diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | net-misc/openssh/Manifest | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch | 351 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net-misc/openssh/files/sshd-r1.confd | 33 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.5 | 89 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net-misc/openssh/openssh-7.7_p1.ebuild | 406 |
5 files changed, 883 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest index 299ae83a14cf..7817efe9f09c 100644 --- a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest +++ b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest @@ -6,5 +6,9 @@ DIST openssh-7.6_p1-sctp.patch.xz 6996 BLAKE2B 4a857afdc8fa5cb2bfb9dd1805ac6343e DIST openssh-7.6p1+x509-11.2.diff.gz 466657 BLAKE2B 3f4f108e2d97eb292c215bc3a6e2c64ae6b9e49704f46f46a21496a71d5ebd051ab648446bf71ef141e2114f4a03363d8cd043f5813f957c2c5f2e2eb193931d SHA512 1c0fea91037bfcaed7aa3f0cb01d262410a99d3e1b98a25a012db5d683f3275ab52f78f1e446bd7e543c78f9d406b1dce2bb3997214534ae94e11c254658080f DIST openssh-7.6p1-hpnssh14v12-r1.tar.xz 15440 BLAKE2B e140852a3ce63e4f744ed4b18b474cf88d09ca55509e5a16d26eef5cf8574466b472073eef56e19467932959d9ba7e941ab561d9ea0704dfee3fd08a6ba7ba8c SHA512 9d0450ec99fe550d790e471cb7815d0863788cf9c41dfef653d102f02be3d38a09e5103e537658279216a5815c1a075ded9f011e05ce216beee2c7daeea8c75a DIST openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz 1489788 BLAKE2B 938bfeeff0a0aaa2fc7e4c345f04561c6c071c526e354a7d344a08742cb70ab1f4a41d325b31720f2fba5c4afa4db11f3fc87055c8c9c8bea37b29cc11dc8f39 SHA512 de17fdcb8239401f76740c8d689a8761802f6df94e68d953f3c70b9f4f8bdb403617c48c1d01cc8c368d88e9d50aee540bf03d5a36687dfb39dfd28d73029d72 +DIST openssh-7.7p1-hpnssh14v14-gentoo1.patch.xz 21448 BLAKE2B 51d9324990d8098707359f355b9212679db38569e566f47659ffdae8046bdbb4e6873bd67ecb7da0b5706c5243f44f82089f08ecbc59c7e39062fceb4be78316 SHA512 63d2ffbcfe121ddedaa07955b1025d2c6e196ea694464610437368835cf46dd507d4d17361548cae93db53a1e3d93d9c409910620bbd0cd619d82b6215c833b5 +DIST openssh-7.7p1-sctp-1.0.patch.xz 7380 BLAKE2B 6ad40972ece131ff148ede6ba94d63bffc606e0bcabb959d4c9056196cb6f4fddc285f97d7b49b73fde7ee84e3c981c07bddb058ad88eb7c7c2fe716e657c630 SHA512 bc5f50805ba25415f93f61b6654e5bcbaef673b0af48d339116ca9c94b6152afae294c5a9144adeb40190da97c2fc73b43e3ac7ac34feb4a647628327a7cac0a +DIST openssh-7.7p1-x509-11.3.1.patch.xz 362672 BLAKE2B 55b8b0ef00dc4d962a0db1115406b7b1e84110870c74198e9e4cb081b2ffde8daca67cb281c69d73b4c5cbffde361429d62634be194b57e888a0b434a0f42a37 SHA512 f84744f6d2e5a15017bce37bfa65ebb47dbafeac07ea9aab46bdc780b4062ff70687512d9d512cab81e3b9c701adb6ce17c5474f35cb4b49f57db2e2d45ac9ac +DIST openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz 1536900 BLAKE2B 7aee360f2cea5bfa3f8426fcbd66fde2568f05f9c8e623326b60f03b7c5f8abf223e178aa1d5958015b51627565bf5b1ace35b57f309638c908f5a7bf5500d21 SHA512 597252cb48209a0cb98ca1928a67e8d63e4275252f25bc37269204c108f034baade6ba0634e32ae63422fddd280f73096a6b31ad2f2e7a848dde75ca30e14261 DIST openssh-lpk-7.5p1-0.3.14.patch.xz 17040 BLAKE2B 5b2204316dd244bb8dd11db50d5bc3a194e2cc4b64964a2d3df68bbe54c53588f15fc5176dbc3811e929573fa3e41cf91f412aa2513bb9a4b6ed02c2523c1e24 SHA512 9ce5d7e5d831c972f0f866b686bf93a048a03979ab38627973f5491eeeaa45f9faab0520b3a7ed90a13a67213fdc9cd4cf11e423acad441ea91b71037c8b435b DIST openssh-lpk-7.6p1-0.3.14.patch.xz 17044 BLAKE2B a31dcb15848d3a22306108a4e181b1d52b195e6adcd2a78d5c7bf57f33c8ed62c3affa434c8d31c07eae84b59f1a3968a3f2a92e702f9225b121127616cb9d61 SHA512 e9a2b18fd6a58354198b6e48199059d055451a5f09c99bf7293d0d54137a59c581a9cb3bd906f31589e03d8450fb017b9015e18c67b7b6ae840e336039436974 diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2840652a9b47 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch @@ -0,0 +1,351 @@ +https://bugs.gentoo.org/165444 +https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1008 + +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -728,120 +728,6 @@ fakepw(void) + return (&fake); + } + +-/* +- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not +- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is +- * called. +- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some +- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. +- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? +- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) +- */ +- +-static char * +-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) +-{ +- struct sockaddr_storage from; +- socklen_t fromlen; +- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; +- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; +- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); +- +- /* Get