1 files changed, 104 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.23-CVE-2013-4122.patch b/dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.23-CVE-2013-4122.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..460953bf01e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/cyrus-sasl/files/cyrus-sasl-2.1.23-CVE-2013-4122.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 0626e86d2e1d0be63a56918371a15d98cfad19d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2013
+Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt().
+
+Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL
+(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,
+on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords
+passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).
+
+When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible
+NULL pointer dereference.
+---
+ pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c | 3 ++-
+ pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c | 3 ++-
+ saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c  | 3 ++-
+ saslauthd/auth_shadow.c    | 7 ++-----
+ 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern char *crypt();
+ char *password;
+ {
+     char* r;
++    char* crpt_passwd;
+     struct passwd *pwd;
+
+     pwd = getpwnam(userid);
+@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;
+     else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
+ 	r = "Account disabled";
+     }
+-    else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	r = "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ {
+     /* VARIABLES */
+     struct passwd *pw;			/* pointer to passwd file entry */
++    char *crpt_passwd;			/* encrypted password */
+     /* END VARIABLES */
+   
+     pw = getpwnam(login);
+@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ 	RETURN("NO");
+     }
+ 
+-    if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {
++    if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {
+ 	RETURN("NO");
+     }
+ 
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+@@ -180,16 +180,13 @@ auth_shadow (
+      * not returning any information about a login until we have validated
+      * the password.
+      */
+-    cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));
+-    if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {
++    if (!(cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp)) || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",
+ 		   sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);
+ 	}
+-	free(cpw);
+ 	RETURN("NO");
+     }
+-    free(cpw);
+ 
+     /*
+      * The following fields will be set to -1 if:
+@@ -251,7 +250,7 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	RETURN("NO");
+     }
+   
+-    if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",
+ 		   password, upw->upw_passwd);
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c	2013-07-14 08:05:00.000000000 +0000
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c	2013-07-14 08:06:10.958815179 +0000
+@@ -32,13 +33,14 @@
+ char *password;
+ {
+     struct spwd *pwd;
++    char *crpt_passwd;
+ 
+     pwd = getspnam(userid);
+     if (!pwd) {
+ 	return "Userid not found";
+     }
+     
+-    if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {
++    if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	return "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {