sys-apps/systemd: remove old

Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/693156
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.84_p2, Repoman-2.3.20_p24
Signed-off-by: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>

8 files changed, 0 insertions, 882 deletions

diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-file-max.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-file-max.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a1fe950e298..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-file-max.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 6e2f78948403a4cce45b9e34311c9577c624f066 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:51:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] core: set fs.file-max sysctl to LONG_MAX rather than
- ULONG_MAX
-
-Since kernel 5.2 the kernel thankfully returns proper errors when we
-write a value out of range to the sysctl. Which however breaks writing
-ULONG_MAX to request the maximum value. Hence let's write the new
-maximum value instead, LONG_MAX.
----
- src/core/main.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/core/main.c b/src/core/main.c
-index b33ea1b5b52..e7f51815f07 100644
---- a/src/core/main.c
-+++ b/src/core/main.c
-@@ -1245,9 +1245,9 @@ static void bump_file_max_and_nr_open(void) {
- #endif
- 
- #if BUMP_PROC_SYS_FS_FILE_MAX
--        /* I so wanted to use STRINGIFY(ULONG_MAX) here, but alas we can't as glibc/gcc define that as
--         * "(0x7fffffffffffffffL * 2UL + 1UL)". Seriously. 😢 */
--        if (asprintf(&t, "%lu\n", ULONG_MAX) < 0) {
-+        /* The maximum the kernel allows for this since 5.2 is LONG_MAX, use that. (Previously thing where
-+         * different but the operation would fail silently.) */
-+        if (asprintf(&t, "%li\n", LONG_MAX) < 0) {
-                 log_oom();
-                 return;
-         }
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-gcc-9.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-gcc-9.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e9f690a65be5..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-gcc-9.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-From c98b3545008d8e984ab456dcf79787418fcbfe13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 13:46:55 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] network: remove redunant link name in message
-
-Fixes #12454.
-
-gcc was complaining that the link->ifname argument is NULL. Adding
-assert(link->ifname) right before the call has no effect. It seems that
-gcc is confused by the fact that log_link_warning_errno() internally
-calls log_object(), with link->ifname passed as the object. log_object()
-is also a macro and is does a check whether the passed object is NULL.
-So we have a check if something is NULL right next an unconditional use
-of it where it cannot be NULL. I think it's a bug in gcc.
-
-Anyway, we don't need to use link->ifname here. log_object() already prepends
-the object name to the message.
----
- src/network/networkd-link.c | 3 +--
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/networkd-link.c b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-index 533193ac932..6fc82940033 100644
---- a/src/network/networkd-link.c
-+++ b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-@@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ static int link_enable_ipv6(Link *link) {
- 
-         r = sysctl_write_ip_property_boolean(AF_INET6, link->ifname, "disable_ipv6", disabled);
-         if (r < 0)
--                log_link_warning_errno(link, r, "Cannot %s IPv6 for interface %s: %m",
--                                       enable_disable(!disabled), link->ifname);
-+                log_link_warning_errno(link, r, "Cannot %s IPv6: %m", enable_disable(!disabled));
-         else
-                 log_link_info(link, "IPv6 successfully %sd", enable_disable(!disabled));
- 
-From bcb846f30f9ca8f42e79d109706aee9f2032261b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
-Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 10:31:01 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] shared/machine-image: avoid passing NULL to log_debug_errno
-
-Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/12534
----
- src/shared/machine-image.c | 11 ++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/shared/machine-image.c b/src/shared/machine-image.c
-index 6b9d8fb97a6..6a6d952b424 100644
---- a/src/shared/machine-image.c
-+++ b/src/shared/machine-image.c
-@@ -201,11 +201,13 @@ static int image_make(
-                 Image **ret) {
- 
-         _cleanup_free_ char *pretty_buffer = NULL;
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *cwd = NULL;
-         struct stat stbuf;
-         bool read_only;
-         int r;
- 
-         assert(dfd >= 0 || dfd == AT_FDCWD);
-+        assert(path || dfd == AT_FDCWD);
-         assert(filename);
- 
-         /* We explicitly *do* follow symlinks here, since we want to allow symlinking trees, raw files and block
-@@ -221,6 +223,9 @@ static int image_make(
-                 st = &stbuf;
-         }
- 
-+        if (!path)
-+                safe_getcwd(&cwd);
-+
-         read_only =
-                 (path && path_startswith(path, "/usr")) ||
-                 (faccessat(dfd, filename, W_OK, AT_EACCESS) < 0 && errno == EROFS);
-@@ -359,7 +364,7 @@ static int image_make(
- 
-                 block_fd = openat(dfd, filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
-                 if (block_fd < 0)
--                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open block device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path, filename);
-+                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open block device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(cwd), filename);
-                 else {
-                         /* Refresh stat data after opening the node */
-                         if (fstat(block_fd, &stbuf) < 0)
-@@ -373,13 +378,13 @@ static int image_make(
-                                 int state = 0;
- 
-                                 if (ioctl(block_fd, BLKROGET, &state) < 0)
--                                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKROGET on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path, filename);
-+                                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKROGET on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(cwd), filename);
-                                 else if (state)
-                                         read_only = true;
-                         }
- 
-                         if (ioctl(block_fd, BLKGETSIZE64, &size) < 0)
--                                log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKGETSIZE64 on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path, filename);
-+                                log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKGETSIZE64 on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(cwd), filename);
- 
-                         block_fd = safe_close(block_fd);
-                 }
-From 2570578d908a8e010828fa1f88826b1c45d534ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:54:09 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] machine-image: openat() doesn't operate on the cwd if the
- first argument is specified
-
-A fix-up for bcb846f30f9ca8f42e79d109706aee9f2032261b.
----
- src/shared/machine-image.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/shared/machine-image.c b/src/shared/machine-image.c
-index 6a6d952b424..55e5f08f91e 100644
---- a/src/shared/machine-image.c
-+++ b/src/shared/machine-image.c
-@@ -200,8 +200,7 @@ static int image_make(
-                 const struct stat *st,
-                 Image **ret) {
- 
--        _cleanup_free_ char *pretty_buffer = NULL;
--        _cleanup_free_ char *cwd = NULL;
-+        _cleanup_free_ char *pretty_buffer = NULL, *parent = NULL;
-         struct stat stbuf;
-         bool read_only;
-         int r;
-@@ -223,8 +222,12 @@ static int image_make(
-                 st = &stbuf;
-         }
- 
--        if (!path)
--                safe_getcwd(&cwd);
-+        if (!path) {
-+                if (dfd == AT_FDCWD)
-+                        (void) safe_getcwd(&parent);
-+                else
-+                        (void) fd_get_path(dfd, &parent);
-+        }
- 
-         read_only =
-                 (path && path_startswith(path, "/usr")) ||
-@@ -364,7 +367,7 @@ static int image_make(
- 
-                 block_fd = openat(dfd, filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
-                 if (block_fd < 0)
--                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open block device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(cwd), filename);
-+                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open block device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(parent), filename);
-                 else {
-                         /* Refresh stat data after opening the node */
-                         if (fstat(block_fd, &stbuf) < 0)
-@@ -378,13 +381,13 @@ static int image_make(
-                                 int state = 0;
- 
-                                 if (ioctl(block_fd, BLKROGET, &state) < 0)
--                                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKROGET on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(cwd), filename);
-+                                        log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKROGET on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(parent), filename);
-                                 else if (state)
-                                         read_only = true;
-                         }
- 
-                         if (ioctl(block_fd, BLKGETSIZE64, &size) < 0)
--                                log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKGETSIZE64 on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(cwd), filename);
-+                                log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to issue BLKGETSIZE64 on device %s/%s, ignoring: %m", path ?: strnull(parent), filename);
- 
-                         block_fd = safe_close(block_fd);
-                 }
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-network-domains.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-network-domains.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 166a8ee5b76f..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-network-domains.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From fe0e16db093a7da09fcb52a2bc7017197047443d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 13 May 2019 05:40:31 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] network: do not use ordered_set_printf() for DOMAINS= or
- ROUTE_DOMAINS=
-
-This partially reverts 5e2a51d588dde4b52c6017ea80b75c16e6e23431.
