
-+    ASSERT(sr->granularity);
-     ASSERT(sr->cpupool != NULL);
-     ASSERT(cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_free_cpus));
-     ASSERT(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, sr->cpupool->cpu_valid));
-@@ -3283,10 +3322,6 @@ int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu)
-     /* See comment in schedule_cpu_add() regarding lock switching. */
-     old_lock = pcpu_schedule_lock_irqsave(cpu, &flags);
- 
--    vpriv_old = idle_vcpu[cpu]->sched_unit->priv;
--    ppriv_old = sr->sched_priv;
--
--    idx = 0;
-     for_each_cpu ( cpu_iter, sr->cpus )
-     {
-         per_cpu(sched_res_idx, cpu_iter) = 0;
-@@ -3300,27 +3335,27 @@ int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu)
-         else
-         {
-             /* Initialize unit. */
--            unit = sr_new[idx]->sched_unit_idle;
--            unit->res = sr_new[idx];
-+            unit = data->sr[idx]->sched_unit_idle;
-+            unit->res = data->sr[idx];
-             unit->is_running = true;
-             sched_unit_add_vcpu(unit, idle_vcpu[cpu_iter]);
-             sched_domain_insert_unit(unit, idle_vcpu[cpu_iter]->domain);
- 
-             /* Adjust cpu masks of resources (old and new). */
-             cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu_iter, sr->cpus);
--            cpumask_set_cpu(cpu_iter, sr_new[idx]->cpus);
-+            cpumask_set_cpu(cpu_iter, data->sr[idx]->cpus);
-             cpumask_set_cpu(cpu_iter, &sched_res_mask);
- 
-             /* Init timer. */
--            init_timer(&sr_new[idx]->s_timer, s_timer_fn, NULL, cpu_iter);
-+            init_timer(&data->sr[idx]->s_timer, s_timer_fn, NULL, cpu_iter);
- 
-             /* Last resource initializations and insert resource pointer. */
--            sr_new[idx]->master_cpu = cpu_iter;
--            set_sched_res(cpu_iter, sr_new[idx]);
-+            data->sr[idx]->master_cpu = cpu_iter;
-+            set_sched_res(cpu_iter, data->sr[idx]);
- 
-             /* Last action: set the new lock pointer. */
-             smp_mb();
--            sr_new[idx]->schedule_lock = &sched_free_cpu_lock;
-+            data->sr[idx]->schedule_lock = &sched_free_cpu_lock;
- 
-             idx++;
-         }
-@@ -3336,16 +3371,12 @@ int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu)
-     /* _Not_ pcpu_schedule_unlock(): schedule_lock may have changed! */
-     spin_unlock_irqrestore(old_lock, flags);
- 
--    sched_deinit_pdata(old_ops, ppriv_old, cpu);
-+    sched_deinit_pdata(data->old_ops, data->ppriv_old, cpu);
- 
--    sched_free_udata(old_ops, vpriv_old);
--    sched_free_pdata(old_ops, ppriv_old, cpu);
--
--out:
-     rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
--    xfree(sr_new);
-+    free_cpu_rm_data(data, cpu);
- 
--    return ret;
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
- struct scheduler *scheduler_get_default(void)
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/private.h b/xen/common/sched/private.h
-index 6e036f8c8077..ff3185425219 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/private.h
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/private.h
-@@ -600,6 +600,15 @@ struct affinity_masks {
- 
- bool alloc_affinity_masks(struct affinity_masks *affinity);
- void free_affinity_masks(struct affinity_masks *affinity);
-+
-+/* Memory allocation related data for schedule_cpu_rm(). */
-+struct cpu_rm_data {
-+    const struct scheduler *old_ops;
-+    void *ppriv_old;
-+    void *vpriv_old;
-+    struct sched_resource *sr[];
-+};
-+
- void sched_rm_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
- const cpumask_t *sched_get_opt_cpumask(enum sched_gran opt, unsigned int cpu);
- void schedule_dump(struct cpupool *c);
-@@ -608,6 +617,8 @@ struct scheduler *scheduler_alloc(unsigned int sched_id);
- void scheduler_free(struct scheduler *sched);
- int cpu_disable_scheduler(unsigned int cpu);
- int schedule_cpu_add(unsigned int cpu, struct cpupool *c);
-+struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu);
-+void free_cpu_rm_data(struct cpu_rm_data *mem, unsigned int cpu);
- int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu);
- int sched_move_domain(struct domain *d, struct cpupool *c);
- struct cpupool *cpupool_get_by_id(unsigned int poolid);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0060-xen-sched-fix-cpu-hotplug.patch b/0060-xen-sched-fix-cpu-hotplug.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 264c8ef..0000000
--- a/0060-xen-sched-fix-cpu-hotplug.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
-From d17680808b4c8015e31070c971e1ee548170ae34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:15:41 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 060/126] xen/sched: fix cpu hotplug
-
-Cpu unplugging is calling schedule_cpu_rm() via stop_machine_run() with
-interrupts disabled, thus any memory allocation or freeing must be
-avoided.
-
-Since commit 5047cd1d5dea ("xen/common: Use enhanced
-ASSERT_ALLOC_CONTEXT in xmalloc()") this restriction is being enforced
-via an assertion, which will now fail.
-
-Fix this by allocating needed memory before entering stop_machine_run()
-and freeing any memory only after having finished stop_machine_run().
-
-Fixes: 1ec410112cdd ("xen/sched: support differing granularity in schedule_cpu_[add/rm]()")
-Reported-by: Gao Ruifeng <ruifeng.gao@intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: d84473689611eed32fd90b27e614f28af767fa3f
-master date: 2022-09-05 11:42:30 +0100
----
- xen/common/sched/core.c    | 25 +++++++++++---
- xen/common/sched/cpupool.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- xen/common/sched/private.h |  5 +--
- 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/core.c b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-index 2decb1161a63..900aab8f66a7 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-@@ -3231,7 +3231,7 @@ out:
-  * by alloc_cpu_rm_data() is modified only in case the cpu in question is
-  * being moved from or to a cpupool.
-  */
--struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu)
-+struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu, bool aff_alloc)
- {
-     struct cpu_rm_data *data;
-     const struct sched_resource *sr;
-@@ -3244,6 +3244,17 @@ struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu)
-     if ( !data )
-         goto out;
- 
-+    if ( aff_alloc )
-+    {
-+        if ( !alloc_affinity_masks(&data->affinity) )
-+        {
-+            XFREE(data);
-+            goto out;
-+        }
-+    }
-+    else
-+        memset(&data->affinity, 0, sizeof(data->affinity));
-+
-     data->old_ops = sr->scheduler;
-     data->vpriv_old = idle_vcpu[cpu]->sched_unit->priv;
-     data->ppriv_old = sr->sched_priv;
-@@ -3264,6 +3275,7 @@ struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu)
-         {
-             while ( idx > 0 )
-                 sched_res_free(&data->sr[--idx]->rcu);
-+            free_affinity_masks(&data->affinity);
-             XFREE(data);
-             goto out;
-         }
-@@ -3286,6 +3298,7 @@ void free_cpu_rm_data(struct cpu_rm_data *mem, unsigned int cpu)
- {
-     sched_free_udata(mem->old_ops, mem->vpriv_old);
-     sched_free_pdata(mem->old_ops, mem->ppriv_old, cpu);
-+    free_affinity_masks(&mem->affinity);
- 
-     xfree(mem);
- }
-@@ -3296,17 +3309,18 @@ void free_cpu_rm_data(struct cpu_rm_data *mem, unsigned int cpu)
-  * The cpu is already marked as "free" and not valid any longer for its
-  * cpupool.
-  */
--int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu)
-+int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu, struct cpu_rm_data *data)
- {
-     struct sched_resource *sr;
--    struct cpu_rm_data *data;
-     struct sched_unit *unit;
-     spinlock_t *old_lock;
-     unsigned long flags;
-     int idx = 0;
-     unsigned int cpu_iter;
-+    bool free_data = !data;
- 
--    data = alloc_cpu_rm_data(cpu);
-+    if ( !data )
-+        data = alloc_cpu_rm_data(cpu, false);
-     if ( !data )
-         return -ENOMEM;
- 
-@@ -3374,7 +3388,8 @@ int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu)
-     sched_deinit_pdata(data->old_ops, data->ppriv_old, cpu);
- 
-     rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
--    free_cpu_rm_data(data, cpu);
-+    if ( free_data )
-+        free_cpu_rm_data(data, cpu);
- 
-     return 0;
- }
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c b/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c
-index 45b6ff99561a..b5a948639aad 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/cpupool.c
-@@ -402,22 +402,28 @@ int cpupool_move_domain(struct domain *d, struct cpupool *c)
- }
- 
- /* Update affinities of all domains in a cpupool. */
--static void cpupool_update_node_affinity(const struct cpupool *c)
-+static void cpupool_update_node_affinity(const struct cpupool *c,
-+                                         struct affinity_masks *masks)
- {
--    struct affinity_masks masks;
-+    struct affinity_masks local_masks;
-     struct domain *d;
- 
--    if ( !alloc_affinity_masks(&masks) )
--        return;
-+    if ( !masks )
-+    {
-+        if ( !alloc_affinity_masks(&local_masks) )
-+            return;
-+        masks = &local_masks;
-+    }
- 
-     rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
- 
-     for_each_domain_in_cpupool(d, c)
--        domain_update_node_aff(d, &masks);
-+        domain_update_node_aff(d, masks);
- 
-     rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
- 
--    free_affinity_masks(&masks);
-+    if ( masks == &local_masks )
-+        free_affinity_masks(masks);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -451,15 +457,17 @@ static int cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(struct cpupool *c, unsigned int cpu)
- 
-     rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
- 
--    cpupool_update_node_affinity(c);
-+    cpupool_update_node_affinity(c, NULL);
- 
-     return 0;
- }
- 
--static int cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(struct cpupool *c)
-+static int cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(struct cpupool *c,
-+                                       struct cpu_rm_data *mem)
- {
-     int cpu = cpupool_moving_cpu;
-     const cpumask_t *cpus;
-+    struct affinity_masks *masks = mem ? &mem->affinity : NULL;
-     int ret;
- 
-     if ( c != cpupool_cpu_moving )
-@@ -482,7 +490,7 @@ static int cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(struct cpupool *c)
-      */
-     if ( !ret )
-     {
--        ret = schedule_cpu_rm(cpu);
-+        ret = schedule_cpu_rm(cpu, mem);
-         if ( ret )
-             cpumask_andnot(&cpupool_free_cpus, &cpupool_free_cpus, cpus);
-         else
-@@ -494,7 +502,7 @@ static int cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(struct cpupool *c)
-     }
-     rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
- 
--    cpupool_update_node_affinity(c);
-+    cpupool_update_node_affinity(c, masks);
- 
-     return ret;
- }
-@@ -558,7 +566,7 @@ static long cpupool_unassign_cpu_helper(void *info)
-                       cpupool_cpu_moving->cpupool_id, cpupool_moving_cpu);
-     spin_lock(&cpupool_lock);
- 
--    ret = cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(c);
-+    ret = cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(c, NULL);
- 
-     spin_unlock(&cpupool_lock);
-     debugtrace_printk("cpupool_unassign_cpu ret=%ld\n", ret);
-@@ -701,7 +709,7 @@ static int cpupool_cpu_add(unsigned int cpu)
-  * This function is called in stop_machine context, so we can be sure no
-  * non-idle vcpu is active on the system.
-  */
--static void cpupool_cpu_remove(unsigned int cpu)
-+static void cpupool_cpu_remove(unsigned int cpu, struct cpu_rm_data *mem)
- {
-     int ret;
- 
-@@ -709,7 +717,7 @@ static void cpupool_cpu_remove(unsigned int cpu)
- 
-     if ( !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_free_cpus) )
-     {
--        ret = cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(cpupool0);
-+        ret = cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(cpupool0, mem);
-         BUG_ON(ret);
-     }
-     cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &cpupool_free_cpus);
-@@ -775,7 +783,7 @@ static void cpupool_cpu_remove_forced(unsigned int cpu)
-         {
-             ret = cpupool_unassign_cpu_start(c, master_cpu);
-             BUG_ON(ret);
--            ret = cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(c);
-+            ret = cpupool_unassign_cpu_finish(c, NULL);
-             BUG_ON(ret);
-         }
-     }
-@@ -993,12 +1001,24 @@ void dump_runq(unsigned char key)
- static int cpu_callback(
-     struct notifier_block *nfb, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
- {
-+    static struct cpu_rm_data *mem;
-+
-     unsigned int cpu = (unsigned long)hcpu;
-     int rc = 0;
- 
-     switch ( action )
-     {
-     case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
-+        if ( system_state <= SYS_STATE_active )
-+        {
-+            if ( mem )
-+            {
-+                free_cpu_rm_data(mem, cpu);
-+                mem = NULL;
-+            }
-+            rc = cpupool_cpu_add(cpu);
-+        }
-+        break;
-     case CPU_ONLINE:
-         if ( system_state <= SYS_STATE_active )
-             rc = cpupool_cpu_add(cpu);
-@@ -1006,12 +1026,31 @@ static int cpu_callback(
-     case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
-         /* Suspend/Resume don't change assignments of cpus to cpupools. */
-         if ( system_state <= SYS_STATE_active )
-+        {
-             rc = cpupool_cpu_remove_prologue(cpu);
-+            if ( !rc )
-+            {
-+                ASSERT(!mem);
-+                mem = alloc_cpu_rm_data(cpu, true);
-+                rc = mem ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
-+            }
-+        }
-         break;
-     case CPU_DYING:
-         /* Suspend/Resume don't change assignments of cpus to cpupools. */
-         if ( system_state <= SYS_STATE_active )
--            cpupool_cpu_remove(cpu);
-+        {
-+            ASSERT(mem);
-+            cpupool_cpu_remove(cpu, mem);
-+        }
-+        break;
-+    case CPU_DEAD:
-+        if ( system_state <= SYS_STATE_active )
-+        {
-+            ASSERT(mem);
-+            free_cpu_rm_data(mem, cpu);
-+            mem = NULL;
-+        }
-         break;
-     case CPU_RESUME_FAILED:
-         cpupool_cpu_remove_forced(cpu);
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/private.h b/xen/common/sched/private.h
-index ff3185425219..3bab78ccb240 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/private.h
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/private.h
-@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ void free_affinity_masks(struct affinity_masks *affinity);
- 
- /* Memory allocation related data for schedule_cpu_rm(). */
- struct cpu_rm_data {
-+    struct affinity_masks affinity;
-     const struct scheduler *old_ops;
-     void *ppriv_old;
-     void *vpriv_old;
-@@ -617,9 +618,9 @@ struct scheduler *scheduler_alloc(unsigned int sched_id);
- void scheduler_free(struct scheduler *sched);
- int cpu_disable_scheduler(unsigned int cpu);
- int schedule_cpu_add(unsigned int cpu, struct cpupool *c);
--struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu);
-+struct cpu_rm_data *alloc_cpu_rm_data(unsigned int cpu, bool aff_alloc);
- void free_cpu_rm_data(struct cpu_rm_data *mem, unsigned int cpu);
--int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu);
-+int schedule_cpu_rm(unsigned int cpu, struct cpu_rm_data *mem);
- int sched_move_domain(struct domain *d, struct cpupool *c);
- struct cpupool *cpupool_get_by_id(unsigned int poolid);
- void cpupool_put(struct cpupool *pool);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0061-Config.mk-correct-PIE-related-option-s-in-EMBEDDED_E.patch b/0061-Config.mk-correct-PIE-related-option-s-in-EMBEDDED_E.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 64144fe..0000000
--- a/0061-Config.mk-correct-PIE-related-option-s-in-EMBEDDED_E.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From 19cf28b515f21da02df80e68f901ad7650daaa37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:15:55 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 061/126] Config.mk: correct PIE-related option(s) in
- EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS
-
-I haven't been able to find evidence of "-nopie" ever having been a
-supported compiler option. The correct spelling is "-no-pie".
-Furthermore like "-pie" this is an option which is solely passed to the
-linker. The compiler only recognizes "-fpie" / "-fPIE" / "-fno-pie", and
-it doesn't infer these options from "-pie" / "-no-pie".
-
-Add the compiler recognized form, but for the possible case of the
-variable also being used somewhere for linking keep the linker option as
-well (with corrected spelling).
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-
-Build: Drop -no-pie from EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS
-
-This breaks all Clang builds, as demostrated by Gitlab CI.
-
-Contrary to the description in ecd6b9759919, -no-pie is not even an option
-passed to the linker.  GCC's actual behaviour is to inhibit the passing of
--pie to the linker, as well as selecting different cr0 artefacts to be linked.
-
-EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS is not used for $(CC)-doing-linking, and not liable to
-gain such a usecase.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Tested-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
-Fixes: ecd6b9759919 ("Config.mk: correct PIE-related option(s) in EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS")
-master commit: ecd6b9759919fa6335b0be1b5fc5cce29a30c4f1
-master date: 2022-09-08 09:25:26 +0200
-master commit: 13a7c0074ac8fb31f6c0485429b7a20a1946cb22
-master date: 2022-09-27 15:40:42 -0700
----
- Config.mk | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Config.mk b/Config.mk
-index 96d89b2f7dfc..9f87608f6602 100644
---- a/Config.mk
-+++ b/Config.mk
-@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ endif
- APPEND_LDFLAGS += $(foreach i, $(APPEND_LIB), -L$(i))
- APPEND_CFLAGS += $(foreach i, $(APPEND_INCLUDES), -I$(i))
- 
--EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS := -nopie -fno-stack-protector -fno-stack-protector-all
-+EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS := -fno-pie -fno-stack-protector -fno-stack-protector-all
- EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS += -fno-exceptions -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
- 
- XEN_EXTFILES_URL ?= http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0062-tools-xenstore-minor-fix-of-the-migration-stream-doc.patch b/0062-tools-xenstore-minor-fix-of-the-migration-stream-doc.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c2299bf..0000000
--- a/0062-tools-xenstore-minor-fix-of-the-migration-stream-doc.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 182f8bb503b9dd3db5dd9118dc763d241787c6fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:16:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 062/126] tools/xenstore: minor fix of the migration stream doc
-
-Drop mentioning the non-existent read-only socket in the migration
-stream description document.
-
-The related record field was removed in commit 8868a0e3f674 ("docs:
-update the xenstore migration stream documentation).
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-master commit: ace1d2eff80d3d66c37ae765dae3e3cb5697e5a4
-master date: 2022-09-08 09:25:58 +0200
----
- docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md | 8 +++-----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md b/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md
-index 5f1155273ec3..78530bbb0ef4 100644
---- a/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md
-+++ b/docs/designs/xenstore-migration.md
-@@ -129,11 +129,9 @@ xenstored state that needs to be restored.
- | `evtchn-fd`    | The file descriptor used to communicate with |
- |                | the event channel driver                     |
- 
--xenstored will resume in the original process context. Hence `rw-socket-fd` and
--`ro-socket-fd` simply specify the file descriptors of the sockets. Sockets
--are not always used, however, and so -1 will be used to denote an unused
--socket.
--
-+xenstored will resume in the original process context. Hence `rw-socket-fd`
-+simply specifies the file descriptor of the socket. Sockets are not always
-+used, however, and so -1 will be used to denote an unused socket.
- 
- \pagebreak
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0063-xen-gnttab-fix-gnttab_acquire_resource.patch b/0063-xen-gnttab-fix-gnttab_acquire_resource.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9087ddb..0000000
--- a/0063-xen-gnttab-fix-gnttab_acquire_resource.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-From 3ac64b3751837a117ee3dfb3e2cc27057a83d0f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:16:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 063/126] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_acquire_resource()
-
-Commit 9dc46386d89d ("gnttab: work around "may be used uninitialized"
-warning") was wrong, as vaddrs can legitimately be NULL in case
-XENMEM_resource_grant_table_id_status was specified for a grant table
-v1. This would result in crashes in debug builds due to
-ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() triggering.
-
-Check vaddrs only to be NULL in the rc == 0 case.
-
-Expand the tests in tools/tests/resource to tickle this path, and verify that
-using XENMEM_resource_grant_table_id_status on a v1 grant table fails.
-
-Fixes: 9dc46386d89d ("gnttab: work around "may be used uninitialized" warning")
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> # xen
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 52daa6a8483e4fbd6757c9d1b791e23931791608
-master date: 2022-09-09 16:28:38 +0100
----
- tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- xen/common/grant_table.c             |  2 +-
- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c b/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c
-index 1caaa60e62d9..bf485baff2b4 100644
---- a/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c
-+++ b/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,21 @@ static void test_gnttab(uint32_t domid, unsigned int nr_frames)
-     rc = xenforeignmemory_unmap_resource(fh, res);
-     if ( rc )
-         return fail("    Fail: Unmap %d - %s\n", errno, strerror(errno));
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Verify that an attempt to map the status frames fails, as the domain is
-+     * in gnttab v1 mode.
-+     */
-+    res = xenforeignmemory_map_resource(
-+        fh, domid, XENMEM_resource_grant_table,
-+        XENMEM_resource_grant_table_id_status, 0, 1,
-+        (void **)&gnttab, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);
-+
-+    if ( res )
-+    {
-+        fail("    Fail: Managed to map gnttab v2 status frames in v1 mode\n");
-+        xenforeignmemory_unmap_resource(fh, res);
-+    }
- }
- 
- static void test_domain_configurations(void)
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index 0523beb9b734..01e426c67fb6 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -4138,7 +4138,7 @@ int gnttab_acquire_resource(
-      * on non-error paths, and hence it needs setting to NULL at the top of the
-      * function.  Leave some runtime safety.
-      */
--    if ( !vaddrs )
-+    if ( !rc && !vaddrs )
-     {
-         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-         rc = -ENODATA;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0064-x86-wire-up-VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area-fo.patch b/0064-x86-wire-up-VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area-fo.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 738df82..0000000
--- a/0064-x86-wire-up-VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area-fo.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 62e534d17cdd838828bfd75d3d845e31524dd336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:17:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 064/126] x86: wire up VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area
- for 32-bit guests
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Forever sinced its introduction VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area
-was available only to native domains. Linux, for example, would attempt
-to use it irrespective of guest bitness (including in its so called
-PVHVM mode) as long as it finds XEN_PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT set (which we
-set only for clocksource=tsc, which in turn needs engaging via command
-line option).
-
-Fixes: a5d39947cb89 ("Allow guests to register secondary vcpu_time_info")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-master commit: b726541d94bd0a80b5864d17a2cd2e6d73a3fe0a
-master date: 2022-09-29 14:47:45 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/domain.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/domain.c
-index c46dccc25a54..d51d99344796 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/domain.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,26 @@ arch_compat_vcpu_op(
-         break;
-     }
- 
-+    case VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area:
-+    {
-+        struct compat_vcpu_register_time_memory_area area = { .addr.p = 0 };
-+
-+        rc = -EFAULT;
-+        if ( copy_from_guest(&area.addr.h, arg, 1) )
-+            break;
-+
-+        if ( area.addr.h.c != area.addr.p ||
-+             !compat_handle_okay(area.addr.h, 1) )
-+            break;
-+
-+        rc = 0;
-+        guest_from_compat_handle(v->arch.time_info_guest, area.addr.h);
-+
-+        force_update_vcpu_system_time(v);
-+
-+        break;
-+    }
-+
-     case VCPUOP_get_physid:
-         rc = arch_do_vcpu_op(cmd, v, arg);
-         break;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0065-x86-vpmu-Fix-race-condition-in-vpmu_load.patch b/0065-x86-vpmu-Fix-race-condition-in-vpmu_load.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 84edf5d..0000000
--- a/0065-x86-vpmu-Fix-race-condition-in-vpmu_load.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-From 9690bb261d5fa09cb281e1fa124d93db7b84fda5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:17:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 065/126] x86/vpmu: Fix race-condition in vpmu_load
-
-The vPMU code-bases attempts to perform an optimization on saving/reloading the
-PMU context by keeping track of what vCPU ran on each pCPU. When a pCPU is
-getting scheduled, checks if the previous vCPU isn't the current one. If so,
-attempts a call to vpmu_save_force. Unfortunately if the previous vCPU is
-already getting scheduled to run on another pCPU its state will be already
-runnable, which results in an ASSERT failure.
-
-Fix this by always performing a pmu context save in vpmu_save when called from
-vpmu_switch_from, and do a vpmu_load when called from vpmu_switch_to.
-
-While this presents a minimal overhead in case the same vCPU is getting
-rescheduled on the same pCPU, the ASSERT failure is avoided and the code is a
-lot easier to reason about.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@intel.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: defa4e51d20a143bdd4395a075bf0933bb38a9a4
-master date: 2022-09-30 09:53:49 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c | 42 ++++-------------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c
-index fb1b296a6cc1..800eff87dc03 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c
-@@ -364,58 +364,24 @@ void vpmu_save(struct vcpu *v)
-     vpmu->last_pcpu = pcpu;
-     per_cpu(last_vcpu, pcpu) = v;
- 
-+    vpmu_set(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE);
-+
-     if ( vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops )
-         if ( vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->arch_vpmu_save(v, 0) )
-             vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
- 
-+    vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE);
-+
-     apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, PMU_APIC_VECTOR | APIC_LVT_MASKED);
- }
- 
- int vpmu_load(struct vcpu *v, bool_t from_guest)
- {
-     struct vpmu_struct *vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(v);
--    int pcpu = smp_processor_id();
--    struct vcpu *prev = NULL;
- 
-     if ( !vpmu_is_set(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_ALLOCATED) )
-         return 0;
- 
--    /* First time this VCPU is running here */
--    if ( vpmu->last_pcpu != pcpu )
--    {
--        /*
--         * Get the context from last pcpu that we ran on. Note that if another
--         * VCPU is running there it must have saved this VPCU's context before
--         * startig to run (see below).
--         * There should be no race since remote pcpu will disable interrupts
--         * before saving the context.
--         */
--        if ( vpmu_is_set(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED) )
--        {
--            on_selected_cpus(cpumask_of(vpmu->last_pcpu),
--                             vpmu_save_force, (void *)v, 1);
--            vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
--        }
--    } 
--
--    /* Prevent forced context save from remote CPU */
--    local_irq_disable();
--
--    prev = per_cpu(last_vcpu, pcpu);
--
--    if ( prev != v && prev )
--    {
--        vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(prev);
--
--        /* Someone ran here before us */
--        vpmu_save_force(prev);
--        vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
--
--        vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(v);
--    }
--
--    local_irq_enable();
--
-     /* Only when PMU is counting, we load PMU context immediately. */
-     if ( !vpmu_is_set(vpmu, VPMU_RUNNING) ||
-          (!has_vlapic(vpmu_vcpu(vpmu)->domain) &&
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0066-tools-tests-fix-wrong-backport-of-upstream-commit-52.patch b/0066-tools-tests-fix-wrong-backport-of-upstream-commit-52.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8578e02..0000000
--- a/0066-tools-tests-fix-wrong-backport-of-upstream-commit-52.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 0d233924d4b0f676056856096e8761205add3ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 17:31:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 066/126] tools/tests: fix wrong backport of upstream commit
- 52daa6a8483e4
-
-The backport of upstream commit 52daa6a8483e4 had a bug, correct it.
-
-Fixes: 3ac64b375183 ("xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_acquire_resource()")
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
----
- tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c b/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c
-index bf485baff2b4..51a8f4a000f6 100644
---- a/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c
-+++ b/tools/tests/resource/test-resource.c
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static void test_gnttab(uint32_t domid, unsigned int nr_frames)
-     res = xenforeignmemory_map_resource(
-         fh, domid, XENMEM_resource_grant_table,
-         XENMEM_resource_grant_table_id_status, 0, 1,
--        (void **)&gnttab, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);
-+        &addr, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);
- 
-     if ( res )
-     {
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0067-libxl-Arm-correct-xc_shadow_control-invocation-to-fi.patch b/0067-libxl-Arm-correct-xc_shadow_control-invocation-to-fi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e75a84..0000000
--- a/0067-libxl-Arm-correct-xc_shadow_control-invocation-to-fi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 816580afdd1730d4f85f64477a242a439af1cdf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 17:33:40 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 067/126] libxl/Arm: correct xc_shadow_control() invocation to
- fix build
-
-The backport didn't adapt to the earlier function prototype taking more
-(unused here) arguments.
-
-Fixes: c5215044578e ("xen/arm, libxl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op for Arm")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
----
- tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-index d21f614ed788..ba548befdd25 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_arm.c
-@@ -132,14 +132,14 @@ int libxl__arch_domain_create(libxl__gc *gc,
-                               uint32_t domid)
- {
-     libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc);
--    unsigned int shadow_mb = DIV_ROUNDUP(d_config->b_info.shadow_memkb, 1024);
-+    unsigned long shadow_mb = DIV_ROUNDUP(d_config->b_info.shadow_memkb, 1024);
- 
-     int r = xc_shadow_control(ctx->xch, domid,
-                               XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION,
--                              &shadow_mb, 0);
-+                              NULL, 0, &shadow_mb, 0, NULL);
-     if (r) {
-         LOGED(ERROR, domid,
--              "Failed to set %u MiB shadow allocation", shadow_mb);
-+              "Failed to set %lu MiB shadow allocation", shadow_mb);
-         return ERROR_FAIL;
-     }
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0068-arm-p2m-Rework-p2m_init.patch b/0068-arm-p2m-Rework-p2m_init.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cc80d52..0000000
--- a/0068-arm-p2m-Rework-p2m_init.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From 6f948fd1929c01b82a119f03670cab38ffebb47e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 09:21:11 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 068/126] arm/p2m: Rework p2m_init()
-
-p2m_init() is mostly trivial initialisation, but has two fallible operations
-which are on either side of the backpointer trigger for teardown to take
-actions.
-
-p2m_free_vmid() is idempotent with a failed p2m_alloc_vmid(), so rearrange
-p2m_init() to perform all trivial setup, then set the backpointer, then
-perform all fallible setup.
-
-This will simplify a future bugfix which needs to add a third fallible
-operation.
-
-No practical change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
-(cherry picked from commit: 3783e583319fa1ce75e414d851f0fde191a14753)
----
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index c1055ff2a745..25eb1d84cbc1 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
- int p2m_init(struct domain *d)
- {
-     struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
--    int rc = 0;
-+    int rc;
-     unsigned int cpu;
- 
-     rwlock_init(&p2m->lock);
-@@ -1742,11 +1742,6 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d)
-     INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
- 
-     p2m->vmid = INVALID_VMID;
--
--    rc = p2m_alloc_vmid(d);
--    if ( rc != 0 )
--        return rc;
--
-     p2m->max_mapped_gfn = _gfn(0);
-     p2m->lowest_mapped_gfn = _gfn(ULONG_MAX);
- 
-@@ -1762,8 +1757,6 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d)
-     p2m->clean_pte = is_iommu_enabled(d) &&
-         !iommu_has_feature(d, IOMMU_FEAT_COHERENT_WALK);
- 
--    rc = p2m_alloc_table(d);
--
-     /*
-      * Make sure that the type chosen to is able to store the an vCPU ID
-      * between 0 and the maximum of virtual CPUS supported as long as
-@@ -1776,13 +1769,20 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d)
-        p2m->last_vcpu_ran[cpu] = INVALID_VCPU_ID;
- 
-     /*
--     * Besides getting a domain when we only have the p2m in hand,
--     * the back pointer to domain is also used in p2m_teardown()
--     * as an end-of-initialization indicator.
-+     * "Trivial" initialisation is now complete.  Set the backpointer so
-+     * p2m_teardown() and friends know to do something.
-      */
-     p2m->domain = d;
- 
--    return rc;
-+    rc = p2m_alloc_vmid(d);
-+    if ( rc )
-+        return rc;
-+
-+    rc = p2m_alloc_table(d);
-+    if ( rc )
-+        return rc;
-+
-+    return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0069-xen-arm-p2m-Populate-pages-for-GICv2-mapping-in-p2m_.patch b/0069-xen-arm-p2m-Populate-pages-for-GICv2-mapping-in-p2m_.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 67cdb7a..0000000
--- a/0069-xen-arm-p2m-Populate-pages-for-GICv2-mapping-in-p2m_.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-From f8915cd5dbe0f51e9bb31a54fe40600b839dd707 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 09:21:12 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 069/126] xen/arm: p2m: Populate pages for GICv2 mapping in
- p2m_init()
-
-Hardware using GICv2 needs to create a P2M mapping of 8KB GICv2 area
-when the domain is created. Considering the worst case of page tables
-which requires 6 P2M pages as the two pages will be consecutive but not
-necessarily in the same L3 page table and keep a buffer, populate 16
-pages as the default value to the P2M pages pool in p2m_init() at the
-domain creation stage to satisfy the GICv2 requirement. For GICv3, the
-above-mentioned P2M mapping is not necessary, but since the allocated
-16 pages here would not be lost, hence populate these pages
-unconditionally.
-
-With the default 16 P2M pages populated, there would be a case that
-failures would happen in the domain creation with P2M pages already in
-use. To properly free the P2M for this case, firstly support the
-optionally preemption of p2m_teardown(), then call p2m_teardown() and
-p2m_set_allocation(d, 0, NULL) non-preemptively in p2m_final_teardown().
-As non-preemptive p2m_teardown() should only return 0, use a
-BUG_ON to confirm that.
-
-Since p2m_final_teardown() is called either after
-domain_relinquish_resources() where relinquish_p2m_mapping() has been
-called, or from failure path of domain_create()/arch_domain_create()
-where mappings that require p2m_put_l3_page() should never be created,
-relinquish_p2m_mapping() is not added in p2m_final_teardown(), add
-in-code comments to refer this.
-
-Fixes: cbea5a1149ca ("xen/arm: Allocate and free P2M pages from the P2M pool")
-Suggested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
-(cherry picked from commit: c7cff1188802646eaa38e918e5738da0e84949be)
----
- xen/arch/arm/domain.c     |  2 +-
- xen/arch/arm/p2m.c        | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h | 14 ++++++++++----
- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-index a5ffd952ecd0..b11359b8cca3 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
-@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
-             return ret;
- 
-     PROGRESS(p2m):
--        ret = p2m_teardown(d);
-+        ret = p2m_teardown(d, true);
-         if ( ret )
-             return ret;
- 
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-index 25eb1d84cbc1..f6012f2a538f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
-@@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ static void p2m_free_vmid(struct domain *d)
-     spin_unlock(&vmid_alloc_lock);
- }
- 
--int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
-+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d, bool allow_preemption)
- {
-     struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
-     unsigned long count = 0;
-@@ -1672,6 +1672,9 @@ int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
-     unsigned int i;
-     int rc = 0;
- 
-+    if ( page_list_empty(&p2m->pages) )
-+        return 0;
-+
-     p2m_write_lock(p2m);
- 
-     /*
-@@ -1695,7 +1698,7 @@ int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d)
-         p2m_free_page(p2m->domain, pg);
-         count++;
-         /* Arbitrarily preempt every 512 iterations */
--        if ( !(count % 512) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-+        if ( allow_preemption && !(count % 512) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
-         {
-             rc = -ERESTART;
-             break;
-@@ -1715,7 +1718,20 @@ void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d)
-     if ( !p2m->domain )
-         return;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * No need to call relinquish_p2m_mapping() here because
-+     * p2m_final_teardown() is called either after domain_relinquish_resources()
-+     * where relinquish_p2m_mapping() has been called, or from failure path of
-+     * domain_create()/arch_domain_create() where mappings that require
-+     * p2m_put_l3_page() should never be created. For the latter case, also see
-+     * comment on top of the p2m_set_entry() for more info.
-+     */
-+
-+    BUG_ON(p2m_teardown(d, false));
-     ASSERT(page_list_empty(&p2m->pages));
-+
-+    while ( p2m_teardown_allocation(d) == -ERESTART )
-+        continue; /* No preemption support here */
-     ASSERT(page_list_empty(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist));
- 
-     if ( p2m->root )
-@@ -1782,6 +1798,20 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d)
-     if ( rc )
-         return rc;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * Hardware using GICv2 needs to create a P2M mapping of 8KB GICv2 area
-+     * when the domain is created. Considering the worst case for page
-+     * tables and keep a buffer, populate 16 pages to the P2M pages pool here.
-+     * For GICv3, the above-mentioned P2M mapping is not necessary, but since
-+     * the allocated 16 pages here would not be lost, hence populate these
-+     * pages unconditionally.
-+     */
-+    spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+    rc = p2m_set_allocation(d, 16, NULL);
-+    spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
-+    if ( rc )
-+        return rc;
-+
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-index 18675b234570..ea7ca41d82b2 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
-@@ -194,14 +194,18 @@ int p2m_init(struct domain *d);
- 
- /*
-  * The P2M resources are freed in two parts:
-- *  - p2m_teardown() will be called when relinquish the resources. It
-- *    will free large resources (e.g. intermediate page-tables) that
-- *    requires preemption.
-+ *  - p2m_teardown() will be called preemptively when relinquish the
-+ *    resources, in which case it will free large resources (e.g. intermediate
-+ *    page-tables) that requires preemption.
-  *  - p2m_final_teardown() will be called when domain struct is been
-  *    freed. This *cannot* be preempted and therefore one small
-  *    resources should be freed here.
-+ *  Note that p2m_final_teardown() will also call p2m_teardown(), to properly
-+ *  free the P2M when failures happen in the domain creation with P2M pages
-+ *  already in use. In this case p2m_teardown() is called non-preemptively and
-+ *  p2m_teardown() will always return 0.
-  */
--int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d);
-+int p2m_teardown(struct domain *d, bool allow_preemption);
- void p2m_final_teardown(struct domain *d);
- 
- /*
-@@ -266,6 +270,8 @@ mfn_t p2m_get_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn,
- /*
-  * Direct set a p2m entry: only for use by the P2M code.
-  * The P2M write lock should be taken.
-+ * TODO: Add a check in __p2m_set_entry() to avoid creating a mapping in
-+ * arch_domain_create() that requires p2m_put_l3_page() to be called.
-  */
- int p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                   gfn_t sgfn,
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0070-VMX-correct-error-handling-in-vmx_create_vmcs.patch b/0070-VMX-correct-error-handling-in-vmx_create_vmcs.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4823c64..0000000
--- a/0070-VMX-correct-error-handling-in-vmx_create_vmcs.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 3885fa42349c3c6f31f0e0eec3b4605dca7fdda9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:31:26 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 070/126] VMX: correct error handling in vmx_create_vmcs()
-
-With the addition of vmx_add_msr() calls to construct_vmcs() there are
-now cases where simply freeing the VMCS isn't enough: The MSR bitmap
-page as well as one of the MSR area ones (if it's the 2nd vmx_add_msr()
-which fails) may also need freeing. Switch to using vmx_destroy_vmcs()
-instead.
-
-Fixes: 3bd36952dab6 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Introduce an option to control L1D_FLUSH for HVM HAP guests")
-Fixes: 53a570b28569 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Support IBPB-on-entry")
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
-master commit: 448d28309f1a966bdc850aff1a637e0b79a03e43
-master date: 2022-10-12 17:57:56 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-index dd817cee4e69..237b13459d4f 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
-@@ -1831,7 +1831,7 @@ int vmx_create_vmcs(struct vcpu *v)
- 
-     if ( (rc = construct_vmcs(v)) != 0 )
-     {
--        vmx_free_vmcs(vmx->vmcs_pa);
-+        vmx_destroy_vmcs(v);
-         return rc;
-     }
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0071-argo-Remove-reachable-ASSERT_UNREACHABLE.patch b/0071-argo-Remove-reachable-ASSERT_UNREACHABLE.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d1563bd..0000000
--- a/0071-argo-Remove-reachable-ASSERT_UNREACHABLE.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 916668baf9252ac30260e3394278a098712c5d34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:32:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 071/126] argo: Remove reachable ASSERT_UNREACHABLE
-
-I observed this ASSERT_UNREACHABLE in partner_rings_remove consistently
-trip.  It was in OpenXT with the viptables patch applied.
-
-dom10 shuts down.
-dom7 is REJECTED sending to dom10.
-dom7 shuts down and this ASSERT trips for dom10.
-
-The argo_send_info has a domid, but there is no refcount taken on
-the domain.  Therefore it's not appropriate to ASSERT that the domain
-can be looked up via domid.  Replace with a debug message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.w.clark@gmail.com>
-master commit: 197f612b77c5afe04e60df2100a855370d720ad7
-master date: 2022-10-14 14:45:41 +0100
----
- xen/common/argo.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/argo.c b/xen/common/argo.c
-index 49be715f638e..2b0d980d4bba 100644
---- a/xen/common/argo.c
-+++ b/xen/common/argo.c
-@@ -1299,7 +1299,8 @@ partner_rings_remove(struct domain *src_d)
-                     ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-             }
-             else
--                ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-+                argo_dprintk("%pd has entry for stale partner d%u\n",
-+                             src_d, send_info->id.domain_id);
- 
-             if ( dst_d )
-                 rcu_unlock_domain(dst_d);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0072-EFI-don-t-convert-memory-marked-for-runtime-use-to-o.patch b/0072-EFI-don-t-convert-memory-marked-for-runtime-use-to-o.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7993482..0000000
--- a/0072-EFI-don-t-convert-memory-marked-for-runtime-use-to-o.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From b833014293f3fa5a7c48756ce0c8c9f3e4a666ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:33:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 072/126] EFI: don't convert memory marked for runtime use to
- ordinary RAM
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-efi_init_memory() in both relevant places is treating EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME
-higher priority than the type of the range. To avoid accessing memory at
-runtime which was re-used for other purposes, make
-efi_arch_process_memory_map() follow suit. While in theory the same would
-apply to EfiACPIReclaimMemory, we don't actually "reclaim" or clobber
-that memory (converted to E820_ACPI on x86) there (and it would be a bug
-if the Dom0 kernel tried to reclaim the range, bypassing Xen's memory
-management, plus it would be at least bogus if it clobbered that space),
-hence that type's handling can be left alone.
-
-Fixes: bf6501a62e80 ("x86-64: EFI boot code")
-Fixes: facac0af87ef ("x86-64: EFI runtime code")
-Fixes: 6d70ea10d49f ("Add ARM EFI boot support")
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-master commit: f324300c8347b6aa6f9c0b18e0a90bbf44011a9a
-master date: 2022-10-21 12:30:24 +0200
----
- xen/arch/arm/efi/efi-boot.h | 3 ++-
- xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h | 4 +++-
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/efi/efi-boot.h b/xen/arch/arm/efi/efi-boot.h
-index cf9c37153fea..37d7ebd59ae2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/arm/efi/efi-boot.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/arm/efi/efi-boot.h
-@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ static EFI_STATUS __init efi_process_memory_map_bootinfo(EFI_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR *
- 
-     for ( Index = 0; Index < (mmap_size / desc_size); Index++ )
-     {
--        if ( desc_ptr->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB &&
-+        if ( !(desc_ptr->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) &&
-+             (desc_ptr->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB) &&
-              (desc_ptr->Type == EfiConventionalMemory ||
-               desc_ptr->Type == EfiLoaderCode ||
-               desc_ptr->Type == EfiLoaderData ||
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h b/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h
-index 84fd77931456..3c3b3ab936f4 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h
-@@ -183,7 +183,9 @@ static void __init efi_arch_process_memory_map(EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable,
-             /* fall through */
-         case EfiLoaderCode:
-         case EfiLoaderData:
--            if ( desc->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB )
-+            if ( desc->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME )
-+                type = E820_RESERVED;
-+            else if ( desc->Attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB )
-                 type = E820_RAM;
-             else
-         case EfiUnusableMemory:
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0073-xen-sched-fix-race-in-RTDS-scheduler.patch b/0073-xen-sched-fix-race-in-RTDS-scheduler.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bb456ca..0000000
--- a/0073-xen-sched-fix-race-in-RTDS-scheduler.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 1f679f084fef76810762ee69a584fc1b524be0b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:33:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 073/126] xen/sched: fix race in RTDS scheduler
-
-When a domain gets paused the unit runnable state can change to "not
-runnable" without the scheduling lock being involved. This means that
-a specific scheduler isn't involved in this change of runnable state.