IP address of client. */ +- fromlen = sizeof(from); +- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); +- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), +- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { +- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); +- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) +- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +- +- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); +- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ +- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), +- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { +- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* +- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, +- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: +- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ +- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { +- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", +- name, ntop); +- freeaddrinfo(ai); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ +- lowercase(name); +- +- /* +- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given +- * address actually is an address of this host. This is +- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can +- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from +- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be +- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of +- * the domain). +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { +- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " +- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ +- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { +- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, +- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && +- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) +- break; +- } +- freeaddrinfo(aitop); +- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ +- if (ai == NULL) { +- /* Address not found for the host name. */ +- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " +- "map back to the address.", ntop, name); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- return strdup(name); +-} +- +-/* +- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current +- * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this +- * several times. +- */ +- +-const char * +-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) +-{ +- static char *dnsname; +- +- if (!use_dns) +- return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); +- else if (dnsname != NULL) +- return dnsname; +- else { +- dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); +- return dnsname; +- } +-} +- + /* + * Runs command in a subprocess wuth a minimal environment. + * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. +--- a/canohost.c ++++ b/canohost.c +@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock) + { + return get_sock_port(sock, 1); + } ++ ++/* ++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not ++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is ++ * called. ++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some ++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. ++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? ++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) ++ */ ++ ++static char * ++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct sockaddr_storage from; ++ socklen_t fromlen; ++ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; ++ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; ++ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ ++ /* Get IP address of client. */ ++ fromlen = sizeof(from); ++ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); ++ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), ++ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { ++ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); ++ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) ++ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++ ++ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); ++ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ ++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), ++ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { ++ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, ++ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: ++ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { ++ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", ++ name, ntop); ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ ++ lowercase(name); ++ ++ /* ++ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given ++ * address actually is an address of this host. This is ++ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can ++ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from ++ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be ++ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of ++ * the domain). ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { ++ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " ++ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ ++ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { ++ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, ++ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && ++ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) ++ break; ++ } ++ freeaddrinfo(aitop); ++ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ ++ if (ai == NULL) { ++ /* Address not found for the host name. */ ++ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " ++ "map back to the address.", ntop, name); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ return strdup(name); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current ++ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this ++ * several times. ++ */ ++ ++const char * ++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) ++{ ++ static char *dnsname; ++ ++ if (!use_dns) ++ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ else if (dnsname != NULL) ++ return dnsname; ++ else { ++ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ return dnsname; ++ } ++} +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -200,9 +201,11 @@ static struct { + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, + # else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, + #endif + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, +@@ -954,6 +957,10 @@ parse_time: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1766,6 +1773,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -1908,6 +1916,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +--- a/readconf.h ++++ b/readconf.h +@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ typedef struct { + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -731,6 +731,16 @@ The default is + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Cm no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -643,6 +643,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + static u_int mech = 0; + OM_uint32 min; + int ok = 0; ++ const char *gss_host; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns); ++ gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1); ++ } else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ +@@ -655,7 +662,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && + ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + mech++; +-- diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd-r1.confd b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd-r1.confd new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cf430371bf0f --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd-r1.confd @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# /etc/conf.d/sshd: config file for /etc/init.d/sshd + +# Where is your sshd_config file stored? + +SSHD_CONFDIR="${RC_PREFIX%/}/etc/ssh" + + +# Any random options you want to pass to sshd. +# See the sshd(8) manpage for more info. + +SSHD_OPTS="" + + +# Wait one second (length chosen arbitrarily) to see if sshd actually +# creates a PID file, or if it crashes for some reason like not being +# able to bind to the address in ListenAddress. + +#SSHD_SSD_OPTS="--wait 1000" + + +# Pid file to use (needs to be absolute path). + +#SSHD_PIDFILE="${RC_PREFIX%/}/run/sshd.pid" + + +# Path to the sshd binary (needs to be absolute path). + +#SSHD_BINARY="${RC_PREFIX%/}/usr/sbin/sshd" + + +# Path to the ssh-keygen binary (needs to be absolute path). + +#SSHD_KEYGEN_BINARY="${RC_PREFIX%/}/usr/bin/ssh-keygen" diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.5 b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.5 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..044cbe7268f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/sshd.rc6.5 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +#!