-
-Fixes #12531.
----
- src/network/networkd-link.c | 17 +++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/networkd-link.c b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-index f8ee48802cb..1dc10c65a1b 100644
---- a/src/network/networkd-link.c
-+++ b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-@@ -3495,12 +3495,11 @@ int link_save(Link *link) {
-                 admin_state, oper_state);
- 
-         if (link->network) {
--                bool space;
-+                char **dhcp6_domains = NULL, **dhcp_domains = NULL;
-+                const char *dhcp_domainname = NULL, *p;
-                 sd_dhcp6_lease *dhcp6_lease = NULL;
--                const char *dhcp_domainname = NULL;
--                char **dhcp6_domains = NULL;
--                char **dhcp_domains = NULL;
-                 unsigned j;
-+                bool space;
- 
-                 fprintf(f, "REQUIRED_FOR_ONLINE=%s\n",
-                         yes_no(link->network->required_for_online));
-@@ -3617,7 +3616,10 @@ int link_save(Link *link) {
-                                 (void) sd_dhcp6_lease_get_domains(dhcp6_lease, &dhcp6_domains);
-                 }
- 
--                ordered_set_print(f, "DOMAINS=", link->network->search_domains);
-+                fputs("DOMAINS=", f);
-+                space = false;
-+                ORDERED_SET_FOREACH(p, link->network->search_domains, i)
-+                        fputs_with_space(f, p, NULL, &space);
- 
-                 if (link->network->dhcp_use_domains == DHCP_USE_DOMAINS_YES) {
-                         NDiscDNSSL *dd;
-@@ -3635,7 +3637,10 @@ int link_save(Link *link) {
- 
-                 fputc('\n', f);
- 
--                ordered_set_print(f, "ROUTE_DOMAINS=", link->network->route_domains);
-+                fputs("ROUTE_DOMAINS=", f);
-+                space = false;
-+                ORDERED_SET_FOREACH(p, link->network->route_domains, i)
-+                        fputs_with_space(f, p, NULL, &space);
- 
-                 if (link->network->dhcp_use_domains == DHCP_USE_DOMAINS_ROUTE) {
-                         NDiscDNSSL *dd;
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-networkd-ipv6-token.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-networkd-ipv6-token.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 87a85f6f6ab0..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-networkd-ipv6-token.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From 4eb086a38712ea98faf41e075b84555b11b54362 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Susant Sahani <ssahani@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 07:35:35 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] networkd: fix link_up() (#12505)
-
-Fillup IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE while we do link_up.
-
-Fixes the following error:
-```
-dummy-test: Could not bring up interface: Invalid argument
-```
-
-After reading the kernel code when we do a link up
-```
-net/core/rtnetlink.c
-IFLA_AF_SPEC
- af_ops->set_link_af(dev, af);
-  inet6_set_link_af
-   if (tb[IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE])
-             Here it looks for IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE
-```
-Since link up we didn't filling up that it's failing.
-
-Closes #12504.
----
- src/network/networkd-link.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/networkd-link.c b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-index 3c8b5c5cb43..4db9f3f980f 100644
---- a/src/network/networkd-link.c
-+++ b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-@@ -2031,6 +2031,8 @@ static int link_up(Link *link) {
-         }
- 
-         if (link_ipv6_enabled(link)) {
-+                uint8_t ipv6ll_mode;
-+
-                 r = sd_netlink_message_open_container(req, IFLA_AF_SPEC);
-                 if (r < 0)
-                         return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not open IFLA_AF_SPEC container: %m");
-@@ -2046,6 +2048,19 @@ static int link_up(Link *link) {
-                                 return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_TOKEN: %m");
-                 }
- 
-+                if (!link_ipv6ll_enabled(link))
-+                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE;
-+                else if (sysctl_read_ip_property(AF_INET6, link->ifname, "stable_secret", NULL) < 0)
-+                        /* The file may not exist. And event if it exists, when stable_secret is unset,
-+                         * reading the file fails with EIO. */
-+                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_EUI64;
-+                else
-+                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_STABLE_PRIVACY;
-+
-+                r = sd_netlink_message_append_u8(req, IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE, ipv6ll_mode);
-+                if (r < 0)
-+                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE: %m");
-+
-                 r = sd_netlink_message_close_container(req);
-                 if (r < 0)
-                         return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not close AF_INET6 container: %m");
-From 9f6e82e6eb3b6e73d66d00d1d6eee60691fb702f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 14:39:46 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] network: do not send ipv6 token to kernel
-
-We disabled kernel RA support. Then, we should not send
-IFLA_INET6_TOKEN.