-
-In the RTDS scheduler this can result in an inconsistency in case a
-unit is losing its "runnable" capability while the RTDS scheduler's
-scheduling function is active. RTDS will remove the unit from the run
-queue, but doesn't do so for the replenish queue, leading to hitting
-an ASSERT() in replq_insert() later when the domain is unpaused again.
-
-Fix that by removing the unit from the replenish queue as well in this
-case.
-
-Fixes: 7c7b407e7772 ("xen/sched: introduce unit_runnable_state()")
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
-master commit: 73c62927f64ecb48f27d06176befdf76b879f340
-master date: 2022-10-21 12:32:23 +0200
----
- xen/common/sched/rt.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/rt.c b/xen/common/sched/rt.c
-index c24cd2ac3200..ec2ca1bebc26 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/rt.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/rt.c
-@@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ rt_schedule(const struct scheduler *ops, struct sched_unit *currunit,
-         else if ( !unit_runnable_state(snext->unit) )
-         {
-             q_remove(snext);
-+            replq_remove(ops, snext);
-             snext = rt_unit(sched_idle_unit(sched_cpu));
-         }
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0074-xen-sched-fix-restore_vcpu_affinity-by-removing-it.patch b/0074-xen-sched-fix-restore_vcpu_affinity-by-removing-it.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9085f67..0000000
--- a/0074-xen-sched-fix-restore_vcpu_affinity-by-removing-it.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-From 9c5114696c6f7773b7f3691f27aaa7a0636c916d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:34:28 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 074/126] xen/sched: fix restore_vcpu_affinity() by removing it
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-When the system is coming up after having been suspended,
-restore_vcpu_affinity() is called for each domain in order to adjust
-the vcpu's affinity settings in case a cpu didn't come to live again.
-
-The way restore_vcpu_affinity() is doing that is wrong, because the
-specific scheduler isn't being informed about a possible migration of
-the vcpu to another cpu. Additionally the migration is often even
-happening if all cpus are running again, as it is done without check
-whether it is really needed.
-
-As cpupool management is already calling cpu_disable_scheduler() for
-cpus not having come up again, and cpu_disable_scheduler() is taking
-care of eventually needed vcpu migration in the proper way, there is
-simply no need for restore_vcpu_affinity().
-
-So just remove restore_vcpu_affinity() completely, together with the
-no longer used sched_reset_affinity_broken().
-
-Fixes: 8a04eaa8ea83 ("xen/sched: move some per-vcpu items to struct sched_unit")
-Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
-Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
-master commit: fce1f381f7388daaa3e96dbb0d67d7a3e4bb2d2d
-master date: 2022-10-24 11:16:27 +0100
----
- xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c |  3 --
- xen/common/sched/core.c   | 78 ---------------------------------------
- xen/include/xen/sched.h   |  1 -
- 3 files changed, 82 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
-index dd397f713067..1a7baeebe6d0 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
-@@ -159,10 +159,7 @@ static void thaw_domains(void)
- 
-     rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
-     for_each_domain ( d )
--    {
--        restore_vcpu_affinity(d);
-         domain_unpause(d);
--    }
-     rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/xen/common/sched/core.c b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-index 900aab8f66a7..9173cf690c72 100644
---- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
-+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
-@@ -1188,84 +1188,6 @@ static bool sched_check_affinity_broken(const struct sched_unit *unit)
-     return false;
- }
- 
--static void sched_reset_affinity_broken(const struct sched_unit *unit)
--{
--    struct vcpu *v;
--
--    for_each_sched_unit_vcpu ( unit, v )
--        v->affinity_broken = false;
--}
--
--void restore_vcpu_affinity(struct domain *d)
--{
--    unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
--    struct sched_unit *unit;
--
--    ASSERT(system_state == SYS_STATE_resume);
--
--    rcu_read_lock(&sched_res_rculock);
--
--    for_each_sched_unit ( d, unit )
--    {
--        spinlock_t *lock;
--        unsigned int old_cpu = sched_unit_master(unit);
--        struct sched_resource *res;
--
--        ASSERT(!unit_runnable(unit));
--
--        /*
--         * Re-assign the initial processor as after resume we have no
--         * guarantee the old processor has come back to life again.
--         *
--         * Therefore, here, before actually unpausing the domains, we should
--         * set v->processor of each of their vCPUs to something that will
--         * make sense for the scheduler of the cpupool in which they are in.
--         */
--        lock = unit_schedule_lock_irq(unit);
--
--        cpumask_and(cpumask_scratch_cpu(cpu), unit->cpu_hard_affinity,
--                    cpupool_domain_master_cpumask(d));
--        if ( cpumask_empty(cpumask_scratch_cpu(cpu)) )
--        {
--            if ( sched_check_affinity_broken(unit) )
--            {
--                sched_set_affinity(unit, unit->cpu_hard_affinity_saved, NULL);
--                sched_reset_affinity_broken(unit);
--                cpumask_and(cpumask_scratch_cpu(cpu), unit->cpu_hard_affinity,
--                            cpupool_domain_master_cpumask(d));
--            }
--
--            if ( cpumask_empty(cpumask_scratch_cpu(cpu)) )
--            {
--                /* Affinity settings of one vcpu are for the complete unit. */
--                printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "Breaking affinity for %pv\n",
--                       unit->vcpu_list);
--                sched_set_affinity(unit, &cpumask_all, NULL);
--                cpumask_and(cpumask_scratch_cpu(cpu), unit->cpu_hard_affinity,
--                            cpupool_domain_master_cpumask(d));
--            }
--        }
--
--        res = get_sched_res(cpumask_any(cpumask_scratch_cpu(cpu)));
--        sched_set_res(unit, res);
--
--        spin_unlock_irq(lock);
--
--        /* v->processor might have changed, so reacquire the lock. */
--        lock = unit_schedule_lock_irq(unit);
--        res = sched_pick_resource(unit_scheduler(unit), unit);
--        sched_set_res(unit, res);
--        spin_unlock_irq(lock);
--
--        if ( old_cpu != sched_unit_master(unit) )
--            sched_move_irqs(unit);
--    }
--
--    rcu_read_unlock(&sched_res_rculock);
--
--    domain_update_node_affinity(d);
--}
--
- /*
-  * This function is used by cpu_hotplug code via cpu notifier chain
-  * and from cpupools to switch schedulers on a cpu.
-diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-index 4e25627d9685..bb05d167ae0f 100644
---- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
-@@ -993,7 +993,6 @@ void vcpu_set_periodic_timer(struct vcpu *v, s_time_t value);
- void sched_setup_dom0_vcpus(struct domain *d);
- int vcpu_temporary_affinity(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cpu, uint8_t reason);
- int vcpu_set_hard_affinity(struct vcpu *v, const cpumask_t *affinity);
--void restore_vcpu_affinity(struct domain *d);
- int vcpu_affinity_domctl(struct domain *d, uint32_t cmd,
-                          struct xen_domctl_vcpuaffinity *vcpuaff);
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0075-x86-shadow-drop-replace-bogus-assertions.patch b/0075-x86-shadow-drop-replace-bogus-assertions.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 183dc68..0000000
--- a/0075-x86-shadow-drop-replace-bogus-assertions.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From 08bc78b4eecaef33250038f7e484bdf01ea1017c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:35:06 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 075/126] x86/shadow: drop (replace) bogus assertions
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The addition of a call to shadow_blow_tables() from shadow_teardown()
-has resulted in the "no vcpus" related assertion becoming triggerable:
-If domain_create() fails with at least one page successfully allocated
-in the course of shadow_enable(), or if domain_create() succeeds and
-the domain is then killed without ever invoking XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus.
-Note that in-tree tests (test-resource and test-tsx) do exactly the
-latter of these two.
-
-The assertion's comment was bogus anyway: Shadow mode has been getting
-enabled before allocation of vCPU-s for quite some time. Convert the
-assertion to a conditional: As long as there are no vCPU-s, there's
-nothing to blow away.
-
-Fixes: e7aa55c0aab3 ("x86/p2m: free the paging memory pool preemptively")
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
-A similar assertion/comment pair exists in _shadow_prealloc(); the
-comment is similarly bogus, and the assertion could in principle trigger
-e.g. when shadow_alloc_p2m_page() is called early enough. Replace those
-at the same time by a similar early return, here indicating failure to
-the caller (which will generally lead to the domain being crashed in
-shadow_prealloc()).
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: a92dc2bb30ba65ae25d2f417677eb7ef9a6a0fef
-master date: 2022-10-24 15:46:11 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 10 ++++++----
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-index 8f7fddcee1e5..e36d49d1fcba 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
-@@ -942,8 +942,9 @@ static bool __must_check _shadow_prealloc(struct domain *d, unsigned int pages)
-         /* No reclaim when the domain is dying, teardown will take care of it. */
-         return false;
- 
--    /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */
--    ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]);
-+    /* Nothing to reclaim when there are no vcpus yet. */
-+    if ( !d->vcpu[0] )
-+        return false;
- 
-     /* Stage one: walk the list of pinned pages, unpinning them */
-     perfc_incr(shadow_prealloc_1);
-@@ -1033,8 +1034,9 @@ void shadow_blow_tables(struct domain *d)
-     mfn_t smfn;
-     int i;
- 
--    /* Shouldn't have enabled shadows if we've no vcpus. */
--    ASSERT(d->vcpu && d->vcpu[0]);
-+    /* Nothing to do when there are no vcpus yet. */
-+    if ( !d->vcpu[0] )
-+        return;
- 
-     /* Pass one: unpin all pinned pages */
-     foreach_pinned_shadow(d, sp, t)
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0076-vpci-don-t-assume-that-vpci-per-device-data-exists-u.patch b/0076-vpci-don-t-assume-that-vpci-per-device-data-exists-u.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0350771..0000000
--- a/0076-vpci-don-t-assume-that-vpci-per-device-data-exists-u.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 6b035f4f5829eb213cb9fcbe83b5dfae05c857a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:35:33 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 076/126] vpci: don't assume that vpci per-device data exists
- unconditionally
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-It's possible for a device to be assigned to a domain but have no
-vpci structure if vpci_process_pending() failed and called
-vpci_remove_device() as a result.  The unconditional accesses done by
-vpci_{read,write}() and vpci_remove_device() to pdev->vpci would
-then trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
-
-Add checks for pdev->vpci presence in the affected functions.
-
-Fixes: 9c244fdef7 ('vpci: add header handlers')
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: 6ccb5e308ceeb895fbccd87a528a8bd24325aa39
-master date: 2022-10-26 14:55:30 +0200
----
- xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c | 7 +++++--
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
-index a27c9e600df1..6b90e4fa32dc 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ extern vpci_register_init_t *const __end_vpci_array[];
- 
- void vpci_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
- {
-+    if ( !pdev->vpci )
-+        return;
-+
-     spin_lock(&pdev->vpci->lock);
-     while ( !list_empty(&pdev->vpci->handlers) )
-     {
-@@ -320,7 +323,7 @@ uint32_t vpci_read(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size)
- 
-     /* Find the PCI dev matching the address. */
-     pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, sbdf.seg, sbdf.bus, sbdf.devfn);
--    if ( !pdev )
-+    if ( !pdev || !pdev->vpci )
-         return vpci_read_hw(sbdf, reg, size);
- 
-     spin_lock(&pdev->vpci->lock);
-@@ -430,7 +433,7 @@ void vpci_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size,
-      * Passthrough everything that's not trapped.
-      */
-     pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, sbdf.seg, sbdf.bus, sbdf.devfn);
--    if ( !pdev )
-+    if ( !pdev || !pdev->vpci )
-     {
-         vpci_write_hw(sbdf, reg, size, data);
-         return;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0077-vpci-msix-remove-from-table-list-on-detach.patch b/0077-vpci-msix-remove-from-table-list-on-detach.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e60831..0000000
--- a/0077-vpci-msix-remove-from-table-list-on-detach.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From bff4c4457950abb498270d921d728f654876f944 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:35:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 077/126] vpci/msix: remove from table list on detach
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Teardown of MSIX vPCI related data doesn't currently remove the MSIX
-device data from the list of MSIX tables handled by the domain,
-leading to a use-after-free of the data in the msix structure.
-
-Remove the structure from the list before freeing in order to solve
-it.
-
-Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Fixes: d6281be9d0 ('vpci/msix: add MSI-X handlers')
-Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-master commit: c14aea137eab29eb9c30bfad745a00c65ad21066
-master date: 2022-10-26 14:56:58 +0200
----
- xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c | 8 ++++++--
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
-index 6b90e4fa32dc..75edbbee4025 100644
---- a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c
-@@ -51,8 +51,12 @@ void vpci_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
-         xfree(r);
-     }
-     spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock);
--    if ( pdev->vpci->msix && pdev->vpci->msix->pba )
--        iounmap(pdev->vpci->msix->pba);
-+    if ( pdev->vpci->msix )
-+    {
-+        list_del(&pdev->vpci->msix->next);
-+        if ( pdev->vpci->msix->pba )
-+            iounmap(pdev->vpci->msix->pba);
-+    }
-     xfree(pdev->vpci->msix);
-     xfree(pdev->vpci->msi);
-     xfree(pdev->vpci);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0078-x86-also-zap-secondary-time-area-handles-during-soft.patch b/0078-x86-also-zap-secondary-time-area-handles-during-soft.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e3db6ad..0000000
--- a/0078-x86-also-zap-secondary-time-area-handles-during-soft.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 9b8b65c827169eca2d0e500150009ac0f857d455 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:36:25 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 078/126] x86: also zap secondary time area handles during soft
- reset
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Just like domain_soft_reset() properly zaps runstate area handles, the
-secondary time area ones also need discarding to prevent guest memory
-corruption once the guest is re-started.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-master commit: b80d4f8d2ea6418e32fb4f20d1304ace6d6566e3
-master date: 2022-10-27 11:49:09 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index ce6ddcf31397..e9b8ed4c96c2 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -927,6 +927,7 @@ int arch_domain_soft_reset(struct domain *d)
-     struct page_info *page = virt_to_page(d->shared_info), *new_page;
-     int ret = 0;
-     struct domain *owner;
-+    struct vcpu *v;
-     mfn_t mfn;
-     gfn_t gfn;
-     p2m_type_t p2mt;
-@@ -1006,7 +1007,12 @@ int arch_domain_soft_reset(struct domain *d)
-                "Failed to add a page to replace %pd's shared_info frame %"PRI_gfn"\n",
-                d, gfn_x(gfn));
-         free_domheap_page(new_page);
-+        goto exit_put_gfn;
-     }
-+
-+    for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-+        set_xen_guest_handle(v->arch.time_info_guest, NULL);
-+
-  exit_put_gfn:
-     put_gfn(d, gfn_x(gfn));
-  exit_put_page:
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0079-common-map_vcpu_info-wants-to-unshare-the-underlying.patch b/0079-common-map_vcpu_info-wants-to-unshare-the-underlying.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2944a80..0000000
--- a/0079-common-map_vcpu_info-wants-to-unshare-the-underlying.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 317894fa6a067a7903199bc5c1e3e06a0436caf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:36:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 079/126] common: map_vcpu_info() wants to unshare the
- underlying page
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Not passing P2M_UNSHARE to get_page_from_gfn() means there won't even be
-an attempt to unshare the referenced page, without any indication to the
-caller (e.g. -EAGAIN). Note that guests have no direct control over
-which of their pages are shared (or paged out), and hence they have no
-way to make sure all on their own that the subsequent obtaining of a
-writable type reference can actually succeed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-master commit: 48980cf24d5cf41fd644600f99c753419505e735
-master date: 2022-10-28 11:38:32 +0200
----
- xen/common/domain.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
-index 17cc32fde373..0fb7f9a6225c 100644
---- a/xen/common/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
-@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ int map_vcpu_info(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long gfn, unsigned offset)
-     if ( (v != current) && !(v->pause_flags & VPF_down) )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
--    page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
-+    page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gfn, NULL, P2M_UNSHARE);
-     if ( !page )
-         return -EINVAL;
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0080-x86-pv-shim-correctly-ignore-empty-onlining-requests.patch b/0080-x86-pv-shim-correctly-ignore-empty-onlining-requests.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 31aa812..0000000
--- a/0080-x86-pv-shim-correctly-ignore-empty-onlining-requests.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From a46f01fad17173afe3809ac1980cbe4b67a9a8b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:37:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 080/126] x86/pv-shim: correctly ignore empty onlining requests
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Mem-op requests may have zero extents. Such requests need treating as
-no-ops. pv_shim_online_memory(), however, would have tried to take 2³²-1
-order-sized pages from its balloon list (to then populate them),
-typically ending when the entire set of ballooned pages of this order
-was consumed.
-
-Note that pv_shim_offline_memory() does not have such an issue.
-
-Fixes: b2245acc60c3 ("xen/pvshim: memory hotplug")
-Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 9272225ca72801fd9fa5b268a2d1c5adebd19cd9
-master date: 2022-10-28 15:47:59 +0200
----
- xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
-index b4e83e077891..104357e2c398 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
-@@ -922,6 +922,9 @@ void pv_shim_online_memory(unsigned int nr, unsigned int order)
-     struct page_info *page, *tmp;
-     PAGE_LIST_HEAD(list);
- 
-+    if ( !nr )
-+        return;
-+
-     spin_lock(&balloon_lock);
-     page_list_for_each_safe ( page, tmp, &balloon )
-     {
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0081-x86-pv-shim-correct-ballooning-up-for-compat-guests.patch b/0081-x86-pv-shim-correct-ballooning-up-for-compat-guests.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cd97334..0000000
--- a/0081-x86-pv-shim-correct-ballooning-up-for-compat-guests.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From b68e3fda8a76fb3ab582b5633727ac5545e4e8b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:37:42 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 081/126] x86/pv-shim: correct ballooning up for compat guests
-
-The compat layer for multi-extent memory ops may need to split incoming
-requests. Since the guest handles in the interface structures may not be
-altered, it does so by leveraging do_memory_op()'s continuation
-handling: It hands on non-initial requests with a non-zero start extent,
-with the (native) handle suitably adjusted down. As a result
-do_memory_op() sees only the first of potentially several requests with
-start extent being zero. It's only that case when the function would
-issue a call to pv_shim_online_memory(), yet the range then covers only
-the first sub-range that results from the split.
-
-Address that breakage by making a complementary call to
-pv_shim_online_memory() in compat layer.
-
-Fixes: b2245acc60c3 ("xen/pvshim: memory hotplug")
-Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: a0bfdd201ea12aa5679bb8944d63a4e0d3c23160
-master date: 2022-10-28 15:48:50 +0200
----
- xen/common/compat/memory.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/compat/memory.c b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
-index c43fa97cf15f..a0e0562a4033 100644
---- a/xen/common/compat/memory.c
-+++ b/xen/common/compat/memory.c
-@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ EMIT_FILE;
- #include <xen/event.h>
- #include <xen/mem_access.h>
- #include <asm/current.h>
-+#include <asm/guest.h>
- #include <compat/memory.h>
- 
- #define xen_domid_t domid_t
-@@ -146,7 +147,10 @@ int compat_memory_op(unsigned int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) compat)
-                 nat.rsrv->nr_extents = end_extent;
-                 ++split;
-             }
--
-+           /* Avoid calling pv_shim_online_memory() when in a continuation. */
-+           if ( pv_shim && op != XENMEM_decrease_reservation && !start_extent )
-+               pv_shim_online_memory(cmp.rsrv.nr_extents - nat.rsrv->nr_extents,
-+                                     cmp.rsrv.extent_order);
-             break;
- 
-         case XENMEM_exchange:
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0082-x86-pv-shim-correct-ballooning-down-for-compat-guest.patch b/0082-x86-pv-shim-correct-ballooning-down-for-compat-guest.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a6d895f..0000000
--- a/0082-x86-pv-shim-correct-ballooning-down-for-compat-guest.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From ddab5b1e001366258c0bfc7d5995b9d548e6042b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 13:38:05 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 082/126] x86/pv-shim: correct ballooning down for compat
- guests
-
-The compat layer for multi-extent memory ops may need to split incoming
-requests. Since the guest handles in the interface structures may not be
-altered, it does so by leveraging do_memory_op()'s continuation
-handling: It hands on non-initial requests with a non-zero start extent,
-with the (native) handle suitably adjusted down. As a result
-do_memory_op() sees only the first of potentially several requests with
-start extent being zero. In order to be usable as overall result, the
-function accumulates args.nr_done, i.e. it initialized the field with
-the start extent. Therefore non-initial requests resulting from the
-split would pass too large a number into pv_shim_offline_memory().
-
-Address that breakage by always calling pv_shim_offline_memory()
-regardless of current hypercall preemption status, with a suitably
-adjusted first argument. Note that this is correct also for the native
-guest case: We now simply "commit" what was completed right away, rather
-than at the end of a series of preemption/re-start cycles. In fact this
-improves overall preemption behavior: There's no longer a potentially
-big chunk of work done non-preemptively at the end of the last
-"iteration".
-
-Fixes: b2245acc60c3 ("xen/pvshim: memory hotplug")
-Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-master commit: 1d7fbc535d1d37bdc2cc53ede360b0f6651f7de1
-master date: 2022-10-28 15:49:33 +0200
----
- xen/common/memory.c | 19 +++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
-index 95b2b934e4a2..a958d94ac3cd 100644
---- a/xen/common/memory.c
-+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
-@@ -1407,22 +1407,17 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
- 
-         rc = args.nr_done;
- 
--        if ( args.preempted )
--            return hypercall_create_continuation(
--                __HYPERVISOR_memory_op, "lh",
--                op | (rc << MEMOP_EXTENT_SHIFT), arg);
--
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86
-         if ( pv_shim && op == XENMEM_decrease_reservation )
--            /*
--             * Only call pv_shim_offline_memory when the hypercall has
--             * finished. Note that nr_done is used to cope in case the
--             * hypercall has failed and only part of the extents where
--             * processed.
--             */
--            pv_shim_offline_memory(args.nr_done, args.extent_order);
-+            pv_shim_offline_memory(args.nr_done - start_extent,
-+                                   args.extent_order);
- #endif
- 
-+        if ( args.preempted )
-+           return hypercall_create_continuation(
-+                __HYPERVISOR_memory_op, "lh",
-+                op | (rc << MEMOP_EXTENT_SHIFT), arg);
-+
-         break;
- 
-     case XENMEM_exchange:
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0083-tools-xenstore-create_node-Don-t-defer-work-to-undo-.patch b/0083-tools-xenstore-create_node-Don-t-defer-work-to-undo-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5204b3f..0000000
--- a/0083-tools-xenstore-create_node-Don-t-defer-work-to-undo-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-From ee03d9b56e6141422b4ef2444f93cf2e88e6a26c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:06 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 083/126] tools/xenstore: create_node: Don't defer work to undo
- any changes on failure
-
-XSA-115 extended destroy_node() to update the node accounting for the
-connection. The implementation is assuming the connection is the parent
-of the node, however all the nodes are allocated using a separate context
-(see process_message()). This will result to crash (or corrupt) xenstored
-as the pointer is wrongly used.
-
-In case of an error, any changes to the database or update to the
-accounting will now be reverted in create_node() by calling directly
-destroy_node(). This has the nice advantage to remove the loop to unset
-the destructors in case of success.
-
-Take the opportunity to free the nodes right now as they are not
-going to be reachable (the function returns NULL) and are just wasting
-resources.
-
-This is XSA-414 / CVE-2022-42309.
-
-Fixes: 0bfb2101f243 ("tools/xenstore: fix node accounting after failed node creation")
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 1cd3cc7ea27cda7640a8d895e09617b61c265697)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 9172dd767140..a00c49e404a1 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1054,9 +1054,8 @@ nomem:
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--static int destroy_node(void *_node)
-+static int destroy_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- {
--	struct node *node = _node;
- 	TDB_DATA key;
- 
- 	if (streq(node->name, "/"))
-@@ -1065,7 +1064,7 @@ static int destroy_node(void *_node)
- 	set_tdb_key(node->name, &key);
- 	tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key);
- 
--	domain_entry_dec(talloc_parent(node), node);
-+	domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -1074,7 +1073,8 @@ static struct node *create_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 				const char *name,
- 				void *data, unsigned int datalen)
- {
--	struct node *node, *i;
-+	struct node *node, *i, *j;
-+	int ret;
- 
- 	node = construct_node(conn, ctx, name);
- 	if (!node)
-@@ -1096,23 +1096,40 @@ static struct node *create_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 		/* i->parent is set for each new node, so check quota. */
- 		if (i->parent &&
- 		    domain_entry(conn) >= quota_nb_entry_per_domain) {
--			errno = ENOSPC;
--			return NULL;
-+			ret = ENOSPC;
-+			goto err;
- 		}
--		if (write_node(conn, i, false))
--			return NULL;
- 
--		/* Account for new node, set destructor for error case. */
--		if (i->parent) {
-+		ret = write_node(conn, i, false);
-+		if (ret)
-+			goto err;
-+
-+		/* Account for new node */
-+		if (i->parent)
- 			domain_entry_inc(conn, i);
--			talloc_set_destructor(i, destroy_node);
--		}
- 	}
- 
--	/* OK, now remove destructors so they stay around */
--	for (i = node; i->parent; i = i->parent)
--		talloc_set_destructor(i, NULL);
- 	return node;
-+
-+err:
-+	/*
-+	 * We failed to update TDB for some of the nodes. Undo any work that
-+	 * have already been done.
-+	 */
-+	for (j = node; j != i; j = j->parent)
-+		destroy_node(conn, j);
-+
-+	/* We don't need to keep the nodes around, so free them. */
-+	i = node;
-+	while (i) {
-+		j = i;
-+		i = i->parent;
-+		talloc_free(j);
-+	}
-+
-+	errno = ret;
-+
-+	return NULL;
- }
- 
- /* path, data... */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0084-tools-xenstore-Fail-a-transaction-if-it-is-not-possi.patch b/0084-tools-xenstore-Fail-a-transaction-if-it-is-not-possi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 05936ea..0000000
--- a/0084-tools-xenstore-Fail-a-transaction-if-it-is-not-possi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-From 579e7334b909c22efc65c5df22e8afe414882154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:06 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 084/126] tools/xenstore: Fail a transaction if it is not
- possible to create a node
-
-Commit f2bebf72c4d5 "xenstore: rework of transaction handling" moved
-out from copying the entire database everytime a new transaction is
-opened to track the list of nodes changed.
-
-The content of all the nodes accessed during a transaction will be
-temporarily stored in TDB using a different key.
-
-The function create_node() may write/update multiple nodes if the child
-doesn't exist. In case of a failure, the function will revert any
-changes (this include any update to TDB). Unfortunately, the function
-which reverts the changes (i.e. destroy_node()) will not use the correct
-key to delete any update or even request the transaction to fail.
-
-This means that if a client decide to go ahead with committing the
-transaction, orphan nodes will be created because they were not linked
-to an existing node (create_node() will write the nodes backwards).
-
-Once some nodes have been partially updated in a transaction, it is not
-easily possible to undo any changes. So rather than continuing and hit
-weird issue while committing, it is much saner to fail the transaction.
-
-This will have an impact on any client that decides to commit even if it
-can't write a node. Although, it is not clear why a normal client would
-want to do that...
-
-Lastly, update destroy_node() to use the correct key for deleting the
-node. Rather than recreating it (this will allocate memory and
-therefore fail), stash the key in the structure node.
-
-This is XSA-415 / CVE-2022-42310.
-
-Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 5d71766bd1a4a3a8b2fe952ca2be80e02fe48f34)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c        | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h        |  2 ++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c |  5 +++++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h |  3 +++
- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index a00c49e404a1..b28c2c66b53b 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -531,15 +531,17 @@ int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Write the node. If the node is written, caller can find the key used in
-+ * node->key. This can later be used if the change needs to be reverted.
-+ */
- static int write_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 		      bool no_quota_check)
- {
--	TDB_DATA key;
--
--	if (access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_WRITE, &key))
-+	if (access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_WRITE, &node->key))
- 		return errno;
- 
--	return write_node_raw(conn, &key, node, no_quota_check);
-+	return write_node_raw(conn, &node->key, node, no_quota_check);
- }
- 
- enum xs_perm_type perm_for_conn(struct connection *conn,
-@@ -1056,16 +1058,21 @@ nomem:
- 
- static int destroy_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- {
--	TDB_DATA key;
--
- 	if (streq(node->name, "/"))
- 		corrupt(NULL, "Destroying root node!");
- 
--	set_tdb_key(node->name, &key);
--	tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key);
-+	tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, node->key);
- 
- 	domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * It is not possible to easily revert the changes in a transaction.
-+	 * So if the failure happens in a transaction, mark it as fail to
-+	 * prevent any commit.
-+	 */
-+	if ( conn->transaction )
-+		fail_transaction(conn->transaction);
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 0c9a0961b57e..900336afa426 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ struct node_perms {
- 
- struct node {
- 	const char *name;
-+	/* Key used to update TDB */
-+	TDB_DATA key;
- 
- 	/* Parent (optional) */
- 	struct node *parent;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index cd07fb0f218b..faf6c930e42a 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -580,6 +580,11 @@ void transaction_entry_dec(struct transaction *trans, unsigned int domid)
- 	list_add_tail(&d->list, &trans->changed_domains);
- }
- 
-+void fail_transaction(struct transaction *trans)
-+{
-+	trans->fail = true;
-+}
-+
- void conn_delete_all_transactions(struct connection *conn)
- {
- 	struct transaction *trans;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-index 43a162bea3f3..14062730e3c9 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- int transaction_prepend(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
-                         TDB_DATA *key);
- 
-+/* Mark the transaction as failed. This will prevent it to be committed. */
-+void fail_transaction(struct transaction *trans);
-+
- void conn_delete_all_transactions(struct connection *conn);
- int check_transactions(struct hashtable *hash);
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0085-tools-xenstore-split-up-send_reply.patch b/0085-tools-xenstore-split-up-send_reply.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7420f93..0000000
--- a/0085-tools-xenstore-split-up-send_reply.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-From 0d8bea403d4d1763dddb0c1c81d30efebafb6962 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 085/126] tools/xenstore: split up send_reply()
-
-Today send_reply() is used for both, normal request replies and watch
-events.
-
-Split it up into send_reply() and send_event(). This will be used to
-add some event specific handling.
-
-add_event() can be merged into send_event(), removing the need for an
-intermediate memory allocation.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9bfde319dbac2a1321898d2f75a3f075c3eb7b32)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c  | 74 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h  |  1 +
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c | 39 +++--------------
- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index b28c2c66b53b..01d4a2e440ec 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -733,49 +733,32 @@ static void send_error(struct connection *conn, int error)
- void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 		const void *data, unsigned int len)
- {
--	struct buffered_data *bdata;
-+	struct buffered_data *bdata = conn->in;
-+
-+	assert(type != XS_WATCH_EVENT);
- 
- 	if ( len > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX ) {
- 		send_error(conn, E2BIG);
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
--	/* Replies reuse the request buffer, events need a new one. */
--	if (type != XS_WATCH_EVENT) {
--		bdata = conn->in;
--		/* Drop asynchronous responses, e.g. errors for watch events. */
--		if (!bdata)
--			return;
--		bdata->inhdr = true;
--		bdata->used = 0;
--		conn->in = NULL;
--	} else {
--		/* Message is a child of the connection for auto-cleanup. */
--		bdata = new_buffer(conn);
-+	if (!bdata)
-+		return;
-+	bdata->inhdr = true;
-+	bdata->used = 0;
- 
--		/*
--		 * Allocation failure here is unfortunate: we have no way to
--		 * tell anybody about it.
--		 */
--		if (!bdata)
--			return;
--	}
- 	if (len <= DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE)
- 		bdata->buffer = bdata->default_buffer;
--	else
-+	else {
- 		bdata->buffer = talloc_array(bdata, char, len);
--	if (!bdata->buffer) {
--		if (type == XS_WATCH_EVENT) {
--			/* Same as above: no way to tell someone. */
--			talloc_free(bdata);
-+		if (!bdata->buffer) {
-+			send_error(conn, ENOMEM);
- 			return;
- 		}
--		/* re-establish request buffer for sending ENOMEM. */
--		conn->in = bdata;
--		send_error(conn, ENOMEM);
--		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	conn->in = NULL;
-+
- 	/* Update relevant header fields and fill in the message body. */
- 	bdata->hdr.msg.type = type;
- 	bdata->hdr.msg.len = len;
-@@ -783,8 +766,39 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 
- 	/* Queue for later transmission. */
- 	list_add_tail(&bdata->list, &conn->out_list);
-+}
- 
--	return;
-+/*
-+ * Send a watch event.
-+ * As this is not directly related to the current command, errors can't be
-+ * reported.
-+ */
-+void send_event(struct connection *conn, const char *path, const char *token)
-+{
-+	struct buffered_data *bdata;
-+	unsigned int len;
-+
-+	len = strlen(path) + 1 + strlen(token) + 1;
-+	/* Don't try to send over-long events. */
-+	if (len > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX)
-+		return;
-+
-+	bdata = new_buffer(conn);
-+	if (!bdata)
-+		return;
-+
-+	bdata->buffer = talloc_array(bdata, char, len);
-+	if (!bdata->buffer) {
-+		talloc_free(bdata);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	strcpy(bdata->buffer, path);
-+	strcpy(bdata->buffer + strlen(path) + 1, token);
-+	bdata->hdr.msg.type = XS_WATCH_EVENT;
-+	bdata->hdr.msg.len = len;
-+
-+	/* Queue for later transmission. */
-+	list_add_tail(&bdata->list, &conn->out_list);
- }
- 
- /* Some routines (write, mkdir, etc) just need a non-error return */
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 900336afa426..38d97fa081a6 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ unsigned int get_string(const struct buffered_data *data, unsigned int offset);
- 
- void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 		const void *data, unsigned int len);
-+void send_event(struct connection *conn, const char *path, const char *token);
- 
- /* Some routines (write, mkdir, etc) just need a non-error return */
- void send_ack(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-index db89e0141fce..a116f967dc66 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-@@ -85,35 +85,6 @@ static const char *get_watch_path(const struct watch *watch, const char *name)
- 	return path;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * Send a watch event.
-- * Temporary memory allocations are done with ctx.
-- */
--static void add_event(struct connection *conn,
--		      const void *ctx,
--		      struct watch *watch,
--		      const char *name)
--{
--	/* Data to send (node\0token\0). */
--	unsigned int len;
--	char *data;
--
--	name = get_watch_path(watch, name);
--
--	len = strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(watch->token) + 1;
--	/* Don't try to send over-long events. */
--	if (len > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX)
--		return;
--
--	data = talloc_array(ctx, char, len);
--	if (!data)
--		return;
--	strcpy(data, name);
--	strcpy(data + strlen(name) + 1, watch->token);
--	send_reply(conn, XS_WATCH_EVENT, data, len);
--	talloc_free(data);
--}
--
- /*
-  * Check permissions of a specific watch to fire:
-  * Either the node itself or its parent have to be readable by the connection
-@@ -190,10 +161,14 @@ void fire_watches(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name,
- 		list_for_each_entry(watch, &i->watches, list) {
- 			if (exact) {
- 				if (streq(name, watch->node))
--					add_event(i, ctx, watch, name);
-+					send_event(i,
-+						   get_watch_path(watch, name),
-+						   watch->token);
- 			} else {
- 				if (is_child(name, watch->node))
--					add_event(i, ctx, watch, name);
-+					send_event(i,
-+						   get_watch_path(watch, name),
-+						   watch->token);
- 			}
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -292,7 +267,7 @@ int do_watch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	send_ack(conn, XS_WATCH);
- 
- 	/* We fire once up front: simplifies clients and restart. */
--	add_event(conn, in, watch, watch->node);
-+	send_event(conn, get_watch_path(watch, watch->node), watch->token);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0086-tools-xenstore-add-helpers-to-free-struct-buffered_d.patch b/0086-tools-xenstore-add-helpers-to-free-struct-buffered_d.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 46ae2d3..0000000
--- a/0086-tools-xenstore-add-helpers-to-free-struct-buffered_d.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-From b322923894ea23f397efc58a938cb9213d7dc617 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 086/126] tools/xenstore: add helpers to free struct
- buffered_data
-
-Add two helpers for freeing struct buffered_data: free_buffered_data()
-for freeing one instance and conn_free_buffered_data() for freeing all
-instances for a connection.
-
-This is avoiding duplicated code and will help later when more actions
-are needed when freeing a struct buffered_data.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit ead062a68a9c201a95488e84750a70a107f7b317)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c   | 26 +++++++++++++++++---------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h   |  2 ++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c |  7 +------
- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 01d4a2e440ec..6498bf603666 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -211,6 +211,21 @@ void reopen_log(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+static void free_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *out,
-+			       struct connection *conn)
-+{
-+	list_del(&out->list);
-+	talloc_free(out);
-+}
-+
-+void conn_free_buffered_data(struct connection *conn)
-+{
-+	struct buffered_data *out;
-+
-+	while ((out = list_top(&conn->out_list, struct buffered_data, list)))
-+		free_buffered_data(out, conn);
-+}
-+
- static bool write_messages(struct connection *conn)
- {
- 	int ret;
-@@ -254,8 +269,7 @@ static bool write_messages(struct connection *conn)
- 
- 	trace_io(conn, out, 1);
- 
--	list_del(&out->list);
--	talloc_free(out);
-+	free_buffered_data(out, conn);
- 
- 	return true;
- }
-@@ -1472,18 +1486,12 @@ static struct {
-  */
- static void ignore_connection(struct connection *conn)
- {
--	struct buffered_data *out, *tmp;
--
- 	trace("CONN %p ignored\n", conn);
- 
- 	conn->is_ignored = true;
- 	conn_delete_all_watches(conn);
- 	conn_delete_all_transactions(conn);
--
--	list_for_each_entry_safe(out, tmp, &conn->out_list, list) {
--		list_del(&out->list);
--		talloc_free(out);
--	}
-+	conn_free_buffered_data(conn);
- 
- 	talloc_free(conn->in);
- 	conn->in = NULL;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 38d97fa081a6..0ba5b783d4d1 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ int remember_string(struct hashtable *hash, const char *str);
- 
- void set_tdb_key(const char *name, TDB_DATA *key);
- 
-+void conn_free_buffered_data(struct connection *conn);
-+
- const char *dump_state_global(FILE *fp);
- const char *dump_state_buffered_data(FILE *fp, const struct connection *c,
- 				     const struct connection *conn,
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index 3d4d0649a243..72a5cd3b9aaf 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -417,15 +417,10 @@ static struct domain *find_domain_by_domid(unsigned int domid)
- static void domain_conn_reset(struct domain *domain)
- {
- 	struct connection *conn = domain->conn;
--	struct buffered_data *out;
- 
- 	conn_delete_all_watches(conn);
- 	conn_delete_all_transactions(conn);
--
--	while ((out = list_top(&conn->out_list, struct buffered_data, list))) {
--		list_del(&out->list);
--		talloc_free(out);
--	}
-+	conn_free_buffered_data(conn);
- 
- 	talloc_free(conn->in);
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0087-tools-xenstore-reduce-number-of-watch-events.patch b/0087-tools-xenstore-reduce-number-of-watch-events.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ab6cc92..0000000
--- a/0087-tools-xenstore-reduce-number-of-watch-events.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-From 8999db805e5ef55172a85d67695429edc3d78771 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 087/126] tools/xenstore: reduce number of watch events
-
-When removing a watched node outside of a transaction, two watch events
-are being produced instead of just a single one.
-
-When finalizing a transaction watch events can be generated for each
-node which is being modified, even if outside a transaction such
-modifications might not have resulted in a watch event.
-
-This happens e.g.:
-
-- for nodes which are only modified due to added/removed child entries
-- for nodes being removed or created implicitly (e.g. creation of a/b/c
-  is implicitly creating a/b, resulting in watch events for a, a/b and
-  a/b/c instead of a/b/c only)
-
-Avoid these additional watch events, in order to reduce the needed
-memory inside Xenstore for queueing them.
-
-This is being achieved by adding event flags to struct accessed_node
-specifying whether an event should be triggered, and whether it should
-be an exact match of the modified path. Both flags can be set from
-fire_watches() instead of implying them only.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 3a96013a3e17baa07410b1b9776225d1d9a74297)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c        | 19 ++++++------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h |  3 ++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c       |  7 +++--
- 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 6498bf603666..5157a7527f58 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ static void delete_child(struct connection *conn,
- }
- 
- static int delete_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
--		       struct node *parent, struct node *node)
-+		       struct node *parent, struct node *node, bool watch_exact)
- {
- 	char *name;
- 
-@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int delete_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 				       node->children);
- 		child = name ? read_node(conn, node, name) : NULL;
- 		if (child) {
--			if (delete_node(conn, ctx, node, child))
-+			if (delete_node(conn, ctx, node, child, true))
- 				return errno;
- 		} else {
- 			trace("delete_node: Error deleting child '%s/%s'!\n",
-@@ -1285,7 +1285,12 @@ static int delete_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 		talloc_free(name);
- 	}
- 
--	fire_watches(conn, ctx, node->name, node, true, NULL);
-+	/*
-+	 * Fire the watches now, when we can still see the node permissions.
-+	 * This fine as we are single threaded and the next possible read will
-+	 * be handled only after the node has been really removed.
-+	 */
-+	fire_watches(conn, ctx, node->name, node, watch_exact, NULL);
- 	delete_node_single(conn, node);
- 	delete_child(conn, parent, basename(node->name));
- 	talloc_free(node);
-@@ -1311,13 +1316,7 @@ static int _rm(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, struct node *node,
- 		return (errno == ENOMEM) ? ENOMEM : EINVAL;
- 	node->parent = parent;
- 
--	/*
--	 * Fire the watches now, when we can still see the node permissions.
--	 * This fine as we are single threaded and the next possible read will
--	 * be handled only after the node has been really removed.