/sbin/openrc-run +# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Foundation +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 + +extra_commands="checkconfig" +extra_started_commands="reload" + +: ${SSHD_CONFDIR:=${RC_PREFIX%/}/etc/ssh} +: ${SSHD_CONFIG:=${SSHD_CONFDIR}/sshd_config} +: ${SSHD_PIDFILE:=${RC_PREFIX%/}/run/${SVCNAME}.pid} +: ${SSHD_BINARY:=${RC_PREFIX%/}/usr/sbin/sshd} +: ${SSHD_KEYGEN_BINARY:=${RC_PREFIX%/}/usr/bin/ssh-keygen} + +command="${SSHD_BINARY}" +pidfile="${SSHD_PIDFILE}" +command_args="${SSHD_OPTS} -o PidFile=${pidfile} -f ${SSHD_CONFIG}" + +# Wait one second (length chosen arbitrarily) to see if sshd actually +# creates a PID file, or if it crashes for some reason like not being +# able to bind to the address in ListenAddress (bug 617596). +: ${SSHD_SSD_OPTS:=--wait 1000} +start_stop_daemon_args="${SSHD_SSD_OPTS}" + +depend() { + # Entropy can be used by ssh-keygen, among other things, but + # is not strictly required (bug 470020). + use logger dns entropy + if [ "${rc_need+set}" = "set" ] ; then + : # Do nothing, the user has explicitly set rc_need + else + local x warn_addr + for x in $(awk '/^ListenAddress/{ print $2 }' "$SSHD_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null) ; do + case "${x}" in + 0.0.0.0|0.0.0.0:*) ;; + ::|\[::\]*) ;; + *) warn_addr="${warn_addr} ${x}" ;; + esac + done + if [ -n "${warn_addr}" ] ; then + need net + ewarn "You are binding an interface in ListenAddress statement in your sshd_config!" + ewarn "You must add rc_need=\"net.FOO\" to your ${RC_PREFIX%/}/etc/conf.d/sshd" + ewarn "where FOO is the interface(s) providing the following address(es):" + ewarn "${warn_addr}" + fi + fi +} + +checkconfig() { + checkpath --directory "${RC_PREFIX%/}/var/empty" + + if [ ! -e "${SSHD_CONFIG}" ] ; then + eerror "You need an ${SSHD_CONFIG} file to run sshd" + eerror "There is a sample file in /usr/share/doc/openssh" + return 1 + fi + + ${SSHD_KEYGEN_BINARY} -A || return 2 + + "${command}" -t ${command_args} || return 3 +} + +start_pre() { + # If this isn't a restart, make sure that the user's config isn't + # busted before we try to start the daemon (this will produce + # better error messages than if we just try to start it blindly). + # + # If, on the other hand, this *is* a restart, then the stop_pre + # action will have ensured that the config is usable and we don't + # need to do that again. + if [ "${RC_CMD}" != "restart" ] ; then + checkconfig || return $? + fi +} + +stop_pre() { + # If this is a restart, check to make sure the user's config + # isn't busted before we stop the running daemon. + if [ "${RC_CMD}" = "restart" ] ; then + checkconfig || return $? + fi +} + +reload() { + checkconfig || return $? + ebegin "Reloading ${SVCNAME}" + start-stop-daemon --signal HUP --pidfile "${pidfile}" + eend $? +} diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/openssh-7.7_p1.ebuild b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-7.7_p1.ebuild new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ba76b889200d --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-7.7_p1.ebuild @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Foundation +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 + +EAPI=6 + +inherit user flag-o-matic multilib autotools pam systemd versionator + +# Make it more portable between straight releases +# and _p? releases. +PARCH=${P/_} + +HPN_VER="14v14-gentoo1" HPN_PATCH="${PARCH}-hpnssh${HPN_VER}.patch.xz" HPN_DISABLE_MTAES=1 +SCTP_VER="1.0" SCTP_PATCH="${PARCH}-sctp-${SCTP_VER}.patch.xz" +X509_VER="11.3.1" X509_PATCH="${PARCH}-x509-${X509_VER}.patch.xz" + +# Disable LDAP support until someone will rewrite the patch, +# upstream removed auth_parse_options() via commit 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 +#LDAP_VER="0.3.14" LDAP_PATCH="${PN}-lpk-7.7p1-${LDAP_VER}.patch.xz" + +DESCRIPTION="Port of OpenBSD's free SSH release" +HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssh.com/" +SRC_URI="mirror://openbsd/OpenSSH/portable/${PARCH}.tar.gz + ${SCTP_PATCH:+https://dev.gentoo.org/~whissi/dist/openssh/${SCTP_PATCH}} + ${HPN_PATCH:+hpn? ( https://dev.gentoo.org/~whissi/dist/openssh/${HPN_PATCH} )} + ${LDAP_PATCH:+ldap? ( https://dev.gentoo.org/~whissi/dist/openssh/${LDAP_PATCH} )} + ${X509_PATCH:+X509? ( https://dev.gentoo.org/~whissi/dist/openssh/${X509_PATCH} )} + " + +LICENSE="BSD GPL-2" +SLOT="0" +KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~ppc-aix ~x64-cygwin ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~amd64-linux ~arm-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos ~m68k-mint ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris" +# Probably want to drop ssl defaulting to on in a future version. +IUSE="abi_mips_n32 audit bindist debug hpn kerberos kernel_linux ldap ldns libedit libressl livecd pam +pie sctp selinux skey +ssl static test X X509" +REQUIRED_USE="ldns? ( ssl ) + pie? ( !static ) + static? ( !kerberos !pam ) + X509? ( !ldap !sctp ssl ) + test? ( ssl )" + +LIB_DEPEND=" + audit? ( sys-process/audit[static-libs(+)] ) + ldns? ( + net-libs/ldns[static-libs(+)] + !bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[ecdsa,ssl(+)] ) + bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[-ecdsa,ssl(+)] ) + ) + libedit? ( dev-libs/libedit:=[static-libs(+)] ) + sctp? ( net-misc/lksctp-tools[static-libs(+)] ) + selinux? ( >=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28[static-libs(+)] ) + skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1[static-libs(+)] ) + ssl? ( + !libressl? ( + >=dev-libs/openssl-1.0.1:0=[bindist=] + dev-libs/openssl:0=[static-libs(+)] + ) + libressl? ( dev-libs/libressl:0=[static-libs(+)] ) + ) + >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.3:=[static-libs(+)]" +RDEPEND=" + !static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND//\[static-libs(+)]} ) + pam? ( virtual/pam ) + kerberos? ( virtual/krb5 ) + ldap? ( net-nds/openldap )" +DEPEND="${RDEPEND} + static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND} ) + virtual/pkgconfig + virtual/os-headers + sys-devel/autoconf" +RDEPEND="${RDEPEND} + pam? ( >=sys-auth/pambase-20081028 ) + userland_GNU? ( virtual/shadow ) + X? ( x11-apps/xauth )" + +S="${WORKDIR}/${PARCH}" + +pkg_pretend() { + # this sucks, but i'd rather have people unable to `emerge -u openssh` + # than not be able to log in to their server any more + maybe_fail() { [[ -z ${!2} ]] && echo "$1" ; } + local fail=" + $(use hpn && maybe_fail hpn HPN_PATCH) + $(use ldap && maybe_fail ldap LDAP_PATCH) + $(use sctp && maybe_fail sctp SCTP_PATCH) + $(use X509 && maybe_fail X509 X509_PATCH) + " + fail=$(echo ${fail}) + if [[ -n ${fail} ]] ; then + eerror "Sorry, but this version does not yet support features" + eerror "that you requested: ${fail}" + eerror "Please mask ${PF} for now and check back later:" + eerror " # echo '=${CATEGORY}/${PF}' >> /etc/portage/package.mask" + die "booooo" + fi + + # Make sure people who are using tcp wrappers are notified of its removal. #531156 + if grep -qs '^ *sshd *:' "${EROOT%/}"/etc/hosts.{allow,deny} ; then + ewarn "Sorry, but openssh no longer supports tcp-wrappers, and it seems like" + ewarn "you're trying to use it. Update your ${EROOT}etc/hosts.{allow,deny} please." + fi +} + +src_prepare() { + sed -i \ + -e "/_PATH_XAUTH/s:/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth:${EPREFIX%/}/usr/bin/xauth:" \ + pathnames.h || die + + # don't break .ssh/authorized_keys2 for fun + sed -i '/^AuthorizedKeysFile/s:^:#:' sshd_config || die + + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.7_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch #165444 integrated into gsskex + eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch + + local PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS=() + + if use X509 ; then + eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${X509_PATCH%.*} + + einfo "Patching version.h to expose X.509 patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE.*/a #define SSH_X509 \"-PKIXSSH-${X509_VER}\"" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in X.509 patch version" + PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_X509' ) + + einfo "Disabling broken X.509 agent test ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^ agent$/d" \ + "${S}"/tests/CA/config || die "Failed to disable broken X.509 agent test" + fi + + if use ldap ; then + eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${LDAP_PATCH%.*} + + einfo "Patching version.h to expose LDAP patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE.*/a #define SSH_LDAP \"-ldap-${LDAP_VER}\"" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in LDAP patch version" + PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_LDAP' ) + fi + + if use sctp ; then + eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${SCTP_PATCH%.*} + + einfo "Patching version.h to expose SCTP patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_SCTP \"-sctp-${SCTP_VER}\"" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in SCTP patch version" + PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_SCTP' ) + + einfo "Disabling know failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/\t\tcfgparse \\\/d" \ + "${S}"/regress/Makefile || die "Failed to disable known failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch" + fi + + if use hpn ; then + eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${HPN_PATCH%.