-Thus, we do not need to send IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE twice.
-
-Follow-up for 0e2fdb83bb5e22047e0c7cc058b415d0e93f02cf and
-4eb086a38712ea98faf41e075b84555b11b54362.
----
- src/network/networkd-link.c | 51 +++++--------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/networkd-link.c b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-index 2b6ff2b6c58..b6da4ea70b7 100644
---- a/src/network/networkd-link.c
-+++ b/src/network/networkd-link.c
-@@ -1954,6 +1954,9 @@ static int link_configure_addrgen_mode(Link *link) {
-         assert(link->manager);
-         assert(link->manager->rtnl);
- 
-+        if (!socket_ipv6_is_supported())
-+                return 0;
-+
-         log_link_debug(link, "Setting address genmode for link");
- 
-         r = sd_rtnl_message_new_link(link->manager->rtnl, &req, RTM_SETLINK, link->ifindex);
-@@ -2047,46 +2050,6 @@ static int link_up(Link *link) {
-                         return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not set MAC address: %m");
-         }
- 
--        if (link_ipv6_enabled(link)) {
--                uint8_t ipv6ll_mode;
--
--                r = sd_netlink_message_open_container(req, IFLA_AF_SPEC);
--                if (r < 0)
--                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not open IFLA_AF_SPEC container: %m");
--
--                /* if the kernel lacks ipv6 support setting IFF_UP fails if any ipv6 options are passed */
--                r = sd_netlink_message_open_container(req, AF_INET6);
--                if (r < 0)
--                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not open AF_INET6 container: %m");
--
--                if (!in_addr_is_null(AF_INET6, &link->network->ipv6_token)) {
--                        r = sd_netlink_message_append_in6_addr(req, IFLA_INET6_TOKEN, &link->network->ipv6_token.in6);
--                        if (r < 0)
--                                return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_TOKEN: %m");
--                }
--
--                if (!link_ipv6ll_enabled(link))
--                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE;
--                else if (sysctl_read_ip_property(AF_INET6, link->ifname, "stable_secret", NULL) < 0)
--                        /* The file may not exist. And event if it exists, when stable_secret is unset,
--                         * reading the file fails with EIO. */
--                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_EUI64;
--                else
--                        ipv6ll_mode = IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_STABLE_PRIVACY;
--
--                r = sd_netlink_message_append_u8(req, IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE, ipv6ll_mode);
--                if (r < 0)
--                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not append IFLA_INET6_ADDR_GEN_MODE: %m");
--
--                r = sd_netlink_message_close_container(req);
--                if (r < 0)
--                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not close AF_INET6 container: %m");
--
--                r = sd_netlink_message_close_container(req);
--                if (r < 0)
--                        return log_link_error_errno(link, r, "Could not close IFLA_AF_SPEC container: %m");
--        }
--
-         r = netlink_call_async(link->manager->rtnl, NULL, req, link_up_handler,
-                                link_netlink_destroy_callback, link);
-         if (r < 0)
-@@ -3226,11 +3189,9 @@ static int link_configure(Link *link) {
-         if (r < 0)
-                 return r;
- 
--        if (socket_ipv6_is_supported()) {
--                r = link_configure_addrgen_mode(link);
--                if (r < 0)
--                        return r;
--        }
-+        r = link_configure_addrgen_mode(link);
-+        if (r < 0)
-+                return r;
- 
-         return link_configure_after_setting_mtu(link);
- }
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ec690c1b3f6c..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-rdrand-ryzen.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
-From d351699739471734666230ae3c6f9ba56ce5ce45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 16:18:13 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] =?UTF-8?q?random-util:=20rename=20RANDOM=5FDONT=5FDRA?=
- =?UTF-8?q?IN=20=E2=86=92=20RANDOM=5FMAY=5FFAIL?=
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The old flag name was a bit of a misnomer, as /dev/urandom cannot be
-"drained". Once it's initialized it's initialized and then is good
-forever. (Only /dev/random has a concept of 'draining', but we never use
-that, as it's an obsolete interface).