--	 */
--	fire_watches(conn, ctx, name, node, false, NULL);
--	return delete_node(conn, ctx, parent, node);
-+	return delete_node(conn, ctx, parent, node, false);
- }
- 
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index faf6c930e42a..54432907fc76 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ struct accessed_node
- 
- 	/* Transaction node in data base? */
- 	bool ta_node;
-+
-+	/* Watch event flags. */
-+	bool fire_watch;
-+	bool watch_exact;
- };
- 
- struct changed_domain
-@@ -323,6 +327,29 @@ err:
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * A watch event should be fired for a node modified inside a transaction.
-+ * Set the corresponding information. A non-exact event is replacing an exact
-+ * one, but not the other way round.
-+ */
-+void queue_watches(struct connection *conn, const char *name, bool watch_exact)
-+{
-+	struct accessed_node *i;
-+
-+	i = find_accessed_node(conn->transaction, name);
-+	if (!i) {
-+		conn->transaction->fail = true;
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (!i->fire_watch) {
-+		i->fire_watch = true;
-+		i->watch_exact = watch_exact;
-+	} else if (!watch_exact) {
-+		i->watch_exact = false;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Finalize transaction:
-  * Walk through accessed nodes and check generation against global data.
-@@ -377,15 +404,15 @@ static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
- 				ret = tdb_store(tdb_ctx, key, data,
- 						TDB_REPLACE);
- 				talloc_free(data.dptr);
--				if (ret)
--					goto err;
--				fire_watches(conn, trans, i->node, NULL, false,
--					     i->perms.p ? &i->perms : NULL);
- 			} else {
--				fire_watches(conn, trans, i->node, NULL, false,
-+				ret = tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key);
-+			}
-+			if (ret)
-+				goto err;
-+			if (i->fire_watch) {
-+				fire_watches(conn, trans, i->node, NULL,
-+					     i->watch_exact,
- 					     i->perms.p ? &i->perms : NULL);
--				if (tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key))
--					goto err;
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-index 14062730e3c9..0093cac807e3 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ void transaction_entry_dec(struct transaction *trans, unsigned int domid);
- int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
-                 enum node_access_type type, TDB_DATA *key);
- 
-+/* Queue watches for a modified node. */
-+void queue_watches(struct connection *conn, const char *name, bool watch_exact);
-+
- /* Prepend the transaction to name if appropriate. */
- int transaction_prepend(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
-                         TDB_DATA *key);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-index a116f967dc66..bc6d833028a3 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
- #include "xenstore_lib.h"
- #include "utils.h"
- #include "xenstored_domain.h"
-+#include "xenstored_transaction.h"
- 
- extern int quota_nb_watch_per_domain;
- 
-@@ -143,9 +144,11 @@ void fire_watches(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name,
- 	struct connection *i;
- 	struct watch *watch;
- 
--	/* During transactions, don't fire watches. */
--	if (conn && conn->transaction)
-+	/* During transactions, don't fire watches, but queue them. */
-+	if (conn && conn->transaction) {
-+		queue_watches(conn, name, exact);
- 		return;
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Create an event for each watch. */
- 	list_for_each_entry(i, &connections, list) {
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0088-tools-xenstore-let-unread-watch-events-time-out.patch b/0088-tools-xenstore-let-unread-watch-events-time-out.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 03419c6..0000000
--- a/0088-tools-xenstore-let-unread-watch-events-time-out.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
-From 53a77b82717530d836300f1de0ad037de85477dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 088/126] tools/xenstore: let unread watch events time out
-
-A future modification will limit the number of outstanding requests
-for a domain, where "outstanding" means that the response of the
-request or any resulting watch event hasn't been consumed yet.
-
-In order to avoid a malicious guest being capable to block other guests
-by not reading watch events, add a timeout for watch events. In case a
-watch event hasn't been consumed after this timeout, it is being
-deleted. Set the default timeout to 20 seconds (a random value being
-not too high).
-
-In order to support to specify other timeout values in future, use a
-generic command line option for that purpose:
-
---timeout|-w watch-event=<seconds>
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42311.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 5285dcb1a5c01695c11e6397c95d906b5e765c98)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h |   6 ++
- 2 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 5157a7527f58..ee3396fefa94 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ int quota_max_transaction = 10;
- int quota_nb_perms_per_node = 5;
- int quota_max_path_len = XENSTORE_REL_PATH_MAX;
- 
-+unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec = 20000;
-+
- void trace(const char *fmt, ...)
- {
- 	va_list arglist;
-@@ -211,19 +213,92 @@ void reopen_log(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+static uint64_t get_now_msec(void)
-+{
-+	struct timespec now_ts;
-+
-+	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &now_ts))
-+		barf_perror("Could not find time (clock_gettime failed)");
-+
-+	return now_ts.tv_sec * 1000 + now_ts.tv_nsec / 1000000;
-+}
-+
- static void free_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *out,
- 			       struct connection *conn)
- {
-+	struct buffered_data *req;
-+
- 	list_del(&out->list);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Update conn->timeout_msec with the next found timeout value in the
-+	 * queued pending requests.
-+	 */
-+	if (out->timeout_msec) {
-+		conn->timeout_msec = 0;
-+		list_for_each_entry(req, &conn->out_list, list) {
-+			if (req->timeout_msec) {
-+				conn->timeout_msec = req->timeout_msec;
-+				break;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	talloc_free(out);
- }
- 
-+static void check_event_timeout(struct connection *conn, uint64_t msecs,
-+				int *ptimeout)
-+{
-+	uint64_t delta;
-+	struct buffered_data *out, *tmp;
-+
-+	if (!conn->timeout_msec)
-+		return;
-+
-+	delta = conn->timeout_msec - msecs;
-+	if (conn->timeout_msec <= msecs) {
-+		delta = 0;
-+		list_for_each_entry_safe(out, tmp, &conn->out_list, list) {
-+			/*
-+			 * Only look at buffers with timeout and no data
-+			 * already written to the ring.
-+			 */
-+			if (out->timeout_msec && out->inhdr && !out->used) {
-+				if (out->timeout_msec > msecs) {
-+					conn->timeout_msec = out->timeout_msec;
-+					delta = conn->timeout_msec - msecs;
-+					break;
-+				}
-+
-+				/*
-+				 * Free out without updating conn->timeout_msec,
-+				 * as the update is done in this loop already.
-+				 */
-+				out->timeout_msec = 0;
-+				trace("watch event path %s for domain %u timed out\n",
-+				      out->buffer, conn->id);
-+				free_buffered_data(out, conn);
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if (!delta) {
-+			conn->timeout_msec = 0;
-+			return;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (*ptimeout == -1 || *ptimeout > delta)
-+		*ptimeout = delta;
-+}
-+
- void conn_free_buffered_data(struct connection *conn)
- {
- 	struct buffered_data *out;
- 
- 	while ((out = list_top(&conn->out_list, struct buffered_data, list)))
- 		free_buffered_data(out, conn);
-+
-+	conn->timeout_msec = 0;
- }
- 
- static bool write_messages(struct connection *conn)
-@@ -382,6 +457,7 @@ static void initialize_fds(int *p_sock_pollfd_idx, int *ptimeout)
- {
- 	struct connection *conn;
- 	struct wrl_timestampt now;
-+	uint64_t msecs;
- 
- 	if (fds)
- 		memset(fds, 0, sizeof(struct pollfd) * current_array_size);
-@@ -402,10 +478,12 @@ static void initialize_fds(int *p_sock_pollfd_idx, int *ptimeout)
- 
- 	wrl_gettime_now(&now);
- 	wrl_log_periodic(now);
-+	msecs = get_now_msec();
- 
- 	list_for_each_entry(conn, &connections, list) {
- 		if (conn->domain) {
- 			wrl_check_timeout(conn->domain, now, ptimeout);
-+			check_event_timeout(conn, msecs, ptimeout);
- 			if (domain_can_read(conn) ||
- 			    (domain_can_write(conn) &&
- 			     !list_empty(&conn->out_list)))
-@@ -760,6 +838,7 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 		return;
- 	bdata->inhdr = true;
- 	bdata->used = 0;
-+	bdata->timeout_msec = 0;
- 
- 	if (len <= DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE)
- 		bdata->buffer = bdata->default_buffer;
-@@ -811,6 +890,12 @@ void send_event(struct connection *conn, const char *path, const char *token)
- 	bdata->hdr.msg.type = XS_WATCH_EVENT;
- 	bdata->hdr.msg.len = len;
- 
-+	if (timeout_watch_event_msec && domain_is_unprivileged(conn)) {
-+		bdata->timeout_msec = get_now_msec() + timeout_watch_event_msec;
-+		if (!conn->timeout_msec)
-+			conn->timeout_msec = bdata->timeout_msec;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Queue for later transmission. */
- 	list_add_tail(&bdata->list, &conn->out_list);
- }
-@@ -2099,6 +2184,9 @@ static void usage(void)
- "  -t, --transaction <nb>  limit the number of transaction allowed per domain,\n"
- "  -A, --perm-nb <nb>      limit the number of permissions per node,\n"
- "  -M, --path-max <chars>  limit the allowed Xenstore node path length,\n"
-+"  -w, --timeout <what>=<seconds>   set the timeout in seconds for <what>,\n"
-+"                          allowed timeout candidates are:\n"
-+"                          watch-event: time a watch-event is kept pending\n"
- "  -R, --no-recovery       to request that no recovery should be attempted when\n"
- "                          the store is corrupted (debug only),\n"
- "  -I, --internal-db       store database in memory, not on disk\n"
-@@ -2121,6 +2209,7 @@ static struct option options[] = {
- 	{ "transaction", 1, NULL, 't' },
- 	{ "perm-nb", 1, NULL, 'A' },
- 	{ "path-max", 1, NULL, 'M' },
-+	{ "timeout", 1, NULL, 'w' },
- 	{ "no-recovery", 0, NULL, 'R' },
- 	{ "internal-db", 0, NULL, 'I' },
- 	{ "verbose", 0, NULL, 'V' },
-@@ -2135,6 +2224,39 @@ int dom0_domid = 0;
- int dom0_event = 0;
- int priv_domid = 0;
- 
-+static int get_optval_int(const char *arg)
-+{
-+	char *end;
-+	long val;
-+
-+	val = strtol(arg, &end, 10);
-+	if (!*arg || *end || val < 0 || val > INT_MAX)
-+		barf("invalid parameter value \"%s\"\n", arg);
-+
-+	return val;
-+}
-+
-+static bool what_matches(const char *arg, const char *what)
-+{
-+	unsigned int what_len = strlen(what);
-+
-+	return !strncmp(arg, what, what_len) && arg[what_len] == '=';
-+}
-+
-+static void set_timeout(const char *arg)
-+{
-+	const char *eq = strchr(arg, '=');
-+	int val;
-+
-+	if (!eq)
-+		barf("quotas must be specified via <what>=<seconds>\n");
-+	val = get_optval_int(eq + 1);
-+	if (what_matches(arg, "watch-event"))
-+		timeout_watch_event_msec = val * 1000;
-+	else
-+		barf("unknown timeout \"%s\"\n", arg);
-+}
-+
- int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
- 	int opt;
-@@ -2149,7 +2271,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 	orig_argc = argc;
- 	orig_argv = argv;
- 
--	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HNPS:t:A:M:T:RVW:U", options,
-+	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HNPS:t:A:M:T:RVW:w:U", options,
- 				  NULL)) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case 'D':
-@@ -2198,6 +2320,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 			quota_max_path_len = min(XENSTORE_REL_PATH_MAX,
- 						 quota_max_path_len);
- 			break;
-+		case 'w':
-+			set_timeout(optarg);
-+			break;
- 		case 'e':
- 			dom0_event = strtol(optarg, NULL, 10);
- 			break;
-@@ -2642,6 +2767,12 @@ static void add_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *bdata,
- 		barf("error restoring buffered data");
- 
- 	memcpy(bdata->buffer, data, len);
-+	if (bdata->hdr.msg.type == XS_WATCH_EVENT && timeout_watch_event_msec &&
-+	    domain_is_unprivileged(conn)) {
-+		bdata->timeout_msec = get_now_msec() + timeout_watch_event_msec;
-+		if (!conn->timeout_msec)
-+			conn->timeout_msec = bdata->timeout_msec;
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Queue for later transmission. */
- 	list_add_tail(&bdata->list, &conn->out_list);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 0ba5b783d4d1..2db577928fc6 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
- #include <dirent.h>
- #include <stdbool.h>
- #include <stdint.h>
-+#include <time.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- 
- #include "xenstore_lib.h"
-@@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ struct buffered_data
- 		char raw[sizeof(struct xsd_sockmsg)];
- 	} hdr;
- 
-+	uint64_t timeout_msec;
-+
- 	/* The actual data. */
- 	char *buffer;
- 	char default_buffer[DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE];
-@@ -110,6 +113,7 @@ struct connection
- 
- 	/* Buffered output data */
- 	struct list_head out_list;
-+	uint64_t timeout_msec;
- 
- 	/* Transaction context for current request (NULL if none). */
- 	struct transaction *transaction;
-@@ -237,6 +241,8 @@ extern int dom0_event;
- extern int priv_domid;
- extern int quota_nb_entry_per_domain;
- 
-+extern unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec;
-+
- /* Map the kernel's xenstore page. */
- void *xenbus_map(void);
- void unmap_xenbus(void *interface);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0089-tools-xenstore-limit-outstanding-requests.patch b/0089-tools-xenstore-limit-outstanding-requests.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e110b0..0000000
--- a/0089-tools-xenstore-limit-outstanding-requests.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,453 +0,0 @@
-From 56300e8e1781cee1b6a514e5f2bea234a7885d55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:08 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 089/126] tools/xenstore: limit outstanding requests
-
-Add another quota for limiting the number of outstanding requests of a
-guest. As the way to specify quotas on the command line is becoming
-rather nasty, switch to a new scheme using [--quota|-Q] <what>=<val>
-allowing to add more quotas in future easily.
-
-Set the default value to 20 (basically a random value not seeming to
-be too high or too low).
-
-A request is said to be outstanding if any message generated by this
-request (the direct response plus potential watch events) is not yet
-completely stored into a ring buffer. The initial watch event sent as
-a result of registering a watch is an exception.
-
-Note that across a live update the relation to buffered watch events
-for other domains is lost.
-
-Use talloc_zero() for allocating the domain structure in order to have
-all per-domain quota zeroed initially.
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42312.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 36de433a273f55d614c83b89c9a8972287a1e475)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c   | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h   | 20 ++++++-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c | 38 ++++++++++---
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h |  3 ++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c  | 15 ++++--
- 5 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index ee3396fefa94..d871f217af9c 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ int quota_max_entry_size = 2048; /* 2K */
- int quota_max_transaction = 10;
- int quota_nb_perms_per_node = 5;
- int quota_max_path_len = XENSTORE_REL_PATH_MAX;
-+int quota_req_outstanding = 20;
- 
- unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec = 20000;
- 
-@@ -223,12 +224,24 @@ static uint64_t get_now_msec(void)
- 	return now_ts.tv_sec * 1000 + now_ts.tv_nsec / 1000000;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Remove a struct buffered_data from the list of outgoing data.
-+ * A struct buffered_data related to a request having caused watch events to be
-+ * sent is kept until all those events have been written out.
-+ * Each watch event is referencing the related request via pend.req, while the
-+ * number of watch events caused by a request is kept in pend.ref.event_cnt
-+ * (those two cases are mutually exclusive, so the two fields can share memory
-+ * via a union).
-+ * The struct buffered_data is freed only if no related watch event is
-+ * referencing it. The related return data can be freed right away.
-+ */
- static void free_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *out,
- 			       struct connection *conn)
- {
- 	struct buffered_data *req;
- 
- 	list_del(&out->list);
-+	out->on_out_list = false;
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Update conn->timeout_msec with the next found timeout value in the
-@@ -244,6 +257,30 @@ static void free_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *out,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	if (out->hdr.msg.type == XS_WATCH_EVENT) {
-+		req = out->pend.req;
-+		if (req) {
-+			req->pend.ref.event_cnt--;
-+			if (!req->pend.ref.event_cnt && !req->on_out_list) {
-+				if (req->on_ref_list) {
-+					domain_outstanding_domid_dec(
-+						req->pend.ref.domid);
-+					list_del(&req->list);
-+				}
-+				talloc_free(req);
-+			}
-+		}
-+	} else if (out->pend.ref.event_cnt) {
-+		/* Hang out off from conn. */
-+		talloc_steal(NULL, out);
-+		if (out->buffer != out->default_buffer)
-+			talloc_free(out->buffer);
-+		list_add(&out->list, &conn->ref_list);
-+		out->on_ref_list = true;
-+		return;
-+	} else
-+		domain_outstanding_dec(conn);
-+
- 	talloc_free(out);
- }
- 
-@@ -399,6 +436,7 @@ int delay_request(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in,
- static int destroy_conn(void *_conn)
- {
- 	struct connection *conn = _conn;
-+	struct buffered_data *req;
- 
- 	/* Flush outgoing if possible, but don't block. */
- 	if (!conn->domain) {
-@@ -412,6 +450,11 @@ static int destroy_conn(void *_conn)
- 				break;
- 		close(conn->fd);
- 	}
-+
-+	conn_free_buffered_data(conn);
-+	list_for_each_entry(req, &conn->ref_list, list)
-+		req->on_ref_list = false;
-+
-         if (conn->target)
-                 talloc_unlink(conn, conn->target);
- 	list_del(&conn->list);
-@@ -859,6 +902,8 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 
- 	/* Queue for later transmission. */
- 	list_add_tail(&bdata->list, &conn->out_list);
-+	bdata->on_out_list = true;
-+	domain_outstanding_inc(conn);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -866,7 +911,8 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
-  * As this is not directly related to the current command, errors can't be
-  * reported.
-  */
--void send_event(struct connection *conn, const char *path, const char *token)
-+void send_event(struct buffered_data *req, struct connection *conn,
-+		const char *path, const char *token)
- {
- 	struct buffered_data *bdata;
- 	unsigned int len;
-@@ -896,8 +942,13 @@ void send_event(struct connection *conn, const char *path, const char *token)
- 			conn->timeout_msec = bdata->timeout_msec;
- 	}
- 
-+	bdata->pend.req = req;
-+	if (req)
-+		req->pend.ref.event_cnt++;
-+
- 	/* Queue for later transmission. */
- 	list_add_tail(&bdata->list, &conn->out_list);
-+	bdata->on_out_list = true;
- }
- 
- /* Some routines (write, mkdir, etc) just need a non-error return */
-@@ -1658,6 +1709,7 @@ static void handle_input(struct connection *conn)
- 			return;
- 	}
- 	in = conn->in;
-+	in->pend.ref.domid = conn->id;
- 
- 	/* Not finished header yet? */
- 	if (in->inhdr) {
-@@ -1727,6 +1779,7 @@ struct connection *new_connection(connwritefn_t *write, connreadfn_t *read)
- 	new->is_ignored = false;
- 	new->transaction_started = 0;
- 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->out_list);
-+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->ref_list);
- 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->watches);
- 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->transaction_list);
- 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->delayed);
-@@ -2184,6 +2237,9 @@ static void usage(void)
- "  -t, --transaction <nb>  limit the number of transaction allowed per domain,\n"
- "  -A, --perm-nb <nb>      limit the number of permissions per node,\n"
- "  -M, --path-max <chars>  limit the allowed Xenstore node path length,\n"
-+"  -Q, --quota <what>=<nb> set the quota <what> to the value <nb>, allowed\n"
-+"                          quotas are:\n"
-+"                          outstanding: number of outstanding requests\n"
- "  -w, --timeout <what>=<seconds>   set the timeout in seconds for <what>,\n"
- "                          allowed timeout candidates are:\n"
- "                          watch-event: time a watch-event is kept pending\n"
-@@ -2209,6 +2265,7 @@ static struct option options[] = {
- 	{ "transaction", 1, NULL, 't' },
- 	{ "perm-nb", 1, NULL, 'A' },
- 	{ "path-max", 1, NULL, 'M' },
-+	{ "quota", 1, NULL, 'Q' },
- 	{ "timeout", 1, NULL, 'w' },
- 	{ "no-recovery", 0, NULL, 'R' },
- 	{ "internal-db", 0, NULL, 'I' },
-@@ -2257,6 +2314,20 @@ static void set_timeout(const char *arg)
- 		barf("unknown timeout \"%s\"\n", arg);
- }
- 
-+static void set_quota(const char *arg)
-+{
-+	const char *eq = strchr(arg, '=');
-+	int val;
-+
-+	if (!eq)
-+		barf("quotas must be specified via <what>=<nb>\n");
-+	val = get_optval_int(eq + 1);
-+	if (what_matches(arg, "outstanding"))
-+		quota_req_outstanding = val;
-+	else
-+		barf("unknown quota \"%s\"\n", arg);
-+}
-+
- int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
- 	int opt;
-@@ -2271,8 +2342,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 	orig_argc = argc;
- 	orig_argv = argv;
- 
--	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HNPS:t:A:M:T:RVW:w:U", options,
--				  NULL)) != -1) {
-+	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HNPS:t:A:M:Q:T:RVW:w:U",
-+				  options, NULL)) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case 'D':
- 			no_domain_init = true;
-@@ -2320,6 +2391,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 			quota_max_path_len = min(XENSTORE_REL_PATH_MAX,
- 						 quota_max_path_len);
- 			break;
-+		case 'Q':
-+			set_quota(optarg);
-+			break;
- 		case 'w':
- 			set_timeout(optarg);
- 			break;
-@@ -2776,6 +2850,14 @@ static void add_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *bdata,
- 
- 	/* Queue for later transmission. */
- 	list_add_tail(&bdata->list, &conn->out_list);
-+	bdata->on_out_list = true;
-+	/*
-+	 * Watch events are never "outstanding", but the request causing them
-+	 * are instead kept "outstanding" until all watch events caused by that
-+	 * request have been delivered.
-+	 */
-+	if (bdata->hdr.msg.type != XS_WATCH_EVENT)
-+		domain_outstanding_inc(conn);
- }
- 
- void read_state_buffered_data(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 2db577928fc6..fcb27399f116 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ struct xs_state_connection;
- struct buffered_data
- {
- 	struct list_head list;
-+	bool on_out_list;
-+	bool on_ref_list;
- 
- 	/* Are we still doing the header? */
- 	bool inhdr;
-@@ -63,6 +65,17 @@ struct buffered_data
- 	/* How far are we? */
- 	unsigned int used;
- 
-+	/* Outstanding request accounting. */
-+	union {
-+		/* ref is being used for requests. */
-+		struct {
-+			unsigned int event_cnt; /* # of outstanding events. */
-+			unsigned int domid;     /* domid of request. */
-+		} ref;
-+		/* req is being used for watch events. */
-+		struct buffered_data *req;      /* request causing event. */
-+	} pend;
-+
- 	union {
- 		struct xsd_sockmsg msg;
- 		char raw[sizeof(struct xsd_sockmsg)];
-@@ -115,6 +128,9 @@ struct connection
- 	struct list_head out_list;
- 	uint64_t timeout_msec;
- 
-+	/* Referenced requests no longer pending. */
-+	struct list_head ref_list;
-+
- 	/* Transaction context for current request (NULL if none). */
- 	struct transaction *transaction;
- 
-@@ -184,7 +200,8 @@ unsigned int get_string(const struct buffered_data *data, unsigned int offset);
- 
- void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 		const void *data, unsigned int len);
--void send_event(struct connection *conn, const char *path, const char *token);
-+void send_event(struct buffered_data *req, struct connection *conn,
-+		const char *path, const char *token);
- 
- /* Some routines (write, mkdir, etc) just need a non-error return */
- void send_ack(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type);
-@@ -240,6 +257,7 @@ extern int dom0_domid;
- extern int dom0_event;
- extern int priv_domid;
- extern int quota_nb_entry_per_domain;
-+extern int quota_req_outstanding;
- 
- extern unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec;
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index 72a5cd3b9aaf..979f8c629835 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ struct domain
- 	/* number of watch for this domain */
- 	int nbwatch;
- 
-+	/* Number of outstanding requests. */
-+	int nboutstanding;
-+
- 	/* write rate limit */
- 	wrl_creditt wrl_credit; /* [ -wrl_config_writecost, +_dburst ] */
- 	struct wrl_timestampt wrl_timestamp;
-@@ -287,8 +290,12 @@ bool domain_can_read(struct connection *conn)
- {
- 	struct xenstore_domain_interface *intf = conn->domain->interface;
- 
--	if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn) && conn->domain->wrl_credit < 0)
--		return false;
-+	if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn)) {
-+		if (conn->domain->wrl_credit < 0)
-+			return false;
-+		if (conn->domain->nboutstanding >= quota_req_outstanding)
-+			return false;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (conn->is_ignored)
- 		return false;
-@@ -337,7 +344,7 @@ static struct domain *alloc_domain(const void *context, unsigned int domid)
- {
- 	struct domain *domain;
- 
--	domain = talloc(context, struct domain);
-+	domain = talloc_zero(context, struct domain);
- 	if (!domain) {
- 		errno = ENOMEM;
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -398,9 +405,6 @@ static int new_domain(struct domain *domain, int port, bool restore)
- 	domain->conn->domain = domain;
- 	domain->conn->id = domain->domid;
- 
--	domain->nbentry = 0;
--	domain->nbwatch = 0;
--
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -944,6 +948,28 @@ int domain_watch(struct connection *conn)
- 		: 0;
- }
- 
-+void domain_outstanding_inc(struct connection *conn)
-+{
-+	if (!conn || !conn->domain)
-+		return;
-+	conn->domain->nboutstanding++;
-+}
-+
-+void domain_outstanding_dec(struct connection *conn)
-+{
-+	if (!conn || !conn->domain)
-+		return;
-+	conn->domain->nboutstanding--;
-+}
-+
-+void domain_outstanding_domid_dec(unsigned int domid)
-+{
-+	struct domain *d = find_domain_by_domid(domid);
-+
-+	if (d)
-+		d->nboutstanding--;
-+}
-+
- static wrl_creditt wrl_config_writecost      = WRL_FACTOR;
- static wrl_creditt wrl_config_rate           = WRL_RATE   * WRL_FACTOR;
- static wrl_creditt wrl_config_dburst         = WRL_DBURST * WRL_FACTOR;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-index dc9759171317..5757a6557146 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ int domain_entry(struct connection *conn);
- void domain_watch_inc(struct connection *conn);
- void domain_watch_dec(struct connection *conn);
- int domain_watch(struct connection *conn);
-+void domain_outstanding_inc(struct connection *conn);
-+void domain_outstanding_dec(struct connection *conn);
-+void domain_outstanding_domid_dec(unsigned int domid);
- 
- /* Special node permission handling. */
- int set_perms_special(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-index bc6d833028a3..1d664e3d6b72 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ void fire_watches(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name,
- 		  struct node *node, bool exact, struct node_perms *perms)
- {
- 	struct connection *i;
-+	struct buffered_data *req;
- 	struct watch *watch;
- 
- 	/* During transactions, don't fire watches, but queue them. */
-@@ -150,6 +151,8 @@ void fire_watches(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name,
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	req = domain_is_unprivileged(conn) ? conn->in : NULL;
-+
- 	/* Create an event for each watch. */
- 	list_for_each_entry(i, &connections, list) {
- 		/* introduce/release domain watches */
-@@ -164,12 +167,12 @@ void fire_watches(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name,
- 		list_for_each_entry(watch, &i->watches, list) {
- 			if (exact) {
- 				if (streq(name, watch->node))
--					send_event(i,
-+					send_event(req, i,
- 						   get_watch_path(watch, name),
- 						   watch->token);
- 			} else {
- 				if (is_child(name, watch->node))
--					send_event(i,
-+					send_event(req, i,
- 						   get_watch_path(watch, name),
- 						   watch->token);
- 			}
-@@ -269,8 +272,12 @@ int do_watch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	trace_create(watch, "watch");
- 	send_ack(conn, XS_WATCH);
- 
--	/* We fire once up front: simplifies clients and restart. */
--	send_event(conn, get_watch_path(watch, watch->node), watch->token);
-+	/*
-+	 * We fire once up front: simplifies clients and restart.
-+	 * This event will not be linked to the XS_WATCH request.
-+	 */
-+	send_event(NULL, conn, get_watch_path(watch, watch->node),
-+		   watch->token);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0090-tools-xenstore-don-t-buffer-multiple-identical-watch.patch b/0090-tools-xenstore-don-t-buffer-multiple-identical-watch.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 305d8ac..0000000
--- a/0090-tools-xenstore-don-t-buffer-multiple-identical-watch.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From 97c251f953c58aec7620499ac12924054b7cd758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:08 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 090/126] tools/xenstore: don't buffer multiple identical watch
- events
-
-A guest not reading its Xenstore response buffer fast enough might
-pile up lots of Xenstore watch events buffered. Reduce the generated
-load by dropping new events which already have an identical copy
-pending.
-
-The special events "@..." are excluded from that handling as there are
-known use cases where the handler is relying on each event to be sent
-individually.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit b5c0bdb96d33e18c324c13d8e33c08732d77eaa2)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h |  3 +++
- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index d871f217af9c..6ea06e20df91 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -882,6 +882,7 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 	bdata->inhdr = true;
- 	bdata->used = 0;
- 	bdata->timeout_msec = 0;
-+	bdata->watch_event = false;
- 
- 	if (len <= DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE)
- 		bdata->buffer = bdata->default_buffer;
-@@ -914,7 +915,7 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- void send_event(struct buffered_data *req, struct connection *conn,
- 		const char *path, const char *token)
- {
--	struct buffered_data *bdata;
-+	struct buffered_data *bdata, *bd;
- 	unsigned int len;
- 
- 	len = strlen(path) + 1 + strlen(token) + 1;
-@@ -936,12 +937,29 @@ void send_event(struct buffered_data *req, struct connection *conn,
- 	bdata->hdr.msg.type = XS_WATCH_EVENT;
- 	bdata->hdr.msg.len = len;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Check whether an identical event is pending already.
-+	 * Special events are excluded from that check.
-+	 */
-+	if (path[0] != '@') {
-+		list_for_each_entry(bd, &conn->out_list, list) {
-+			if (bd->watch_event && bd->hdr.msg.len == len &&
-+			    !memcmp(bdata->buffer, bd->buffer, len)) {
-+				trace("dropping duplicate watch %s %s for domain %u\n",
-+				      path, token, conn->id);
-+				talloc_free(bdata);
-+				return;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	if (timeout_watch_event_msec && domain_is_unprivileged(conn)) {
- 		bdata->timeout_msec = get_now_msec() + timeout_watch_event_msec;
- 		if (!conn->timeout_msec)
- 			conn->timeout_msec = bdata->timeout_msec;
- 	}
- 
-+	bdata->watch_event = true;
- 	bdata->pend.req = req;
- 	if (req)
- 		req->pend.ref.event_cnt++;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index fcb27399f116..afbd982c2654 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ struct buffered_data
- 	/* Are we still doing the header? */
- 	bool inhdr;
- 
-+	/* Is this a watch event? */
-+	bool watch_event;
-+
- 	/* How far are we? */
- 	unsigned int used;
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0091-tools-xenstore-fix-connection-id-usage.patch b/0091-tools-xenstore-fix-connection-id-usage.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dd7f382..0000000
--- a/0091-tools-xenstore-fix-connection-id-usage.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 3e51699fcc578c7c005fd4add70cf7c8117d0af9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:08 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 091/126] tools/xenstore: fix connection->id usage
-
-Don't use conn->id for privilege checks, but domain_is_unprivileged().
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 3047df38e1991510bc295e3e1bb6b6b6c4a97831)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c     | 2 +-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h        | 2 +-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c | 3 ++-
- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-index 8e470f2b2056..211fe1fd9b37 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ int do_control(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	unsigned int cmd, num, off;
- 	char **vec = NULL;
- 
--	if (conn->id != 0)
-+	if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn))
- 		return EACCES;
- 
- 	off = get_string(in, 0);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index afbd982c2654..c0a056ce13fe 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ struct connection
- 	/* The index of pollfd in global pollfd array */
- 	int pollfd_idx;
- 
--	/* Who am I? 0 for socket connections. */
-+	/* Who am I? Domid of connection. */
- 	unsigned int id;
- 
- 	/* Is this connection ignored? */
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index 54432907fc76..ee1b09031a3b 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -477,7 +477,8 @@ int do_transaction_start(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (conn->transaction)
- 		return EBUSY;
- 
--	if (conn->id && conn->transaction_started > quota_max_transaction)
-+	if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn) &&
-+	    conn->transaction_started > quota_max_transaction)
- 		return ENOSPC;
- 
- 	/* Attach transaction to input for autofree until it's complete */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0092-tools-xenstore-simplify-and-fix-per-domain-node-acco.patch b/0092-tools-xenstore-simplify-and-fix-per-domain-node-acco.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 01f29b1..0000000
--- a/0092-tools-xenstore-simplify-and-fix-per-domain-node-acco.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
-From 8ee7ed7c1ef435f43edc08be07c036d81642d8e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:08 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 092/126] tools/xenstore: simplify and fix per domain node
- accounting
-
-The accounting of nodes can be simplified now that each connection
-holds the associated domid.
-
-Fix the node accounting to cover nodes created for a domain before it
-has been introduced. This requires to react properly to an allocation
-failure inside domain_entry_inc() by returning an error code.
-
-Especially in error paths the node accounting has to be fixed in some
-cases.
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42313.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit dbef1f7482894c572d90cd73d99ed689c891e863)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c        |  43 ++++++++--
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c      | 105 ++++++++++++++++---------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h      |   4 +-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c |   8 +-
- 4 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 6ea06e20df91..85c0d2f38fac 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 
- 	/* Permissions are struct xs_permissions. */
- 	node->perms.p = hdr->perms;
--	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(node)) {
-+	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(conn, node)) {
- 		talloc_free(node);
- 		return NULL;
- 	}
-@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
- 	void *p;
- 	struct xs_tdb_record_hdr *hdr;
- 
--	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(node))
-+	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(conn, node))
- 		return errno;
- 
- 	data.dsize = sizeof(*hdr)
-@@ -1238,13 +1238,17 @@ nomem:
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--static int destroy_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
-+static void destroy_node_rm(struct node *node)
- {
- 	if (streq(node->name, "/"))
- 		corrupt(NULL, "Destroying root node!");
- 
- 	tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, node->key);
-+}
- 
-+static int destroy_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
-+{
-+	destroy_node_rm(node);
- 	domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -1294,8 +1298,12 @@ static struct node *create_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 			goto err;
- 
- 		/* Account for new node */
--		if (i->parent)
--			domain_entry_inc(conn, i);
-+		if (i->parent) {
-+			if (domain_entry_inc(conn, i)) {
-+				destroy_node_rm(i);
-+				return NULL;
-+			}
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	return node;
-@@ -1580,10 +1588,27 @@ static int do_set_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	old_perms = node->perms;
- 	domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
- 	node->perms = perms;
--	domain_entry_inc(conn, node);
-+	if (domain_entry_inc(conn, node)) {
-+		node->perms = old_perms;
-+		/*
-+		 * This should never fail because we had a reference on the
-+		 * domain before and Xenstored is single-threaded.
-+		 */
-+		domain_entry_inc(conn, node);
-+		return ENOMEM;
-+	}
- 
--	if (write_node(conn, node, false))
-+	if (write_node(conn, node, false)) {
-+		int saved_errno = errno;
-+
-+		domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
-+		node->perms = old_perms;
-+		/* No failure possible as above. */
-+		domain_entry_inc(conn, node);
-+
-+		errno = saved_errno;
- 		return errno;
-+	}
- 
- 	fire_watches(conn, in, name, node, false, &old_perms);
- 	send_ack(conn, XS_SET_PERMS);
-@@ -3003,7 +3028,9 @@ void read_state_node(const void *ctx, const void *state)
- 	set_tdb_key(name, &key);
- 	if (write_node_raw(NULL, &key, node, true))
- 		barf("write node error restoring node");
--	domain_entry_inc(&conn, node);
-+
-+	if (domain_entry_inc(&conn, node))
-+		barf("node accounting error restoring node");
- 
- 	talloc_free(node);
- }
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index 979f8c629835..3c27973fb836 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
-     along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
- */
- 
-+#include <assert.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <sys/mman.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-@@ -369,6 +370,18 @@ static struct domain *find_or_alloc_domain(const void *ctx, unsigned int domid)
- 	return domain ? : alloc_domain(ctx, domid);
- }
- 
-+static struct domain *find_or_alloc_existing_domain(unsigned int domid)
-+{
-+	struct domain *domain;
-+	xc_dominfo_t dominfo;
-+
-+	domain = find_domain_struct(domid);
-+	if (!domain && get_domain_info(domid, &dominfo))
-+		domain = alloc_domain(NULL, domid);
-+
-+	return domain;
-+}
-+
- static int new_domain(struct domain *domain, int port, bool restore)
- {
- 	int rc;
-@@ -788,30 +801,28 @@ void domain_deinit(void)
- 		xenevtchn_unbind(xce_handle, virq_port);
- }
- 
--void domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
-+int domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- {
- 	struct domain *d;
-+	unsigned int domid;
- 
- 	if (!conn)
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 
--	if (node->perms.p && node->perms.p[0].id != conn->id) {
--		if (conn->transaction) {
--			transaction_entry_inc(conn->transaction,
--				node->perms.p[0].id);
--		} else {
--			d = find_domain_by_domid(node->perms.p[0].id);
--			if (d)
--				d->nbentry++;
--		}
--	} else if (conn->domain) {
--		if (conn->transaction) {
--			transaction_entry_inc(conn->transaction,
--				conn->domain->domid);
-- 		} else {
-- 			conn->domain->nbentry++;
--		}
-+	domid = node->perms.p ? node->perms.p[0].id : conn->id;
-+
-+	if (conn->transaction) {
-+		transaction_entry_inc(conn->transaction, domid);
-+	} else {
-+		d = (domid == conn->id && conn->domain) ? conn->domain
-+		    : find_or_alloc_existing_domain(domid);
-+		if (d)
-+			d->nbentry++;
-+		else
-+			return ENOMEM;
- 	}
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -847,7 +858,7 @@ static int chk_domain_generation(unsigned int domid, uint64_t gen)
-  * Remove permissions for no longer existing domains in order to avoid a new
-  * domain with the same domid inheriting the permissions.
-  */
--int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct node *node)
-+int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- {
- 	unsigned int i;
- 	int ret;
-@@ -857,8 +868,14 @@ int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct node *node)
- 		return errno;
- 
- 	/* If the owner doesn't exist any longer give it to priv domain. */
--	if (!ret)
-+	if (!ret) {
-+		/*
-+		 * In theory we'd need to update the number of dom0 nodes here,
-+		 * but we could be called for a read of the node. So better
-+		 * avoid the risk to overflow the node count of dom0.
-+		 */
- 		node->perms.p[0].id = priv_domid;
-+	}
- 
- 	for (i = 1; i < node->perms.num; i++) {
- 		if (node->perms.p[i].perms & XS_PERM_IGNORE)
-@@ -877,25 +894,25 @@ int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct node *node)
- void domain_entry_dec(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- {
- 	struct domain *d;
-+	unsigned int domid;
- 
- 	if (!conn)
- 		return;
- 
--	if (node->perms.p && node->perms.p[0].id != conn->id) {
--		if (conn->transaction) {
--			transaction_entry_dec(conn->transaction,
--				node->perms.p[0].id);
-+	domid = node->perms.p ? node->perms.p[0].id : conn->id;
-+
-+	if (conn->transaction) {
-+		transaction_entry_dec(conn->transaction, domid);
-+	} else {
-+		d = (domid == conn->id && conn->domain) ? conn->domain
-+		    : find_domain_struct(domid);
-+		if (d) {
-+			d->nbentry--;
- 		} else {
--			d = find_domain_by_domid(node->perms.p[0].id);
--			if (d && d->nbentry)
--				d->nbentry--;
--		}
--	} else if (conn->domain && conn->domain->nbentry) {
--		if (conn->transaction) {
--			transaction_entry_dec(conn->transaction,
--				conn->domain->domid);
--		} else {
--			conn->domain->nbentry--;
-+			errno = ENOENT;
-+			corrupt(conn,
-+				"Node \"%s\" owned by non-existing domain %u\n",
-+				node->name, domid);
- 		}
- 	}
- }
-@@ -905,13 +922,23 @@ int domain_entry_fix(unsigned int domid, int num, bool update)
- 	struct domain *d;
- 	int cnt;
- 
--	d = find_domain_by_domid(domid);
--	if (!d)
--		return 0;
-+	if (update) {
-+		d = find_domain_struct(domid);
-+		assert(d);
-+	} else {
-+		/*
-+		 * We are called first with update == false in order to catch
-+		 * any error. So do a possible allocation and check for error
-+		 * only in this case, as in the case of update == true nothing
-+		 * can go wrong anymore as the allocation already happened.
-+		 */
-+		d = find_or_alloc_existing_domain(domid);
-+		if (!d)
-+			return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	cnt = d->nbentry + num;
--	if (cnt < 0)
--		cnt = 0;
-+	assert(cnt >= 0);
- 
- 	if (update)
- 		d->nbentry = cnt;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-index 5757a6557146..cce13d14f016 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-@@ -58,10 +58,10 @@ bool domain_can_write(struct connection *conn);
- bool domain_is_unprivileged(struct connection *conn);
- 
- /* Remove node permissions for no longer existing domains. */
--int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct node *node);
-+int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct connection *conn, struct node *node);
- 
- /* Quota manipulation */
--void domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *);
-+int domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *);
- void domain_entry_dec(struct connection *conn, struct node *);
- int domain_entry_fix(unsigned int domid, int num, bool update);
- int domain_entry(struct connection *conn);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index ee1b09031a3b..86caf6c398be 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -519,8 +519,12 @@ static int transaction_fix_domains(struct transaction *trans, bool update)
- 
- 	list_for_each_entry(d, &trans->changed_domains, list) {
- 		cnt = domain_entry_fix(d->domid, d->nbentry, update);
--		if (!update && cnt >= quota_nb_entry_per_domain)
--			return ENOSPC;
-+		if (!update) {
-+			if (cnt >= quota_nb_entry_per_domain)
-+				return ENOSPC;
-+			if (cnt < 0)
-+				return ENOMEM;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	return 0;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0093-tools-xenstore-limit-max-number-of-nodes-accessed-in.patch b/0093-tools-xenstore-limit-max-number-of-nodes-accessed-in.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f064355..0000000
--- a/0093-tools-xenstore-limit-max-number-of-nodes-accessed-in.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-From 1035371fee5552b8cfe9819c4058a4c9e695ba5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 093/126] tools/xenstore: limit max number of nodes accessed in
- a transaction
-
-Today a guest is free to access as many nodes in a single transaction
-as it wants. This can lead to unbounded memory consumption in Xenstore
-as there is the need to keep track of all nodes having been accessed
-during a transaction.
-
-In oxenstored the number of requests in a transaction is being limited
-via a quota maxrequests (default is 1024). As multiple accesses of a
-node are not problematic in C Xenstore, limit the number of accessed
-nodes.