*} + + einfo "Patching Makefile.in for HPN patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^LIBS=/ s/\$/ -lpthread/" \ + "${S}"/Makefile.in || die "Failed to patch Makefile.in" + + einfo "Patching version.h to expose HPN patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_HPN \"-hpn${HPN_VER}\"" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in HPN patch version" + PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_HPN' ) + + if [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then + einfo "Disabling known non-working MT AES cipher per default ..." + + cat > "${T}"/disable_mtaes.conf <<- EOF + + # HPN's Multi-Threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken + # and therefore disabled per default. + DisableMTAES yes + EOF + sed -i \ + -e "/^#HPNDisabled.*/r ${T}/disable_mtaes.conf" \ + "${S}"/sshd_config || die "Failed to disabled MT AES ciphers in sshd_config" + + sed -i \ + -e "/AcceptEnv.*_XXX_TEST$/a \\\tDisableMTAES\t\tyes" \ + "${S}"/regress/test-exec.sh || die "Failed to disable MT AES ciphers in test config" + fi + fi + + if use X509 || use hpn ; then + einfo "Patching packet.c for X509 and/or HPN patch set ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/const struct sshcipher/struct sshcipher/" \ + "${S}"/packet.c || die "Failed to patch ssh_packet_set_connection() (packet.c)" + fi + + if use X509 || use sctp || use ldap || use hpn ; then + einfo "Patching sshconnect.c to use SSH_RELEASE in send_client_banner() ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \ + "${S}"/sshconnect.c || die "Failed to patch send_client_banner() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshconnect.c)" + + einfo "Patching sshd.c to use SSH_RELEASE in sshd_exchange_identification() ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \ + "${S}"/sshd.c || die "Failed to patch sshd_exchange_identification() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshd.c)" + + einfo "Patching version.h to add our patch sets to SSH_RELEASE ..." + sed -i \ + -e "s/^#define SSH_RELEASE.*/#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE ${PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS[*]}/" \ + "${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to patch SSH_RELEASE (version.h)" + fi + + tc-export PKG_CONFIG + local sed_args=( + -e "s:-lcrypto:$(${PKG_CONFIG} --libs openssl):" + # Disable PATH reset, trust what portage gives us #254615 + -e 's:^PATH=/:#PATH=/:' + # Disable fortify flags ... our gcc does this for us + -e 's:-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2::' + ) + + # The -ftrapv flag ICEs on hppa #505182 + use hppa && sed_args+=( + -e '/CFLAGS/s:-ftrapv:-fdisable-this-test:' + -e '/OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK.*-ftrapv/d' + ) + # _XOPEN_SOURCE causes header conflicts on Solaris + [[ ${CHOST} == *-solaris* ]] && sed_args+=( + -e 's/-D_XOPEN_SOURCE//' + ) + sed -i "${sed_args[@]}" configure{.ac,} || die + + eapply_user #473004 + + eautoreconf +} + +src_configure() { + addwrite /dev/ptmx + + use debug && append-cppflags -DSANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG + use static && append-ldflags -static + + local myconf=( + --with-ldflags="${LDFLAGS}" + --disable-strip + --with-pid-dir="${EPREFIX}"$(usex kernel_linux '' '/var')/run + --sysconfdir="${EPREFIX%/}"/etc/ssh + --libexecdir="${EPREFIX%/}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/misc + --datadir="${EPREFIX%/}"/usr/share/openssh + --with-privsep-path="${EPREFIX%/}"/var/empty + --with-privsep-user=sshd + $(use_with audit audit linux) + $(use_with kerberos kerberos5 "${EPREFIX%/}"/usr) + # We apply the ldap and sctp patch conditionally, so can't pass --without-{ldap,sctp} + # unconditionally else we get unknown flag warnings. + $(use ldap && use_with ldap) + $(use sctp && use_with sctp) + $(use_with ldns) + $(use_with libedit) + $(use_with pam) + $(use_with pie) + $(use_with selinux) + $(use_with skey) + $(use_with ssl openssl) + $(use_with ssl md5-passwords) + $(use_with ssl ssl-engine) + ) + + # The seccomp sandbox is broken on x32, so use the older method for now. #553748 + use amd64 && [[ ${ABI} == "x32" ]] && myconf+=( --with-sandbox=rlimit ) + + econf "${myconf[@]}" +} + +src_test() { + local t skipped=() failed=() passed=() + local tests=( interop-tests compat-tests ) + + local shell=$(egetshell "${UID}") + if [[ ${shell} == */nologin ]] || [[ ${shell} == */false ]] ; then + elog "Running the full OpenSSH testsuite requires a usable shell for the 'portage'" + elog "user, so we will run a subset only." + skipped+=( tests ) + else + tests+=( tests ) + fi + + # It will also attempt to write to the homedir .ssh. + local sshhome=${T}/homedir + mkdir -p "${sshhome}"/.ssh + for t in "${tests[@]}" ; do + # Some tests read from stdin ... + HOMEDIR="${sshhome}" HOME="${sshhome}" \ + emake -k -j1 ${t} </dev/null \ + && passed+=( "${t}" ) \ + || failed+=( "${t}" ) + done + + einfo "Passed tests: ${passed[*]}" + [[ ${#skipped[@]} -gt 0 ]] && ewarn "Skipped tests: ${skipped[*]}" + [[ ${#failed[@]} -gt 0 ]] && die "Some tests failed: ${failed[*]}" +} + +src_install() { + emake install-nokeys DESTDIR="${D}" + fperms 600 /etc/ssh/sshd_config + dobin contrib/ssh-copy-id + newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.rc6.5 sshd + newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd-r1.confd sshd + + newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.pam_include.2 sshd + if use pam ; then + sed -i \ + -e "/^#UsePAM /s:.*:UsePAM yes:" \ + -e "/^#PasswordAuthentication /s:.*:PasswordAuthentication no:" \ + -e "/^#PrintMotd /s:.*:PrintMotd no:" \ + -e "/^#PrintLastLog /s:.*:PrintLastLog no:" \ + "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die + fi + + # Gentoo tweaks to default config files + cat <<-EOF >> "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config + + # Allow client to pass locale environment variables #367017 + AcceptEnv LANG LC_* + EOF + cat <<-EOF >> "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/ssh_config + + # Send locale environment variables #367017 + SendEnv LANG LC_* + EOF + + if use livecd ; then + sed -i \ + -e '/^#PermitRootLogin/c# Allow root login with password on livecds.\nPermitRootLogin Yes' \ + "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die + fi + + if use ldap && [[ -n ${LDAP_PATCH} ]] ; then + insinto /etc/openldap/schema/ + newins openssh-lpk_openldap.schema openssh-lpk.schema + fi + + doman contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 + dodoc CREDITS OVERVIEW README* TODO sshd_config + use hpn && dodoc HPN-README + use X509 || dodoc ChangeLog + + diropts -m 0700 + dodir /etc/skel/.ssh + + keepdir /var/empty + + systemd_dounit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.{service,socket} + systemd_newunit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd_at.service 'sshd@.service' +} + +pkg_preinst() { + enewgroup sshd 22 + enewuser sshd 22 -1 /var/empty sshd +} + +pkg_postinst() { + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-5.8_p1" ; then + elog "Starting with openssh-5.8p1, the server will default to a newer key" + elog "algorithm (ECDSA). You are encouraged to manually update your stored" + elog "keys list as servers update theirs. See ssh-keyscan(1) for more info." + fi + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.0_p1" ; then + elog "Starting with openssh-6.7, support for USE=tcpd has been dropped by upstream." + elog "Make sure to update any configs that you might have. Note that xinetd might" + elog "be an alternative for you as it supports USE=tcpd." + fi + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.1_p1" ; then #557388 #555518 + elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, support for ssh-dss keys were disabled due to their" + elog "weak sizes. If you rely on these key types, you can re-enable the key types by" + elog "adding to your sshd_config or ~/.ssh/config files:" + elog " PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=+ssh-dss" + elog "You should however generate new keys using rsa or ed25519." + + elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, the default for PermitRootLogin changed from 'yes'" + elog "to 'prohibit-password'. That means password auth for root users no longer works" + elog "out of the box. If you need this, please update your sshd_config explicitly." + fi + if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.6_p1" ; then + elog "Starting with openssh-7.6p1, openssh upstream has removed ssh1 support entirely." + elog "Furthermore, rsa keys with less than 1024 bits will be refused." + fi + if ! use ssl && has_version "${CATEGORY}/${PN}[ssl]" ; then + elog "Be aware that by disabling openssl support in openssh, the server and clients" + elog "no longer support dss/rsa/ecdsa keys. You will need to generate ed25519 keys" + elog "and update all clients/servers that utilize them." + fi + + if use hpn && [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then + elog "" + elog "HPN's multi-threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken" + elog "and therefore disabled at runtime per default." + elog "Make sure your sshd_config is up to date and contains" + elog "" + elog " DisableMTAES yes" + elog "" + elog "Otherwise you maybe unable to connect to this sshd using any AES CTR cipher." + elog "" + fi +} |