-
-The flag is still useful though, since it allows us to suppress accesses
-to the random pool while it is not initialized, as that trips up the
-kernel and it logs about any such attempts, which we really don't want.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 1a0ffa1e737e65312abac63dcf4b44e1ac0e1642)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- src/basic/random-util.h |  4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index ca25fd2420..de29e07549 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -71,21 +71,22 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
-         bool got_some = false;
-         int r;
- 
--        /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This call won't
--         * block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN is set, an error is returned if the random
--         * pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the kernel, regardless of whether
--         * the random pool is fully initialized or not. */
-+        /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This
-+         * call won't block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, an error is
-+         * returned if the random pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the
-+         * kernel, regardless of whether the random pool is fully initialized or not. */
- 
-         if (n == 0)
-                 return 0;
- 
-         if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND))
--                /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is not
--                 * required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of RDRAND here,
--                 * even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10 invocations or so. That's
--                 * because we don't really care about the quality here. We generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller
--                 * allows us too, since this way we won't drain the kernel randomness pool if we don't need it, as the
--                 * pool's entropy is scarce. */
-+                /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is
-+                 * not required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of
-+                 * RDRAND here, even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10
-+                 * invocations or so. That's because we don't really care about the quality here. We
-+                 * generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller allows us to, since this way we won't upset
-+                 * the kernel's random subsystem by accessing it before the pool is initialized (after all it
-+                 * will kmsg log about every attempt to do so)..*/
-                 for (;;) {
-                         unsigned long u;
-                         size_t m;
-@@ -153,12 +154,13 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
-                                 break;
- 
-                         } else if (errno == EAGAIN) {
--                                /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall the next
--                                 * time again though.
-+                                /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall
-+                                 * the next time again though.
-                                  *
--                                 * If RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can produce some
--                                 * pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to /dev/urandom, which we know is empty,
--                                 * but the kernel will produce some bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */
-+                                 * If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can
-+                                 * produce some pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to
-+                                 * /dev/urandom, which we know is empty, but the kernel will produce some
-+                                 * bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */
-                                 have_syscall = true;
- 
-                                 if (got_some && FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO)) {
-@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) {
-                                         return 0;
-                                 }
- 
--                                if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN))
-+                                if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_MAY_FAIL))
-                                         return -ENODATA;
- 
-                                 /* Use /dev/urandom instead */
-@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) {
- 
- void random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) {
- 
--        if (genuine_random_bytes(p, n, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO|RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND) >= 0)
-+        if (genuine_random_bytes(p, n, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO|RANDOM_MAY_FAIL|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND) >= 0)
-                 return;
- 
-         /* If for some reason some user made /dev/urandom unavailable to us, or the kernel has no entropy, use a PRNG instead. */
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.h b/src/basic/random-util.h
-index 3e8c288d3d..148b6c7813 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.h
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.h
-@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
- typedef enum RandomFlags {
-         RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO = 1 << 0, /* If we can't get enough genuine randomness, but some, fill up the rest with pseudo-randomness */
