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author | Alex Legler <alex@a3li.li> | 2015-03-08 22:02:38 +0100 |
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committer | Alex Legler <alex@a3li.li> | 2015-03-08 22:02:38 +0100 |
commit | a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46 (patch) | |
tree | 910a04fe6ee560ac0eebac55f3cd2781c3519760 /glsa-200504-20.xml | |
download | glsa-a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46.tar.gz glsa-a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46.tar.bz2 glsa-a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46.zip |
Import existing advisories
Diffstat (limited to 'glsa-200504-20.xml')
-rw-r--r-- | glsa-200504-20.xml | 68 |
1 files changed, 68 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/glsa-200504-20.xml b/glsa-200504-20.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9f870828 --- /dev/null +++ b/glsa-200504-20.xml @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> +<?xml-stylesheet href="/xsl/glsa.xsl" type="text/xsl"?> +<?xml-stylesheet href="/xsl/guide.xsl" type="text/xsl"?> +<!DOCTYPE glsa SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/glsa.dtd"> + +<glsa id="200504-20"> + <title>openMosixview: Insecure temporary file creation</title> + <synopsis> + openMosixview and the openMosixcollector daemon are vulnerable to symlink + attacks, potentially allowing a local user to overwrite arbitrary files. + </synopsis> + <product type="ebuild">openMosixview</product> + <announced>April 21, 2005</announced> + <revised>April 21, 2005: 01</revised> + <bug>86686</bug> + <access>local</access> + <affected> + <package name="sys-cluster/openmosixview" auto="yes" arch="*"> + <unaffected range="ge">1.5-r1</unaffected> + <vulnerable range="lt">1.5-r1</vulnerable> + </package> + </affected> + <background> + <p> + The openMosixview package contains several tools used to manage + openMosix clusters, including openMosixview (the main monitoring and + administration application) and openMosixcollector (a daemon collecting + cluster and node information). + </p> + </background> + <description> + <p> + Gangstuck and Psirac from Rexotec discovered that openMosixview + insecurely creates several temporary files with predictable filenames. + </p> + </description> + <impact type="normal"> + <p> + A local attacker could create symbolic links in the temporary + files directory, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the filesystem. + When openMosixView or the openMosixcollector daemon runs, this would + result in the file being overwritten with the rights of the user + running the utility, which could be the root user. + </p> + </impact> + <workaround> + <p> + There is no known workaround at this time. + </p> + </workaround> + <resolution> + <p> + All openMosixview users should upgrade to the latest version: + </p> + <code> + # emerge --sync + # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=sys-cluster/openmosixview-1.5-r1"</code> + </resolution> + <references> + <uri link="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0894">CAN-2005-0894</uri> + </references> + <metadata tag="submitter" timestamp="Wed, 20 Apr 2005 11:45:51 +0000"> + koon + </metadata> + <metadata tag="bugReady" timestamp="Wed, 20 Apr 2005 11:46:46 +0000"> + koon + </metadata> +</glsa> |