-
-In order to let read_node() detect a quota error in case too many nodes
-are being accessed, check the return value of access_node() and return
-NULL in case an error has been seen. Introduce __must_check and add it
-to the access_node() prototype.
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42314.
-
-Suggested-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 268369d8e322d227a74a899009c5748d7b0ea142)
----
- tools/include/xen-tools/libs.h         |  4 +++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c        | 50 ++++++++++++++++++--------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h        |  1 +
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c |  9 +++++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h |  4 +--
- 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/include/xen-tools/libs.h b/tools/include/xen-tools/libs.h
-index a16e0c380709..bafc90e2f603 100644
---- a/tools/include/xen-tools/libs.h
-+++ b/tools/include/xen-tools/libs.h
-@@ -63,4 +63,8 @@
- #define ROUNDUP(_x,_w) (((unsigned long)(_x)+(1UL<<(_w))-1) & ~((1UL<<(_w))-1))
- #endif
- 
-+#ifndef __must_check
-+#define __must_check __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__))
-+#endif
-+
- #endif	/* __XEN_TOOLS_LIBS__ */
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 85c0d2f38fac..050d6f651ae9 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ int quota_nb_watch_per_domain = 128;
- int quota_max_entry_size = 2048; /* 2K */
- int quota_max_transaction = 10;
- int quota_nb_perms_per_node = 5;
-+int quota_trans_nodes = 1024;
- int quota_max_path_len = XENSTORE_REL_PATH_MAX;
- int quota_req_outstanding = 20;
- 
-@@ -560,6 +561,7 @@ struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 	TDB_DATA key, data;
- 	struct xs_tdb_record_hdr *hdr;
- 	struct node *node;
-+	int err;
- 
- 	node = talloc(ctx, struct node);
- 	if (!node) {
-@@ -581,14 +583,13 @@ struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 	if (data.dptr == NULL) {
- 		if (tdb_error(tdb_ctx) == TDB_ERR_NOEXIST) {
- 			node->generation = NO_GENERATION;
--			access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_READ, NULL);
--			errno = ENOENT;
-+			err = access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_READ, NULL);
-+			errno = err ? : ENOENT;
- 		} else {
- 			log("TDB error on read: %s", tdb_errorstr(tdb_ctx));
- 			errno = EIO;
- 		}
--		talloc_free(node);
--		return NULL;
-+		goto error;
- 	}
- 
- 	node->parent = NULL;
-@@ -603,19 +604,36 @@ struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 
- 	/* Permissions are struct xs_permissions. */
- 	node->perms.p = hdr->perms;
--	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(conn, node)) {
--		talloc_free(node);
--		return NULL;
--	}
-+	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(conn, node))
-+		goto error;
- 
- 	/* Data is binary blob (usually ascii, no nul). */
- 	node->data = node->perms.p + hdr->num_perms;
- 	/* Children is strings, nul separated. */
- 	node->children = node->data + node->datalen;
- 
--	access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_READ, NULL);
-+	if (access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_READ, NULL))
-+		goto error;
- 
- 	return node;
-+
-+ error:
-+	err = errno;
-+	talloc_free(node);
-+	errno = err;
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static bool read_node_can_propagate_errno(void)
-+{
-+	/*
-+	 * 2 error cases for read_node() can always be propagated up:
-+	 * ENOMEM, because this has nothing to do with the node being in the
-+	 * data base or not, but is caused by a general lack of memory.
-+	 * ENOSPC, because this is related to hitting quota limits which need
-+	 * to be respected.
-+	 */
-+	return errno == ENOMEM || errno == ENOSPC;
- }
- 
- int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
-@@ -732,7 +750,7 @@ static int ask_parents(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 		node = read_node(conn, ctx, name);
- 		if (node)
- 			break;
--		if (errno == ENOMEM)
-+		if (read_node_can_propagate_errno())
- 			return errno;
- 	} while (!streq(name, "/"));
- 
-@@ -795,7 +813,7 @@ static struct node *get_node(struct connection *conn,
- 		}
- 	}
- 	/* Clean up errno if they weren't supposed to know. */
--	if (!node && errno != ENOMEM)
-+	if (!node && !read_node_can_propagate_errno())
- 		errno = errno_from_parents(conn, ctx, name, errno, perm);
- 	return node;
- }
-@@ -1201,7 +1219,7 @@ static struct node *construct_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 
- 	/* If parent doesn't exist, create it. */
- 	parent = read_node(conn, parentname, parentname);
--	if (!parent)
-+	if (!parent && errno == ENOENT)
- 		parent = construct_node(conn, ctx, parentname);
- 	if (!parent)
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -1475,7 +1493,7 @@ static int _rm(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, struct node *node,
- 
- 	parent = read_node(conn, ctx, parentname);
- 	if (!parent)
--		return (errno == ENOMEM) ? ENOMEM : EINVAL;
-+		return read_node_can_propagate_errno() ? errno : EINVAL;
- 	node->parent = parent;
- 
- 	return delete_node(conn, ctx, parent, node, false);
-@@ -1505,7 +1523,7 @@ static int do_rm(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 				return 0;
- 			}
- 			/* Restore errno, just in case. */
--			if (errno != ENOMEM)
-+			if (!read_node_can_propagate_errno())
- 				errno = ENOENT;
- 		}
- 		return errno;
-@@ -2282,6 +2300,8 @@ static void usage(void)
- "  -M, --path-max <chars>  limit the allowed Xenstore node path length,\n"
- "  -Q, --quota <what>=<nb> set the quota <what> to the value <nb>, allowed\n"
- "                          quotas are:\n"
-+"                          transaction-nodes: number of accessed node per\n"
-+"                                             transaction\n"
- "                          outstanding: number of outstanding requests\n"
- "  -w, --timeout <what>=<seconds>   set the timeout in seconds for <what>,\n"
- "                          allowed timeout candidates are:\n"
-@@ -2367,6 +2387,8 @@ static void set_quota(const char *arg)
- 	val = get_optval_int(eq + 1);
- 	if (what_matches(arg, "outstanding"))
- 		quota_req_outstanding = val;
-+	else if (what_matches(arg, "transaction-nodes"))
-+		quota_trans_nodes = val;
- 	else
- 		barf("unknown quota \"%s\"\n", arg);
- }
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index c0a056ce13fe..1b3bd5ca563a 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ extern int dom0_event;
- extern int priv_domid;
- extern int quota_nb_entry_per_domain;
- extern int quota_req_outstanding;
-+extern int quota_trans_nodes;
- 
- extern unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec;
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index 86caf6c398be..7bd41eb475e3 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ struct transaction
- 	/* Connection-local identifier for this transaction. */
- 	uint32_t id;
- 
-+	/* Node counter. */
-+	unsigned int nodes;
-+
- 	/* Generation when transaction started. */
- 	uint64_t generation;
- 
-@@ -260,6 +263,11 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 
- 	i = find_accessed_node(trans, node->name);
- 	if (!i) {
-+		if (trans->nodes >= quota_trans_nodes &&
-+		    domain_is_unprivileged(conn)) {
-+			ret = ENOSPC;
-+			goto err;
-+		}
- 		i = talloc_zero(trans, struct accessed_node);
- 		if (!i)
- 			goto nomem;
-@@ -297,6 +305,7 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 				i->ta_node = true;
- 			}
- 		}
-+		trans->nodes++;
- 		list_add_tail(&i->list, &trans->accessed);
- 	}
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-index 0093cac807e3..e3cbd6b23095 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ void transaction_entry_inc(struct transaction *trans, unsigned int domid);
- void transaction_entry_dec(struct transaction *trans, unsigned int domid);
- 
- /* This node was accessed. */
--int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
--                enum node_access_type type, TDB_DATA *key);
-+int __must_check access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
-+                             enum node_access_type type, TDB_DATA *key);
- 
- /* Queue watches for a modified node. */
- void queue_watches(struct connection *conn, const char *name, bool watch_exact);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0094-tools-xenstore-move-the-call-of-setup_structure-to-d.patch b/0094-tools-xenstore-move-the-call-of-setup_structure-to-d.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4cebe89..0000000
--- a/0094-tools-xenstore-move-the-call-of-setup_structure-to-d.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-From ccef72b6a885714dae0b6f1accb33042ee40e108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 094/126] tools/xenstore: move the call of setup_structure() to
- dom0 introduction
-
-Setting up the basic structure when introducing dom0 has the advantage
-to be able to add proper node memory accounting for the added nodes
-later.
-
-This makes it possible to do proper node accounting, too.
-
-An additional requirement to make that work fine is to correct the
-owner of the created nodes to be dom0_domid instead of domid 0.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 60e2f6020dea7f616857b8fc1141b1c085d88761)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c   | 9 ++++-----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h   | 1 +
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c | 3 +++
- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 050d6f651ae9..51af74390cbe 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1940,7 +1940,8 @@ static int tdb_flags;
- static void manual_node(const char *name, const char *child)
- {
- 	struct node *node;
--	struct xs_permissions perms = { .id = 0, .perms = XS_PERM_NONE };
-+	struct xs_permissions perms = { .id = dom0_domid,
-+					.perms = XS_PERM_NONE };
- 
- 	node = talloc_zero(NULL, struct node);
- 	if (!node)
-@@ -1979,7 +1980,7 @@ static void tdb_logger(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, int level, const char * fmt, ...)
- 	}
- }
- 
--static void setup_structure(bool live_update)
-+void setup_structure(bool live_update)
- {
- 	char *tdbname;
- 
-@@ -2002,6 +2003,7 @@ static void setup_structure(bool live_update)
- 		manual_node("/", "tool");
- 		manual_node("/tool", "xenstored");
- 		manual_node("/tool/xenstored", NULL);
-+		domain_entry_fix(dom0_domid, 3, true);
- 	}
- 
- 	check_store();
-@@ -2512,9 +2514,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 
- 	init_pipe(reopen_log_pipe);
- 
--	/* Setup the database */
--	setup_structure(live_update);
--
- 	/* Listen to hypervisor. */
- 	if (!no_domain_init && !live_update) {
- 		domain_init(-1);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 1b3bd5ca563a..459698d8407a 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
- struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 		       const char *name);
- 
-+void setup_structure(bool live_update);
- struct connection *new_connection(connwritefn_t *write, connreadfn_t *read);
- struct connection *get_connection_by_id(unsigned int conn_id);
- void check_store(void);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index 3c27973fb836..0dd75a6a2194 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -476,6 +476,9 @@ static struct domain *introduce_domain(const void *ctx,
- 		}
- 		domain->interface = interface;
- 
-+		if (is_master_domain)
-+			setup_structure(restore);
-+
- 		/* Now domain belongs to its connection. */
- 		talloc_steal(domain->conn, domain);
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0095-tools-xenstore-add-infrastructure-to-keep-track-of-p.patch b/0095-tools-xenstore-add-infrastructure-to-keep-track-of-p.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f826f80..0000000
--- a/0095-tools-xenstore-add-infrastructure-to-keep-track-of-p.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,289 +0,0 @@
-From aa29eb624797fb6825e4a23071c88417672868a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 095/126] tools/xenstore: add infrastructure to keep track of
- per domain memory usage
-
-The amount of memory a domain can consume in Xenstore is limited by
-various quota today, but even with sane quota a domain can still
-consume rather large memory quantities.
-
-Add the infrastructure for keeping track of the amount of memory a
-domain is consuming in Xenstore. Note that this is only the memory a
-domain has direct control over, so any internal administration data
-needed by Xenstore only is not being accounted for.
-
-There are two quotas defined: a soft quota which will result in a
-warning issued via syslog() when it is exceeded, and a hard quota
-resulting in a stop of accepting further requests or watch events as
-long as the hard quota would be violated by accepting those.
-
-Setting any of those quotas to 0 will disable it.
-
-As default values use 2MB per domain for the soft limit (this basically
-covers the allowed case to create 1000 nodes needing 2kB each), and
-2.5MB for the hard limit.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 0d4a8ec7a93faedbe54fd197db146de628459e77)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c   | 30 ++++++++--
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h   |  2 +
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h | 20 +++++++
- 4 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 51af74390cbe..eeb0d893e8c3 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ int quota_nb_perms_per_node = 5;
- int quota_trans_nodes = 1024;
- int quota_max_path_len = XENSTORE_REL_PATH_MAX;
- int quota_req_outstanding = 20;
-+int quota_memory_per_domain_soft = 2 * 1024 * 1024; /* 2 MB */
-+int quota_memory_per_domain_hard = 2 * 1024 * 1024 + 512 * 1024; /* 2.5 MB */
- 
- unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec = 20000;
- 
-@@ -2304,7 +2306,14 @@ static void usage(void)
- "                          quotas are:\n"
- "                          transaction-nodes: number of accessed node per\n"
- "                                             transaction\n"
-+"                          memory: total used memory per domain for nodes,\n"
-+"                                  transactions, watches and requests, above\n"
-+"                                  which Xenstore will stop talking to domain\n"
- "                          outstanding: number of outstanding requests\n"
-+"  -q, --quota-soft <what>=<nb> set a soft quota <what> to the value <nb>,\n"
-+"                          causing a warning to be issued via syslog() if the\n"
-+"                          limit is violated, allowed quotas are:\n"
-+"                          memory: see above\n"
- "  -w, --timeout <what>=<seconds>   set the timeout in seconds for <what>,\n"
- "                          allowed timeout candidates are:\n"
- "                          watch-event: time a watch-event is kept pending\n"
-@@ -2331,6 +2340,7 @@ static struct option options[] = {
- 	{ "perm-nb", 1, NULL, 'A' },
- 	{ "path-max", 1, NULL, 'M' },
- 	{ "quota", 1, NULL, 'Q' },
-+	{ "quota-soft", 1, NULL, 'q' },
- 	{ "timeout", 1, NULL, 'w' },
- 	{ "no-recovery", 0, NULL, 'R' },
- 	{ "internal-db", 0, NULL, 'I' },
-@@ -2379,7 +2389,7 @@ static void set_timeout(const char *arg)
- 		barf("unknown timeout \"%s\"\n", arg);
- }
- 
--static void set_quota(const char *arg)
-+static void set_quota(const char *arg, bool soft)
- {
- 	const char *eq = strchr(arg, '=');
- 	int val;
-@@ -2387,11 +2397,16 @@ static void set_quota(const char *arg)
- 	if (!eq)
- 		barf("quotas must be specified via <what>=<nb>\n");
- 	val = get_optval_int(eq + 1);
--	if (what_matches(arg, "outstanding"))
-+	if (what_matches(arg, "outstanding") && !soft)
- 		quota_req_outstanding = val;
--	else if (what_matches(arg, "transaction-nodes"))
-+	else if (what_matches(arg, "transaction-nodes") && !soft)
- 		quota_trans_nodes = val;
--	else
-+	else if (what_matches(arg, "memory")) {
-+		if (soft)
-+			quota_memory_per_domain_soft = val;
-+		else
-+			quota_memory_per_domain_hard = val;
-+	} else
- 		barf("unknown quota \"%s\"\n", arg);
- }
- 
-@@ -2409,7 +2424,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 	orig_argc = argc;
- 	orig_argv = argv;
- 
--	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HNPS:t:A:M:Q:T:RVW:w:U",
-+	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HNPS:t:A:M:Q:q:T:RVW:w:U",
- 				  options, NULL)) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case 'D':
-@@ -2459,7 +2474,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 						 quota_max_path_len);
- 			break;
- 		case 'Q':
--			set_quota(optarg);
-+			set_quota(optarg, false);
-+			break;
-+		case 'q':
-+			set_quota(optarg, true);
- 			break;
- 		case 'w':
- 			set_timeout(optarg);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 459698d8407a..2fb37dbfe847 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ extern int priv_domid;
- extern int quota_nb_entry_per_domain;
- extern int quota_req_outstanding;
- extern int quota_trans_nodes;
-+extern int quota_memory_per_domain_soft;
-+extern int quota_memory_per_domain_hard;
- 
- extern unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec;
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index 0dd75a6a2194..ec542df6a67e 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -76,6 +76,13 @@ struct domain
- 	/* number of entry from this domain in the store */
- 	int nbentry;
- 
-+	/* Amount of memory allocated for this domain. */
-+	int memory;
-+	bool soft_quota_reported;
-+	bool hard_quota_reported;
-+	time_t mem_last_msg;
-+#define MEM_WARN_MINTIME_SEC 10
-+
- 	/* number of watch for this domain */
- 	int nbwatch;
- 
-@@ -296,6 +303,9 @@ bool domain_can_read(struct connection *conn)
- 			return false;
- 		if (conn->domain->nboutstanding >= quota_req_outstanding)
- 			return false;
-+		if (conn->domain->memory >= quota_memory_per_domain_hard &&
-+		    quota_memory_per_domain_hard)
-+			return false;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (conn->is_ignored)
-@@ -956,6 +966,89 @@ int domain_entry(struct connection *conn)
- 		: 0;
- }
- 
-+static bool domain_chk_quota(struct domain *domain, int mem)
-+{
-+	time_t now;
-+
-+	if (!domain || !domid_is_unprivileged(domain->domid) ||
-+	    (domain->conn && domain->conn->is_ignored))
-+		return false;
-+
-+	now = time(NULL);
-+
-+	if (mem >= quota_memory_per_domain_hard &&
-+	    quota_memory_per_domain_hard) {
-+		if (domain->hard_quota_reported)
-+			return true;
-+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Domain %u exceeds hard memory quota, Xenstore interface to domain stalled\n",
-+		       domain->domid);
-+		domain->mem_last_msg = now;
-+		domain->hard_quota_reported = true;
-+		return true;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (now - domain->mem_last_msg >= MEM_WARN_MINTIME_SEC) {
-+		if (domain->hard_quota_reported) {
-+			domain->mem_last_msg = now;
-+			domain->hard_quota_reported = false;
-+			syslog(LOG_INFO, "Domain %u below hard memory quota again\n",
-+			       domain->domid);
-+		}
-+		if (mem >= quota_memory_per_domain_soft &&
-+		    quota_memory_per_domain_soft &&
-+		    !domain->soft_quota_reported) {
-+			domain->mem_last_msg = now;
-+			domain->soft_quota_reported = true;
-+			syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Domain %u exceeds soft memory quota\n",
-+			       domain->domid);
-+		}
-+		if (mem < quota_memory_per_domain_soft &&
-+		    domain->soft_quota_reported) {
-+			domain->mem_last_msg = now;
-+			domain->soft_quota_reported = false;
-+			syslog(LOG_INFO, "Domain %u below soft memory quota again\n",
-+			       domain->domid);
-+		}
-+
-+	}
-+
-+	return false;
-+}
-+
-+int domain_memory_add(unsigned int domid, int mem, bool no_quota_check)
-+{
-+	struct domain *domain;
-+
-+	domain = find_domain_struct(domid);
-+	if (domain) {
-+		/*
-+		 * domain_chk_quota() will print warning and also store whether
-+		 * the soft/hard quota has been hit. So check no_quota_check
-+		 * *after*.
-+		 */
-+		if (domain_chk_quota(domain, domain->memory + mem) &&
-+		    !no_quota_check)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+		domain->memory += mem;
-+	} else {
-+		/*
-+		 * The domain the memory is to be accounted for should always
-+		 * exist, as accounting is done either for a domain related to
-+		 * the current connection, or for the domain owning a node
-+		 * (which is always existing, as the owner of the node is
-+		 * tested to exist and replaced by domid 0 if not).
-+		 * So not finding the related domain MUST be an error in the
-+		 * data base.
-+		 */
-+		errno = ENOENT;
-+		corrupt(NULL, "Accounting called for non-existing domain %u\n",
-+			domid);
-+		return ENOENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- void domain_watch_inc(struct connection *conn)
- {
- 	if (!conn || !conn->domain)
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-index cce13d14f016..571aa46d158e 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,26 @@ int domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *);
- void domain_entry_dec(struct connection *conn, struct node *);
- int domain_entry_fix(unsigned int domid, int num, bool update);
- int domain_entry(struct connection *conn);
-+int domain_memory_add(unsigned int domid, int mem, bool no_quota_check);
-+
-+/*
-+ * domain_memory_add_chk(): to be used when memory quota should be checked.
-+ * Not to be used when specifying a negative mem value, as lowering the used
-+ * memory should always be allowed.
-+ */
-+static inline int domain_memory_add_chk(unsigned int domid, int mem)
-+{
-+	return domain_memory_add(domid, mem, false);
-+}
-+/*
-+ * domain_memory_add_nochk(): to be used when memory quota should not be
-+ * checked, e.g. when lowering memory usage, or in an error case for undoing
-+ * a previous memory adjustment.
-+ */
-+static inline void domain_memory_add_nochk(unsigned int domid, int mem)
-+{
-+	domain_memory_add(domid, mem, true);
-+}
- void domain_watch_inc(struct connection *conn);
- void domain_watch_dec(struct connection *conn);
- int domain_watch(struct connection *conn);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0096-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-responses.patch b/0096-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-responses.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6174433..0000000
--- a/0096-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-responses.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From 0113aacb3d791600668cd7703f6f12ed94fc6d03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 096/126] tools/xenstore: add memory accounting for responses
-
-Add the memory accounting for queued responses.
-
-In case adding a watch event for a guest is causing the hard memory
-quota of that guest to be violated, the event is dropped. This will
-ensure that it is impossible to drive another guest past its memory
-quota by generating insane amounts of events for that guest. This is
-especially important for protecting driver domains from that attack
-vector.
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42315.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit f6d00133643a524d2138c9e3f192bbde719050ba)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index eeb0d893e8c3..2e02b577c912 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ static void free_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *out,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	domain_memory_add_nochk(conn->id, -out->hdr.msg.len - sizeof(out->hdr));
-+
- 	if (out->hdr.msg.type == XS_WATCH_EVENT) {
- 		req = out->pend.req;
- 		if (req) {
-@@ -904,11 +906,14 @@ void send_reply(struct connection *conn, enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
- 	bdata->timeout_msec = 0;
- 	bdata->watch_event = false;
- 
--	if (len <= DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE)
-+	if (len <= DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE) {
- 		bdata->buffer = bdata->default_buffer;
--	else {
-+		/* Don't check quota, path might be used for returning error. */
-+		domain_memory_add_nochk(conn->id, len + sizeof(bdata->hdr));
-+	} else {
- 		bdata->buffer = talloc_array(bdata, char, len);
--		if (!bdata->buffer) {
-+		if (!bdata->buffer ||
-+		    domain_memory_add_chk(conn->id, len + sizeof(bdata->hdr))) {
- 			send_error(conn, ENOMEM);
- 			return;
- 		}
-@@ -973,6 +978,11 @@ void send_event(struct buffered_data *req, struct connection *conn,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	if (domain_memory_add_chk(conn->id, len + sizeof(bdata->hdr))) {
-+		talloc_free(bdata);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (timeout_watch_event_msec && domain_is_unprivileged(conn)) {
- 		bdata->timeout_msec = get_now_msec() + timeout_watch_event_msec;
- 		if (!conn->timeout_msec)
-@@ -2940,6 +2950,12 @@ static void add_buffered_data(struct buffered_data *bdata,
- 	 */
- 	if (bdata->hdr.msg.type != XS_WATCH_EVENT)
- 		domain_outstanding_inc(conn);
-+	/*
-+	 * We are restoring the state after Live-Update and the new quota may
-+	 * be smaller. So ignore it. The limit will be applied for any resource
-+	 * after the state has been fully restored.
-+	 */
-+	domain_memory_add_nochk(conn->id, len + sizeof(bdata->hdr));
- }
- 
- void read_state_buffered_data(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0097-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-watches.patch b/0097-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-watches.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dd2ed61..0000000
--- a/0097-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-watches.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-From 9c2e71fe0611da9ed2ebbf2362a9bb05d42bf0c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 097/126] tools/xenstore: add memory accounting for watches
-
-Add the memory accounting for registered watches.
-
-When a socket connection is destroyed, the associated watches are
-removed, too. In order to keep memory accounting correct the watches
-must be removed explicitly via a call of conn_delete_all_watches() from
-destroy_conn().
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42315.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 7f9978a2cc37aaffab2fb09593bc598c0712a69b)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c  |  1 +
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c | 13 ++++++++++---
- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 2e02b577c912..b1a4575929bd 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -457,6 +457,7 @@ static int destroy_conn(void *_conn)
- 	}
- 
- 	conn_free_buffered_data(conn);
-+	conn_delete_all_watches(conn);
- 	list_for_each_entry(req, &conn->ref_list, list)
- 		req->on_ref_list = false;
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-index 1d664e3d6b72..0d5858df5bdd 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int check_watch_path(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- }
- 
- static struct watch *add_watch(struct connection *conn, char *path, char *token,
--			       bool relative)
-+			       bool relative, bool no_quota_check)
- {
- 	struct watch *watch;
- 
-@@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ static struct watch *add_watch(struct connection *conn, char *path, char *token,
- 	watch->token = talloc_strdup(watch, token);
- 	if (!watch->node || !watch->token)
- 		goto nomem;
-+	if (domain_memory_add(conn->id, strlen(path) + strlen(token),
-+			      no_quota_check))
-+		goto nomem;
- 
- 	if (relative)
- 		watch->relative_path = get_implicit_path(conn);
-@@ -265,7 +268,7 @@ int do_watch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (domain_watch(conn) > quota_nb_watch_per_domain)
- 		return E2BIG;
- 
--	watch = add_watch(conn, vec[0], vec[1], relative);
-+	watch = add_watch(conn, vec[0], vec[1], relative, false);
- 	if (!watch)
- 		return errno;
- 
-@@ -296,6 +299,8 @@ int do_unwatch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	list_for_each_entry(watch, &conn->watches, list) {
- 		if (streq(watch->node, node) && streq(watch->token, vec[1])) {
- 			list_del(&watch->list);
-+			domain_memory_add_nochk(conn->id, -strlen(watch->node) -
-+							  strlen(watch->token));
- 			talloc_free(watch);
- 			domain_watch_dec(conn);
- 			send_ack(conn, XS_UNWATCH);
-@@ -311,6 +316,8 @@ void conn_delete_all_watches(struct connection *conn)
- 
- 	while ((watch = list_top(&conn->watches, struct watch, list))) {
- 		list_del(&watch->list);
-+		domain_memory_add_nochk(conn->id, -strlen(watch->node) -
-+						  strlen(watch->token));
- 		talloc_free(watch);
- 		domain_watch_dec(conn);
- 	}
-@@ -373,7 +380,7 @@ void read_state_watch(const void *ctx, const void *state)
- 	if (!path)
- 		barf("allocation error for read watch");
- 
--	if (!add_watch(conn, path, token, relative))
-+	if (!add_watch(conn, path, token, relative, true))
- 		barf("error adding watch");
- }
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0098-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-nodes.patch b/0098-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-nodes.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f2f8e4f..0000000
--- a/0098-tools-xenstore-add-memory-accounting-for-nodes.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
-From 32efe29a00efab2896cc973e966a35ecad556495 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 098/126] tools/xenstore: add memory accounting for nodes
-
-Add the memory accounting for Xenstore nodes. In order to make this
-not too complicated allow for some sloppiness when writing nodes. Any
-hard quota violation will result in no further requests to be accepted.
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42315.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 00e9e32d022be1afc144b75acdaeba8393e63315)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c        | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h        |  12 +++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c |  16 ++-
- 3 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index b1a4575929bd..f27d5c0101bc 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -556,6 +556,117 @@ void set_tdb_key(const char *name, TDB_DATA *key)
- 	key->dsize = strlen(name);
- }
- 
-+static void get_acc_data(TDB_DATA *key, struct node_account_data *acc)
-+{
-+	TDB_DATA old_data;
-+	struct xs_tdb_record_hdr *hdr;
-+
-+	if (acc->memory < 0) {
-+		old_data = tdb_fetch(tdb_ctx, *key);
-+		/* No check for error, as the node might not exist. */
-+		if (old_data.dptr == NULL) {
-+			acc->memory = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			hdr = (void *)old_data.dptr;
-+			acc->memory = old_data.dsize;
-+			acc->domid = hdr->perms[0].id;
-+		}
-+		talloc_free(old_data.dptr);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Per-transaction nodes need to be accounted for the transaction owner.
-+ * Those nodes are stored in the data base with the transaction generation
-+ * count prepended (e.g. 123/local/domain/...). So testing for the node's
-+ * key not to start with "/" is sufficient.
-+ */
-+static unsigned int get_acc_domid(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key,
-+				  unsigned int domid)
-+{
-+	return (!conn || key->dptr[0] == '/') ? domid : conn->id;
-+}
-+
-+int do_tdb_write(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, TDB_DATA *data,
-+		 struct node_account_data *acc, bool no_quota_check)
-+{
-+	struct xs_tdb_record_hdr *hdr = (void *)data->dptr;
-+	struct node_account_data old_acc = {};
-+	unsigned int old_domid, new_domid;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if (!acc)
-+		old_acc.memory = -1;
-+	else
-+		old_acc = *acc;
-+
-+	get_acc_data(key, &old_acc);
-+	old_domid = get_acc_domid(conn, key, old_acc.domid);
-+	new_domid = get_acc_domid(conn, key, hdr->perms[0].id);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Don't check for ENOENT, as we want to be able to switch orphaned
-+	 * nodes to new owners.
-+	 */
-+	if (old_acc.memory)
-+		domain_memory_add_nochk(old_domid,
-+					-old_acc.memory - key->dsize);
-+	ret = domain_memory_add(new_domid, data->dsize + key->dsize,
-+				no_quota_check);
-+	if (ret) {
-+		/* Error path, so no quota check. */
-+		if (old_acc.memory)
-+			domain_memory_add_nochk(old_domid,
-+						old_acc.memory + key->dsize);
-+		return ret;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* TDB should set errno, but doesn't even set ecode AFAICT. */
-+	if (tdb_store(tdb_ctx, *key, *data, TDB_REPLACE) != 0) {
-+		domain_memory_add_nochk(new_domid, -data->dsize - key->dsize);
-+		/* Error path, so no quota check. */
-+		if (old_acc.memory)
-+			domain_memory_add_nochk(old_domid,
-+						old_acc.memory + key->dsize);
-+		errno = EIO;
-+		return errno;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (acc) {
-+		/* Don't use new_domid, as it might be a transaction node. */
-+		acc->domid = hdr->perms[0].id;
-+		acc->memory = data->dsize;
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int do_tdb_delete(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key,
-+		  struct node_account_data *acc)
-+{
-+	struct node_account_data tmp_acc;
-+	unsigned int domid;
-+
-+	if (!acc) {
-+		acc = &tmp_acc;
-+		acc->memory = -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	get_acc_data(key, acc);
-+
-+	if (tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, *key)) {
-+		errno = EIO;
-+		return errno;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (acc->memory) {
-+		domid = get_acc_domid(conn, key, acc->domid);
-+		domain_memory_add_nochk(domid, -acc->memory - key->dsize);
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * If it fails, returns NULL and sets errno.
-  * Temporary memory allocations will be done with ctx.
-@@ -609,9 +720,15 @@ struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 
- 	/* Permissions are struct xs_permissions. */
- 	node->perms.p = hdr->perms;
-+	node->acc.domid = node->perms.p[0].id;
-+	node->acc.memory = data.dsize;
- 	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(conn, node))
- 		goto error;
- 
-+	/* If owner is gone reset currently accounted memory size. */
-+	if (node->acc.domid != node->perms.p[0].id)
-+		node->acc.memory = 0;
-+
- 	/* Data is binary blob (usually ascii, no nul). */
- 	node->data = node->perms.p + hdr->num_perms;
- 	/* Children is strings, nul separated. */
-@@ -680,12 +797,9 @@ int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
- 	p += node->datalen;
- 	memcpy(p, node->children, node->childlen);
- 
--	/* TDB should set errno, but doesn't even set ecode AFAICT. */
--	if (tdb_store(tdb_ctx, *key, data, TDB_REPLACE) != 0) {
--		corrupt(conn, "Write of %s failed", key->dptr);
--		errno = EIO;
--		return errno;
--	}
-+	if (do_tdb_write(conn, key, &data, &node->acc, no_quota_check))
-+		return EIO;
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -1188,7 +1302,7 @@ static void delete_node_single(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- 	if (access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_DELETE, &key))
- 		return;
- 
--	if (tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key) != 0) {
-+	if (do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, &node->acc) != 0) {
- 		corrupt(conn, "Could not delete '%s'", node->name);
- 		return;
- 	}
-@@ -1261,6 +1375,7 @@ static struct node *construct_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 	/* No children, no data */
- 	node->children = node->data = NULL;
- 	node->childlen = node->datalen = 0;
-+	node->acc.memory = 0;
- 	node->parent = parent;
- 	return node;
- 
-@@ -1269,17 +1384,17 @@ nomem:
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--static void destroy_node_rm(struct node *node)
-+static void destroy_node_rm(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- {
- 	if (streq(node->name, "/"))
- 		corrupt(NULL, "Destroying root node!");
- 
--	tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, node->key);
-+	do_tdb_delete(conn, &node->key, &node->acc);
- }
- 
- static int destroy_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- {
--	destroy_node_rm(node);
-+	destroy_node_rm(conn, node);
- 	domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -1331,7 +1446,7 @@ static struct node *create_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 		/* Account for new node */
- 		if (i->parent) {
- 			if (domain_entry_inc(conn, i)) {
--				destroy_node_rm(i);
-+				destroy_node_rm(conn, i);
- 				return NULL;
- 			}
- 		}
-@@ -2192,7 +2307,7 @@ static int clean_store_(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, TDB_DATA key, TDB_DATA val,
- 	if (!hashtable_search(reachable, name)) {
- 		log("clean_store: '%s' is orphaned!", name);
- 		if (recovery) {
--			tdb_delete(tdb, key);
-+			do_tdb_delete(NULL, &key, NULL);
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-@@ -3030,6 +3145,7 @@ void read_state_node(const void *ctx, const void *state)
- 	if (!node)
- 		barf("allocation error restoring node");
- 
-+	node->acc.memory = 0;
- 	node->name = name;
- 	node->generation = ++generation;
- 	node->datalen = sn->data_len;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 2fb37dbfe847..5c1b574bffe6 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -169,6 +169,11 @@ struct node_perms {
- 	struct xs_permissions *p;
- };
- 
-+struct node_account_data {
-+	unsigned int domid;
-+	int memory;		/* -1 if unknown */
-+};
-+
- struct node {
- 	const char *name;
- 	/* Key used to update TDB */
-@@ -191,6 +196,9 @@ struct node {
- 	/* Children, each nul-terminated. */
- 	unsigned int childlen;
- 	char *children;
-+
-+	/* Allocation information for node currently in store. */
-+	struct node_account_data acc;
- };
- 
- /* Return the only argument in the input. */
-@@ -300,6 +308,10 @@ extern xengnttab_handle **xgt_handle;
- int remember_string(struct hashtable *hash, const char *str);
- 
- void set_tdb_key(const char *name, TDB_DATA *key);
-+int do_tdb_write(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, TDB_DATA *data,
-+		 struct node_account_data *acc, bool no_quota_check);
-+int do_tdb_delete(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key,
-+		  struct node_account_data *acc);
- 
- void conn_free_buffered_data(struct connection *conn);
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index 7bd41eb475e3..ace9a11d77bb 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ struct transaction
- 	/* List of all transactions active on this connection. */
- 	struct list_head list;
- 
-+	/* Connection this transaction is associated with. */
-+	struct connection *conn;
-+
- 	/* Connection-local identifier for this transaction. */
- 	uint32_t id;
- 
-@@ -286,6 +289,8 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 
- 		introduce = true;
- 		i->ta_node = false;
-+		/* acc.memory < 0 means "unknown, get size from TDB". */
-+		node->acc.memory = -1;
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * Additional transaction-specific node for read type. We only
-@@ -410,11 +415,11 @@ static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
- 					goto err;
- 				hdr = (void *)data.dptr;
- 				hdr->generation = ++generation;
--				ret = tdb_store(tdb_ctx, key, data,
--						TDB_REPLACE);
-+				ret = do_tdb_write(conn, &key, &data, NULL,
-+						   true);
- 				talloc_free(data.dptr);
- 			} else {
--				ret = tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key);
-+				ret = do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, NULL);
- 			}
- 			if (ret)
- 				goto err;
-@@ -425,7 +430,7 @@ static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
- 			}
- 		}
- 
--		if (i->ta_node && tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, ta_key))
-+		if (i->ta_node && do_tdb_delete(conn, &ta_key, NULL))
- 			goto err;
- 		list_del(&i->list);
- 		talloc_free(i);
-@@ -453,7 +458,7 @@ static int destroy_transaction(void *_transaction)
- 							       i->node);
- 			if (trans_name) {
- 				set_tdb_key(trans_name, &key);
--				tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key);
-+				do_tdb_delete(trans->conn, &key, NULL);
- 			}
- 		}
- 		list_del(&i->list);
-@@ -497,6 +502,7 @@ int do_transaction_start(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 
- 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&trans->accessed);
- 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&trans->changed_domains);
-+	trans->conn = conn;
- 	trans->fail = false;
- 	trans->generation = ++generation;
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0099-tools-xenstore-add-exports-for-quota-variables.patch b/0099-tools-xenstore-add-exports-for-quota-variables.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 98f341f..0000000
--- a/0099-tools-xenstore-add-exports-for-quota-variables.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From 1fc3ecc9bfead0a50d8e05de983ed2a8f02fa03c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 099/126] tools/xenstore: add exports for quota variables
-
-Some quota variables are not exported via header files.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 1da16d5990b5f7752657fca3e948f735177ea9ad)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h        | 5 +++++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c | 1 -
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c       | 2 --
- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 5c1b574bffe6..1eb3708f82dd 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -268,6 +268,11 @@ extern TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_ctx;
- extern int dom0_domid;
- extern int dom0_event;
- extern int priv_domid;
-+extern int quota_nb_watch_per_domain;
-+extern int quota_max_transaction;
-+extern int quota_max_entry_size;
-+extern int quota_nb_perms_per_node;
-+extern int quota_max_path_len;
- extern int quota_nb_entry_per_domain;
- extern int quota_req_outstanding;
- extern int quota_trans_nodes;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index ace9a11d77bb..28774813de83 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -175,7 +175,6 @@ struct transaction
- 	bool fail;
- };
- 
--extern int quota_max_transaction;
- uint64_t generation;
- 
- static struct accessed_node *find_accessed_node(struct transaction *trans,
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-index 0d5858df5bdd..4970e9f1a1b9 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
- #include "xenstored_domain.h"
- #include "xenstored_transaction.h"
- 
--extern int quota_nb_watch_per_domain;
--
- struct watch
- {
- 	/* Watches on this connection */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0100-tools-xenstore-add-control-command-for-setting-and-s.patch b/0100-tools-xenstore-add-control-command-for-setting-and-s.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e721645..0000000
--- a/0100-tools-xenstore-add-control-command-for-setting-and-s.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-From 4d30175fdadb75c55acb8abb186727eda7cd5585 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 100/126] tools/xenstore: add control command for setting and
- showing quota
-
-Add a xenstore-control command "quota" to:
-- show current quota settings
-- change quota settings
-- show current quota related values of a domain
-
-Note that in the case the new quota is lower than existing one,
-Xenstored may continue to handle requests from a domain exceeding the
-new limit (depends on which one has been broken) and the amount of
-resource used will not change. However the domain will not be able to
-create more resource (associated to the quota) until it is back to below
-the limit.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9c484bef83496b683b0087e3bd2a560da4aa37af)
----
- docs/misc/xenstore.txt             |  11 +++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c  |  33 +++++++++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h  |   2 +
- 4 files changed, 157 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xenstore.txt b/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
-index 334dc8b6fdf5..a7d006519ae8 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
-+++ b/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
-@@ -366,6 +366,17 @@ CONTROL			<command>|[<parameters>|]
- 	print|<string>
- 		print <string> to syslog (xenstore runs as daemon) or
- 		to console (xenstore runs as stubdom)
-+	quota|[set <name> <val>|<domid>]
-+		without parameters: print the current quota settings
-+		with "set <name> <val>": set the quota <name> to new value
-+		<val> (The admin should make sure all the domain usage is
-+		below the quota. If it is not, then Xenstored may continue to
-+		handle requests from the domain as long as the resource
-+		violating the new quota setting isn't increased further)
-+		with "<domid>": print quota related accounting data for
-+		the domain <domid>
-+	quota-soft|[set <name> <val>]
-+		like the "quota" command, but for soft-quota.