-         RANDOM_BLOCK              = 1 << 1, /* Rather block than return crap randomness (only if the kernel supports that) */
--        RANDOM_DONT_DRAIN         = 1 << 2, /* If we can't get any randomness at all, return early with -EAGAIN */
-+        RANDOM_MAY_FAIL           = 1 << 2, /* If we can't get any randomness at all, return early with -ENODATA */
-         RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND       = 1 << 3, /* Allow usage of the CPU RNG */
- } RandomFlags;
- 
--int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags); /* returns "genuine" randomness, optionally filled upwith pseudo random, if not enough is available */
-+int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags); /* returns "genuine" randomness, optionally filled up with pseudo random, if not enough is available */
- void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n);                    /* returns only pseudo-randommess (but possibly seeded from something better) */
- void random_bytes(void *p, size_t n);                           /* returns genuine randomness if cheaply available, and pseudo randomness if not. */
- 
--- 
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 1f492b9ecc31aa3782f9ce82058d8fb72a5c323f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 16:21:44 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] random-util: use gcc's bit_RDRND definition if it exists
-
-(cherry picked from commit cc28145d51f62711fdc4b4c229aecd5778806419)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index de29e07549..205d5501e5 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-                         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-                 }
- 
--                have_rdrand = !!(ecx & (1U << 30));
-+/* Compat with old gcc where bit_RDRND didn't exist yet */
-+#ifndef bit_RDRND
-+#define bit_RDRND (1U << 30)
-+#endif
-+
-+                have_rdrand = !!(ecx & bit_RDRND);
-         }
- 
-         if (have_rdrand == 0)
--- 
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 6460c540e6183dd19de89b7f0672b3b47c4d41cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 17:26:55 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] random-util: hash AT_RANDOM getauxval() value before
- using it
-
-Let's be a bit paranoid and hash the 16 bytes we get from getauxval()
-before using them. AFter all they might be used by other stuff too (in
-particular ASLR), and we probably shouldn't end up leaking that seed
-though our crappy pseudo-random numbers.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 80eb560a5bd7439103036867d5e09a5e0393e5d3)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index 205d5501e5..40f1928936 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include "io-util.h"
- #include "missing.h"
- #include "random-util.h"
-+#include "siphash24.h"
- #include "time-util.h"
- 
- int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-@@ -203,14 +204,19 @@ void initialize_srand(void) {
-                 return;
- 
- #if HAVE_SYS_AUXV_H
--        /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's
--         * try to make use of that to seed the pseudo-random generator. It's
--         * better than nothing... */
-+        /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's try to make use of that to seed
-+         * the pseudo-random generator. It's better than nothing... But let's first hash it to make it harder
-+         * to recover the original value by watching any pseudo-random bits we generate. After all the
-+         * AT_RANDOM data might be used by other stuff too (in particular: ASLR), and we probably shouldn't
-+         * leak the seed for that. */
- 
--        auxv = (const void*) getauxval(AT_RANDOM);
-+        auxv = ULONG_TO_PTR(getauxval(AT_RANDOM));
-         if (auxv) {
--                assert_cc(sizeof(x) <= 16);
--                memcpy(&x, auxv, sizeof(x));
-+                static const uint8_t auxval_hash_key[16] = {
-+                        0x92, 0x6e, 0xfe, 0x1b, 0xcf, 0x00, 0x52, 0x9c, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x81, 0x0f
-+                };
-+
-+                x = (unsigned) siphash24(auxv, 16, auxval_hash_key);
-         } else
- #endif
-                 x = 0;
--- 
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 17d52f6320b45d1728af6007b4df4aaccc6fdaf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 18:51:26 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] random-util: rename "err" to "success"
-
-After all rdrand returns 1 on success, and 0 on failure, hence let's
-name this accordingly.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 328f850e36e86d14ab06d11fa8f2397e9575a7f9)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index 40f1928936..7c64857592 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
- 
- #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-         static int have_rdrand = -1;
--        unsigned char err;
-+        uint8_t success;
- 
-         if (have_rdrand < 0) {
-                 uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
-@@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-         asm volatile("rdrand %0;"
-                      "setc %1"
-                      : "=r" (*ret),
--                       "=qm" (err));
--        msan_unpoison(&err, sizeof(err));
--        if (!err)
-+                       "=qm" (success));
-+        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
-+        if (!success)
-                 return -EAGAIN;
- 
-         return 0;
--- 
-2.22.0
-
-
-From a6c72245ba5ba688cd6544650b9c6e313b39b53e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
-Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 15:50:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] util-lib: fix a typo in rdrand
-
-Otherwise, the fuzzers will fail to compile with MSan:
-```
-../../src/systemd/src/basic/random-util.c:64:40: error: use of undeclared identifier 'sucess'; did you mean 'success'?