- 	help			<supported-commands>
- 		return list of supported commands for CONTROL
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-index 211fe1fd9b37..980279fa53ff 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-@@ -148,6 +148,115 @@ static int do_control_log(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+struct quota {
-+	const char *name;
-+	int *quota;
-+	const char *descr;
-+};
-+
-+static const struct quota hard_quotas[] = {
-+	{ "nodes", &quota_nb_entry_per_domain, "Nodes per domain" },
-+	{ "watches", &quota_nb_watch_per_domain, "Watches per domain" },
-+	{ "transactions", &quota_max_transaction, "Transactions per domain" },
-+	{ "outstanding", &quota_req_outstanding,
-+		"Outstanding requests per domain" },
-+	{ "transaction-nodes", &quota_trans_nodes,
-+		"Max. number of accessed nodes per transaction" },
-+	{ "memory", &quota_memory_per_domain_hard,
-+		"Total Xenstore memory per domain (error level)" },
-+	{ "node-size", &quota_max_entry_size, "Max. size of a node" },
-+	{ "path-max", &quota_max_path_len, "Max. length of a node path" },
-+	{ "permissions", &quota_nb_perms_per_node,
-+		"Max. number of permissions per node" },
-+	{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
-+};
-+
-+static const struct quota soft_quotas[] = {
-+	{ "memory", &quota_memory_per_domain_soft,
-+		"Total Xenstore memory per domain (warning level)" },
-+	{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
-+};
-+
-+static int quota_show_current(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			      const struct quota *quotas)
-+{
-+	char *resp;
-+	unsigned int i;
-+
-+	resp = talloc_strdup(ctx, "Quota settings:\n");
-+	if (!resp)
-+		return ENOMEM;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; quotas[i].quota; i++) {
-+		resp = talloc_asprintf_append(resp, "%-17s: %8d %s\n",
-+					      quotas[i].name, *quotas[i].quota,
-+					      quotas[i].descr);
-+		if (!resp)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+	}
-+
-+	send_reply(conn, XS_CONTROL, resp, strlen(resp) + 1);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int quota_set(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		     char **vec, int num, const struct quota *quotas)
-+{
-+	unsigned int i;
-+	int val;
-+
-+	if (num != 2)
-+		return EINVAL;
-+
-+	val = atoi(vec[1]);
-+	if (val < 1)
-+		return EINVAL;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; quotas[i].quota; i++) {
-+		if (!strcmp(vec[0], quotas[i].name)) {
-+			*quotas[i].quota = val;
-+			send_ack(conn, XS_CONTROL);
-+			return 0;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return EINVAL;
-+}
-+
-+static int quota_get(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		     char **vec, int num)
-+{
-+	if (num != 1)
-+		return EINVAL;
-+
-+	return domain_get_quota(ctx, conn, atoi(vec[0]));
-+}
-+
-+static int do_control_quota(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			    char **vec, int num)
-+{
-+	if (num == 0)
-+		return quota_show_current(ctx, conn, hard_quotas);
-+
-+	if (!strcmp(vec[0], "set"))
-+		return quota_set(ctx, conn, vec + 1, num - 1, hard_quotas);
-+
-+	return quota_get(ctx, conn, vec, num);
-+}
-+
-+static int do_control_quota_s(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			      char **vec, int num)
-+{
-+	if (num == 0)
-+		return quota_show_current(ctx, conn, soft_quotas);
-+
-+	if (!strcmp(vec[0], "set"))
-+		return quota_set(ctx, conn, vec + 1, num - 1, soft_quotas);
-+
-+	return EINVAL;
-+}
-+
- #ifdef __MINIOS__
- static int do_control_memreport(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 				char **vec, int num)
-@@ -777,6 +886,8 @@ static struct cmd_s cmds[] = {
- 	{ "memreport", do_control_memreport, "[<file>]" },
- #endif
- 	{ "print", do_control_print, "<string>" },
-+	{ "quota", do_control_quota, "[set <name> <val>|<domid>]" },
-+	{ "quota-soft", do_control_quota_s, "[set <name> <val>]" },
- 	{ "help", do_control_help, "" },
- };
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index ec542df6a67e..3d5142581332 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- #include "xenstored_domain.h"
- #include "xenstored_transaction.h"
- #include "xenstored_watch.h"
-+#include "xenstored_control.h"
- 
- #include <xenevtchn.h>
- #include <xenctrl.h>
-@@ -351,6 +352,38 @@ static struct domain *find_domain_struct(unsigned int domid)
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
-+int domain_get_quota(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		     unsigned int domid)
-+{
-+	struct domain *d = find_domain_struct(domid);
-+	char *resp;
-+	int ta;
-+
-+	if (!d)
-+		return ENOENT;
-+
-+	ta = d->conn ? d->conn->transaction_started : 0;
-+	resp = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "Domain %u:\n", domid);
-+	if (!resp)
-+		return ENOMEM;
-+
-+#define ent(t, e) \
-+	resp = talloc_asprintf_append(resp, "%-16s: %8d\n", #t, e); \
-+	if (!resp) return ENOMEM
-+
-+	ent(nodes, d->nbentry);
-+	ent(watches, d->nbwatch);
-+	ent(transactions, ta);
-+	ent(outstanding, d->nboutstanding);
-+	ent(memory, d->memory);
-+
-+#undef ent
-+
-+	send_reply(conn, XS_CONTROL, resp, strlen(resp) + 1);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static struct domain *alloc_domain(const void *context, unsigned int domid)
- {
- 	struct domain *domain;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-index 571aa46d158e..0f883936f413 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ int domain_watch(struct connection *conn);
- void domain_outstanding_inc(struct connection *conn);
- void domain_outstanding_dec(struct connection *conn);
- void domain_outstanding_domid_dec(unsigned int domid);
-+int domain_get_quota(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		     unsigned int domid);
- 
- /* Special node permission handling. */
- int set_perms_special(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0101-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Synchronise-defaults-with-oxen.patch b/0101-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Synchronise-defaults-with-oxen.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7df76b1..0000000
--- a/0101-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Synchronise-defaults-with-oxen.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From 8fabb963e662a544a397cb2afefb2b15af07ace9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 19:13:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 101/126] tools/ocaml/xenstored: Synchronise defaults with
- oxenstore.conf.in
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-We currently have 2 different set of defaults in upstream Xen git tree:
-* defined in the source code, only used if there is no config file
-* defined in the oxenstored.conf.in upstream Xen
-
-An oxenstored.conf file is not mandatory, and if missing, maxrequests in
-particular has an unsafe default.
-
-Resync the defaults from oxenstored.conf.in into the source code.
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42316.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 84734955d4bf629ba459a74773afcde50a52236f)
----
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml | 6 +++---
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/quota.ml  | 4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-index ebe18b8e312c..6b06f808595b 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ let xs_daemon_socket = Paths.xen_run_stored ^ "/socket"
- 
- let default_config_dir = Paths.xen_config_dir
- 
--let maxwatch = ref (50)
--let maxtransaction = ref (20)
--let maxrequests = ref (-1)   (* maximum requests per transaction *)
-+let maxwatch = ref (100)
-+let maxtransaction = ref (10)
-+let maxrequests = ref (1024)   (* maximum requests per transaction *)
- 
- let conflict_burst_limit = ref 5.0
- let conflict_max_history_seconds = ref 0.05
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/quota.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/quota.ml
-index abcac912805a..6e3d6401ae89 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/quota.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/quota.ml
-@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ exception Transaction_opened
- 
- let warn fmt = Logging.warn "quota" fmt
- let activate = ref true
--let maxent = ref (10000)
--let maxsize = ref (4096)
-+let maxent = ref (1000)
-+let maxsize = ref (2048)
- 
- type t = {
- 	maxent: int;               (* max entities per domU *)
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0102-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Check-for-maxrequests-before-p.patch b/0102-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Check-for-maxrequests-before-p.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bc741ae..0000000
--- a/0102-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Check-for-maxrequests-before-p.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-From 45816222bb3da04f4cd3388efc46d127d48b8906 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2022 17:08:15 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 102/126] tools/ocaml/xenstored: Check for maxrequests before
- performing operations
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Previously we'd perform the operation, record the updated tree in the
-transaction record, then try to insert a watchop path and the reply packet.
-
-If we exceeded max requests we would've returned EQUOTA, but still:
-* have performed the operation on the transaction's tree
-* have recorded the watchop, making this queue effectively unbounded
-
-It is better if we check whether we'd have room to store the operation before
-performing the transaction, and raise EQUOTA there.  Then the transaction
-record won't grow.
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42317.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 329f4d1a6535c6c5a34025ca0d03fc5c7228fcff)
----
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml     |  4 +++-
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/transaction.ml | 16 ++++++++++++----
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-index 27790d4a5c41..dd58e6979cf9 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ let input_handle_error ~cons ~doms ~fct ~con ~t ~req =
- 	let reply_error e =
- 		Packet.Error e in
- 	try
-+		Transaction.check_quota_exn ~perm:(Connection.get_perm con) t;
- 		fct con t doms cons req.Packet.data
- 	with
- 	| Define.Invalid_path          -> reply_error "EINVAL"
-@@ -681,9 +682,10 @@ let process_packet ~store ~cons ~doms ~con ~req =
- 		in
- 
- 		let response = try
-+			Transaction.check_quota_exn ~perm:(Connection.get_perm con) t;
- 			if tid <> Transaction.none then
- 				(* Remember the request and response for this operation in case we need to replay the transaction *)
--				Transaction.add_operation ~perm:(Connection.get_perm con) t req response;
-+				Transaction.add_operation t req response;
- 			response
- 		with Quota.Limit_reached ->
- 			Packet.Error "EQUOTA"
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/transaction.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/transaction.ml
-index 17b1bdf2eaf9..294143e2335b 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/transaction.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/transaction.ml
-@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ type t = {
- 	oldroot: Store.Node.t;
- 	mutable paths: (Xenbus.Xb.Op.operation * Store.Path.t) list;
- 	mutable operations: (Packet.request * Packet.response) list;
-+	mutable quota_reached: bool;
- 	mutable read_lowpath: Store.Path.t option;
- 	mutable write_lowpath: Store.Path.t option;
- }
-@@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ let make ?(internal=false) id store =
- 		oldroot = Store.get_root store;
- 		paths = [];
- 		operations = [];
-+		quota_reached = false;
- 		read_lowpath = None;
- 		write_lowpath = None;
- 	} in
-@@ -143,13 +145,19 @@ let get_root t = Store.get_root t.store
- 
- let is_read_only t = t.paths = []
- let add_wop t ty path = t.paths <- (ty, path) :: t.paths
--let add_operation ~perm t request response =
-+let get_operations t = List.rev t.operations
-+
-+let check_quota_exn ~perm t =
- 	if !Define.maxrequests >= 0
- 		&& not (Perms.Connection.is_dom0 perm)
--		&& List.length t.operations >= !Define.maxrequests
--		then raise Quota.Limit_reached;
-+		&& (t.quota_reached || List.length t.operations >= !Define.maxrequests)
-+		then begin
-+			t.quota_reached <- true;
-+			raise Quota.Limit_reached;
-+		end
-+
-+let add_operation t request response =
- 	t.operations <- (request, response) :: t.operations
--let get_operations t = List.rev t.operations
- let set_read_lowpath t path = t.read_lowpath <- get_lowest path t.read_lowpath
- let set_write_lowpath t path = t.write_lowpath <- get_lowest path t.write_lowpath
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0103-tools-ocaml-GC-parameter-tuning.patch b/0103-tools-ocaml-GC-parameter-tuning.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d1473df..0000000
--- a/0103-tools-ocaml-GC-parameter-tuning.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From 9f89883fabd53cb7873cc31778887ba2a1228dd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 19:13:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 103/126] tools/ocaml: GC parameter tuning
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-By default the OCaml garbage collector would return memory to the OS only
-after unused memory is 5x live memory.  Tweak this to 120% instead, which
-would match the major GC speed.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 4a8bacff20b857ca0d628ef5525877ade11f2a42)
----
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml    |  1 +
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-index 6b06f808595b..ba63a8147e09 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ let maxwatch = ref (100)
- let maxtransaction = ref (10)
- let maxrequests = ref (1024)   (* maximum requests per transaction *)
- 
-+let gc_max_overhead = ref 120 (* 120% see comment in xenstored.ml *)
- let conflict_burst_limit = ref 5.0
- let conflict_max_history_seconds = ref 0.05
- let conflict_rate_limit_is_aggregate = ref true
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml
-index d44ae673c42a..3b57ad016dfb 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml
-@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ let parse_config filename =
- 		("quota-maxsize", Config.Set_int Quota.maxsize);
- 		("quota-maxrequests", Config.Set_int Define.maxrequests);
- 		("quota-path-max", Config.Set_int Define.path_max);
-+		("gc-max-overhead", Config.Set_int Define.gc_max_overhead);
- 		("test-eagain", Config.Set_bool Transaction.test_eagain);
- 		("persistent", Config.Set_bool Disk.enable);
- 		("xenstored-log-file", Config.String Logging.set_xenstored_log_destination);
-@@ -265,6 +266,67 @@ let to_file store cons fds file =
- 	        (fun () -> close_out channel)
- end
- 
-+(*
-+	By default OCaml's GC only returns memory to the OS when it exceeds a
-+	configurable 'max overhead' setting.
-+	The default is 500%, that is 5/6th of the OCaml heap needs to be free
-+	and only 1/6th live for a compaction to be triggerred that would
-+	release memory back to the OS.
-+	If the limit is not hit then the OCaml process can reuse that memory
-+	for its own purposes, but other processes won't be able to use it.
-+
-+	There is also a 'space overhead' setting that controls how much work
-+	each major GC slice does, and by default aims at having no more than
-+	80% or 120% (depending on version) garbage values compared to live
-+	values.
-+	This doesn't have as much relevance to memory returned to the OS as
-+	long as space_overhead <= max_overhead, because compaction is only
-+	triggerred at the end of major GC cycles.
-+
-+	The defaults are too large once the program starts using ~100MiB of
-+	memory, at which point ~500MiB would be unavailable to other processes
-+	(which would be fine if this was the main process in this VM, but it is
-+	not).
-+
-+	Max overhead can also be set to 0, however this is for testing purposes
-+	only (setting it lower than 'space overhead' wouldn't help because the
-+	major GC wouldn't run fast enough, and compaction does have a
-+	performance cost: we can only compact contiguous regions, so memory has
-+	to be moved around).
-+
-+	Max overhead controls how often the heap is compacted, which is useful
-+	if there are burst of activity followed by long periods of idle state,
-+	or if a domain quits, etc. Compaction returns memory to the OS.
-+
-+	wasted = live * space_overhead / 100
-+
-+	For globally overriding the GC settings one can use OCAMLRUNPARAM,
-+	however we provide a config file override to be consistent with other
-+	oxenstored settings.
-+
-+	One might want to dynamically adjust the overhead setting based on used
-+	memory, i.e. to use a fixed upper bound in bytes, not percentage. However
-+	measurements show that such adjustments increase GC overhead massively,
-+	while still not guaranteeing that memory is returned any more quickly
-+	than with a percentage based setting.
-+
-+	The allocation policy could also be tweaked, e.g. first fit would reduce
-+	fragmentation and thus memory usage, but the documentation warns that it
-+	can be sensibly slower, and indeed one of our own testcases can trigger
-+	such a corner case where it is multiple times slower, so it is best to keep
-+	the default allocation policy (next-fit/best-fit depending on version).
-+
-+	There are other tweaks that can be attempted in the future, e.g. setting
-+	'ulimit -v' to 75% of RAM, however getting the kernel to actually return
-+	NULL from allocations is difficult even with that setting, and without a
-+	NULL the emergency GC won't be triggerred.
-+	Perhaps cgroup limits could help, but for now tweak the safest only.
-+*)
-+
-+let tweak_gc () =
-+	Gc.set { (Gc.get ()) with Gc.max_overhead = !Define.gc_max_overhead }
-+
-+
- let _ =
- 	let cf = do_argv in
- 	let pidfile =
-@@ -274,6 +336,8 @@ let _ =
- 			default_pidfile
- 		in
- 
-+	tweak_gc ();
-+
- 	(try
- 		Unixext.mkdir_rec (Filename.dirname pidfile) 0o755
- 	with _ ->
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0104-tools-ocaml-libs-xb-hide-type-of-Xb.t.patch b/0104-tools-ocaml-libs-xb-hide-type-of-Xb.t.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 15f69b0..0000000
--- a/0104-tools-ocaml-libs-xb-hide-type-of-Xb.t.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-From bbb4ceab25124646fa845855f3cb95ae15d0c3f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 18:53:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 104/126] tools/ocaml/libs/xb: hide type of Xb.t
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Hiding the type will make it easier to change the implementation
-in the future without breaking code that relies on it.
-
-No functional change.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 7ade30a1451734d041363c750a65d322e25b47ba)
----
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml           | 3 +++
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli          | 9 ++-------
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml | 8 ++------
- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-index 104d319d7747..8404ddd8a682 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-@@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ let peek_output con = Queue.peek con.pkt_out
- let input_len con = Queue.length con.pkt_in
- let has_in_packet con = Queue.length con.pkt_in > 0
- let get_in_packet con = Queue.pop con.pkt_in
-+let has_partial_input con = match con.partial_in with
-+	| HaveHdr _ -> true
-+	| NoHdr (n, _) -> n < Partial.header_size ()
- let has_more_input con =
- 	match con.backend with
- 	| Fd _         -> false
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-index 3a00da6cddc1..794e35bb343e 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-@@ -66,13 +66,7 @@ type backend_mmap = {
- type backend_fd = { fd : Unix.file_descr; }
- type backend = Fd of backend_fd | Xenmmap of backend_mmap
- type partial_buf = HaveHdr of Partial.pkt | NoHdr of int * bytes
--type t = {
--  backend : backend;
--  pkt_in : Packet.t Queue.t;
--  pkt_out : Packet.t Queue.t;
--  mutable partial_in : partial_buf;
--  mutable partial_out : string;
--}
-+type t
- val init_partial_in : unit -> partial_buf
- val reconnect : t -> unit
- val queue : t -> Packet.t -> unit
-@@ -97,6 +91,7 @@ val has_output : t -> bool
- val peek_output : t -> Packet.t
- val input_len : t -> int
- val has_in_packet : t -> bool
-+val has_partial_input : t -> bool
- val get_in_packet : t -> Packet.t
- val has_more_input : t -> bool
- val is_selectable : t -> bool
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-index 65f99ea6f28a..38b47363a173 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-@@ -125,9 +125,7 @@ let get_perm con =
- let set_target con target_domid =
- 	con.perm <- Perms.Connection.set_target (get_perm con) ~perms:[Perms.READ; Perms.WRITE] target_domid
- 
--let is_backend_mmap con = match con.xb.Xenbus.Xb.backend with
--	| Xenbus.Xb.Xenmmap _ -> true
--	| _ -> false
-+let is_backend_mmap con = Xenbus.Xb.is_mmap con.xb
- 
- let send_reply con tid rid ty data =
- 	if (String.length data) > xenstore_payload_max && (is_backend_mmap con) then
-@@ -280,9 +278,7 @@ let get_transaction con tid =
- 
- let do_input con = Xenbus.Xb.input con.xb
- let has_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_in_packet con.xb
--let has_partial_input con = match con.xb.Xenbus.Xb.partial_in with
--	| HaveHdr _ -> true
--	| NoHdr (n, _) -> n < Xenbus.Partial.header_size ()
-+let has_partial_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_partial_input con.xb
- let pop_in con = Xenbus.Xb.get_in_packet con.xb
- let has_more_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_more_input con.xb
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0105-tools-ocaml-Change-Xb.input-to-return-Packet.t-optio.patch b/0105-tools-ocaml-Change-Xb.input-to-return-Packet.t-optio.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2691ae4..0000000
--- a/0105-tools-ocaml-Change-Xb.input-to-return-Packet.t-optio.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
-From fccdca83a4425b0e30ec9e29e9a5909e1a55b80d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 19:13:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 105/126] tools/ocaml: Change Xb.input to return Packet.t
- option
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The queue here would only ever hold at most one element.  This will simplify
-follow-up patches.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit c0a86a462721008eca5ff733660de094d3c34bc7)
----
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml           | 18 +++++-------------
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli          |  5 +----
- tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml        | 20 ++++++--------------
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml |  4 +---
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml    | 15 +++++++--------
- 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-index 8404ddd8a682..165fd4a1edf4 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ type partial_buf = HaveHdr of Partial.pkt | NoHdr of int * bytes
- type t =
- {
- 	backend: backend;
--	pkt_in: Packet.t Queue.t;
- 	pkt_out: Packet.t Queue.t;
- 	mutable partial_in: partial_buf;
- 	mutable partial_out: string;
-@@ -62,7 +61,6 @@ let reconnect t = match t.backend with
- 		Xs_ring.close backend.mmap;
- 		backend.eventchn_notify ();
- 		(* Clear our old connection state *)
--		Queue.clear t.pkt_in;
- 		Queue.clear t.pkt_out;
- 		t.partial_in <- init_partial_in ();
- 		t.partial_out <- ""
-@@ -124,7 +122,6 @@ let output con =
- 
- (* NB: can throw Reconnect *)
- let input con =
--	let newpacket = ref false in
- 	let to_read =
- 		match con.partial_in with
- 		| HaveHdr partial_pkt -> Partial.to_complete partial_pkt
-@@ -143,21 +140,19 @@ let input con =
- 		if Partial.to_complete partial_pkt = 0 then (
- 			let pkt = Packet.of_partialpkt partial_pkt in
- 			con.partial_in <- init_partial_in ();
--			Queue.push pkt con.pkt_in;
--			newpacket := true
--		)
-+			Some pkt
-+		) else None
- 	| NoHdr (i, buf)      ->
- 		(* we complete the partial header *)
- 		if sz > 0 then
- 			Bytes.blit b 0 buf (Partial.header_size () - i) sz;
- 		con.partial_in <- if sz = i then
--			HaveHdr (Partial.of_string (Bytes.to_string buf)) else NoHdr (i - sz, buf)
--	);
--	!newpacket
-+			HaveHdr (Partial.of_string (Bytes.to_string buf)) else NoHdr (i - sz, buf);
-+		None
-+	)
- 
- let newcon backend = {
- 	backend = backend;
--	pkt_in = Queue.create ();
- 	pkt_out = Queue.create ();
- 	partial_in = init_partial_in ();
- 	partial_out = "";
-@@ -193,9 +188,6 @@ let has_output con = has_new_output con || has_old_output con
- 
- let peek_output con = Queue.peek con.pkt_out
- 
--let input_len con = Queue.length con.pkt_in
--let has_in_packet con = Queue.length con.pkt_in > 0
--let get_in_packet con = Queue.pop con.pkt_in
- let has_partial_input con = match con.partial_in with
- 	| HaveHdr _ -> true
- 	| NoHdr (n, _) -> n < Partial.header_size ()
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-index 794e35bb343e..91c682162cea 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ val write_fd : backend_fd -> 'a -> string -> int -> int
- val write_mmap : backend_mmap -> 'a -> string -> int -> int
- val write : t -> string -> int -> int
- val output : t -> bool
--val input : t -> bool
-+val input : t -> Packet.t option
- val newcon : backend -> t
- val open_fd : Unix.file_descr -> t
- val open_mmap : Xenmmap.mmap_interface -> (unit -> unit) -> t
-@@ -89,10 +89,7 @@ val has_new_output : t -> bool
- val has_old_output : t -> bool
- val has_output : t -> bool
- val peek_output : t -> Packet.t
--val input_len : t -> int
--val has_in_packet : t -> bool
- val has_partial_input : t -> bool
--val get_in_packet : t -> Packet.t
- val has_more_input : t -> bool
- val is_selectable : t -> bool
- val get_fd : t -> Unix.file_descr
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml
-index d982fb24dbb1..451f8b38dbcc 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml
-@@ -94,26 +94,18 @@ let pkt_send con =
- 	done
- 
- (* receive one packet - can sleep *)
--let pkt_recv con =
--	let workdone = ref false in
--	while not !workdone
--	do
--		workdone := Xb.input con.xb
--	done;
--	Xb.get_in_packet con.xb
-+let rec pkt_recv con =
-+	match Xb.input con.xb with
-+	| Some packet -> packet
-+	| None -> pkt_recv con
- 
- let pkt_recv_timeout con timeout =
- 	let fd = Xb.get_fd con.xb in
- 	let r, _, _ = Unix.select [ fd ] [] [] timeout in
- 	if r = [] then
- 		true, None
--	else (
--		let workdone = Xb.input con.xb in
--		if workdone then
--			false, (Some (Xb.get_in_packet con.xb))
--		else
--			false, None
--	)
-+	else
-+		false, Xb.input con.xb
- 
- let queue_watchevent con data =
- 	let ls = split_string ~limit:2 '\000' data in
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-index 38b47363a173..cc20e047d2b9 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-@@ -277,9 +277,7 @@ let get_transaction con tid =
- 	Hashtbl.find con.transactions tid
- 
- let do_input con = Xenbus.Xb.input con.xb
--let has_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_in_packet con.xb
- let has_partial_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_partial_input con.xb
--let pop_in con = Xenbus.Xb.get_in_packet con.xb
- let has_more_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_more_input con.xb
- 
- let has_output con = Xenbus.Xb.has_output con.xb
-@@ -307,7 +305,7 @@ let is_bad con = match con.dom with None -> false | Some dom -> Domain.is_bad_do
-    Restrictions below can be relaxed once xenstored learns to dump more
-    of its live state in a safe way *)
- let has_extra_connection_data con =
--	let has_in = has_input con || has_partial_input con in
-+	let has_in = has_partial_input con in
- 	let has_out = has_output con in
- 	let has_socket = con.dom = None in
- 	let has_nondefault_perms = make_perm con.dom <> con.perm in
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-index dd58e6979cf9..cbf708213796 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-@@ -195,10 +195,9 @@ let parse_live_update args =
- 			| _ when Unix.gettimeofday () < t.deadline -> false
- 			| l ->
- 				warn "timeout reached: have to wait, migrate or shutdown %d domains:" (List.length l);
--				let msgs = List.rev_map (fun con -> Printf.sprintf "%s: %d tx, in: %b, out: %b, perm: %s"
-+				let msgs = List.rev_map (fun con -> Printf.sprintf "%s: %d tx, out: %b, perm: %s"
- 					(Connection.get_domstr con)
- 					(Connection.number_of_transactions con)
--					(Connection.has_input con)
- 					(Connection.has_output con)
- 					(Connection.get_perm con |> Perms.Connection.to_string)
- 					) l in
-@@ -706,16 +705,17 @@ let do_input store cons doms con =
- 			info "%s requests a reconnect" (Connection.get_domstr con);
- 			History.reconnect con;
- 			info "%s reconnection complete" (Connection.get_domstr con);
--			false
-+			None
- 		| Failure exp ->
- 			error "caught exception %s" exp;
- 			error "got a bad client %s" (sprintf "%-8s" (Connection.get_domstr con));
- 			Connection.mark_as_bad con;
--			false
-+			None
- 	in
- 
--	if newpacket then (
--		let packet = Connection.pop_in con in
-+	match newpacket with
-+	| None -> ()
-+	| Some packet ->
- 		let tid, rid, ty, data = Xenbus.Xb.Packet.unpack packet in
- 		let req = {Packet.tid=tid; Packet.rid=rid; Packet.ty=ty; Packet.data=data} in
- 
-@@ -725,8 +725,7 @@ let do_input store cons doms con =
- 		         (Xenbus.Xb.Op.to_string ty) (sanitize_data data); *)
- 		process_packet ~store ~cons ~doms ~con ~req;
- 		write_access_log ~ty ~tid ~con:(Connection.get_domstr con) ~data;
--		Connection.incr_ops con;
--	)
-+		Connection.incr_ops con
- 
- let do_output _store _cons _doms con =
- 	if Connection.has_output con then (
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0106-tools-ocaml-xb-Add-BoundedQueue.patch b/0106-tools-ocaml-xb-Add-BoundedQueue.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c1f0385..0000000
--- a/0106-tools-ocaml-xb-Add-BoundedQueue.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-From 9e5290daf923e84ca56a6f3d9fc6a333175ef0f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 19:13:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 106/126] tools/ocaml/xb: Add BoundedQueue
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Ensures we cannot store more than [capacity] elements in a [Queue].  Replacing
-all Queue with this module will then ensure at compile time that all Queues
-are correctly bound checked.
-
-Each element in the queue has a class with its own limits.  This, in a
-subsequent change, will ensure that command responses can proceed during a
-flood of watch events.
-
-No functional change.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 19171fb5d888b4467a7073e8febc5e05540956e9)
----
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-index 165fd4a1edf4..4197a3888a68 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-@@ -17,6 +17,98 @@
- module Op = struct include Op end
- module Packet = struct include Packet end
- 
-+module BoundedQueue : sig
-+	type ('a, 'b) t
-+
-+	(** [create ~capacity ~classify ~limit] creates a queue with maximum [capacity] elements.
-+	    This is burst capacity, each element is further classified according to [classify],
-+	    and each class can have its own [limit].
-+	    [capacity] is enforced as an overall limit.
-+	    The [limit] can be dynamic, and can be smaller than the number of elements already queued of that class,
-+	    in which case those elements are considered to use "burst capacity".
-+	  *)
-+	val create: capacity:int -> classify:('a -> 'b) -> limit:('b -> int) -> ('a, 'b) t
-+
-+	(** [clear q] discards all elements from [q] *)
-+	val clear: ('a, 'b) t -> unit
-+
-+	(** [can_push q] when [length q < capacity].	*)
-+	val can_push: ('a, 'b) t -> 'b -> bool
-+
-+	(** [push e q] adds [e] at the end of queue [q] if [can_push q], or returns [None]. *)
-+	val push: 'a -> ('a, 'b) t -> unit option
-+
-+	(** [pop q] removes and returns first element in [q], or raises [Queue.Empty]. *)
-+	val pop: ('a, 'b) t -> 'a
-+
-+	(** [peek q] returns the first element in [q], or raises [Queue.Empty].  *)
-+	val peek : ('a, 'b) t -> 'a
-+
-+	(** [length q] returns the current number of elements in [q] *)
-+	val length: ('a, 'b) t -> int
-+
-+	(** [debug string_of_class q] prints queue usage statistics in an unspecified internal format. *)
-+	val debug: ('b -> string) -> (_, 'b) t -> string
-+end = struct
-+	type ('a, 'b) t =
-+		{ q: 'a Queue.t
-+		; capacity: int
-+		; classify: 'a -> 'b
-+		; limit: 'b -> int
-+		; class_count: ('b, int) Hashtbl.t
-+		}
-+
-+	let create ~capacity ~classify ~limit =
-+		{ capacity; q = Queue.create (); classify; limit; class_count = Hashtbl.create 3 }
-+
-+	let get_count t classification = try Hashtbl.find t.class_count classification with Not_found -> 0
-+
-+	let can_push_internal t classification class_count =
-+		Queue.length t.q < t.capacity && class_count < t.limit classification
-+
-+	let ok = Some ()
-+
-+	let push e t =
-+		let classification = t.classify e in
-+		let class_count = get_count t classification in
-+		if can_push_internal t classification class_count then begin
-+			Queue.push e t.q;
-+			Hashtbl.replace t.class_count classification (class_count + 1);
-+			ok
-+		end
-+		else
-+			None
-+
-+	let can_push t classification =
-+		can_push_internal t classification @@ get_count t classification
-+
-+	let clear t =
-+		Queue.clear t.q;
-+		Hashtbl.reset t.class_count
-+
-+	let pop t =
-+		let e = Queue.pop t.q in
-+		let classification = t.classify e in
-+		let () = match get_count t classification - 1 with
-+		| 0 -> Hashtbl.remove t.class_count classification (* reduces memusage *)
-+		| n -> Hashtbl.replace t.class_count classification n
-+		in
-+		e
-+
-+	let peek t = Queue.peek t.q
-+	let length t = Queue.length t.q
-+
-+	let debug string_of_class t =
-+		let b = Buffer.create 128 in
-+		Printf.bprintf b "BoundedQueue capacity: %d, used: {" t.capacity;
-+		Hashtbl.iter (fun packet_class count ->
-+			Printf.bprintf b "	%s: %d" (string_of_class packet_class) count
-+		) t.class_count;
-+		Printf.bprintf b "}";
-+		Buffer.contents b
-+end
-+
-+
- exception End_of_file
- exception Eagain
- exception Noent
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0107-tools-ocaml-Limit-maximum-in-flight-requests-outstan.patch b/0107-tools-ocaml-Limit-maximum-in-flight-requests-outstan.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5f5c4b6..0000000
--- a/0107-tools-ocaml-Limit-maximum-in-flight-requests-outstan.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,888 +0,0 @@
-From 64048b4c218099b6adcf46cd7b4d1dc9c658009e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 19:13:04 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 107/126] tools/ocaml: Limit maximum in-flight requests /
- outstanding replies
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Introduce a limit on the number of outstanding reply packets in the xenbus
-queue.  This limits the number of in-flight requests: when the output queue is
-full we'll stop processing inputs until the output queue has room again.
-
-To avoid a busy loop on the Unix socket we only add it to the watched input
-file descriptor set if we'd be able to call `input` on it.  Even though Dom0
-is trusted and exempt from quotas a flood of events might cause a backlog
-where events are produced faster than daemons in Dom0 can consume them, which
-could lead to an unbounded queue size and OOM.
-
-Therefore the xenbus queue limit must apply to all connections, Dom0 is not
-exempt from it, although if everything works correctly it will eventually
-catch up.
-
-This prevents a malicious guest from sending more commands while it has
-outstanding watch events or command replies in its input ring.  However if it
-can cause the generation of watch events by other means (e.g. by Dom0, or
-another cooperative guest) and stop reading its own ring then watch events
-would've queued up without limit.
-
-The xenstore protocol doesn't have a back-pressure mechanism, and doesn't
-allow dropping watch events.  In fact, dropping watch events is known to break
-some pieces of normal functionality.  This leaves little choice to safely
-implement the xenstore protocol without exposing the xenstore daemon to
-out-of-memory attacks.
-
-Implement the fix as pipes with bounded buffers:
-* Use a bounded buffer for watch events
-* The watch structure will have a bounded receiving pipe of watch events
-* The source will have an "overflow" pipe of pending watch events it couldn't
-  deliver
-
-Items are queued up on one end and are sent as far along the pipe as possible:
-
-  source domain -> watch -> xenbus of target -> xenstore ring/socket of target
-
-If the pipe is "full" at any point then back-pressure is applied and we prevent
-more items from being queued up.  For the source domain this means that we'll
-stop accepting new commands as long as its pipe buffer is not empty.
-
-Before we try to enqueue an item we first check whether it is possible to send
-it further down the pipe, by attempting to recursively flush the pipes. This
-ensures that we retain the order of events as much as possible.
-
-We might break causality of watch events if the target domain's queue is full
-and we need to start using the watch's queue.  This is a breaking change in
-the xenstore protocol, but only for domains which are not processing their
-incoming ring as expected.
-
-When a watch is deleted its entire pending queue is dropped (no code is needed
-for that, because it is part of the 'watch' type).
-
-There is a cache of watches that have pending events that we attempt to flush
-at every cycle if possible.
-
-Introduce 3 limits here:
-* quota-maxwatchevents on watch event destination: when this is hit the
-  source will not be allowed to queue up more watch events.
-* quota-maxoustanding which is the number of responses not read from the ring:
-  once exceeded, no more inputs are processed until all outstanding replies
-  are consumed by the client.
-* overflow queue on the watch event source: all watches that cannot be stored
-  on destination are queued up here, a single command can trigger multiple
-  watches (e.g. due to recursion).
-
-The overflow queue currently doesn't have an upper bound, it is difficult to
-accurately calculate one as it depends on whether you are Dom0 and how many
-watches each path has registered and how many watch events you can trigger
-with a single command (e.g. a commit).  However these events were already
-using memory, this just moves them elsewhere, and as long as we correctly
-block a domain it shouldn't result in unbounded memory usage.
-
-Note that Dom0 is not excluded from these checks, it is important that Dom0 is
-especially not excluded when it is the source, since there are many ways in
-which a guest could trigger Dom0 to send it watch events.
-
-This should protect against malicious frontends as long as the backend follows
-the PV xenstore protocol and only exposes paths needed by the frontend, and
-changes those paths at most once as a reaction to guest events, or protocol
-state.
-
-The queue limits are per watch, and per domain-pair, so even if one
-communication channel would be "blocked", others would keep working, and the
-domain itself won't get blocked as long as it doesn't overflow the queue of
-watch events.
-
-Similarly a malicious backend could cause the frontend to get blocked, but
-this watch queue protects the frontend as well as long as it follows the PV
-protocol.  (Although note that protection against malicious backends is only a
-best effort at the moment)
-
-This is part of XSA-326 / CVE-2022-42318.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9284ae0c40fb5b9606947eaaec23dc71d0540e96)
----
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml                |  61 +++++++--
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli               |  11 +-
- tools/ocaml/libs/xs/queueop.ml           |  25 ++--
- tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml             |   4 +-
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml      | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++--
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/connections.ml     |  57 +++++++--
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml          |   7 +
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/oxenstored.conf.in |   2 +
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml         |  31 ++++-
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml       |   2 +
- 10 files changed, 296 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-index 4197a3888a68..b292ed7a874d 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.ml
-@@ -134,14 +134,44 @@ type backend = Fd of backend_fd | Xenmmap of backend_mmap
- 
- type partial_buf = HaveHdr of Partial.pkt | NoHdr of int * bytes
- 
-+(*
-+	separate capacity reservation for replies and watch events:
-+	this allows a domain to keep working even when under a constant flood of
-+	watch events
-+*)
-+type capacity = { maxoutstanding: int; maxwatchevents: int }
-+
-+module Queue = BoundedQueue
-+
-+type packet_class =
-+	| CommandReply
-+	| Watchevent
-+
-+let string_of_packet_class = function
-+	| CommandReply -> "command_reply"
-+	| Watchevent -> "watch_event"
-+
- type t =
- {
- 	backend: backend;
--	pkt_out: Packet.t Queue.t;
-+	pkt_out: (Packet.t, packet_class) Queue.t;
- 	mutable partial_in: partial_buf;
- 	mutable partial_out: string;
-+	capacity: capacity
- }
- 
-+let to_read con =
-+	match con.partial_in with
-+		| HaveHdr partial_pkt -> Partial.to_complete partial_pkt
-+		| NoHdr   (i, _)    -> i
-+
-+let debug t =
-+	Printf.sprintf "XenBus state: partial_in: %d needed, partial_out: %d bytes, pkt_out: %d packets, %s"
-+		(to_read t)
-+		(String.length t.partial_out)
-+		(Queue.length t.pkt_out)
-+		(BoundedQueue.debug string_of_packet_class t.pkt_out)
-+
- let init_partial_in () = NoHdr
- 	(Partial.header_size (), Bytes.make (Partial.header_size()) '\000')
- 
-@@ -199,7 +229,8 @@ let output con =
- 	let s = if String.length con.partial_out > 0 then
- 			con.partial_out
- 		else if Queue.length con.pkt_out > 0 then
--			Packet.to_string (Queue.pop con.pkt_out)
-+			let pkt = Queue.pop con.pkt_out in
-+			Packet.to_string pkt
- 		else
- 			"" in
- 	(* send data from s, and save the unsent data to partial_out *)
-@@ -212,12 +243,15 @@ let output con =
- 	(* after sending one packet, partial is empty *)
- 	con.partial_out = ""
- 
-+(* we can only process an input packet if we're guaranteed to have room
-+   to store the response packet *)
-+let can_input con = Queue.can_push con.pkt_out CommandReply
-+
- (* NB: can throw Reconnect *)
- let input con =
--	let to_read =
--		match con.partial_in with
--		| HaveHdr partial_pkt -> Partial.to_complete partial_pkt
--		| NoHdr   (i, _)    -> i in
-+	if not (can_input con) then None
-+	else
-+	let to_read = to_read con in
- 
- 	(* try to get more data from input stream *)
- 	let b = Bytes.make to_read '\000' in
-@@ -243,11 +277,22 @@ let input con =
- 		None
- 	)
- 
--let newcon backend = {
-+let classify t =
-+	match t.Packet.ty with
-+	| Op.Watchevent -> Watchevent
-+	| _ -> CommandReply
-+
-+let newcon ~capacity backend =
-+	let limit = function
-+		| CommandReply -> capacity.maxoutstanding
-+		| Watchevent -> capacity.maxwatchevents
-+	in
-+	{
- 	backend = backend;
--	pkt_out = Queue.create ();
-+	pkt_out = Queue.create ~capacity:(capacity.maxoutstanding + capacity.maxwatchevents) ~classify ~limit;
- 	partial_in = init_partial_in ();
- 	partial_out = "";
-+	capacity = capacity;
- 	}
- 
- let open_fd fd = newcon (Fd { fd = fd; })
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-index 91c682162cea..71b2754ca788 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xb.mli
-@@ -66,10 +66,11 @@ type backend_mmap = {
- type backend_fd = { fd : Unix.file_descr; }
- type backend = Fd of backend_fd | Xenmmap of backend_mmap
- type partial_buf = HaveHdr of Partial.pkt | NoHdr of int * bytes
-+type capacity = { maxoutstanding: int; maxwatchevents: int }
- type t
- val init_partial_in : unit -> partial_buf
- val reconnect : t -> unit
--val queue : t -> Packet.t -> unit
-+val queue : t -> Packet.t -> unit option
- val read_fd : backend_fd -> 'a -> bytes -> int -> int
- val read_mmap : backend_mmap -> 'a -> bytes -> int -> int
- val read : t -> bytes -> int -> int
-@@ -78,13 +79,14 @@ val write_mmap : backend_mmap -> 'a -> string -> int -> int
- val write : t -> string -> int -> int
- val output : t -> bool
- val input : t -> Packet.t option
--val newcon : backend -> t
--val open_fd : Unix.file_descr -> t
--val open_mmap : Xenmmap.mmap_interface -> (unit -> unit) -> t
-+val newcon : capacity:capacity -> backend -> t
-+val open_fd : Unix.file_descr -> capacity:capacity -> t
-+val open_mmap : Xenmmap.mmap_interface -> (unit -> unit) -> capacity:capacity -> t
- val close : t -> unit
- val is_fd : t -> bool
- val is_mmap : t -> bool
- val output_len : t -> int
-+val can_input: t -> bool
- val has_new_output : t -> bool
- val has_old_output : t -> bool
- val has_output : t -> bool
-@@ -93,3 +95,4 @@ val has_partial_input : t -> bool
- val has_more_input : t -> bool
- val is_selectable : t -> bool
- val get_fd : t -> Unix.file_descr
-+val debug: t -> string
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/queueop.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/queueop.ml
-index 9ff5bbd529ce..4e532cdaeacb 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/queueop.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/queueop.ml
-@@ -16,9 +16,10 @@
- open Xenbus
- 
- let data_concat ls = (String.concat "\000" ls) ^ "\000"
-+let queue con pkt = let r = Xb.queue con pkt in assert (r <> None)
- let queue_path ty (tid: int) (path: string) con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ path; ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 ty data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 ty data)
- 
- (* operations *)
- let directory tid path con = queue_path Xb.Op.Directory tid path con
-@@ -27,48 +28,48 @@ let read tid path con = queue_path Xb.Op.Read tid path con
- let getperms tid path con = queue_path Xb.Op.Getperms tid path con
- 
- let debug commands con =
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Debug (data_concat commands))
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Debug (data_concat commands))
- 
- let watch path data con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ path; data; ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Watch data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Watch data)
- 
- let unwatch path data con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ path; data; ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Unwatch data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Unwatch data)
- 
- let transaction_start con =
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Transaction_start (data_concat []))
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Transaction_start (data_concat []))
- 
- let transaction_end tid commit con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ (if commit then "T" else "F"); ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 Xb.Op.Transaction_end data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 Xb.Op.Transaction_end data)
- 
- let introduce domid mfn port con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ Printf.sprintf "%u" domid;
- 	                         Printf.sprintf "%nu" mfn;
- 	                         string_of_int port; ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Introduce data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Introduce data)
- 
- let release domid con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ Printf.sprintf "%u" domid; ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Release data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Release data)
- 
- let resume domid con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ Printf.sprintf "%u" domid; ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Resume data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Resume data)
- 
- let getdomainpath domid con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ Printf.sprintf "%u" domid; ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Getdomainpath data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create 0 0 Xb.Op.Getdomainpath data)
- 
- let write tid path value con =
- 	let data = path ^ "\000" ^ value (* no NULL at the end *) in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 Xb.Op.Write data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 Xb.Op.Write data)
- 
- let mkdir tid path con = queue_path Xb.Op.Mkdir tid path con
- let rm tid path con = queue_path Xb.Op.Rm tid path con
- 
- let setperms tid path perms con =
- 	let data = data_concat [ path; perms ] in
--	Xb.queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 Xb.Op.Setperms data)
-+	queue con (Xb.Packet.create tid 0 Xb.Op.Setperms data)
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml
-index 451f8b38dbcc..cbd17280600c 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xs/xsraw.ml
-@@ -36,8 +36,10 @@ type con = {
- let close con =
- 	Xb.close con.xb
- 
-+let capacity = { Xb.maxoutstanding = 1; maxwatchevents = 0; }
-+
- let open_fd fd = {
--	xb = Xb.open_fd fd;
-+	xb = Xb.open_fd ~capacity fd;
- 	watchevents = Queue.create ();
- }
- 
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-index cc20e047d2b9..9624a5f9da2c 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connection.ml
-@@ -20,12 +20,84 @@ open Stdext
- 
- let xenstore_payload_max = 4096 (* xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h *)
- 
-+type 'a bounded_sender = 'a -> unit option
-+(** a bounded sender accepts an ['a] item and returns:
-+    None - if there is no room to accept the item
-+    Some () -  if it has successfully accepted/sent the item
-+ *)
-+
-+module BoundedPipe : sig
-+	type 'a t
-+
-+	(** [create ~capacity ~destination] creates a bounded pipe with a
-+	    local buffer holding at most [capacity] items.  Once the buffer is
-+	    full it will not accept further items.  items from the pipe are
-+	    flushed into [destination] as long as it accepts items.  The
-+	    destination could be another pipe.
-+	 *)
-+	val create: capacity:int -> destination:'a bounded_sender -> 'a t
-+
-+	(** [is_empty t] returns whether the local buffer of [t] is empty. *)
-+	val is_empty : _ t -> bool
-+
-+	(** [length t] the number of items in the internal buffer *)
-+	val length: _ t -> int
-+
-+	(** [flush_pipe t] sends as many items from the local buffer as possible,
-+			which could be none. *)
-+	val flush_pipe: _ t -> unit
-+
-+	(** [push t item] tries to [flush_pipe] and then push [item]
-+	    into the pipe if its [capacity] allows.
-+	    Returns [None] if there is no more room
-+	 *)
-+	val push : 'a t -> 'a bounded_sender
-+end = struct
-+	(* items are enqueued in [q], and then flushed to [connect_to] *)
-+	type 'a t =
-+		{ q: 'a Queue.t
-+		; destination: 'a bounded_sender
-+		; capacity: int
-+		}
-+
-+	let create ~capacity ~destination =
-+		{ q = Queue.create (); capacity; destination }
-+
-+	let rec flush_pipe t =
-+		if not Queue.(is_empty t.q) then
-+			let item = Queue.peek t.q in
-+			match t.destination item with
-+			| None -> () (* no room *)
-+			| Some () ->
-+				(* successfully sent item to next stage *)
-+				let _ = Queue.pop t.q in
-+				(* continue trying to send more items *)
-+				flush_pipe t
-+
-+	let push t item =
-+		(* first try to flush as many items from this pipe as possible to make room,
-+		   it is important to do this first to preserve the order of the items
-+		 *)
-+		flush_pipe t;
-+		if Queue.length t.q < t.capacity then begin
-+			(* enqueue, instead of sending directly.
-+			   this ensures that [out] sees the items in the same order as we receive them
-+			 *)
-+			Queue.push item t.q;
-+			Some (flush_pipe t)
-+		end else None
-+
-+	let is_empty t = Queue.is_empty t.q
-+	let length t = Queue.length t.q
-+end
-+
- type watch = {
- 	con: t;
- 	token: string;
- 	path: string;
- 	base: string;
- 	is_relative: bool;
-+	pending_watchevents: Xenbus.Xb.Packet.t BoundedPipe.t;
- }
- 
- and t = {
-@@ -38,8 +110,36 @@ and t = {
- 	anonid: int;
- 	mutable stat_nb_ops: int;
- 	mutable perm: Perms.Connection.t;
-+	pending_source_watchevents: (watch * Xenbus.Xb.Packet.t) BoundedPipe.t
- }
- 
-+module Watch = struct
-+	module T = struct
-+		type t = watch
-+
-+		let compare w1 w2 =
-+			(* cannot compare watches from different connections *)
-+			assert (w1.con == w2.con);
-+			match String.compare w1.token w2.token with
-+			| 0 -> String.compare w1.path w2.path
-+			| n -> n
-+	end
-+	module Set = Set.Make(T)
-+
-+	let flush_events t =
-+		BoundedPipe.flush_pipe t.pending_watchevents;
-+		not (BoundedPipe.is_empty t.pending_watchevents)
-+
-+	let pending_watchevents t =
-+		BoundedPipe.length t.pending_watchevents
-+end
-+
-+let source_flush_watchevents t =
-+	BoundedPipe.flush_pipe t.pending_source_watchevents
-+
-+let source_pending_watchevents t =
-+	BoundedPipe.length t.pending_source_watchevents
-+
- let mark_as_bad con =
- 	match con.dom with
- 	|None -> ()
-@@ -67,7 +167,8 @@ let watch_create ~con ~path ~token = {
- 	token = token;
- 	path = path;
- 	base = get_path con;
--	is_relative = path.[0] <> '/' && path.[0] <> '@'
-+	is_relative = path.[0] <> '/' && path.[0] <> '@';
-+	pending_watchevents = BoundedPipe.create ~capacity:!Define.maxwatchevents ~destination:(Xenbus.Xb.queue con.xb)
- }
- 
- let get_con w = w.con
-@@ -93,6 +194,9 @@ let make_perm dom =
- 	Perms.Connection.create ~perms:[Perms.READ; Perms.WRITE] domid
- 
- let create xbcon dom =
-+	let destination (watch, pkt) =
-+		BoundedPipe.push watch.pending_watchevents pkt
-+	in
- 	let id =
- 		match dom with
- 		| None -> let old = !anon_id_next in incr anon_id_next; old
-@@ -109,6 +213,16 @@ let create xbcon dom =
- 	anonid = id;
- 	stat_nb_ops = 0;
- 	perm = make_perm dom;
-+
-+	(* the actual capacity will be lower, this is used as an overflow
-+	   buffer: anything that doesn't fit elsewhere gets put here, only
-+	   limited by the amount of watches that you can generate with a
-+	   single xenstore command (which is finite, although possibly very
-+	   large in theory for Dom0).  Once the pipe here has any contents the
-+	   domain is blocked from sending more commands until it is empty
-+	   again though.
-+	 *)
-+	pending_source_watchevents = BoundedPipe.create ~capacity:Sys.max_array_length ~destination
- 	}
- 	in
- 	Logging.new_connection ~tid:Transaction.none ~con:(get_domstr con);
-@@ -127,11 +241,17 @@ let set_target con target_domid =
- 
- let is_backend_mmap con = Xenbus.Xb.is_mmap con.xb
- 
--let send_reply con tid rid ty data =
-+let packet_of con tid rid ty data =
- 	if (String.length data) > xenstore_payload_max && (is_backend_mmap con) then
--		Xenbus.Xb.queue con.xb (Xenbus.Xb.Packet.create tid rid Xenbus.Xb.Op.Error "E2BIG\000")
-+		Xenbus.Xb.Packet.create tid rid Xenbus.Xb.Op.Error "E2BIG\000"
- 	else
--		Xenbus.Xb.queue con.xb (Xenbus.Xb.Packet.create tid rid ty data)
-+		Xenbus.Xb.Packet.create tid rid ty data
-+
-+let send_reply con tid rid ty data =
-+	let result = Xenbus.Xb.queue con.xb (packet_of con tid rid ty data) in
-+	(* should never happen: we only process an input packet when there is room for an output packet *)
-+	(* and the limit for replies is different from the limit for watch events *)
-+	assert (result <> None)
- 
- let send_error con tid rid err = send_reply con tid rid Xenbus.Xb.Op.Error (err ^ "\000")
- let send_ack con tid rid ty = send_reply con tid rid ty "OK\000"
-@@ -181,11 +301,11 @@ let del_watch con path token =
- 	apath, w
- 
- let del_watches con =
--  Hashtbl.clear con.watches;
-+  Hashtbl.reset con.watches;
-   con.nb_watches <- 0
- 
- let del_transactions con =
--  Hashtbl.clear con.transactions
-+  Hashtbl.reset con.transactions
- 
- let list_watches con =
- 	let ll = Hashtbl.fold
-@@ -208,21 +328,29 @@ let lookup_watch_perm path = function
- let lookup_watch_perms oldroot root path =
- 	lookup_watch_perm path oldroot @ lookup_watch_perm path (Some root)
- 
--let fire_single_watch_unchecked watch =
-+let fire_single_watch_unchecked source watch =
- 	let data = Utils.join_by_null [watch.path; watch.token; ""] in
--	send_reply watch.con Transaction.none 0 Xenbus.Xb.Op.Watchevent data
-+	let pkt = packet_of watch.con Transaction.none 0 Xenbus.Xb.Op.Watchevent data in
- 
--let fire_single_watch (oldroot, root) watch =
-+	match BoundedPipe.push source.pending_source_watchevents (watch, pkt) with
-+	| Some () -> () (* packet queued *)
-+	| None ->
-+			(* a well behaved Dom0 shouldn't be able to trigger this,
-+			   if it happens it is likely a Dom0 bug causing runaway memory usage
-+			 *)
-+			failwith "watch event overflow, cannot happen"
-+
-+let fire_single_watch source (oldroot, root) watch =
- 	let abspath = get_watch_path watch.con watch.path |> Store.Path.of_string in
- 	let perms = lookup_watch_perms oldroot root abspath in
- 	if Perms.can_fire_watch watch.con.perm perms then
--		fire_single_watch_unchecked watch
-+		fire_single_watch_unchecked source watch
- 	else
- 		let perms = perms |> List.map (Perms.Node.to_string ~sep:" ") |> String.concat ", " in
- 		let con = get_domstr watch.con in
- 		Logging.watch_not_fired ~con perms (Store.Path.to_string abspath)
- 
--let fire_watch roots watch path =
-+let fire_watch source roots watch path =
- 	let new_path =
- 		if watch.is_relative && path.[0] = '/'
- 		then begin
-@@ -232,7 +360,7 @@ let fire_watch roots watch path =
- 		end else
- 			path
- 	in
--	fire_single_watch roots { watch with path = new_path }
-+	fire_single_watch source roots { watch with path = new_path }
- 
- (* Search for a valid unused transaction id. *)
- let rec valid_transaction_id con proposed_id =
-@@ -280,6 +408,7 @@ let do_input con = Xenbus.Xb.input con.xb
- let has_partial_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_partial_input con.xb
- let has_more_input con = Xenbus.Xb.has_more_input con.xb
- 
-+let can_input con = Xenbus.Xb.can_input con.xb && BoundedPipe.is_empty con.pending_source_watchevents
- let has_output con = Xenbus.Xb.has_output con.xb
- let has_old_output con = Xenbus.Xb.has_old_output con.xb
- let has_new_output con = Xenbus.Xb.has_new_output con.xb
-@@ -323,7 +452,7 @@ let prevents_live_update con = not (is_bad con)
- 	&& (has_extra_connection_data con || has_transaction_data con)
- 
- let has_more_work con =
--	has_more_input con || not (has_old_output con) && has_new_output con
-+	(has_more_input con && can_input con) || not (has_old_output con) && has_new_output con
- 
- let incr_ops con = con.stat_nb_ops <- con.stat_nb_ops + 1
- 
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connections.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connections.ml
-index 3c7429fe7f61..7d68c583b43a 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connections.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/connections.ml
-@@ -22,22 +22,30 @@ type t = {
- 	domains: (int, Connection.t) Hashtbl.t;
- 	ports: (Xeneventchn.t, Connection.t) Hashtbl.t;
- 	mutable watches: Connection.watch list Trie.t;
-+	mutable has_pending_watchevents: Connection.Watch.Set.t
- }
- 
- let create () = {
- 	anonymous = Hashtbl.create 37;
- 	domains = Hashtbl.create 37;
- 	ports = Hashtbl.create 37;
--	watches = Trie.create ()
-+	watches = Trie.create ();
-+	has_pending_watchevents = Connection.Watch.Set.empty;
- }
- 
-+let get_capacity () =
-+	(* not multiplied by maxwatch on purpose: 2nd queue in watch itself! *)
-+	{ Xenbus.Xb.maxoutstanding = !Define.maxoutstanding; maxwatchevents = !Define.maxwatchevents }
-+
- let add_anonymous cons fd =
--	let xbcon = Xenbus.Xb.open_fd fd in
-+	let capacity = get_capacity () in
-+	let xbcon = Xenbus.Xb.open_fd fd ~capacity in
- 	let con = Connection.create xbcon None in
- 	Hashtbl.add cons.anonymous (Xenbus.Xb.get_fd xbcon) con
- 
- let add_domain cons dom =
--	let xbcon = Xenbus.Xb.open_mmap (Domain.get_interface dom) (fun () -> Domain.notify dom) in
-+	let capacity = get_capacity () in
-+	let xbcon = Xenbus.Xb.open_mmap ~capacity (Domain.get_interface dom) (fun () -> Domain.notify dom) in
- 	let con = Connection.create xbcon (Some dom) in
- 	Hashtbl.add cons.domains (Domain.get_id dom) con;
- 	match Domain.get_port dom with
-@@ -48,7 +56,9 @@ let select ?(only_if = (fun _ -> true)) cons =
- 	Hashtbl.fold (fun _ con (ins, outs) ->
- 		if (only_if con) then (
- 			let fd = Connection.get_fd con in
--			(fd :: ins,  if Connection.has_output con then fd :: outs else outs)
-+			let in_fds = if Connection.can_input con then fd :: ins else ins in
-+			let out_fds = if Connection.has_output con then fd :: outs else outs in
-+			in_fds, out_fds
- 		) else (ins, outs)
- 	)
- 	cons.anonymous ([], [])
-@@ -67,10 +77,17 @@ let del_watches_of_con con watches =
- 	| [] -> None
- 	| ws -> Some ws
- 
-+let del_watches cons con =
-+	Connection.del_watches con;
-+	cons.watches <- Trie.map (del_watches_of_con con) cons.watches;
-+	cons.has_pending_watchevents <-
-+		cons.has_pending_watchevents |> Connection.Watch.Set.filter @@ fun w ->
-+		Connection.get_con w != con
-+
- let del_anonymous cons con =
- 	try
- 		Hashtbl.remove cons.anonymous (Connection.get_fd con);
--		cons.watches <- Trie.map (del_watches_of_con con) cons.watches;
-+		del_watches cons con;
- 		Connection.close con
- 	with exn ->
- 		debug "del anonymous %s" (Printexc.to_string exn)
-@@ -85,7 +102,7 @@ let del_domain cons id =
- 		    | Some p -> Hashtbl.remove cons.ports p
- 		    | None -> ())
- 		 | None -> ());
--		cons.watches <- Trie.map (del_watches_of_con con) cons.watches;
-+		del_watches cons con;
- 		Connection.close con
- 	with exn ->
- 		debug "del domain %u: %s" id (Printexc.to_string exn)
-@@ -136,31 +153,33 @@ let del_watch cons con path token =
- 		cons.watches <- Trie.set cons.watches key watches;
-  	watch
- 
--let del_watches cons con =
--	Connection.del_watches con;
--	cons.watches <- Trie.map (del_watches_of_con con) cons.watches
--
- (* path is absolute *)
--let fire_watches ?oldroot root cons path recurse =
-+let fire_watches ?oldroot source root cons path recurse =
- 	let key = key_of_path path in
- 	let path = Store.Path.to_string path in
- 	let roots = oldroot, root in
- 	let fire_watch _ = function
- 		| None         -> ()
--		| Some watches -> List.iter (fun w -> Connection.fire_watch roots w path) watches
-+		| Some watches -> List.iter (fun w -> Connection.fire_watch source roots w path) watches
- 	in
- 	let fire_rec _x = function
- 		| None         -> ()
- 		| Some watches ->
--			List.iter (Connection.fire_single_watch roots) watches
-+			List.iter (Connection.fire_single_watch source roots) watches
- 	in
- 	Trie.iter_path fire_watch cons.watches key;
- 	if recurse then
- 		Trie.iter fire_rec (Trie.sub cons.watches key)
- 
-+let send_watchevents cons con =
-+	cons.has_pending_watchevents <-
-+		cons.has_pending_watchevents |> Connection.Watch.Set.filter Connection.Watch.flush_events;
-+	Connection.source_flush_watchevents con
-+
- let fire_spec_watches root cons specpath =
-+	let source = find_domain cons 0 in
- 	iter cons (fun con ->
--		List.iter (Connection.fire_single_watch (None, root)) (Connection.get_watches con specpath))
-+		List.iter (Connection.fire_single_watch source (None, root)) (Connection.get_watches con specpath))
- 
- let set_target cons domain target_domain =
- 	let con = find_domain cons domain in
-@@ -197,6 +216,16 @@ let debug cons =
- 	let domains = Hashtbl.fold (fun _ con accu -> Connection.debug con :: accu) cons.domains [] in
- 	String.concat "" (domains @ anonymous)
- 
-+let debug_watchevents cons con =
-+	(* == (physical equality)
-+	   has to be used here because w.con.xb.backend might contain a [unit->unit] value causing regular
-+	   comparison to fail due to having a 'functional value' which cannot be compared.
-+	 *)
-+	let s = cons.has_pending_watchevents |> Connection.Watch.Set.filter (fun w -> w.con == con) in
-+	let pending = s |> Connection.Watch.Set.elements
-+		|> List.map (fun w -> Connection.Watch.pending_watchevents w) |> List.fold_left (+) 0 in
-+	Printf.sprintf "Watches with pending events: %d, pending events total: %d" (Connection.Watch.Set.cardinal s) pending
-+
- let filter ~f cons =
- 	let fold _ v acc = if f v then v :: acc else acc in
- 	[]
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-index ba63a8147e09..327b6d795ec7 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/define.ml
-@@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ let default_config_dir = Paths.xen_config_dir
- let maxwatch = ref (100)
- let maxtransaction = ref (10)
- let maxrequests = ref (1024)   (* maximum requests per transaction *)
-+let maxoutstanding = ref (1024) (* maximum outstanding requests, i.e. in-flight requests / domain *)
-+let maxwatchevents = ref (1024)
-+(*
-+	maximum outstanding watch events per watch,
-+	recommended >= maxoutstanding to avoid blocking backend transactions due to
-+	malicious frontends
-+ *)
- 
- let gc_max_overhead = ref 120 (* 120% see comment in xenstored.ml *)
- let conflict_burst_limit = ref 5.0
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/oxenstored.conf.in b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/oxenstored.conf.in
-index 4ae48e42d47d..9d034e744b4b 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/oxenstored.conf.in
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/oxenstored.conf.in
-@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ quota-maxwatch = 100
- quota-transaction = 10
- quota-maxrequests = 1024
- quota-path-max = 1024
-+quota-maxoutstanding = 1024
-+quota-maxwatchevents = 1024
- 
- # Activate filed base backend
- persistent = false
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-index cbf708213796..ce39ce28b5f3 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ let split_one_path data con =
- 	| path :: "" :: [] -> Store.Path.create path (Connection.get_path con)
- 	| _                -> raise Invalid_Cmd_Args
- 
--let process_watch t cons =
-+let process_watch source t cons =
- 	let oldroot = t.Transaction.oldroot in
- 	let newroot = Store.get_root t.store in
- 	let ops = Transaction.get_paths t |> List.rev in
-@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ let process_watch t cons =
- 		| Xenbus.Xb.Op.Rm       -> true, None, oldroot
- 		| Xenbus.Xb.Op.Setperms -> false, Some oldroot, newroot
- 		| _              -> raise (Failure "huh ?") in
--		Connections.fire_watches ?oldroot root cons (snd op) recurse in
--	List.iter (fun op -> do_op_watch op cons) ops
-+		Connections.fire_watches ?oldroot source root cons (snd op) recurse in
-+	List.iter (fun op -> do_op_watch op cons) ops;
-+	Connections.send_watchevents cons source
- 
- let create_implicit_path t perm path =
- 	let dirname = Store.Path.get_parent path in
-@@ -234,6 +235,20 @@ let do_debug con t _domains cons data =
- 	| "watches" :: _ ->
- 		let watches = Connections.debug cons in
- 		Some (watches ^ "\000")
-+	| "xenbus" :: domid :: _ ->
-+		let domid = int_of_string domid in
-+		let con = Connections.find_domain cons domid in
-+		let s = Printf.sprintf "xenbus: %s; overflow queue length: %d, can_input: %b, has_more_input: %b, has_old_output: %b, has_new_output: %b, has_more_work: %b. pending: %s"
-+			(Xenbus.Xb.debug con.xb)
-+			(Connection.source_pending_watchevents con)
-+			(Connection.can_input con)
-+			(Connection.has_more_input con)
-+			(Connection.has_old_output con)
-+			(Connection.has_new_output con)
-+			(Connection.has_more_work con)
-+			(Connections.debug_watchevents cons con)
-+		in
-+		Some s
- 	| "mfn" :: domid :: _ ->
- 		let domid = int_of_string domid in
- 		let con = Connections.find_domain cons domid in
-@@ -342,7 +357,7 @@ let reply_ack fct con t doms cons data =
- 	fct con t doms cons data;
- 	Packet.Ack (fun () ->
- 		if Transaction.get_id t = Transaction.none then
--			process_watch t cons
-+			process_watch con t cons
- 	)
- 
- let reply_data fct con t doms cons data =
-@@ -501,7 +516,7 @@ let do_watch con t _domains cons data =
- 	Packet.Ack (fun () ->
- 		(* xenstore.txt says this watch is fired immediately,
- 		   implying even if path doesn't exist or is unreadable *)
--		Connection.fire_single_watch_unchecked watch)
-+		Connection.fire_single_watch_unchecked con watch)
- 
- let do_unwatch con _t _domains cons data =
- 	let (node, token) =
-@@ -532,7 +547,7 @@ let do_transaction_end con t domains cons data =
- 	if not success then
- 		raise Transaction_again;
- 	if commit then begin
--		process_watch t cons;
-+		process_watch con t cons;
- 		match t.Transaction.ty with
- 		| Transaction.No ->
- 			() (* no need to record anything *)
-@@ -700,7 +715,8 @@ let process_packet ~store ~cons ~doms ~con ~req =
- let do_input store cons doms con =
- 	let newpacket =
- 		try
--			Connection.do_input con
-+			if Connection.can_input con then Connection.do_input con
-+			else None
- 		with Xenbus.Xb.Reconnect ->
- 			info "%s requests a reconnect" (Connection.get_domstr con);
- 			History.reconnect con;
-@@ -728,6 +744,7 @@ let do_input store cons doms con =
- 		Connection.incr_ops con
- 
- let do_output _store _cons _doms con =
-+	Connection.source_flush_watchevents con;
- 	if Connection.has_output con then (
- 		if Connection.has_new_output con then (
- 			let packet = Connection.peek_output con in
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml
-index 3b57ad016dfb..c799e20f1145 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/xenstored.ml
-@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ let parse_config filename =
- 		("quota-maxentity", Config.Set_int Quota.maxent);
- 		("quota-maxsize", Config.Set_int Quota.maxsize);
- 		("quota-maxrequests", Config.Set_int Define.maxrequests);
-+		("quota-maxoutstanding", Config.Set_int Define.maxoutstanding);
-+		("quota-maxwatchevents", Config.Set_int Define.maxwatchevents);
- 		("quota-path-max", Config.Set_int Define.path_max);
- 		("gc-max-overhead", Config.Set_int Define.gc_max_overhead);
- 		("test-eagain", Config.Set_bool Transaction.test_eagain);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0108-SUPPORT.md-clarify-support-of-untrusted-driver-domai.patch b/0108-SUPPORT.md-clarify-support-of-untrusted-driver-domai.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 82773df..0000000
--- a/0108-SUPPORT.md-clarify-support-of-untrusted-driver-domai.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 26faa6b55881445c25e7e83613c2354090fdff18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2022 13:07:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 108/126] SUPPORT.md: clarify support of untrusted driver
- domains with oxenstored
-
-Add a support statement for the scope of support regarding different
-Xenstore variants. Especially oxenstored does not (yet) have security
-support of untrusted driver domains, as those might drive oxenstored
-out of memory by creating lots of watch events for the guests they are
-servicing.
-
-Add a statement regarding Live Update support of oxenstored.
-
-This is part of XSA-326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit c7bc20d8d123851a468402bbfc9e3330efff21ec)
----
- SUPPORT.md | 13 +++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md
-index 0fb262f81f40..48fb462221cf 100644
---- a/SUPPORT.md
-+++ b/SUPPORT.md
-@@ -179,13 +179,18 @@ Support for running qemu-xen device model in a linux stubdomain.
- 
-     Status: Tech Preview
- 
--## Liveupdate of C xenstored daemon
-+## Xenstore
- 
--    Status: Tech Preview
-+### C xenstored daemon
- 
--## Liveupdate of OCaml xenstored daemon
-+    Status: Supported
-+    Status, Liveupdate: Tech Preview
- 
--    Status: Tech Preview
-+### OCaml xenstored daemon
-+
-+    Status: Supported
-+    Status, untrusted driver domains: Supported, not security supported
-+    Status, Liveupdate: Not functional
- 
- ## Toolstack/3rd party
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0109-tools-xenstore-don-t-use-conn-in-as-context-for-temp.patch b/0109-tools-xenstore-don-t-use-conn-in-as-context-for-temp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c9a2e6e..0000000
--- a/0109-tools-xenstore-don-t-use-conn-in-as-context-for-temp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,716 +0,0 @@
-From 607e186fe094f8d1c78572cd3b1f7a43730203c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 109/126] tools/xenstore: don't use conn->in as context for
- temporary allocations
-
-Using the struct buffered data pointer of the current processed request
-for temporary data allocations has a major drawback: the used area (and
-with that the temporary data) is freed only after the response of the
-request has been written to the ring page or has been read via the
-socket. This can happen much later in case a guest isn't reading its
-responses fast enough.
-
-As the temporary data can be safely freed after creating the response,
-add a temporary context for that purpose and use that for allocating
-the temporary memory, as it was already the case before commit
-cc0612464896 ("xenstore: add small default data buffer to internal
-struct").
-
-Some sub-functions need to gain the "const" attribute for the talloc
-context.
-
-This is XSA-416 / CVE-2022-42319.
-
-Fixes: cc0612464896 ("xenstore: add small default data buffer to internal struct")
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 2a587de219cc0765330fbf9fac6827bfaf29e29b)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c     | 31 ++++++-----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.h     |  3 +-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c        | 76 ++++++++++++++++----------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c      | 29 ++++++----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h      | 21 ++++---
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c | 14 +++--
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h |  6 +-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c       |  9 +--
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.h       |  6 +-
- 9 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-index 980279fa53ff..95a60bf57858 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.c
-@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static const char *lu_begin(struct connection *conn)
- 
- struct cmd_s {
- 	char *cmd;
--	int (*func)(void *, struct connection *, char **, int);
-+	int (*func)(const void *, struct connection *, char **, int);
- 	char *pars;
- 	/*
- 	 * max_pars can be used to limit the size of the parameter vector,
-@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ struct cmd_s {
- 	unsigned int max_pars;
- };
- 
--static int do_control_check(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_check(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			    char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	if (num)
-@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int do_control_check(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int do_control_log(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_log(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			  char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	if (num != 1)
-@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static int quota_get(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return domain_get_quota(ctx, conn, atoi(vec[0]));
- }
- 
--static int do_control_quota(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_quota(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			    char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	if (num == 0)
-@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int do_control_quota(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return quota_get(ctx, conn, vec, num);
- }
- 
--static int do_control_quota_s(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_quota_s(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			      char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	if (num == 0)
-@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static int do_control_quota_s(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- }
- 
- #ifdef __MINIOS__
--static int do_control_memreport(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_memreport(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 				char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	if (num)
-@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int do_control_memreport(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- #else
--static int do_control_logfile(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_logfile(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			      char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	if (num != 1)
-@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int do_control_logfile(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int do_control_memreport(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_memreport(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 				char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	FILE *fp;
-@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static int do_control_memreport(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- }
- #endif
- 
--static int do_control_print(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_print(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			    char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	if (num != 1)
-@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ static const char *lu_start(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--static int do_control_lu(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_lu(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			 char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	const char *ret = NULL;
-@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static int do_control_lu(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- }
- #endif
- 
--static int do_control_help(void *, struct connection *, char **, int);
-+static int do_control_help(const void *, struct connection *, char **, int);
- 
- static struct cmd_s cmds[] = {
- 	{ "check", do_control_check, "" },
-@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ static struct cmd_s cmds[] = {
- 	{ "help", do_control_help, "" },
- };
- 
--static int do_control_help(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+static int do_control_help(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			   char **vec, int num)
- {
- 	int cmd, len = 0;
-@@ -927,7 +927,8 @@ static int do_control_help(void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int do_control(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_control(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	       struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	unsigned int cmd, num, off;
- 	char **vec = NULL;
-@@ -947,11 +948,11 @@ int do_control(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	num = xs_count_strings(in->buffer, in->used);
- 	if (cmds[cmd].max_pars)
- 		num = min(num, cmds[cmd].max_pars);
--	vec = talloc_array(in, char *, num);
-+	vec = talloc_array(ctx, char *, num);
- 	if (!vec)
- 		return ENOMEM;
- 	if (get_strings(in, vec, num) < num)
- 		return EIO;
- 
--	return cmds[cmd].func(in, conn, vec + 1, num - 1);
-+	return cmds[cmd].func(ctx, conn, vec + 1, num - 1);
- }
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.h
-index aac61f05908f..6430c3769361 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_control.h
-@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@
-     along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
- */
- 
--int do_control(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_control(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	       struct buffered_data *in);
- void lu_read_state(void);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index f27d5c0101bc..806f24bbab8b 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1214,11 +1214,13 @@ static struct node *get_node_canonicalized(struct connection *conn,
- 	return get_node(conn, ctx, *canonical_name, perm);
- }
- 
--static int send_directory(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+static int send_directory(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			  struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct node *node;
- 
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, onearg(in), NULL, XS_PERM_READ);
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, onearg(in), NULL,
-+				      XS_PERM_READ);
- 	if (!node)
- 		return errno;
- 
-@@ -1227,7 +1229,7 @@ static int send_directory(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int send_directory_part(struct connection *conn,
-+static int send_directory_part(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			       struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	unsigned int off, len, maxlen, genlen;
-@@ -1239,7 +1241,8 @@ static int send_directory_part(struct connection *conn,
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
- 	/* First arg is node name. */
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, in->buffer, NULL, XS_PERM_READ);
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, in->buffer, NULL,
-+				      XS_PERM_READ);
- 	if (!node)
- 		return errno;
- 
-@@ -1266,7 +1269,7 @@ static int send_directory_part(struct connection *conn,
- 			break;
- 	}
- 
--	data = talloc_array(in, char, genlen + len + 1);
-+	data = talloc_array(ctx, char, genlen + len + 1);
- 	if (!data)
- 		return ENOMEM;
- 
-@@ -1282,11 +1285,13 @@ static int send_directory_part(struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int do_read(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+static int do_read(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		   struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct node *node;
- 
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, onearg(in), NULL, XS_PERM_READ);
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, onearg(in), NULL,
-+				      XS_PERM_READ);
- 	if (!node)
- 		return errno;
- 
-@@ -1476,7 +1481,8 @@ err:
- }
- 
- /* path, data... */
--static int do_write(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+static int do_write(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		    struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	unsigned int offset, datalen;
- 	struct node *node;
-@@ -1490,12 +1496,12 @@ static int do_write(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	offset = strlen(vec[0]) + 1;
- 	datalen = in->used - offset;
- 
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, vec[0], &name, XS_PERM_WRITE);
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, vec[0], &name, XS_PERM_WRITE);
- 	if (!node) {
- 		/* No permissions, invalid input? */
- 		if (errno != ENOENT)
- 			return errno;
--		node = create_node(conn, in, name, in->buffer + offset,
-+		node = create_node(conn, ctx, name, in->buffer + offset,
- 				   datalen);
- 		if (!node)
- 			return errno;
-@@ -1506,18 +1512,19 @@ static int do_write(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 			return errno;
- 	}
- 
--	fire_watches(conn, in, name, node, false, NULL);
-+	fire_watches(conn, ctx, name, node, false, NULL);
- 	send_ack(conn, XS_WRITE);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int do_mkdir(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+static int do_mkdir(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		    struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct node *node;
- 	char *name;
- 
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, onearg(in), &name,
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, onearg(in), &name,
- 				      XS_PERM_WRITE);
- 
- 	/* If it already exists, fine. */
-@@ -1527,10 +1534,10 @@ static int do_mkdir(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 			return errno;
- 		if (!name)
- 			return ENOMEM;
--		node = create_node(conn, in, name, NULL, 0);
-+		node = create_node(conn, ctx, name, NULL, 0);
- 		if (!node)
- 			return errno;
--		fire_watches(conn, in, name, node, false, NULL);
-+		fire_watches(conn, ctx, name, node, false, NULL);
- 	}
- 	send_ack(conn, XS_MKDIR);
- 
-@@ -1628,24 +1635,25 @@ static int _rm(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, struct node *node,
- }
- 
- 
--static int do_rm(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+static int do_rm(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		 struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct node *node;
- 	int ret;
- 	char *name;
- 	char *parentname;
- 
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, onearg(in), &name,
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, onearg(in), &name,
- 				      XS_PERM_WRITE);
- 	if (!node) {
- 		/* Didn't exist already?  Fine, if parent exists. */
- 		if (errno == ENOENT) {
- 			if (!name)
- 				return ENOMEM;
--			parentname = get_parent(in, name);
-+			parentname = get_parent(ctx, name);
- 			if (!parentname)
- 				return errno;
--			node = read_node(conn, in, parentname);
-+			node = read_node(conn, ctx, parentname);
- 			if (node) {
- 				send_ack(conn, XS_RM);
- 				return 0;
-@@ -1660,7 +1668,7 @@ static int do_rm(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (streq(name, "/"))
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
--	ret = _rm(conn, in, node, name);
-+	ret = _rm(conn, ctx, node, name);
- 	if (ret)
- 		return ret;
- 
-@@ -1670,13 +1678,15 @@ static int do_rm(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- }
- 
- 
--static int do_get_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+static int do_get_perms(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct node *node;
- 	char *strings;
- 	unsigned int len;
- 
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, onearg(in), NULL, XS_PERM_READ);
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, onearg(in), NULL,
-+				      XS_PERM_READ);
- 	if (!node)
- 		return errno;
- 
-@@ -1689,7 +1699,8 @@ static int do_get_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int do_set_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+static int do_set_perms(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct node_perms perms, old_perms;
- 	char *name, *permstr;
-@@ -1706,7 +1717,7 @@ static int do_set_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 
- 	permstr = in->buffer + strlen(in->buffer) + 1;
- 
--	perms.p = talloc_array(in, struct xs_permissions, perms.num);
-+	perms.p = talloc_array(ctx, struct xs_permissions, perms.num);
- 	if (!perms.p)
- 		return ENOMEM;
- 	if (!xs_strings_to_perms(perms.p, perms.num, permstr))
-@@ -1721,7 +1732,7 @@ static int do_set_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	}
- 
- 	/* We must own node to do this (tools can do this too). */
--	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, in->buffer, &name,
-+	node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, ctx, in->buffer, &name,
- 				      XS_PERM_WRITE | XS_PERM_OWNER);
- 	if (!node)
- 		return errno;
-@@ -1756,7 +1767,7 @@ static int do_set_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 		return errno;
- 	}
- 
--	fire_watches(conn, in, name, node, false, &old_perms);
-+	fire_watches(conn, ctx, name, node, false, &old_perms);
- 	send_ack(conn, XS_SET_PERMS);
- 
- 	return 0;
-@@ -1764,7 +1775,8 @@ static int do_set_perms(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 
- static struct {
- 	const char *str;
--	int (*func)(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+	int (*func)(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		    struct buffered_data *in);
- 	unsigned int flags;
- #define XS_FLAG_NOTID		(1U << 0)	/* Ignore transaction id. */
- #define XS_FLAG_PRIV		(1U << 1)	/* Privileged domain only. */
-@@ -1840,6 +1852,7 @@ static void process_message(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	struct transaction *trans;
- 	enum xsd_sockmsg_type type = in->hdr.msg.type;
- 	int ret;
-+	void *ctx;
- 
- 	if ((unsigned int)type >= XS_TYPE_COUNT || !wire_funcs[type].func) {
- 		eprintf("Client unknown operation %i", type);
-@@ -1860,10 +1873,17 @@ static void process_message(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		send_error(conn, ENOMEM);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	assert(conn->transaction == NULL);
- 	conn->transaction = trans;
- 
--	ret = wire_funcs[type].func(conn, in);
-+	ret = wire_funcs[type].func(ctx, conn, in);
-+	talloc_free(ctx);
- 	if (ret)
- 		send_error(conn, ret);
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index 3d5142581332..d262f4e9dbdf 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ bool domain_can_write(struct connection *conn)
- 	return ((intf->rsp_prod - intf->rsp_cons) != XENSTORE_RING_SIZE);
- }
- 
--static char *talloc_domain_path(void *context, unsigned int domid)
-+static char *talloc_domain_path(const void *context, unsigned int domid)
- {
- 	return talloc_asprintf(context, "/local/domain/%u", domid);
- }
-@@ -540,7 +540,8 @@ static struct domain *introduce_domain(const void *ctx,
- }
- 
- /* domid, gfn, evtchn, path */
--int do_introduce(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_introduce(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		 struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct domain *domain;
- 	char *vec[3];
-@@ -558,7 +559,7 @@ int do_introduce(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (port <= 0)
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
--	domain = introduce_domain(in, domid, port, false);
-+	domain = introduce_domain(ctx, domid, port, false);
- 	if (!domain)
- 		return errno;
- 
-@@ -581,7 +582,8 @@ static struct domain *find_connected_domain(unsigned int domid)
- 	return domain;
- }
- 
--int do_set_target(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_set_target(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		  struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	char *vec[2];
- 	unsigned int domid, tdomid;
-@@ -625,7 +627,8 @@ static struct domain *onearg_domain(struct connection *conn,
- }
- 
- /* domid */
--int do_release(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_release(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	       struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct domain *domain;
- 
-@@ -640,7 +643,8 @@ int do_release(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int do_resume(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_resume(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	      struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct domain *domain;
- 
-@@ -655,7 +659,8 @@ int do_resume(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int do_get_domain_path(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_get_domain_path(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		       struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	char *path;
- 	const char *domid_str = onearg(in);
-@@ -663,18 +668,17 @@ int do_get_domain_path(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (!domid_str)
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
--	path = talloc_domain_path(conn, atoi(domid_str));
-+	path = talloc_domain_path(ctx, atoi(domid_str));
- 	if (!path)
- 		return errno;
- 
- 	send_reply(conn, XS_GET_DOMAIN_PATH, path, strlen(path) + 1);
- 
--	talloc_free(path);
--
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int do_is_domain_introduced(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_is_domain_introduced(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			    struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	int result;
- 	unsigned int domid;
-@@ -695,7 +699,8 @@ int do_is_domain_introduced(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- }
- 
- /* Allow guest to reset all watches */
--int do_reset_watches(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_reset_watches(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		     struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	conn_delete_all_watches(conn);
- 	conn_delete_all_transactions(conn);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-index 0f883936f413..da513443cd46 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-@@ -24,25 +24,32 @@ void handle_event(void);
- void check_domains(bool restore);
- 
- /* domid, mfn, eventchn, path */
--int do_introduce(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_introduce(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		 struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- /* domid */
--int do_is_domain_introduced(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_is_domain_introduced(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			    struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- /* domid */
--int do_release(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_release(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	       struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- /* domid */
--int do_resume(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_resume(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	      struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- /* domid, target */
--int do_set_target(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_set_target(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		  struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- /* domid */
--int do_get_domain_path(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_get_domain_path(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		       struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- /* Allow guest to reset all watches */
--int do_reset_watches(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_reset_watches(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		     struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- void domain_init(int evtfd);
- void dom0_init(void);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index 28774813de83..3e3eb47326cc 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -481,7 +481,8 @@ struct transaction *transaction_lookup(struct connection *conn, uint32_t id)
- 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
- }
- 
--int do_transaction_start(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_transaction_start(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			 struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct transaction *trans, *exists;
- 	char id_str[20];
-@@ -494,8 +495,8 @@ int do_transaction_start(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	    conn->transaction_started > quota_max_transaction)
- 		return ENOSPC;
- 
--	/* Attach transaction to input for autofree until it's complete */
--	trans = talloc_zero(in, struct transaction);
-+	/* Attach transaction to ctx for autofree until it's complete */
-+	trans = talloc_zero(ctx, struct transaction);
- 	if (!trans)
- 		return ENOMEM;
- 
-@@ -544,7 +545,8 @@ static int transaction_fix_domains(struct transaction *trans, bool update)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int do_transaction_end(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_transaction_end(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		       struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	const char *arg = onearg(in);
- 	struct transaction *trans;
-@@ -562,8 +564,8 @@ int do_transaction_end(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (!conn->transaction_started)
- 		conn->ta_start_time = 0;
- 
--	/* Attach transaction to in for auto-cleanup */
--	talloc_steal(in, trans);
-+	/* Attach transaction to ctx for auto-cleanup */
-+	talloc_steal(ctx, trans);
- 
- 	if (streq(arg, "T")) {
- 		if (trans->fail)
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-index e3cbd6b23095..39d7f81c5127 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ struct transaction;
- 
- extern uint64_t generation;
- 
--int do_transaction_start(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *node);
--int do_transaction_end(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_transaction_start(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			 struct buffered_data *node);
-+int do_transaction_end(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		       struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- struct transaction *transaction_lookup(struct connection *conn, uint32_t id);
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-index 4970e9f1a1b9..854bbcad6e45 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
-@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static struct watch *add_watch(struct connection *conn, char *path, char *token,
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--int do_watch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_watch(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct watch *watch;
- 	char *vec[2];
-@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int do_watch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (get_strings(in, vec, ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) != ARRAY_SIZE(vec))
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
--	errno = check_watch_path(conn, in, &(vec[0]), &relative);
-+	errno = check_watch_path(conn, ctx, &(vec[0]), &relative);
- 	if (errno)
- 		return errno;
- 
-@@ -283,7 +283,8 @@ int do_watch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int do_unwatch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
-+int do_unwatch(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	       struct buffered_data *in)
- {
- 	struct watch *watch;
- 	char *node, *vec[2];
-@@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ int do_unwatch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
- 	if (get_strings(in, vec, ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) != ARRAY_SIZE(vec))
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
--	node = canonicalize(conn, in, vec[0]);
-+	node = canonicalize(conn, ctx, vec[0]);
- 	if (!node)
- 		return ENOMEM;
- 	list_for_each_entry(watch, &conn->watches, list) {
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.h
-index 0e693f0839cd..091890edca96 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.h
-@@ -21,8 +21,10 @@
- 
- #include "xenstored_core.h"
- 
--int do_watch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
--int do_unwatch(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_watch(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	     struct buffered_data *in);
-+int do_unwatch(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+	       struct buffered_data *in);
- 
- /* Fire all watches: !exact means all the children are affected (ie. rm). */
- void fire_watches(struct connection *conn, const void *tmp, const char *name,
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0110-tools-xenstore-fix-checking-node-permissions.patch b/0110-tools-xenstore-fix-checking-node-permissions.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 77345f7..0000000
--- a/0110-tools-xenstore-fix-checking-node-permissions.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-From 8012324cb9e676bd342a5adfda1700525f195e2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 110/126] tools/xenstore: fix checking node permissions
-
-Today chk_domain_generation() is being used to check whether a node
-permission entry is still valid or whether it is referring to a domain
-no longer existing. This is done by comparing the node's and the
-domain's generation count.
-
-In case no struct domain is existing for a checked domain, but the
-domain itself is valid, chk_domain_generation() assumes it is being
-called due to the first node created for a new domain and it will
-return success.
-
-This might be wrong in case the checked permission is related to an
-old domain, which has just been replaced with a new domain using the
-same domid.
-
-Fix that by letting chk_domain_generation() fail in case a struct
-domain isn't found. In order to cover the case of the first node for
-a new domain try to allocate the needed struct domain explicitly when
-processing the related SET_PERMS command. In case a referenced domain
-isn't existing, flag the related permission to be ignored right away.
-
-This is XSA-417 / CVE-2022-42320.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit ab128218225d3542596ca3a02aee80d55494bef8)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c   |  5 +++++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h |  1 +
- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 806f24bbab8b..8aecd425f274 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1723,6 +1723,11 @@ static int do_set_perms(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	if (!xs_strings_to_perms(perms.p, perms.num, permstr))
- 		return errno;
- 
-+	if (domain_alloc_permrefs(&perms) < 0)
-+		return ENOMEM;
-+	if (perms.p[0].perms & XS_PERM_IGNORE)
-+		return ENOENT;
-+
- 	/* First arg is node name. */
- 	if (strstarts(in->buffer, "@")) {
- 		if (set_perms_special(conn, in->buffer, &perms))
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index d262f4e9dbdf..8b503c2dfe07 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -881,7 +881,6 @@ int domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
-  * count (used for testing whether a node permission is older than a domain).
-  *
-  * Return values:
-- * -1: error
-  *  0: domain has higher generation count (it is younger than a node with the
-  *     given count), or domain isn't existing any longer
-  *  1: domain is older than the node
-@@ -889,20 +888,38 @@ int domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- static int chk_domain_generation(unsigned int domid, uint64_t gen)
- {
- 	struct domain *d;
--	xc_dominfo_t dominfo;
- 
- 	if (!xc_handle && domid == 0)
- 		return 1;
- 
- 	d = find_domain_struct(domid);
--	if (d)
--		return (d->generation <= gen) ? 1 : 0;
- 
--	if (!get_domain_info(domid, &dominfo))
--		return 0;
-+	return (d && d->generation <= gen) ? 1 : 0;
-+}
- 
--	d = alloc_domain(NULL, domid);
--	return d ? 1 : -1;
-+/*
-+ * Allocate all missing struct domain referenced by a permission set.
-+ * Any permission entries for not existing domains will be marked to be
-+ * ignored.
-+ */
-+int domain_alloc_permrefs(struct node_perms *perms)
-+{
-+	unsigned int i, domid;
-+	struct domain *d;
-+	xc_dominfo_t dominfo;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < perms->num; i++) {
-+		domid = perms->p[i].id;
-+		d = find_domain_struct(domid);
-+		if (!d) {
-+			if (!get_domain_info(domid, &dominfo))
-+				perms->p[i].perms |= XS_PERM_IGNORE;
-+			else if (!alloc_domain(NULL, domid))
-+				return ENOMEM;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -915,8 +932,6 @@ int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- 	int ret;
- 
- 	ret = chk_domain_generation(node->perms.p[0].id, node->generation);
--	if (ret < 0)
--		return errno;
- 
- 	/* If the owner doesn't exist any longer give it to priv domain. */
- 	if (!ret) {
-@@ -933,8 +948,6 @@ int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- 			continue;
- 		ret = chk_domain_generation(node->perms.p[i].id,
- 					    node->generation);
--		if (ret < 0)
--			return errno;
- 		if (!ret)
- 			node->perms.p[i].perms |= XS_PERM_IGNORE;
- 	}
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-index da513443cd46..0b4f56b8146c 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ bool domain_is_unprivileged(struct connection *conn);
- 
- /* Remove node permissions for no longer existing domains. */
- int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct connection *conn, struct node *node);
-+int domain_alloc_permrefs(struct node_perms *perms);
- 
- /* Quota manipulation */
- int domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0111-tools-xenstore-remove-recursion-from-construct_node.patch b/0111-tools-xenstore-remove-recursion-from-construct_node.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aa63d32..0000000
--- a/0111-tools-xenstore-remove-recursion-from-construct_node.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From 62755d0a90344e704062e7b6943a3fa2dc5e02e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:11 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 111/126] tools/xenstore: remove recursion from
- construct_node()
-
-In order to reduce stack usage due to recursion, switch
-construct_node() to use a loop instead.
-
-This is part of XSA-418 / CVE-2022-42321.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit da8ee25d02a5447ba39a9800ee2a710ae1f54222)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 8aecd425f274..46a37e5257e5 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1343,45 +1343,69 @@ static int add_child(const void *ctx, struct node *parent, const char *name)
- static struct node *construct_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 				   const char *name)
- {
--	struct node *parent, *node;
--	char *parentname = get_parent(ctx, name);
-+	const char **names = NULL;
-+	unsigned int levels = 0;
-+	struct node *node = NULL;
-+	struct node *parent = NULL;
-+	const char *parentname = talloc_strdup(ctx, name);
- 
- 	if (!parentname)
- 		return NULL;
- 
--	/* If parent doesn't exist, create it. */
--	parent = read_node(conn, parentname, parentname);
--	if (!parent && errno == ENOENT)
--		parent = construct_node(conn, ctx, parentname);
--	if (!parent)
--		return NULL;
-+	/* Walk the path up until an existing node is found. */
-+	while (!parent) {
-+		names = talloc_realloc(ctx, names, const char *, levels + 1);
-+		if (!names)
-+			goto nomem;
- 
--	/* Add child to parent. */
--	if (add_child(ctx, parent, name))
--		goto nomem;
-+		/*
-+		 * names[0] is the name of the node to construct initially,
-+		 * names[1] is its parent, and so on.
-+		 */
-+		names[levels] = parentname;
-+		parentname = get_parent(ctx, parentname);
-+		if (!parentname)
-+			return NULL;
- 
--	/* Allocate node */
--	node = talloc(ctx, struct node);
--	if (!node)
--		goto nomem;
--	node->name = talloc_strdup(node, name);
--	if (!node->name)
--		goto nomem;
-+		/* Try to read parent node until we found an existing one. */
-+		parent = read_node(conn, ctx, parentname);
-+		if (!parent && (errno != ENOENT || !strcmp(parentname, "/")))
-+			return NULL;
- 
--	/* Inherit permissions, except unprivileged domains own what they create */
--	node->perms.num = parent->perms.num;
--	node->perms.p = talloc_memdup(node, parent->perms.p,
--				      node->perms.num * sizeof(*node->perms.p));
--	if (!node->perms.p)
--		goto nomem;
--	if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn))
--		node->perms.p[0].id = conn->id;
-+		levels++;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Walk the path down again constructing the missing nodes. */
-+	for (; levels > 0; levels--) {
-+		/* Add child to parent. */
-+		if (add_child(ctx, parent, names[levels - 1]))
-+			goto nomem;
-+
-+		/* Allocate node */
-+		node = talloc(ctx, struct node);
-+		if (!node)
-+			goto nomem;
-+		node->name = talloc_steal(node, names[levels - 1]);
-+
-+		/* Inherit permissions, unpriv domains own what they create. */
-+		node->perms.num = parent->perms.num;
-+		node->perms.p = talloc_memdup(node, parent->perms.p,
-+					      node->perms.num *
-+					      sizeof(*node->perms.p));
-+		if (!node->perms.p)
-+			goto nomem;
-+		if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn))
-+			node->perms.p[0].id = conn->id;
-+
-+		/* No children, no data */
-+		node->children = node->data = NULL;
-+		node->childlen = node->datalen = 0;
-+		node->acc.memory = 0;
-+		node->parent = parent;
-+
-+		parent = node;
-+	}
- 
--	/* No children, no data */
--	node->children = node->data = NULL;
--	node->childlen = node->datalen = 0;
--	node->acc.memory = 0;
--	node->parent = parent;
- 	return node;
- 
- nomem:
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0112-tools-xenstore-don-t-let-remove_child_entry-call-cor.patch b/0112-tools-xenstore-don-t-let-remove_child_entry-call-cor.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8250ff0..0000000
--- a/0112-tools-xenstore-don-t-let-remove_child_entry-call-cor.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-From b9a005b0b4520261c6c362fca55500782837f119 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:11 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 112/126] tools/xenstore: don't let remove_child_entry() call
- corrupt()
-
-In case of write_node() returning an error, remove_child_entry() will
-call corrupt() today. This could result in an endless recursion, as
-remove_child_entry() is called by corrupt(), too:
-
-corrupt()
-  check_store()
-    check_store_()
-      remove_child_entry()
-
-Fix that by letting remove_child_entry() return an error instead and
-let the caller decide what to do.
-
-This is part of XSA-418 / CVE-2022-42321.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 0c00c51f3bc8206c7f9cf87d014650157bee2bf4)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 46a37e5257e5..4c3897721bdd 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1574,15 +1574,15 @@ static void memdel(void *mem, unsigned off, unsigned len, unsigned total)
- 	memmove(mem + off, mem + off + len, total - off - len);
- }
- 
--static void remove_child_entry(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
--			       size_t offset)
-+static int remove_child_entry(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
-+			      size_t offset)
- {
- 	size_t childlen = strlen(node->children + offset);
- 
- 	memdel(node->children, offset, childlen + 1, node->childlen);
- 	node->childlen -= childlen + 1;
--	if (write_node(conn, node, true))
--		corrupt(conn, "Can't update parent node '%s'", node->name);
-+
-+	return write_node(conn, node, true);
- }
- 
- static void delete_child(struct connection *conn,
-@@ -1592,7 +1592,9 @@ static void delete_child(struct connection *conn,
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < node->childlen; i += strlen(node->children+i) + 1) {
- 		if (streq(node->children+i, childname)) {
--			remove_child_entry(conn, node, i);
-+			if (remove_child_entry(conn, node, i))
-+				corrupt(conn, "Can't update parent node '%s'",
-+					node->name);
- 			return;
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -2226,6 +2228,17 @@ int remember_string(struct hashtable *hash, const char *str)
- 	return hashtable_insert(hash, k, (void *)1);
- }
- 
-+static int rm_child_entry(struct node *node, size_t off, size_t len)
-+{
-+	if (!recovery)
-+		return off;
-+
-+	if (remove_child_entry(NULL, node, off))
-+		log("check_store: child entry could not be removed from '%s'",
-+		    node->name);
-+
-+	return off - len - 1;
-+}
- 
- /**
-  * A node has a children field that names the children of the node, separated
-@@ -2278,12 +2291,7 @@ static int check_store_(const char *name, struct hashtable *reachable)
- 				if (hashtable_search(children, childname)) {
- 					log("check_store: '%s' is duplicated!",
- 					    childname);
--
--					if (recovery) {
--						remove_child_entry(NULL, node,
--								   i);
--						i -= childlen + 1;
--					}
-+					i = rm_child_entry(node, i, childlen);
- 				}
- 				else {
- 					if (!remember_string(children,
-@@ -2300,11 +2308,7 @@ static int check_store_(const char *name, struct hashtable *reachable)
- 			} else if (errno != ENOMEM) {
- 				log("check_store: No child '%s' found!\n",
- 				    childname);
--
--				if (recovery) {
--					remove_child_entry(NULL, node, i);
--					i -= childlen + 1;
--				}
-+				i = rm_child_entry(node, i, childlen);
- 			} else {
- 				log("check_store: ENOMEM");
- 				ret = ENOMEM;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0113-tools-xenstore-add-generic-treewalk-function.patch b/0113-tools-xenstore-add-generic-treewalk-function.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b80c574..0000000
--- a/0113-tools-xenstore-add-generic-treewalk-function.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-From 83b6c511a5989a83c50daae83c5b5a683d6dc096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:11 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 113/126] tools/xenstore: add generic treewalk function
-
-Add a generic function to walk the complete node tree. It will start
-at "/" and descend recursively into each child, calling a function
-specified by the caller. Depending on the return value of the user
-specified function the walk will be aborted, continued, or the current
-child will be skipped by not descending into its children.
-
-This is part of XSA-418 / CVE-2022-42321.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 0d7c5d19bc27492360196e7dad2b227908564fff)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h |  40 +++++++++
- 2 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 4c3897721bdd..7463d0a002d7 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1804,6 +1804,135 @@ static int do_set_perms(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+static char *child_name(const void *ctx, const char *s1, const char *s2)
-+{
-+	if (strcmp(s1, "/"))
-+		return talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/%s", s1, s2);
-+	return talloc_asprintf(ctx, "/%s", s2);
-+}
-+
-+static int rm_from_parent(struct connection *conn, struct node *parent,
-+			  const char *name)
-+{
-+	size_t off;
-+
-+	if (!parent)
-+		return WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+
-+	for (off = parent->childoff - 1; off && parent->children[off - 1];
-+	     off--);
-+	if (remove_child_entry(conn, parent, off)) {
-+		log("treewalk: child entry could not be removed from '%s'",
-+		    parent->name);
-+		return WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+	}
-+	parent->childoff = off;
-+
-+	return WALK_TREE_OK;
-+}
-+
-+static int walk_call_func(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			  struct node *node, struct node *parent, void *arg,
-+			  int (*func)(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+				      struct node *node, void *arg))
-+{
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if (!func)
-+		return WALK_TREE_OK;
-+
-+	ret = func(ctx, conn, node, arg);
-+	if (ret == WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY && parent)
-+		ret = rm_from_parent(conn, parent, node->name);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int walk_node_tree(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn, const char *root,
-+		   struct walk_funcs *funcs, void *arg)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	void *tmpctx;
-+	char *name;
-+	struct node *node = NULL;
-+	struct node *parent = NULL;
-+
-+	tmpctx = talloc_new(ctx);
-+	if (!tmpctx) {
-+		errno = ENOMEM;
-+		return WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+	}
-+	name = talloc_strdup(tmpctx, root);
-+	if (!name) {
-+		errno = ENOMEM;
-+		talloc_free(tmpctx);
-+		return WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Continue the walk until an error is returned. */
-+	while (ret >= 0) {
-+		/* node == NULL possible only for the initial loop iteration. */
-+		if (node) {
-+			/* Go one step up if ret or if last child finished. */
-+			if (ret || node->childoff >= node->childlen) {
-+				parent = node->parent;
-+				/* Call function AFTER processing a node. */
-+				ret = walk_call_func(ctx, conn, node, parent,
-+						     arg, funcs->exit);
-+				/* Last node, so exit loop. */
-+				if (!parent)
-+					break;
-+				talloc_free(node);
-+				/* Continue with parent. */
-+				node = parent;
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+			/* Get next child of current node. */
-+			name = child_name(tmpctx, node->name,
-+					  node->children + node->childoff);
-+			if (!name) {
-+				ret = WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+				break;
-+			}
-+			/* Point to next child. */
-+			node->childoff += strlen(node->children +
-+						 node->childoff) + 1;
-+			/* Descent into children. */
-+			parent = node;
-+		}
-+		/* Read next node (root node or next child). */
-+		node = read_node(conn, tmpctx, name);
-+		if (!node) {
-+			/* Child not found - should not happen! */
-+			/* ENOENT case can be handled by supplied function. */
-+			if (errno == ENOENT && funcs->enoent)
-+				ret = funcs->enoent(ctx, conn, parent, name,
-+						    arg);
-+			else
-+				ret = WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+			if (!parent)
-+				break;
-+			if (ret == WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY)
-+				ret = rm_from_parent(conn, parent, name);
-+			if (ret < 0)
-+				break;
-+			talloc_free(name);
-+			node = parent;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		talloc_free(name);
-+		node->parent = parent;
-+		node->childoff = 0;
-+		/* Call function BEFORE processing a node. */
-+		ret = walk_call_func(ctx, conn, node, parent, arg,
-+				     funcs->enter);
-+	}
-+
-+	talloc_free(tmpctx);
-+
-+	return ret < 0 ? ret : WALK_TREE_OK;
-+}
-+
- static struct {
- 	const char *str;
- 	int (*func)(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-@@ -2206,18 +2335,6 @@ static int keys_equal_fn(void *key1, void *key2)
- 	return 0 == strcmp((char *)key1, (char *)key2);
- }
- 
--
--static char *child_name(const char *s1, const char *s2)
--{
--	if (strcmp(s1, "/")) {
--		return talloc_asprintf(NULL, "%s/%s", s1, s2);
--	}
--	else {
--		return talloc_asprintf(NULL, "/%s", s2);
--	}
--}
--
--
- int remember_string(struct hashtable *hash, const char *str)
- {
- 	char *k = malloc(strlen(str) + 1);
-@@ -2277,7 +2394,7 @@ static int check_store_(const char *name, struct hashtable *reachable)
- 		while (i < node->childlen && !ret) {
- 			struct node *childnode;
- 			size_t childlen = strlen(node->children + i);
--			char * childname = child_name(node->name,
-+			char * childname = child_name(NULL, node->name,
- 						      node->children + i);
- 
- 			if (!childname) {
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 1eb3708f82dd..f0fd8c352857 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ struct node {
- 
- 	/* Children, each nul-terminated. */
- 	unsigned int childlen;
-+	unsigned int childoff;	/* Used by walk_node_tree() internally. */
- 	char *children;
- 
- 	/* Allocation information for node currently in store. */
-@@ -334,6 +335,45 @@ void read_state_buffered_data(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 			      const struct xs_state_connection *sc);
- void read_state_node(const void *ctx, const void *state);
- 
-+/*
-+ * Walk the node tree below root calling funcs->enter() and funcs->exit() for
-+ * each node. funcs->enter() is being called when entering a node, so before
-+ * any of the children of the node is processed. funcs->exit() is being
-+ * called when leaving the node, so after all children have been processed.
-+ * funcs->enoent() is being called when a node isn't existing.
-+ * funcs->*() return values:
-+ *  < 0: tree walk is stopped, walk_node_tree() returns funcs->*() return value
-+ *       in case WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP is returned, errno should be set
-+ *  WALK_TREE_OK: tree walk is continuing
-+ *  WALK_TREE_SKIP_CHILDREN: tree walk won't descend below current node, but
-+ *       walk continues
-+ *  WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY: Remove the child entry from its parent and write
-+ *       the modified parent node back to the data base, implies to not descend
-+ *       below the current node, but to continue the walk
-+ * funcs->*() is allowed to modify the node it is called for in the data base.
-+ * In case funcs->enter() is deleting the node, it must not return WALK_TREE_OK
-+ * in order to avoid descending into no longer existing children.
-+ */
-+/* Return values for funcs->*() and walk_node_tree(). */
-+#define WALK_TREE_SUCCESS_STOP  -100    /* Stop walk early, no error. */
-+#define WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP    -1      /* Stop walk due to error. */
-+#define WALK_TREE_OK            0       /* No error. */
-+/* Return value for funcs->*() only. */
-+#define WALK_TREE_SKIP_CHILDREN 1       /* Don't recurse below current node. */
-+#define WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY 2       /* Remove child entry from parent. */
-+
-+struct walk_funcs {
-+	int (*enter)(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		     struct node *node, void *arg);
-+	int (*exit)(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		    struct node *node, void *arg);
-+	int (*enoent)(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		      struct node *parent, char *name, void *arg);
-+};
-+
-+int walk_node_tree(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn, const char *root,
-+		   struct walk_funcs *funcs, void *arg);
-+
- #endif /* _XENSTORED_CORE_H */
- 
- /*
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0114-tools-xenstore-simplify-check_store.patch b/0114-tools-xenstore-simplify-check_store.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6247114..0000000
--- a/0114-tools-xenstore-simplify-check_store.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-From 4096512a70fd0bb65e40ed4269a1ca74dbb16220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 114/126] tools/xenstore: simplify check_store()
-
-check_store() is using a hash table for storing all node names it has
-found via walking the tree. Additionally it using another hash table
-for all children of a node to detect duplicate child names.
-
-Simplify that by dropping the second hash table as the first one is
-already holding all the needed information.
-
-This is part of XSA-418 / CVE-2022-42321.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 70f719f52a220bc5bc987e4dd28e14a7039a176b)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 47 +++++++++++----------------------
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 7463d0a002d7..a48255c64cad 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -2378,50 +2378,34 @@ static int check_store_(const char *name, struct hashtable *reachable)
- 	if (node) {
- 		size_t i = 0;
- 
--		struct hashtable * children =
--			create_hashtable(16, hash_from_key_fn, keys_equal_fn);
--		if (!children) {
--			log("check_store create table: ENOMEM");
--			return ENOMEM;
--		}
--
- 		if (!remember_string(reachable, name)) {
--			hashtable_destroy(children, 0);
- 			log("check_store: ENOMEM");
- 			return ENOMEM;
- 		}
- 
- 		while (i < node->childlen && !ret) {
--			struct node *childnode;
-+			struct node *childnode = NULL;
- 			size_t childlen = strlen(node->children + i);
--			char * childname = child_name(NULL, node->name,
--						      node->children + i);
-+			char *childname = child_name(NULL, node->name,
-+						     node->children + i);
- 
- 			if (!childname) {
- 				log("check_store: ENOMEM");
- 				ret = ENOMEM;
- 				break;
- 			}
-+
-+			if (hashtable_search(reachable, childname)) {
-+				log("check_store: '%s' is duplicated!",
-+				    childname);
-+				i = rm_child_entry(node, i, childlen);
-+				goto next;
-+			}
-+
- 			childnode = read_node(NULL, childname, childname);
--			
-+
- 			if (childnode) {
--				if (hashtable_search(children, childname)) {
--					log("check_store: '%s' is duplicated!",
--					    childname);
--					i = rm_child_entry(node, i, childlen);
--				}
--				else {
--					if (!remember_string(children,
--							     childname)) {
--						log("check_store: ENOMEM");
--						talloc_free(childnode);
--						talloc_free(childname);
--						ret = ENOMEM;
--						break;
--					}
--					ret = check_store_(childname,
--							   reachable);
--				}
-+				ret = check_store_(childname, reachable);
- 			} else if (errno != ENOMEM) {
- 				log("check_store: No child '%s' found!\n",
- 				    childname);
-@@ -2431,19 +2415,18 @@ static int check_store_(const char *name, struct hashtable *reachable)
- 				ret = ENOMEM;
- 			}
- 
-+ next:
- 			talloc_free(childnode);
- 			talloc_free(childname);
- 			i += childlen + 1;
- 		}
- 
--		hashtable_destroy(children, 0 /* Don't free values (they are
--						 all (void *)1) */);
- 		talloc_free(node);
- 	} else if (errno != ENOMEM) {
- 		/* Impossible, because no database should ever be without the
- 		   root, and otherwise, we've just checked in our caller
- 		   (which made a recursive call to get here). */
--		   
-+
- 		log("check_store: No child '%s' found: impossible!", name);
- 	} else {
- 		log("check_store: ENOMEM");
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0115-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-check_store.patch b/0115-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-check_store.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 74d58f4..0000000
--- a/0115-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-check_store.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-From a95277ee36e1db2f67e8091f4ea401975d341659 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 115/126] tools/xenstore: use treewalk for check_store()
-
-Instead of doing an open tree walk using call recursion, use
-walk_node_tree() when checking the store for inconsistencies.
-
-This will reduce code size and avoid many nesting levels of function
-calls which could potentially exhaust the stack.
-
-This is part of XSA-418 / CVE-2022-42321.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit a07cc0ec60612f414bedf2bafb26ec38d2602e95)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 109 +++++++++-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index a48255c64cad..ed8bc9b02ed2 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -2345,18 +2345,6 @@ int remember_string(struct hashtable *hash, const char *str)
- 	return hashtable_insert(hash, k, (void *)1);
- }
- 
--static int rm_child_entry(struct node *node, size_t off, size_t len)
--{
--	if (!recovery)
--		return off;
--
--	if (remove_child_entry(NULL, node, off))
--		log("check_store: child entry could not be removed from '%s'",
--		    node->name);
--
--	return off - len - 1;
--}
--
- /**
-  * A node has a children field that names the children of the node, separated
-  * by NULs.  We check whether there are entries in there that are duplicated
-@@ -2370,70 +2358,29 @@ static int rm_child_entry(struct node *node, size_t off, size_t len)
-  * As we go, we record each node in the given reachable hashtable.  These
-  * entries will be used later in clean_store.
-  */
--static int check_store_(const char *name, struct hashtable *reachable)
-+static int check_store_step(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			    struct node *node, void *arg)
- {
--	struct node *node = read_node(NULL, name, name);
--	int ret = 0;
-+	struct hashtable *reachable = arg;
- 
--	if (node) {
--		size_t i = 0;
--
--		if (!remember_string(reachable, name)) {
--			log("check_store: ENOMEM");
--			return ENOMEM;
--		}
--
--		while (i < node->childlen && !ret) {
--			struct node *childnode = NULL;
--			size_t childlen = strlen(node->children + i);
--			char *childname = child_name(NULL, node->name,
--						     node->children + i);
--
--			if (!childname) {
--				log("check_store: ENOMEM");
--				ret = ENOMEM;
--				break;
--			}
--
--			if (hashtable_search(reachable, childname)) {
--				log("check_store: '%s' is duplicated!",
--				    childname);
--				i = rm_child_entry(node, i, childlen);
--				goto next;
--			}
--
--			childnode = read_node(NULL, childname, childname);
--
--			if (childnode) {
--				ret = check_store_(childname, reachable);
--			} else if (errno != ENOMEM) {
--				log("check_store: No child '%s' found!\n",
--				    childname);
--				i = rm_child_entry(node, i, childlen);
--			} else {
--				log("check_store: ENOMEM");
--				ret = ENOMEM;
--			}
--
-- next:
--			talloc_free(childnode);
--			talloc_free(childname);
--			i += childlen + 1;
--		}
--
--		talloc_free(node);
--	} else if (errno != ENOMEM) {
--		/* Impossible, because no database should ever be without the
--		   root, and otherwise, we've just checked in our caller
--		   (which made a recursive call to get here). */
--
--		log("check_store: No child '%s' found: impossible!", name);
--	} else {
--		log("check_store: ENOMEM");
--		ret = ENOMEM;
-+	if (hashtable_search(reachable, (void *)node->name)) {
-+		log("check_store: '%s' is duplicated!", node->name);
-+		return recovery ? WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY
-+				: WALK_TREE_SKIP_CHILDREN;
- 	}
- 
--	return ret;
-+	if (!remember_string(reachable, node->name))
-+		return WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+
-+	return WALK_TREE_OK;
-+}
-+
-+static int check_store_enoent(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			      struct node *parent, char *name, void *arg)
-+{
-+	log("check_store: node '%s' not found", name);
-+
-+	return recovery ? WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY : WALK_TREE_OK;
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -2482,24 +2429,28 @@ static void clean_store(struct hashtable *reachable)
- 
- void check_store(void)
- {
--	char * root = talloc_strdup(NULL, "/");
--	struct hashtable * reachable =
--		create_hashtable(16, hash_from_key_fn, keys_equal_fn);
-- 
-+	struct hashtable *reachable;
-+	struct walk_funcs walkfuncs = {
-+		.enter = check_store_step,
-+		.enoent = check_store_enoent,
-+	};
-+
-+	reachable = create_hashtable(16, hash_from_key_fn, keys_equal_fn);
- 	if (!reachable) {
- 		log("check_store: ENOMEM");
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
- 	log("Checking store ...");
--	if (!check_store_(root, reachable) &&
--	    !check_transactions(reachable))
-+	if (walk_node_tree(NULL, NULL, "/", &walkfuncs, reachable)) {
-+		if (errno == ENOMEM)
-+			log("check_store: ENOMEM");
-+	} else if (!check_transactions(reachable))
- 		clean_store(reachable);
- 	log("Checking store complete.");
- 
- 	hashtable_destroy(reachable, 0 /* Don't free values (they are all
- 					  (void *)1) */);
--	talloc_free(root);
- }
- 
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0116-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-deleting-nodes.patch b/0116-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-deleting-nodes.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2dcf32e..0000000
--- a/0116-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-deleting-nodes.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-From 9ead5845034c04a5c6e04d9b069d9c13141f4f33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 116/126] tools/xenstore: use treewalk for deleting nodes
-
-Instead of doing an open tree walk using call recursion, use
-walk_node_tree() when deleting a sub-tree of nodes.
-
-This will reduce code size and avoid many nesting levels of function
-calls which could potentially exhaust the stack.
-
-This is part of XSA-418 / CVE-2022-42321.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit ea16962053a6849a6e7cada549ba7f8c586d85c6)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 99 ++++++++++++++-------------------
- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index ed8bc9b02ed2..9576411757fa 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -1300,21 +1300,6 @@ static int do_read(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static void delete_node_single(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
--{
--	TDB_DATA key;
--
--	if (access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_DELETE, &key))
--		return;
--
--	if (do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, &node->acc) != 0) {
--		corrupt(conn, "Could not delete '%s'", node->name);
--		return;
--	}
--
--	domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
--}
--
- /* Must not be / */
- static char *basename(const char *name)
- {
-@@ -1585,69 +1570,59 @@ static int remove_child_entry(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 	return write_node(conn, node, true);
- }
- 
--static void delete_child(struct connection *conn,
--			 struct node *node, const char *childname)
-+static int delete_child(struct connection *conn,
-+			struct node *node, const char *childname)
- {
- 	unsigned int i;
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < node->childlen; i += strlen(node->children+i) + 1) {
- 		if (streq(node->children+i, childname)) {
--			if (remove_child_entry(conn, node, i))
--				corrupt(conn, "Can't update parent node '%s'",
--					node->name);
--			return;
-+			errno = remove_child_entry(conn, node, i) ? EIO : 0;
-+			return errno;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	corrupt(conn, "Can't find child '%s' in %s", childname, node->name);
-+
-+	errno = EIO;
-+	return errno;
- }
- 
--static int delete_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
--		       struct node *parent, struct node *node, bool watch_exact)
-+static int delnode_sub(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+		       struct node *node, void *arg)
- {
--	char *name;
-+	const char *root = arg;
-+	bool watch_exact;
-+	int ret;
-+	TDB_DATA key;
- 
--	/* Delete children. */
--	while (node->childlen) {
--		struct node *child;
-+	/* Any error here will probably be repeated for all following calls. */
-+	ret = access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_DELETE, &key);
-+	if (ret > 0)
-+		return WALK_TREE_SUCCESS_STOP;
- 
--		name = talloc_asprintf(node, "%s/%s", node->name,
--				       node->children);
--		child = name ? read_node(conn, node, name) : NULL;
--		if (child) {
--			if (delete_node(conn, ctx, node, child, true))
--				return errno;
--		} else {
--			trace("delete_node: Error deleting child '%s/%s'!\n",
--			      node->name, node->children);
--			/* Quit deleting. */
--			errno = ENOMEM;
--			return errno;
--		}
--		talloc_free(name);
--	}
-+	/* In case of error stop the walk. */
-+	if (!ret && do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, &node->acc))
-+		return WALK_TREE_SUCCESS_STOP;
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Fire the watches now, when we can still see the node permissions.
- 	 * This fine as we are single threaded and the next possible read will
- 	 * be handled only after the node has been really removed.
--	 */
-+	*/
-+	watch_exact = strcmp(root, node->name);
- 	fire_watches(conn, ctx, node->name, node, watch_exact, NULL);
--	delete_node_single(conn, node);
--	delete_child(conn, parent, basename(node->name));
--	talloc_free(node);
- 
--	return 0;
-+	domain_entry_dec(conn, node);
-+
-+	return WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY;
- }
- 
--static int _rm(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, struct node *node,
--	       const char *name)
-+static int _rm(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name)
- {
--	/*
--	 * Deleting node by node, so the result is always consistent even in
--	 * case of a failure.
--	 */
- 	struct node *parent;
- 	char *parentname = get_parent(ctx, name);
-+	struct walk_funcs walkfuncs = { .exit = delnode_sub };
-+	int ret;
- 
- 	if (!parentname)
- 		return errno;
-@@ -1655,9 +1630,21 @@ static int _rm(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, struct node *node,
- 	parent = read_node(conn, ctx, parentname);
- 	if (!parent)
- 		return read_node_can_propagate_errno() ? errno : EINVAL;
--	node->parent = parent;
- 
--	return delete_node(conn, ctx, parent, node, false);
-+	ret = walk_node_tree(ctx, conn, name, &walkfuncs, (void *)name);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
-+		if (ret == WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP) {
-+			corrupt(conn, "error when deleting sub-nodes of %s\n",
-+				name);
-+			errno = EIO;
-+		}
-+		return errno;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (delete_child(conn, parent, basename(name)))
-+		return errno;
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -1694,7 +1681,7 @@ static int do_rm(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	if (streq(name, "/"))
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
--	ret = _rm(conn, ctx, node, name);
-+	ret = _rm(conn, ctx, name);
- 	if (ret)
- 		return ret;
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0117-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-creating-node-record.patch b/0117-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-creating-node-record.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6271169..0000000
--- a/0117-tools-xenstore-use-treewalk-for-creating-node-record.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
-From 84674f206778e9b3d8d67c6c76aa8094a262d5ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 117/126] tools/xenstore: use treewalk for creating node
- records
-
-Instead of doing an open tree walk using call recursion, use
-walk_node_tree() when creating the node records during a live update.
-
-This will reduce code size and avoid many nesting levels of function
-calls which could potentially exhaust the stack.
-
-This is part of XSA-418 / CVE-2022-42321.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 297ac246a5d8ed656b349641288f3402dcc0251e)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c   | 127 ++++++++++++------------------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h   |   3 +-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c |   2 +-
- 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 9576411757fa..e8cdfeef50c7 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -2990,132 +2990,109 @@ const char *dump_state_buffered_data(FILE *fp, const struct connection *c,
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--const char *dump_state_node_perms(FILE *fp, struct xs_state_node *sn,
--				  const struct xs_permissions *perms,
-+const char *dump_state_node_perms(FILE *fp, const struct xs_permissions *perms,
- 				  unsigned int n_perms)
- {
- 	unsigned int p;
- 
- 	for (p = 0; p < n_perms; p++) {
-+		struct xs_state_node_perm sp;
-+
- 		switch ((int)perms[p].perms & ~XS_PERM_IGNORE) {
- 		case XS_PERM_READ:
--			sn->perms[p].access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_READ;
-+			sp.access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_READ;
- 			break;
- 		case XS_PERM_WRITE:
--			sn->perms[p].access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_WRITE;
-+			sp.access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_WRITE;
- 			break;
- 		case XS_PERM_READ | XS_PERM_WRITE:
--			sn->perms[p].access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_BOTH;
-+			sp.access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_BOTH;
- 			break;
- 		default:
--			sn->perms[p].access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_NONE;
-+			sp.access = XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_NONE;
- 			break;
- 		}
--		sn->perms[p].flags = (perms[p].perms & XS_PERM_IGNORE)
-+		sp.flags = (perms[p].perms & XS_PERM_IGNORE)
- 				     ? XS_STATE_NODE_PERM_IGNORE : 0;
--		sn->perms[p].domid = perms[p].id;
--	}
-+		sp.domid = perms[p].id;
- 
--	if (fwrite(sn->perms, sizeof(*sn->perms), n_perms, fp) != n_perms)
--		return "Dump node permissions error";
-+		if (fwrite(&sp, sizeof(sp), 1, fp) != 1)
-+			return "Dump node permissions error";
-+	}
- 
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--static const char *dump_state_node_tree(FILE *fp, char *path)
-+struct dump_node_data {
-+	FILE *fp;
-+	const char *err;
-+};
-+
-+static int dump_state_node_err(struct dump_node_data *data, const char *err)
- {
--	unsigned int pathlen, childlen, p = 0;
-+	data->err = err;
-+	return WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP;
-+}
-+
-+static int dump_state_node(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+			   struct node *node, void *arg)
-+{
-+	struct dump_node_data *data = arg;
-+	FILE *fp = data->fp;
-+	unsigned int pathlen;
- 	struct xs_state_record_header head;
- 	struct xs_state_node sn;
--	TDB_DATA key, data;
--	const struct xs_tdb_record_hdr *hdr;
--	const char *child;
- 	const char *ret;
- 
--	pathlen = strlen(path) + 1;
--
--	set_tdb_key(path, &key);
--	data = tdb_fetch(tdb_ctx, key);
--	if (data.dptr == NULL)
--		return "Error reading node";
--
--	/* Clean up in case of failure. */
--	talloc_steal(path, data.dptr);
--
--	hdr = (void *)data.dptr;
-+	pathlen = strlen(node->name) + 1;
- 
- 	head.type = XS_STATE_TYPE_NODE;
- 	head.length = sizeof(sn);
- 	sn.conn_id = 0;
- 	sn.ta_id = 0;
- 	sn.ta_access = 0;
--	sn.perm_n = hdr->num_perms;
-+	sn.perm_n = node->perms.num;
- 	sn.path_len = pathlen;
--	sn.data_len = hdr->datalen;
--	head.length += hdr->num_perms * sizeof(*sn.perms);
-+	sn.data_len = node->datalen;
-+	head.length += node->perms.num * sizeof(*sn.perms);
- 	head.length += pathlen;
--	head.length += hdr->datalen;
-+	head.length += node->datalen;
- 	head.length = ROUNDUP(head.length, 3);
- 
- 	if (fwrite(&head, sizeof(head), 1, fp) != 1)
--		return "Dump node state error";
-+		return dump_state_node_err(data, "Dump node head error");
- 	if (fwrite(&sn, sizeof(sn), 1, fp) != 1)
--		return "Dump node state error";
-+		return dump_state_node_err(data, "Dump node state error");
- 
--	ret = dump_state_node_perms(fp, &sn, hdr->perms, hdr->num_perms);
-+	ret = dump_state_node_perms(fp, node->perms.p, node->perms.num);
- 	if (ret)
--		return ret;
-+		return dump_state_node_err(data, ret);
- 
--	if (fwrite(path, pathlen, 1, fp) != 1)
--		return "Dump node path error";
--	if (hdr->datalen &&
--	    fwrite(hdr->perms + hdr->num_perms, hdr->datalen, 1, fp) != 1)
--		return "Dump node data error";
-+	if (fwrite(node->name, pathlen, 1, fp) != 1)
-+		return dump_state_node_err(data, "Dump node path error");
-+
-+	if (node->datalen && fwrite(node->data, node->datalen, 1, fp) != 1)
-+		return dump_state_node_err(data, "Dump node data error");
- 
- 	ret = dump_state_align(fp);
- 	if (ret)
--		return ret;
-+		return dump_state_node_err(data, ret);
- 
--	child = (char *)(hdr->perms + hdr->num_perms) + hdr->datalen;
--
--	/*
--	 * Use path for constructing children paths.
--	 * As we don't write out nodes without having written their parent
--	 * already we will never clobber a part of the path we'll need later.
--	 */
--	pathlen--;
--	if (path[pathlen - 1] != '/') {
--		path[pathlen] = '/';
--		pathlen++;
--	}
--	while (p < hdr->childlen) {
--		childlen = strlen(child) + 1;
--		if (pathlen + childlen > XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX)
--			return "Dump node path length error";
--		strcpy(path + pathlen, child);
--		ret = dump_state_node_tree(fp, path);
--		if (ret)
--			return ret;
--		p += childlen;
--		child += childlen;
--	}
--
--	talloc_free(data.dptr);
--
--	return NULL;
-+	return WALK_TREE_OK;
- }
- 
- const char *dump_state_nodes(FILE *fp, const void *ctx)
- {
--	char *path;
-+	struct dump_node_data data = {
-+		.fp = fp,
-+		.err = "Dump node walk error"
-+	};
-+	struct walk_funcs walkfuncs = { .enter = dump_state_node };
- 
--	path = talloc_size(ctx, XENSTORE_ABS_PATH_MAX);
--	if (!path)
--		return "Path buffer allocation error";
-+	if (walk_node_tree(ctx, NULL, "/", &walkfuncs, &data))
-+		return data.err;
- 
--	strcpy(path, "/");
--
--	return dump_state_node_tree(fp, path);
-+	return NULL;
- }
- 
- void read_state_global(const void *ctx, const void *state)
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index f0fd8c352857..3190494bbeb5 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -326,8 +326,7 @@ const char *dump_state_buffered_data(FILE *fp, const struct connection *c,
- 				     const struct connection *conn,
- 				     struct xs_state_connection *sc);
- const char *dump_state_nodes(FILE *fp, const void *ctx);
--const char *dump_state_node_perms(FILE *fp, struct xs_state_node *sn,
--				  const struct xs_permissions *perms,
-+const char *dump_state_node_perms(FILE *fp, const struct xs_permissions *perms,
- 				  unsigned int n_perms);
- 
- void read_state_global(const void *ctx, const void *state);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index 8b503c2dfe07..a91cc75ab59b 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -1449,7 +1449,7 @@ static const char *dump_state_special_node(FILE *fp, const char *name,
- 	if (fwrite(&sn, sizeof(sn), 1, fp) != 1)
- 		return "Dump special node error";
- 
--	ret = dump_state_node_perms(fp, &sn, perms->p, perms->num);
-+	ret = dump_state_node_perms(fp, perms->p, perms->num);
- 	if (ret)
- 		return ret;
- 
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0118-tools-xenstore-remove-nodes-owned-by-destroyed-domai.patch b/0118-tools-xenstore-remove-nodes-owned-by-destroyed-domai.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a95a48e..0000000
--- a/0118-tools-xenstore-remove-nodes-owned-by-destroyed-domai.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
-From da87661d058c4a6cf2ea6439771b9834f1c06223 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 118/126] tools/xenstore: remove nodes owned by destroyed
- domain
-
-In case a domain is removed from Xenstore, remove all nodes owned by
-it per default.
-
-This tackles the problem that nodes might be created by a domain
-outside its home path in Xenstore, leading to Xenstore hogging more
-and more memory. Domain quota don't work in this case if the guest is
-rebooting in between.
-
-Since XSA-322 ownership of such stale nodes is transferred to dom0,
-which is helping against unintended access, but not against OOM of
-Xenstore.
-
-As a fallback for weird cases add a Xenstore start parameter for
-keeping today's way to handle stale nodes, adding the risk of Xenstore
-hitting an OOM situation.
-
-This is part of XSA-419 / CVE-2022-42322.