-        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
-                                       ^~~~~~
-                                       success
-../../src/systemd/src/basic/alloc-util.h:169:50: note: expanded from macro 'msan_unpoison'
-                                                 ^
-../../src/systemd/src/basic/random-util.c:38:17: note: 'success' declared here
-        uint8_t success;
-                ^
-1 error generated.
-[80/545] Compiling C object 'src/basic/a6ba3eb@@basic@sta/process-util.c.o'.
-ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed.
-Fuzzers build failed
-```
-
-(cherry picked from commit 7f2cdceaed4d37c4e601e531c7d863fca1bd1460)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index 7c64857592..b8bbf2d418 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
-                      "setc %1"
-                      : "=r" (*ret),
-                        "=qm" (success));
--        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(sucess));
-+        msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(success));
-         if (!success)
-                 return -EAGAIN;
- 
--- 
-2.22.0
-
-
-From 47eec0ae61c887cb8cc05ce8d49b8d151bc4ef25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 15:16:16 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] random-util: eat up bad RDRAND values seen on AMD CPUs
-
-An ugly, ugly work-around for #11810. And no, we shouldn't have to do
-this. This is something for AMD, the firmware or the kernel to
-fix/work-around, not us. But nonetheless, this should do it for now.
-
-Fixes: #11810
-(cherry picked from commit 1c53d4a070edbec8ad2d384ba0014d0eb6bae077)
----
- src/basic/random-util.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/random-util.c b/src/basic/random-util.c
-index b8bbf2d418..0561f0cb22 100644
---- a/src/basic/random-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/random-util.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
- 
- #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-         static int have_rdrand = -1;
-+        unsigned long v;
-         uint8_t success;
- 
-         if (have_rdrand < 0) {
-@@ -59,12 +60,24 @@ int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) {
- 
-         asm volatile("rdrand %0;"
-                      "setc %1"
--                     : "=r" (*ret),
-+                     : "=r" (v),
-                        "=qm" (success));
-         msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(success));
-         if (!success)
-                 return -EAGAIN;
- 
-+        /* Apparently on some AMD CPUs RDRAND will sometimes (after a suspend/resume cycle?) report success
-+         * via the carry flag but nonetheless return the same fixed value -1 in all cases. This appears to be
-+         * a bad bug in the CPU or firmware. Let's deal with that and work-around this by explicitly checking
-+         * for this special value (and also 0, just to be sure) and filtering it out. This is a work-around
-+         * only however and something AMD really should fix properly. The Linux kernel should probably work
-+         * around this issue by turning off RDRAND altogether on those CPUs. See:
-+         * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/11810 */
-+        if (v == 0 || v == ULONG_MAX)
-+                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN),
-+                                       "RDRAND returned suspicious value %lx, assuming bad hardware RNG, not using value.", v);
-+
-+        *ret = v;
-         return 0;
- #else
-         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
--- 
-2.22.0
-
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-socket-util-flush-accept.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-socket-util-flush-accept.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4849c4c0789e..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-socket-util-flush-accept.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From f3d75364fbebf2ddb6393e54db5e10b6f6234e14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
-Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 15:13:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] socket-util: make sure flush_accept() doesn't hang on
- unexpected EOPNOTSUPP
-
-So apparently there are two reasons why accept() can return EOPNOTSUPP:
-because the socket is not a listening stream socket (or similar), or
-because the incoming TCP connection for some reason wasn't acceptable to
-the host. THe latter should be a transient error, as suggested on
-accept(2). The former however should be considered fatal for
-flush_accept(). Let's fix this by explicitly checking whether the socket
-is a listening socket beforehand.
----
- src/basic/socket-util.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/socket-util.c b/src/basic/socket-util.c
-index 904bafb76f9..e787d53d8f4 100644
---- a/src/basic/socket-util.c
-+++ b/src/basic/socket-util.c
-@@ -1225,9 +1225,22 @@ int flush_accept(int fd) {
-                 .fd = fd,
-                 .events = POLLIN,
-         };
--        int r;
-+        int r, b;
-+        socklen_t l = sizeof(b);
-+
-+        /* Similar to flush_fd() but flushes all incoming connection by accepting them and immediately
-+         * closing them.  */
-+
-+        if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ACCEPTCONN, &b, &l) < 0)
-+                return -errno;
- 
--        /* Similar to flush_fd() but flushes all incoming connection by accepting them and immediately closing them. */
-+        assert(l == sizeof(b));
-+        if (!b) /* Let's check if this is a socket accepting connections before calling accept(). That's
-+                 * because accept4() can return EOPNOTSUPP in the fd we are called on is not a listening
-+                 * socket, or in case the incoming TCP connection transiently triggered that (see accept(2)
-+                 * man page for details). The latter case is a transient error we should continue looping
-+                 * on. The former case however is fatal. */
-+                return -ENOTTY;
- 
-         for (;;) {
-                 int cfd;
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-wireguard-listenport.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-wireguard-listenport.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 39b3c7c0a54c..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/242-wireguard-listenport.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From a62b7bb79e9a2aa683624c32cde1c756d8466fb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 00:39:04 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] network: fix ListenPort= in [WireGuard] section
-
-This fixes a bug introduced by f1368a333e5e08575f0b45dfe41e936b106a8627.
-
-Fixes #12377.
----
- src/network/netdev/wireguard.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c b/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c
-index f3084c0773f..5ebc5dfed84 100644
---- a/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c
-+++ b/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c
-@@ -452,22 +452,23 @@ int config_parse_wireguard_listen_port(
-                 void *userdata) {
- 
-         uint16_t *s = data;
--        uint16_t port = 0;
-         int r;
- 
-         assert(rvalue);
-         assert(data);
- 
--        if (!streq(rvalue, "auto")) {
--                r = parse_ip_port(rvalue, s);
--                if (r < 0) {
--                        log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r,
--                                   "Invalid port specification, ignoring assignment: %s", rvalue);
--                        return 0;
--                }
-+        if (isempty(rvalue) || streq(rvalue, "auto")) {
-+                *s = 0;
-+                return 0;
-+        }
-+
-+        r = parse_ip_port(rvalue, s);
-+        if (r < 0) {
-+                log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r,
-+                           "Invalid port specification, ignoring assignment: %s", rvalue);
-+                return 0;
-         }
- 
--        *s = port;
-         return 0;
- }
- 
diff --git a/sys-apps/systemd/files/CVE-2019-15718.patch b/sys-apps/systemd/files/CVE-2019-15718.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8186f7096f82..000000000000
--- a/sys-apps/systemd/files/CVE-2019-15718.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 35e528018f315798d3bffcb592b32a0d8f5162bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
-Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 19:00:34 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] shared/but-util: drop trusted annotation from
- bus_open_system_watch_bind_with_description()
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1746057
-
-This only affects systemd-resolved. bus_open_system_watch_bind_with_description()
-is also used in timesyncd, but it has no methods, only read-only properties, and
-in networkd, but it annotates all methods with SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED and does
-polkit checks.
----
- src/shared/bus-util.c | 4 ----
- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/shared/bus-util.c b/src/shared/bus-util.c
-index 6af115e7aa..821339d4ae 100644
---- a/src/shared/bus-util.c
-+++ b/src/shared/bus-util.c
-@@ -1705,10 +1705,6 @@ int bus_open_system_watch_bind_with_description(sd_bus **ret, const char *descri
-         if (r < 0)
-                 return r;
- 
--        r = sd_bus_set_trusted(bus, true);
--        if (r < 0)
--                return r;
--
-         r = sd_bus_negotiate_creds(bus, true, SD_BUS_CREDS_UID|SD_BUS_CREDS_EUID|SD_BUS_CREDS_EFFECTIVE_CAPS);
-         if (r < 0)
-                 return r;