-
-Fixes: 496306324d8d ("tools/xenstore: revoke access rights for removed domains")
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 755d3f9debf8879448211fffb018f556136f6a79)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c   | 17 +++++--
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h   |  4 ++
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index e8cdfeef50c7..d5b2e59b0db6 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static bool verbose = false;
- LIST_HEAD(connections);
- int tracefd = -1;
- static bool recovery = true;
-+bool keep_orphans = false;
- static int reopen_log_pipe[2];
- static int reopen_log_pipe0_pollfd_idx = -1;
- char *tracefile = NULL;
-@@ -722,7 +723,7 @@ struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 	node->perms.p = hdr->perms;
- 	node->acc.domid = node->perms.p[0].id;
- 	node->acc.memory = data.dsize;
--	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(conn, node))
-+	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(node))
- 		goto error;
- 
- 	/* If owner is gone reset currently accounted memory size. */
-@@ -765,7 +766,7 @@ int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
- 	void *p;
- 	struct xs_tdb_record_hdr *hdr;
- 
--	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(conn, node))
-+	if (domain_adjust_node_perms(node))
- 		return errno;
- 
- 	data.dsize = sizeof(*hdr)
-@@ -1617,7 +1618,7 @@ static int delnode_sub(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	return WALK_TREE_RM_CHILDENTRY;
- }
- 
--static int _rm(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name)
-+int rm_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name)
- {
- 	struct node *parent;
- 	char *parentname = get_parent(ctx, name);
-@@ -1681,7 +1682,7 @@ static int do_rm(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 	if (streq(name, "/"))
- 		return EINVAL;
- 
--	ret = _rm(conn, ctx, name);
-+	ret = rm_node(conn, ctx, name);
- 	if (ret)
- 		return ret;
- 
-@@ -2537,6 +2538,8 @@ static void usage(void)
- "  -R, --no-recovery       to request that no recovery should be attempted when\n"
- "                          the store is corrupted (debug only),\n"
- "  -I, --internal-db       store database in memory, not on disk\n"
-+"  -K, --keep-orphans      don't delete nodes owned by a domain when the\n"
-+"                          domain is deleted (this is a security risk!)\n"
- "  -V, --verbose           to request verbose execution.\n");
- }
- 
-@@ -2561,6 +2564,7 @@ static struct option options[] = {
- 	{ "timeout", 1, NULL, 'w' },
- 	{ "no-recovery", 0, NULL, 'R' },
- 	{ "internal-db", 0, NULL, 'I' },
-+	{ "keep-orphans", 0, NULL, 'K' },
- 	{ "verbose", 0, NULL, 'V' },
- 	{ "watch-nb", 1, NULL, 'W' },
- #ifndef NO_LIVE_UPDATE
-@@ -2641,7 +2645,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 	orig_argc = argc;
- 	orig_argv = argv;
- 
--	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HNPS:t:A:M:Q:q:T:RVW:w:U",
-+	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HKNPS:t:A:M:Q:q:T:RVW:w:U",
- 				  options, NULL)) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case 'D':
-@@ -2677,6 +2681,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 		case 'I':
- 			tdb_flags = TDB_INTERNAL|TDB_NOLOCK;
- 			break;
-+		case 'K':
-+			keep_orphans = true;
-+			break;
- 		case 'V':
- 			verbose = true;
- 			break;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-index 3190494bbeb5..9a9dbb2c3c86 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
-@@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
- struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 		       const char *name);
- 
-+/* Remove a node and its children. */
-+int rm_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, const char *name);
-+
- void setup_structure(bool live_update);
- struct connection *new_connection(connwritefn_t *write, connreadfn_t *read);
- struct connection *get_connection_by_id(unsigned int conn_id);
-@@ -279,6 +282,7 @@ extern int quota_req_outstanding;
- extern int quota_trans_nodes;
- extern int quota_memory_per_domain_soft;
- extern int quota_memory_per_domain_hard;
-+extern bool keep_orphans;
- 
- extern unsigned int timeout_watch_event_msec;
- 
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-index a91cc75ab59b..ee4b19387db8 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
-@@ -196,10 +196,64 @@ static void unmap_interface(void *interface)
- 	xengnttab_unmap(*xgt_handle, interface, 1);
- }
- 
-+static int domain_tree_remove_sub(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
-+				  struct node *node, void *arg)
-+{
-+	struct domain *domain = arg;
-+	TDB_DATA key;
-+	int ret = WALK_TREE_OK;
-+
-+	if (node->perms.p[0].id != domain->domid)
-+		return WALK_TREE_OK;
-+
-+	if (keep_orphans) {
-+		set_tdb_key(node->name, &key);
-+		domain->nbentry--;
-+		node->perms.p[0].id = priv_domid;
-+		node->acc.memory = 0;
-+		domain_entry_inc(NULL, node);
-+		if (write_node_raw(NULL, &key, node, true)) {
-+			/* That's unfortunate. We only can try to continue. */
-+			syslog(LOG_ERR,
-+			       "error when moving orphaned node %s to dom0\n",
-+			       node->name);
-+		} else
-+			trace("orphaned node %s moved to dom0\n", node->name);
-+	} else {
-+		if (rm_node(NULL, ctx, node->name)) {
-+			/* That's unfortunate. We only can try to continue. */
-+			syslog(LOG_ERR,
-+			       "error when deleting orphaned node %s\n",
-+			       node->name);
-+		} else
-+			trace("orphaned node %s deleted\n", node->name);
-+
-+		/* Skip children in all cases in order to avoid more errors. */
-+		ret = WALK_TREE_SKIP_CHILDREN;
-+	}
-+
-+	return domain->nbentry > 0 ? ret : WALK_TREE_SUCCESS_STOP;
-+}
-+
-+static void domain_tree_remove(struct domain *domain)
-+{
-+	int ret;
-+	struct walk_funcs walkfuncs = { .enter = domain_tree_remove_sub };
-+
-+	if (domain->nbentry > 0) {
-+		ret = walk_node_tree(domain, NULL, "/", &walkfuncs, domain);
-+		if (ret == WALK_TREE_ERROR_STOP)
-+			syslog(LOG_ERR,
-+			       "error when looking for orphaned nodes\n");
-+	}
-+}
-+
- static int destroy_domain(void *_domain)
- {
- 	struct domain *domain = _domain;
- 
-+	domain_tree_remove(domain);
-+
- 	list_del(&domain->list);
- 
- 	if (!domain->introduced)
-@@ -857,15 +911,15 @@ int domain_entry_inc(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- 	struct domain *d;
- 	unsigned int domid;
- 
--	if (!conn)
-+	if (!node->perms.p)
- 		return 0;
- 
--	domid = node->perms.p ? node->perms.p[0].id : conn->id;
-+	domid = node->perms.p[0].id;
- 
--	if (conn->transaction) {
-+	if (conn && conn->transaction) {
- 		transaction_entry_inc(conn->transaction, domid);
- 	} else {
--		d = (domid == conn->id && conn->domain) ? conn->domain
-+		d = (conn && domid == conn->id && conn->domain) ? conn->domain
- 		    : find_or_alloc_existing_domain(domid);
- 		if (d)
- 			d->nbentry++;
-@@ -926,23 +980,11 @@ int domain_alloc_permrefs(struct node_perms *perms)
-  * Remove permissions for no longer existing domains in order to avoid a new
-  * domain with the same domid inheriting the permissions.
-  */
--int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
-+int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct node *node)
- {
- 	unsigned int i;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	ret = chk_domain_generation(node->perms.p[0].id, node->generation);
--
--	/* If the owner doesn't exist any longer give it to priv domain. */
--	if (!ret) {
--		/*
--		 * In theory we'd need to update the number of dom0 nodes here,
--		 * but we could be called for a read of the node. So better
--		 * avoid the risk to overflow the node count of dom0.
--		 */
--		node->perms.p[0].id = priv_domid;
--	}
--
- 	for (i = 1; i < node->perms.num; i++) {
- 		if (node->perms.p[i].perms & XS_PERM_IGNORE)
- 			continue;
-@@ -960,15 +1002,15 @@ void domain_entry_dec(struct connection *conn, struct node *node)
- 	struct domain *d;
- 	unsigned int domid;
- 
--	if (!conn)
-+	if (!node->perms.p)
- 		return;
- 
- 	domid = node->perms.p ? node->perms.p[0].id : conn->id;
- 
--	if (conn->transaction) {
-+	if (conn && conn->transaction) {
- 		transaction_entry_dec(conn->transaction, domid);
- 	} else {
--		d = (domid == conn->id && conn->domain) ? conn->domain
-+		d = (conn && domid == conn->id && conn->domain) ? conn->domain
- 		    : find_domain_struct(domid);
- 		if (d) {
- 			d->nbentry--;
-@@ -1087,7 +1129,7 @@ int domain_memory_add(unsigned int domid, int mem, bool no_quota_check)
- 		 * exist, as accounting is done either for a domain related to
- 		 * the current connection, or for the domain owning a node
- 		 * (which is always existing, as the owner of the node is
--		 * tested to exist and replaced by domid 0 if not).
-+		 * tested to exist and deleted or replaced by domid 0 if not).
- 		 * So not finding the related domain MUST be an error in the
- 		 * data base.
- 		 */
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-index 0b4f56b8146c..491d7a325bd3 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ bool domain_can_write(struct connection *conn);
- bool domain_is_unprivileged(struct connection *conn);
- 
- /* Remove node permissions for no longer existing domains. */
--int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct connection *conn, struct node *node);
-+int domain_adjust_node_perms(struct node *node);
- int domain_alloc_permrefs(struct node_perms *perms);
- 
- /* Quota manipulation */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0119-tools-xenstore-make-the-internal-memory-data-base-th.patch b/0119-tools-xenstore-make-the-internal-memory-data-base-th.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c1611b..0000000
--- a/0119-tools-xenstore-make-the-internal-memory-data-base-th.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-From 4269999ecedf79452a3fbbfab842f045d1ece16e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:13 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 119/126] tools/xenstore: make the internal memory data base
- the default
-
-Having a file backed data base has the only advantage of being capable
-to dump the contents of it while Xenstore is running, and potentially
-using less swap space in case the data base can't be kept in memory.
-
-It has the major disadvantage of a huge performance overhead: switching
-to keep the data base in memory only speeds up live update of xenstored
-with 120000 nodes from 20 minutes to 11 seconds. A complete tree walk
-of this configuration will be reduced from 7 seconds to 280 msecs
-(measured by "xenstore-control check").
-
-So make the internal memory data base the default and enhance the
-"--internal-db" command line parameter to take an optional parameter
-allowing to switch the internal data base back to the file based one.
-
-This is part of XSA-419.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit d174fefa90487ddd25ebc618028f67b2e8a1f795)
----
- tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c |  4 ++--
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c      | 13 ++++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c b/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c
-index 32689abd7479..d080dae5d3b8 100644
---- a/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c
-+++ b/tools/helpers/init-xenstore-domain.c
-@@ -214,9 +214,9 @@ static int build(xc_interface *xch)
-     }
- 
-     if ( param )
--        snprintf(cmdline, 512, "--event %d --internal-db %s", rv, param);
-+        snprintf(cmdline, 512, "--event %d %s", rv, param);
-     else
--        snprintf(cmdline, 512, "--event %d --internal-db", rv);
-+        snprintf(cmdline, 512, "--event %d", rv);
- 
-     dom->cmdline = xc_dom_strdup(dom, cmdline);
-     dom->xenstore_domid = domid;
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index d5b2e59b0db6..9ddbd934f794 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -2230,7 +2230,7 @@ static void accept_connection(int sock)
- }
- #endif
- 
--static int tdb_flags;
-+static int tdb_flags = TDB_INTERNAL | TDB_NOLOCK;
- 
- /* We create initial nodes manually. */
- static void manual_node(const char *name, const char *child)
-@@ -2537,7 +2537,8 @@ static void usage(void)
- "                          watch-event: time a watch-event is kept pending\n"
- "  -R, --no-recovery       to request that no recovery should be attempted when\n"
- "                          the store is corrupted (debug only),\n"
--"  -I, --internal-db       store database in memory, not on disk\n"
-+"  -I, --internal-db [on|off] store database in memory, not on disk, default is\n"
-+"                          memory, with \"--internal-db off\" it is on disk\n"
- "  -K, --keep-orphans      don't delete nodes owned by a domain when the\n"
- "                          domain is deleted (this is a security risk!)\n"
- "  -V, --verbose           to request verbose execution.\n");
-@@ -2563,7 +2564,7 @@ static struct option options[] = {
- 	{ "quota-soft", 1, NULL, 'q' },
- 	{ "timeout", 1, NULL, 'w' },
- 	{ "no-recovery", 0, NULL, 'R' },
--	{ "internal-db", 0, NULL, 'I' },
-+	{ "internal-db", 2, NULL, 'I' },
- 	{ "keep-orphans", 0, NULL, 'K' },
- 	{ "verbose", 0, NULL, 'V' },
- 	{ "watch-nb", 1, NULL, 'W' },
-@@ -2645,7 +2646,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 	orig_argc = argc;
- 	orig_argv = argv;
- 
--	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "DE:F:HKNPS:t:A:M:Q:q:T:RVW:w:U",
-+	while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv,
-+				  "DE:F:HI::KNPS:t:A:M:Q:q:T:RVW:w:U",
- 				  options, NULL)) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case 'D':
-@@ -2679,7 +2681,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 			tracefile = optarg;
- 			break;
- 		case 'I':
--			tdb_flags = TDB_INTERNAL|TDB_NOLOCK;
-+			if (optarg && !strcmp(optarg, "off"))
-+				tdb_flags = 0;
- 			break;
- 		case 'K':
- 			keep_orphans = true;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0120-docs-enhance-xenstore.txt-with-permissions-descripti.patch b/0120-docs-enhance-xenstore.txt-with-permissions-descripti.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e0d7d9e..0000000
--- a/0120-docs-enhance-xenstore.txt-with-permissions-descripti.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From bc3921135cf8590d0f587f460be431922183c4c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:13 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 120/126] docs: enhance xenstore.txt with permissions
- description
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The permission scheme of Xenstore nodes is not really covered by
-docs/misc/xenstore.txt, other than referring to the Xen wiki.
-
-Add a paragraph explaining the permissions of nodes, and especially
-mentioning removal of nodes when a domain has been removed from
-Xenstore.
-
-This is part of XSA-419.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit d084d2c6dff7044956ebdf83a259ad6081a1d921)
----
- docs/misc/xenstore.txt | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/docs/misc/xenstore.txt b/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
-index a7d006519ae8..eccd596ee38c 100644
---- a/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
-+++ b/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
-@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ bytes are forbidden; clients specifying relative paths should keep
- them to within 2048 bytes.  (See XENSTORE_*_PATH_MAX in xs_wire.h.)
- 
- 
-+Each node has one or multiple permission entries.  Permissions are
-+granted by domain-id, the first permission entry of each node specifies
-+the owner of the node.  Permissions of a node can be changed by the
-+owner of the node, the owner can only be modified by the control
-+domain (usually domain id 0).  The owner always has the right to read
-+and write the node, while other permissions can be setup to allow
-+read and/or write access.  When a domain is being removed from Xenstore
-+nodes owned by that domain will be removed together with all of those
-+nodes' children.
-+
-+
- Communication with xenstore is via either sockets, or event channel
- and shared memory, as specified in io/xs_wire.h: each message in
- either direction is a header formatted as a struct xsd_sockmsg
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0121-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Fix-quota-bypass-on-domain-shu.patch b/0121-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Fix-quota-bypass-on-domain-shu.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 722700e..0000000
--- a/0121-tools-ocaml-xenstored-Fix-quota-bypass-on-domain-shu.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-From b9ede0950b3a6526d5ccea074841f093e0580948 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 19:13:06 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 121/126] tools/ocaml/xenstored: Fix quota bypass on domain
- shutdown
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-XSA-322 fixed a domid reuse vulnerability by assigning Dom0 as the owner of
-any nodes left after a domain is shutdown (e.g. outside its /local/domain/N
-tree).
-
-However Dom0 has no quota on purpose, so this opened up another potential
-attack vector. Avoid it by deleting these nodes instead of assigning them to
-Dom0.
-
-This is part of XSA-419 / CVE-2022-42323.
-
-Fixes: c46eff921209 ("tools/ocaml/xenstored: clean up permissions for dead domains")
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit db471408edd46af403b8bd44d180a928ad7fbb80)
----
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/perms.ml |  3 +--
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/perms.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/perms.ml
-index e8a16221f8fa..84f2503e8e29 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/perms.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/perms.ml
-@@ -64,8 +64,7 @@ let get_owner perm = perm.owner
- * *)
- let remove_domid ~domid perm =
- 	let acl = List.filter (fun (acl_domid, _) -> acl_domid <> domid) perm.acl in
--	let owner = if perm.owner = domid then 0 else perm.owner in
--	{ perm with acl; owner }
-+	if perm.owner = domid then None else Some { perm with acl; owner = perm.owner }
- 
- let default0 = create 0 NONE []
- 
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-index 20e67b142746..70f0c83de404 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/store.ml
-@@ -87,10 +87,21 @@ let check_owner node connection =
- 
- let rec recurse fct node = fct node; SymbolMap.iter (fun _ -> recurse fct) node.children
- 
--(** [recurse_map f tree] applies [f] on each node in the tree recursively *)
--let recurse_map f =
-+(** [recurse_filter_map f tree] applies [f] on each node in the tree recursively,
-+    possibly removing some nodes.
-+    Note that the nodes removed this way won't generate watch events.
-+*)
-+let recurse_filter_map f =
-+	let invalid = -1 in
-+	let is_valid _ node = node.perms.owner <> invalid in
- 	let rec walk node =
--		f { node with children = SymbolMap.map walk node.children }
-+		(* Map.filter_map is Ocaml 4.11+ only *)
-+		let node =
-+		{ node with children =
-+			SymbolMap.map walk node.children |> SymbolMap.filter is_valid } in
-+		match f node with
-+		| Some keep -> keep
-+		| None -> { node with perms = {node.perms with owner = invalid } }
- 	in
- 	walk
- 
-@@ -444,11 +455,13 @@ let setperms store perm path nperms =
- 
- let reset_permissions store domid =
- 	Logging.info "store|node" "Cleaning up xenstore ACLs for domid %d" domid;
--	store.root <- Node.recurse_map (fun node ->
--		let perms = Perms.Node.remove_domid ~domid node.perms in
--		if perms <> node.perms then
--			Logging.debug "store|node" "Changed permissions for node %s" (Node.get_name node);
--		{ node with perms }
-+	store.root <- Node.recurse_filter_map (fun node ->
-+		match Perms.Node.remove_domid ~domid node.perms with
-+		| None -> None
-+		| Some perms ->
-+			if perms <> node.perms then
-+				Logging.debug "store|node" "Changed permissions for node %s" (Node.get_name node);
-+			Some { node with perms }
- 	) store.root
- 
- type ops = {
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0122-tools-ocaml-Ensure-packet-size-is-never-negative.patch b/0122-tools-ocaml-Ensure-packet-size-is-never-negative.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 35a14f1..0000000
--- a/0122-tools-ocaml-Ensure-packet-size-is-never-negative.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-From d3649d33e1eae49d3925ef34a7ccf39cae8852e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 19:13:05 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 122/126] tools/ocaml: Ensure packet size is never negative
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Integers in Ocaml have 63 or 31 bits of signed precision.
-
-On 64-bit builds of Ocaml, this is fine because a C uint32_t always fits
-within a 63-bit signed integer.
-
-In 32-bit builds of Ocaml, this goes wrong.  The C uint32_t is truncated
-first (loses the top bit), then has a unsigned/signed mismatch.
-
-A "negative" value (i.e. a packet on the ring of between 1G and 2G in size)
-will trigger an exception later in Bytes.make in xb.ml, and because the packet
-is not removed from the ring, the exception re-triggers on every subsequent
-query, creating a livelock.
-
-Fix both the source of the exception in Xb, and as defence in depth, mark the
-domain as bad for any Invalid_argument exceptions to avoid the risk of
-livelock.
-
-This is XSA-420 / CVE-2022-42324.
-
-Signed-off-by: Edwin Török <edvin.torok@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
-(cherry picked from commit ae34df4d82636f4c82700b447ea2c93b9f82b3f3)
----
- tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml   | 6 +++---
- tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
-index b6e2a716e263..3aa8927eb7f0 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
-@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ let of_string s =
- 	   This will leave the guest connection is a bad state and will
- 	   be hard to recover from without restarting the connection
- 	   (ie rebooting the guest) *)
--	let dlen = min xenstore_payload_max dlen in
-+	let dlen = max 0 (min xenstore_payload_max dlen) in
- 	{
- 		tid = tid;
- 		rid = rid;
-@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ let of_string s =
- 	}
- 
- let append pkt s sz =
--	if pkt.len > 4096 then failwith "Buffer.add: cannot grow buffer";
--	Buffer.add_string pkt.buf (String.sub s 0 sz)
-+	if Buffer.length pkt.buf + sz > xenstore_payload_max then failwith "Buffer.add: cannot grow buffer";
-+	Buffer.add_substring pkt.buf s 0 sz
- 
- let to_complete pkt =
- 	pkt.len - (Buffer.length pkt.buf)
-diff --git a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-index ce39ce28b5f3..6cb990ee7fb2 100644
---- a/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-+++ b/tools/ocaml/xenstored/process.ml
-@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ let do_input store cons doms con =
- 			History.reconnect con;
- 			info "%s reconnection complete" (Connection.get_domstr con);
- 			None
--		| Failure exp ->
-+		| Invalid_argument exp | Failure exp ->
- 			error "caught exception %s" exp;
- 			error "got a bad client %s" (sprintf "%-8s" (Connection.get_domstr con));
- 			Connection.mark_as_bad con;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0123-tools-xenstore-fix-deleting-node-in-transaction.patch b/0123-tools-xenstore-fix-deleting-node-in-transaction.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index efa7178..0000000
--- a/0123-tools-xenstore-fix-deleting-node-in-transaction.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From 2d3476effe3a9236867562f14dc26979a6527080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:13 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 123/126] tools/xenstore: fix deleting node in transaction
-
-In case a node has been created in a transaction and it is later
-deleted in the same transaction, the transaction will be terminated
-with an error.
-
-As this error is encountered only when handling the deleted node at
-transaction finalization, the transaction will have been performed
-partially and without updating the accounting information. This will
-enable a malicious guest to create arbitrary number of nodes.
-
-This is part of XSA-421 / CVE-2022-42325.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Tested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 13ac37f1416cae88d97f7baf6cf2a827edb9a187)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c | 8 +++++++-
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index 3e3eb47326cc..7ffe21bb5285 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -418,7 +418,13 @@ static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
- 						   true);
- 				talloc_free(data.dptr);
- 			} else {
--				ret = do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, NULL);
-+				/*
-+				 * A node having been created and later deleted
-+				 * in this transaction will have no generation
-+				 * information stored.
-+				 */
-+				ret = (i->generation == NO_GENERATION)
-+				      ? 0 : do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, NULL);
- 			}
- 			if (ret)
- 				goto err;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0124-tools-xenstore-harden-transaction-finalization-again.patch b/0124-tools-xenstore-harden-transaction-finalization-again.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8279aeb..0000000
--- a/0124-tools-xenstore-harden-transaction-finalization-again.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,410 +0,0 @@
-From e818f4f0dabf83a6138cd77d7464495fab7bfc16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 07:35:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 124/126] tools/xenstore: harden transaction finalization
- against errors
-
-When finalizing a transaction, any error occurring after checking for
-conflicts will result in the transaction being performed only
-partially today. Additionally accounting data will not be updated at
-the end of the transaction, which might result in further problems
-later.
-
-Avoid those problems by multiple modifications:
-
-- free any transaction specific nodes which don't need to be committed
-  as they haven't been written during the transaction as soon as their
-  generation count has been verified, this will reduce the risk of
-  out-of-memory situations
-
-- store the transaction specific node name in struct accessed_node in
-  order to avoid the need to allocate additional memory for it when
-  finalizing the transaction
-
-- don't stop the transaction finalization when hitting an error
-  condition, but try to continue to handle all modified nodes
-
-- in case of a detected error do the accounting update as needed and
-  call the data base checking only after that
-
-- if writing a node in a transaction is failing (e.g. due to a failed
-  quota check), fail the transaction, as prior changes to struct
-  accessed_node can't easily be undone in that case
-
-This is part of XSA-421 / CVE-2022-42326.
-
-Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-Tested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 2dd823ca7237e7fb90c890642d6a3b357a26fcff)
----
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c        |  16 ++-
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c | 171 +++++++++++--------------
- tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h |   4 +-
- 3 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-index 9ddbd934f794..3c008c8cd455 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
-@@ -692,8 +692,7 @@ struct node *read_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx,
- 		return NULL;
- 	}
- 
--	if (transaction_prepend(conn, name, &key))
--		return NULL;
-+	transaction_prepend(conn, name, &key);
- 
- 	data = tdb_fetch(tdb_ctx, key);
- 
-@@ -811,10 +810,21 @@ int write_node_raw(struct connection *conn, TDB_DATA *key, struct node *node,
- static int write_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 		      bool no_quota_check)
- {
-+	int ret;
-+
- 	if (access_node(conn, node, NODE_ACCESS_WRITE, &node->key))
- 		return errno;
- 
--	return write_node_raw(conn, &node->key, node, no_quota_check);
-+	ret = write_node_raw(conn, &node->key, node, no_quota_check);
-+	if (ret && conn && conn->transaction) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Reverting access_node() is hard, so just fail the
-+		 * transaction.
-+		 */
-+		fail_transaction(conn->transaction);
-+	}
-+
-+	return ret;
- }
- 
- enum xs_perm_type perm_for_conn(struct connection *conn,
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-index 7ffe21bb5285..ac854197cadb 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
-@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ struct accessed_node
- 	struct list_head list;
- 
- 	/* The name of the node. */
--	char *node;
-+	char *trans_name;	/* Transaction specific name. */
-+	char *node;		/* Main data base name. */
- 
- 	/* Generation count (or NO_GENERATION) for conflict checking. */
- 	uint64_t generation;
-@@ -199,25 +200,20 @@ static char *transaction_get_node_name(void *ctx, struct transaction *trans,
-  * Prepend the transaction to name if node has been modified in the current
-  * transaction.
-  */
--int transaction_prepend(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
--			TDB_DATA *key)
-+void transaction_prepend(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
-+			 TDB_DATA *key)
- {
--	char *tdb_name;
-+	struct accessed_node *i;
- 
--	if (!conn || !conn->transaction ||
--	    !find_accessed_node(conn->transaction, name)) {
--		set_tdb_key(name, key);
--		return 0;
-+	if (conn && conn->transaction) {
-+		i = find_accessed_node(conn->transaction, name);
-+		if (i) {
-+			set_tdb_key(i->trans_name, key);
-+			return;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
--	tdb_name = transaction_get_node_name(conn->transaction,
--					     conn->transaction, name);
--	if (!tdb_name)
--		return errno;
--
--	set_tdb_key(tdb_name, key);
--
--	return 0;
-+	set_tdb_key(name, key);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -240,7 +236,6 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 	struct accessed_node *i = NULL;
- 	struct transaction *trans;
- 	TDB_DATA local_key;
--	const char *trans_name = NULL;
- 	int ret;
- 	bool introduce = false;
- 
-@@ -259,10 +254,6 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 
- 	trans = conn->transaction;
- 
--	trans_name = transaction_get_node_name(node, trans, node->name);
--	if (!trans_name)
--		goto nomem;
--
- 	i = find_accessed_node(trans, node->name);
- 	if (!i) {
- 		if (trans->nodes >= quota_trans_nodes &&
-@@ -273,9 +264,10 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 		i = talloc_zero(trans, struct accessed_node);
- 		if (!i)
- 			goto nomem;
--		i->node = talloc_strdup(i, node->name);
--		if (!i->node)
-+		i->trans_name = transaction_get_node_name(i, trans, node->name);
-+		if (!i->trans_name)
- 			goto nomem;
-+		i->node = strchr(i->trans_name, '/') + 1;
- 		if (node->generation != NO_GENERATION && node->perms.num) {
- 			i->perms.p = talloc_array(i, struct xs_permissions,
- 						  node->perms.num);
-@@ -302,7 +294,7 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 			i->generation = node->generation;
- 			i->check_gen = true;
- 			if (node->generation != NO_GENERATION) {
--				set_tdb_key(trans_name, &local_key);
-+				set_tdb_key(i->trans_name, &local_key);
- 				ret = write_node_raw(conn, &local_key, node, true);
- 				if (ret)
- 					goto err;
-@@ -321,7 +313,7 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- 		return -1;
- 
- 	if (key) {
--		set_tdb_key(trans_name, key);
-+		set_tdb_key(i->trans_name, key);
- 		if (type == NODE_ACCESS_WRITE)
- 			i->ta_node = true;
- 		if (type == NODE_ACCESS_DELETE)
-@@ -333,7 +325,6 @@ int access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- nomem:
- 	ret = ENOMEM;
- err:
--	talloc_free((void *)trans_name);
- 	talloc_free(i);
- 	trans->fail = true;
- 	errno = ret;
-@@ -371,100 +362,90 @@ void queue_watches(struct connection *conn, const char *name, bool watch_exact)
-  * base.
-  */
- static int finalize_transaction(struct connection *conn,
--				struct transaction *trans)
-+				struct transaction *trans, bool *is_corrupt)
- {
--	struct accessed_node *i;
-+	struct accessed_node *i, *n;
- 	TDB_DATA key, ta_key, data;
- 	struct xs_tdb_record_hdr *hdr;
- 	uint64_t gen;
--	char *trans_name;
--	int ret;
- 
--	list_for_each_entry(i, &trans->accessed, list) {
--		if (!i->check_gen)
--			continue;
-+	list_for_each_entry_safe(i, n, &trans->accessed, list) {
-+		if (i->check_gen) {
-+			set_tdb_key(i->node, &key);
-+			data = tdb_fetch(tdb_ctx, key);
-+			hdr = (void *)data.dptr;
-+			if (!data.dptr) {
-+				if (tdb_error(tdb_ctx) != TDB_ERR_NOEXIST)
-+					return EIO;
-+				gen = NO_GENERATION;
-+			} else
-+				gen = hdr->generation;
-+			talloc_free(data.dptr);
-+			if (i->generation != gen)
-+				return EAGAIN;
-+		}
- 
--		set_tdb_key(i->node, &key);
--		data = tdb_fetch(tdb_ctx, key);
--		hdr = (void *)data.dptr;
--		if (!data.dptr) {
--			if (tdb_error(tdb_ctx) != TDB_ERR_NOEXIST)
--				return EIO;
--			gen = NO_GENERATION;
--		} else
--			gen = hdr->generation;
--		talloc_free(data.dptr);
--		if (i->generation != gen)
--			return EAGAIN;
-+		/* Entries for unmodified nodes can be removed early. */
-+		if (!i->modified) {
-+			if (i->ta_node) {
-+				set_tdb_key(i->trans_name, &ta_key);
-+				if (do_tdb_delete(conn, &ta_key, NULL))
-+					return EIO;
-+			}
-+			list_del(&i->list);
-+			talloc_free(i);
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	while ((i = list_top(&trans->accessed, struct accessed_node, list))) {
--		trans_name = transaction_get_node_name(i, trans, i->node);
--		if (!trans_name)
--			/* We are doomed: the transaction is only partial. */
--			goto err;
--
--		set_tdb_key(trans_name, &ta_key);
--
--		if (i->modified) {
--			set_tdb_key(i->node, &key);
--			if (i->ta_node) {
--				data = tdb_fetch(tdb_ctx, ta_key);
--				if (!data.dptr)
--					goto err;
-+		set_tdb_key(i->node, &key);
-+		if (i->ta_node) {
-+			set_tdb_key(i->trans_name, &ta_key);
-+			data = tdb_fetch(tdb_ctx, ta_key);
-+			if (data.dptr) {
- 				hdr = (void *)data.dptr;
- 				hdr->generation = ++generation;
--				ret = do_tdb_write(conn, &key, &data, NULL,
--						   true);
-+				*is_corrupt |= do_tdb_write(conn, &key, &data,
-+							    NULL, true);
- 				talloc_free(data.dptr);
-+				if (do_tdb_delete(conn, &ta_key, NULL))
-+					*is_corrupt = true;
- 			} else {
--				/*
--				 * A node having been created and later deleted
--				 * in this transaction will have no generation
--				 * information stored.
--				 */
--				ret = (i->generation == NO_GENERATION)
--				      ? 0 : do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, NULL);
--			}
--			if (ret)
--				goto err;
--			if (i->fire_watch) {
--				fire_watches(conn, trans, i->node, NULL,
--					     i->watch_exact,
--					     i->perms.p ? &i->perms : NULL);
-+				*is_corrupt = true;
- 			}
-+		} else {
-+			/*
-+			 * A node having been created and later deleted
-+			 * in this transaction will have no generation
-+			 * information stored.
-+			 */
-+			*is_corrupt |= (i->generation == NO_GENERATION)
-+				       ? false
-+				       : do_tdb_delete(conn, &key, NULL);
- 		}
-+		if (i->fire_watch)
-+			fire_watches(conn, trans, i->node, NULL, i->watch_exact,
-+				     i->perms.p ? &i->perms : NULL);
- 
--		if (i->ta_node && do_tdb_delete(conn, &ta_key, NULL))
--			goto err;
- 		list_del(&i->list);
- 		talloc_free(i);
- 	}
- 
- 	return 0;
--
--err:
--	corrupt(conn, "Partial transaction");
--	return EIO;
- }
- 
- static int destroy_transaction(void *_transaction)
- {
- 	struct transaction *trans = _transaction;
- 	struct accessed_node *i;
--	char *trans_name;
- 	TDB_DATA key;
- 
- 	wrl_ntransactions--;
- 	trace_destroy(trans, "transaction");
- 	while ((i = list_top(&trans->accessed, struct accessed_node, list))) {
- 		if (i->ta_node) {
--			trans_name = transaction_get_node_name(i, trans,
--							       i->node);
--			if (trans_name) {
--				set_tdb_key(trans_name, &key);
--				do_tdb_delete(trans->conn, &key, NULL);
--			}
-+			set_tdb_key(i->trans_name, &key);
-+			do_tdb_delete(trans->conn, &key, NULL);
- 		}
- 		list_del(&i->list);
- 		talloc_free(i);
-@@ -556,6 +537,7 @@ int do_transaction_end(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- {
- 	const char *arg = onearg(in);
- 	struct transaction *trans;
-+	bool is_corrupt = false;
- 	int ret;
- 
- 	if (!arg || (!streq(arg, "T") && !streq(arg, "F")))
-@@ -579,13 +561,17 @@ int do_transaction_end(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
- 		ret = transaction_fix_domains(trans, false);
- 		if (ret)
- 			return ret;
--		if (finalize_transaction(conn, trans))
--			return EAGAIN;
-+		ret = finalize_transaction(conn, trans, &is_corrupt);
-+		if (ret)
-+			return ret;
- 
- 		wrl_apply_debit_trans_commit(conn);
- 
- 		/* fix domain entry for each changed domain */
- 		transaction_fix_domains(trans, true);
-+
-+		if (is_corrupt)
-+			corrupt(conn, "transaction inconsistency");
- 	}
- 	send_ack(conn, XS_TRANSACTION_END);
- 
-@@ -660,7 +646,7 @@ int check_transactions(struct hashtable *hash)
- 	struct connection *conn;
- 	struct transaction *trans;
- 	struct accessed_node *i;
--	char *tname, *tnode;
-+	char *tname;
- 
- 	list_for_each_entry(conn, &connections, list) {
- 		list_for_each_entry(trans, &conn->transaction_list, list) {
-@@ -672,11 +658,8 @@ int check_transactions(struct hashtable *hash)
- 			list_for_each_entry(i, &trans->accessed, list) {
- 				if (!i->ta_node)
- 					continue;
--				tnode = transaction_get_node_name(tname, trans,
--								  i->node);
--				if (!tnode || !remember_string(hash, tnode))
-+				if (!remember_string(hash, i->trans_name))
- 					goto nomem;
--				talloc_free(tnode);
- 			}
- 
- 			talloc_free(tname);
-diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-index 39d7f81c5127..3417303f9427 100644
---- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.h
-@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ int __must_check access_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node,
- void queue_watches(struct connection *conn, const char *name, bool watch_exact);
- 
- /* Prepend the transaction to name if appropriate. */
--int transaction_prepend(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
--                        TDB_DATA *key);
-+void transaction_prepend(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
-+                         TDB_DATA *key);
- 
- /* Mark the transaction as failed. This will prevent it to be committed. */
- void fail_transaction(struct transaction *trans);
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0125-x86-spec-ctrl-Enumeration-for-IBPB_RET.patch b/0125-x86-spec-ctrl-Enumeration-for-IBPB_RET.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f1667ac..0000000
--- a/0125-x86-spec-ctrl-Enumeration-for-IBPB_RET.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From 07be0fe497349ed423c5201bdc410b6281ebf04f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 16:18:36 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 125/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for IBPB_RET
-
-The IBPB_RET bit indicates that the CPU's implementation of MSR_PRED_CMD.IBPB
-does flush the RSB/RAS too.
-
-This is part of XSA-422 / CVE-2022-23824.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 24496558e650535bdbd22cc04731e82276cd1b3f)
----
- tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c              | 1 +
- tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c                      | 1 +
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c                    | 5 +++--
- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 1 +
- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c
-index 2632efc6adb0..4cc2f211b878 100644
---- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c
-+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_cpuid.c
-@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list *cpuid, const char* str)
-         {"ssb-no",       0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 26,  1},
-         {"psfd",         0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 28,  1},
-         {"btc-no",       0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 29,  1},
-+        {"ibpb-ret",     0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 30,  1},
- 
-         {"nc",           0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX,  0,  8},
-         {"apicidsize",   0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 12,  4},
-diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-index e83bc4793d6e..5c944c24fe36 100644
---- a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-+++ b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
-@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static const char *const str_e8b[32] =
-     [24] = "amd-ssbd",         [25] = "virt-ssbd",
-     [26] = "ssb-no",
-     [28] = "psfd",             [29] = "btc-no",
-+    [30] = "ibpb-ret",
- };
- 
- static const char *const str_7d0[32] =
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 3ff602bd0281..459c64d139b6 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-      * Hardware read-only information, stating immunity to certain issues, or
-      * suggestions of which mitigation to use.
-      */
--    printk("  Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-+    printk("  Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO)                        ? " RDCL_NO"        : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL)                       ? " IBRS_ALL"       : "",
-            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA)                           ? " RSBA"           : "",
-@@ -436,7 +436,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS))   ? " STIBP_ALWAYS"   : "",
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_FAST))      ? " IBRS_FAST"      : "",
-            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_SAME_MODE)) ? " IBRS_SAME_MODE" : "",
--           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))         ? " BTC_NO"         : "");
-+           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))         ? " BTC_NO"         : "",
-+           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_RET))       ? " IBPB_RET"       : "");
- 
-     /* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */
-     printk("  Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
-diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-index 1bbc7da4b53c..41a358d575d3 100644
---- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
-@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD,     8*32+25) /*   MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO,        8*32+26) /*A  Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(PSFD,          8*32+28) /*S  MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(BTC_NO,        8*32+29) /*A  Hardware not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
-+XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_RET,      8*32+30) /*A  IBPB clears RSB/RAS too. */
- 
- /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0.edx, word 9 */
- XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A  AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/0126-x86-spec-ctrl-Mitigate-IBPB-not-flushing-the-RSB-RAS.patch b/0126-x86-spec-ctrl-Mitigate-IBPB-not-flushing-the-RSB-RAS.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2abb0f2..0000000
--- a/0126-x86-spec-ctrl-Mitigate-IBPB-not-flushing-the-RSB-RAS.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-From 32445f23fea6a533fc1d7ade5871246d75210bf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 16:18:36 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 126/126] x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate IBPB not flushing the RSB/RAS
-
-Introduce spec_ctrl_new_guest_context() to encapsulate all logic pertaining to
-using MSR_PRED_CMD for a new guest context, even if it only has one user
-presently.
-
-Introduce X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET, and use it extend spec_ctrl_new_guest_context()
-with a manual fixup for hardware which mis-implements IBPB.
-
-This is part of XSA-422 / CVE-2022-23824.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 2b27967fb89d7904a1571a2fb963b1c9cac548db)
----
- xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c         |  1 +
- xen/arch/x86/domain.c             |  2 +-
- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c          |  8 ++++++++
- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
- xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h   | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c b/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c
-index 7e536b0d82f5..891d86c7655c 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c
-@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
- #include <asm/asm-defns.h>
- #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
-+#include <asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h>
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-index e9b8ed4c96c2..b82e18dd62d8 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
-              */
-             if ( *last_id != next_id )
-             {
--                wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
-+                spec_ctrl_new_guest_context();
-                 *last_id = next_id;
-             }
-         }
-diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-index 459c64d139b6..5636853aae6b 100644
---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
-@@ -775,6 +775,14 @@ static void __init ibpb_calculations(void)
-         return;
-     }
- 
-+    /*
-+     * AMD/Hygon CPUs to date (June 2022) don't flush the the RAS.  Future
-+     * CPUs are expected to enumerate IBPB_RET when this has been fixed.
-+     * Until then, cover the difference with the software sequence.
-+     */
-+    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_RET) )
-+        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
-+
-     /*
-      * IBPB-on-entry mitigations for Branch Type Confusion.
-      *
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-index b233e5835fb5..bdb119a34c5d 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM,    X86_SYNTH(29)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for
- 
- #define X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS          X86_BUG( 0) /* (F)X{SAVE,RSTOR} doesn't save/restore FOP/FIP/FDP. */
- #define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE    X86_BUG( 2) /* MFENCE needed to serialise CLFLUSH */
-+#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET       X86_BUG( 3) /* IBPB doesn't flush the RSB/RAS */
- 
- /* Total number of capability words, inc synth and bug words. */
- #define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH + X86_NR_BUG) /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
-diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-index 33e845991b0a..e400ff227391 100644
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,28 @@
- void init_speculation_mitigations(void);
- void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d);
- 
-+/*
-+ * Switch to a new guest prediction context.
-+ *
-+ * This flushes all indirect branch predictors (BTB, RSB/RAS), so guest code
-+ * which has previously run on this CPU can't attack subsequent guest code.
-+ *
-+ * As this flushes the RSB/RAS, it destroys the predictions of the calling
-+ * context.  For best performace, arrange for this to be used when we're going
-+ * to jump out of the current context, e.g. with reset_stack_and_jump().
-+ *
-+ * For hardware which mis-implements IBPB, fix up by flushing the RSB/RAS
-+ * manually.
-+ */
-+static always_inline void spec_ctrl_new_guest_context(void)
-+{
-+    wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
-+
-+    /* (ab)use alternative_input() to specify clobbers. */
-+    alternative_input("", "DO_OVERWRITE_RSB", X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET,
-+                      : "rax", "rcx");
-+}
-+
- extern int8_t opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch;
- extern bool opt_ssbd;
- extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu;
--- 
-2.37.4
-
diff --git a/info.txt b/info.txt
index 6f3a715..29f314e 100644
--- a/info.txt
+++ b/info.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-Xen upstream patchset #2 for 4.15.4-pre
+Xen upstream patchset #0 for 4.15.5-pre
 
 Containing patches from
-RELEASE-4.15.3 (feecaf4abf733e83b7a297190819eca7a7f65168)
+RELEASE-4.15.4 (460047c177fe7b0b1e5eb7d42ffb400e680f521f)
 to
-staging-4.15 (32445f23fea6a533fc1d7ade5871246d75210bf1)
+staging-4.15 (7963cdbf91d8a8d2f8338171adab3807b20f658a)